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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I must start with an apology that this thesis does not
include a first hand account of the present view of those other
leaders principally concerned in the formation and birth of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Circumstances
beyond my control, both political and economic, have made it impossible
for me to journey to the various West African countries to interview
them. I have, however, had access to a considerable number of documents,
having been partly responsible myself for the formulation of most of them.
I have also requested and obtained copies of correspondence, minutes of
confidential discussions and written briefs concerning ECOWAS from a
number of the main participants, which it is hoped will contribute to
existing knowledge about the history and creation of the West African
Community. I have used such documents and have acknowledged the relevant
source.
Fortunately, the subject being a contemporary one, and topical,
has been reasonably well reported in the principal newspapers and journals,
such as West Africa, Africa, Africa Confidential, Jeune Afrique, and other
reputable sources of information about Africa. Well informed articles have
also appeared at various times in the major international newspapers
concerning West Africa in general and ECOWAS and the various sub-regional
groupings in particular, e.g. The Times (London), The Financial Times,
The Guardian, Le Monde latcRecent publications, by Nigerian and other
academics, have also been very useful and will receive due recognition
wherever appropriate.
Because of events in Nigeria following my departure for the
OAU Summit in Kampala, Uganda, on July 27, 19SO, I was not able to return
home and did not therefore have access to most of my notes and other source
materials relating to ECOWAS. For much of the period until 1975 I have
had to rely on memory and whatever documents and sources were at hand.
Fortunately, however, I had been party to most of the early discussions
preceding the formation of ECOWAS. I was also able to act as host to the
West African leaders at the Lagos Summit of May 1975 when the decision was
taken to establish the community. It was a privilege in this enterprise
to be closely associated with my brother and colleague, General Gnassingbe
Eyadema, President of the Republic of Togo, as our two governments collaborated
to shape the strategy that finally brought ECOWAS into being. Together we
sought and obtained the support and cooperation of our other colleagues
in this regional endeavour.
My thesis attempts to Provide a detailed account of this effort
at regional integration in West Africa which, with the benefit of hindsight,
was both a political and socio-economic coup - in a region renowned for its
differences and divisions and more frequently associated, until 1975, with
disintegration. Where our experience seems to have differed from that of
other regional and sub-regional communites I have tried to analyse
some of the features that have made ECOWAS unique in this area. /
must warn the reader, however, that it is a subject to which I have
long been committed - even at the expense of my personal interest and
welfare - and a subject in which I have retained a lively interest
despite being cut off from any direct contact with or participation
in ECOWAS after July 1975.
On several occasions since quitting the political scene I
have pleaded with former colleagues, Heads of State and Government,
not to allow our previous personalrelations and my sudden removal to
any way jeopardise the present and future success of ECOWAS. I would
rather our personal relationship was put into 'deep-freeze' so as to
permit the new.-found relationship between Nigeria and our West African
partners to continue to develop for the mutual benefit of all. Our aim
was a new political and economic order in the region that would one day
usher in an era of political, social and economic justice for all our
peoples and that would be an example for the other regions in Africa and
for developing countries elsewhere in the world.
ECOWAS offers the student of politics the opportunity of
studying at close quarters the political and economic problems that
confront at least some of the developing countries and of the factors
that led the West African government to conclude that they might best
be tackled and eventually overcome by means of regional economic integration.
First, however, I must acknowledge my indebtedness to various people who have
in one way or another assisted me with my work. Without their help, 1 would
not have been able to complete the task. /f, by misadventure, I have
omitted any particular individual or group of people / tender my sincere
apologies and hope I can remedy the oversight at some later opportunity.
I am particularly grateful to President Alhaji Shehu Shagari,
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, for making available to me
in 1982 a substantial number of confidential papers and documents from
Nigeria relating to ECOWAS, which enabled me to complete the present work.
After the initial anxiety about obtaining original sources of information,
the President's directive that these invaluable materials should be forwarded
to me was of the greatest help and is most appreciated. To his staff, to
the Foreign Minister, Dr. (Professor) T.S.Audu, and to Alhaji U.Shinkafi,
Alhaji M.Atta, Mr.Shimkaye and Mr.Baiye (formerly my excellent French
interpreter), my grateful thanks for ensuring that the papers and documents
were collected, photocopied and despatched to me without delay. To Dr.Lewu,
the Councillor (EconomicsY at the Nigerian High Commission, my special thanks
for agreeing to proof-read my work and for providing valuable advice and
suggestions.
From the Republic of Togo / received a number of other documents
and papers relating to ECOWAS, for some time my only direct contact with
ECOWAS and its development was through Togo. For this I am indebted to
President Gnassingbe Eyadema, President of the Republic of Togo, for
his kindness and consideration in ensuring that I received whatever documents
considered necessary for my work on ECOWAS. His Ambassador in the UK,
H.E.Mr. Ayivi-Ajevon UMW Minister of Justice) was most kind and helpful.
He ensured constant contact between me and the President of Togo on my work
and other matters. Their friendship was a source of strength.
I was amazed at the interest shown by various people, Nigerians
and non-Nigerians, as well as West Africans and several non-West Africans,
in the work I was undertaking and offered to get or obtain essential papers,
information and documents that I may require. Special Mention must be made
of H.E. Mr. Moses Ihonde, who was at one time my Press Secretary, now
Nigerian Consul in Atlanta, Georgia. He was able to make available to me
minutes of my various discussions with visiting Heads of State, envoys or
emissaries, particularly those dealing with ECOWAS matters. The details
as well as the exact dates, time and place of events were most invaluable
to get my record right. Mr. Dan Ogona, a family friend who personally called
at the ECOWAS Headquarters in Lagos to collect some documents and ECOWAS
publications for me. My very good and old school-friend Mallam Hamza Zayyad
was able to obtain some ECOWAS study papers from a former Nigerian Minister
of Economic Development and Reconstruction, Alhaji Muttalab. I am grateful
to the ex-minister for releasing those papers for my use. Mr. Solomon Asemota,
my legal adviser was most helpful in obtaining some of the essential papers and
documents needed.
From the academic world outside the University of Warwick, I am
indebted to Mr.Martin Dent of Keele University for his constant discourse
on ECOWAS and other African and Nigerian problems, whose arrangements for me
to give papers on ECOWAS to the Postgraduate and International Studies Group
at Keele University greatly assisted my work on ECOWAS. My thanks also go
to Professor James O'Connell of the Department of Peace Studies, University of
Bradford, whose constant advice and encouragement, as in the past helped me
immensely.
From the USA to Miss Jean Herskovits of The State University of
New York at Purchase, for her advice and suggestions as well as for her
lucid papers on Nigerian and ECOWAS matters prepared for the US State
Department, and to Professor Ali Mazrui of the University of Michigan (USA)
and of the University of Jos (Nigeria) for his constant support and encouragement
From Nigeria, my thanks go to Dr. Jonah Isawa Elaigwu for-his
staunch support for, and defence of, my policies when in Government. I value
his helpful criticism on ECOWAS, his ideas and suggestions on how to improve
it. To my old Wusasa school mates and colleagues, Dr. (Professor) Adamu Baikie
(Vice-Chancellor of Benin University), Mr. Michael Angulu (of JAMB), my thanks
for their constant support and encouragement. As for my many Barewa College
old colleagues, Mr. Sunday Awoniyi, Alhaji Muhamed Saidu Gwarzo, Sule KuPfi,
Mmrana Yazidu Katsina, etc., I thank them all for their encouragement and
good wishes during my work on ECOWAS.
iv.
I believe it is most appropriate that I ackowledge here the
invaluable contributions of all those Nigerian public servants who were
involved with me in working for ECOWAS without whose support, hard work,
dedication and vision, ECOWAS might not have seer/the light of day, and as
for the Nigerian people in general, my grateful thanks for backing me to the
hilt to go ahead with the establishment of ECOWAS for the good, not only
of West Africa alone, but of Africa as a whole.
I would like also to pay tribute to the Editor and Staff of
West Africa Magazine  . I am particularly indebted to Mr. Kaye Whiteman and
Mr. Joe Okoli for taking the trouble to help out in such a thorough manner.
The publishers of Afro-Fun Magazine also deserves thanks for providing me with
a set of their Africa Year Book and Who's-Who, a very useful encyclopaedia
of African issues, personalities and other vital information. I am particularly
grateful to Mr. Sam Uba for his kindness in personally supplying the volumes.
I must also thank the Secretariat of ECOWAS in Lagos for ensuring
that their various publications and reports were made available for my work.
Their studies of various West African problems and suggested solutions to
them have been most useful for my work. Their information series - Official
Journal of ECOWAS is a very useful source of information about details of
ECOWAS decisions both at Authority and Ministerial level.
The University of Warwick deserves my unmitigated thanks and
gratitude. I am grateful to all the staff - academic and administrative,
and students for making it possible for me to integrate so well and so quickly.
My first and major thanks goes to my tutor, Dr. Ian Campbell,
whose tutorship and guidance saw me through my work. He has been most
understanding, sympathetic and helpful. My thanks also go to my Heads of
Department, past and present - Professors Malcolm Anderson and Jack Lively
for their interest in my welfare and work. I value their understanding and
encouragement most sincerely. To all the staff in the Departments of
Politics and International Studies, my sincere appreciation for their
support and encouragement, especially those who taught me and helped me
throughout my undergraduate and postgraduate studies.
To Iris Host, Secretary, Department of Politics, my thanks and
gratitude for seeing to all my administrative needs.
To Joy Gardner, Secretary, International Studies Department, my
big thank you for accepting to type my thesis and for the constant nourishment,
with mid-morning cups of coffee and biscuits. She has been a most helpful
and considerate secretary at the International Studies Department since its
inception.
From the Law Schoo4 Professor Yash Ghai and Miss Jill Cottrell
deserve my special thank you for helping me out with books and special
UN publications and magazines relevant to my studies and work. I am
indebted to Miss Jill Cottrell for agreeing to proof read my work.
V.
I am very touched by the interest and encouragement that
I received from a number of young West African students from various
universities, especially those from the University of Warwick. I found
that their interest in ECOWAS is a deeply genuine one. They see in
it a great future and that they will be its future torch bearers.
A number of them are doing various postgraduate work on various aspects
of ECOWAS and invariably we meet and discuss 	 at length and in depth
the problems and prospects of ECOWAS. It is very refreshing to see how
dedicated these young people are about their sub-region. I must mention
two in particular, Mr. George Yankey from Ghana and Mr. Hassan Lawal from
Nigeria, both of the Law Department, the University of Warwick, and both
successful MA graduates of the University. I found their company most
rewarding and appreciate all their help and encouragement.
To the Library staff and the Bindery also, I thank you.
Last, but not the least, my thanks to the Vice-Chancellor,
Mr. 'Jack' Butterworth and his administrative staff for their interest in
me, my work, and my welfare. I appreciate their generosity in permitting
me to study at the University of Warwick and their encouragement to me to
complete my work on time. I shall be forever in their debt.
Finally, my infinite thanks to my wife, Victoria and the family,
for enduring the long years of temporary separation while I got on with
my studies. Victoria had the responsibility for looking after the
children most of the time. But for her love, understanding and devotion
I would not have been able to go through with this work. She has been in
all respects, a tower of strength.
I would therefore like to dedicate this work to my wife Victoria
and the children - Ibrahim, Saratu and Rahila.
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ABSTRACT
The creation of ECOWAS in May 1975 marked the successful outcome
of protracted negotiations that had begun shortly after independence, and
which reflected the mounting sense of unease in Africa and throughout the
Third World that political independence did not signify effective control
by the new states of their economies. Hence the numerous ex periments at
integration within the region, some mainly political and others more economic
in character. All, however, contributed to the movement towards regional
economic integration and ECOWAS.
The Ghana-Guinea Union attempted briefly to bridge the unfortunate
linguistic and cultural divide separating former British and French territories
In West Africa. The Union was restricted, however, to political cooperation
between leaders with more or less compatible and radical ideologies, who
were a small minority within the region as a whole. With independence the
very number and diversity of West African states seemed to dictate a different
and more gradual approach to unity based, initially, on economic cooperation and
functional inter-dependence, and that has been the policy of every Nigerian
government since 1960.
If I have emphasised the role played by Nigeria, particularly after
1970, it is because international agencies and our future partners themselves
recognised that, without Nigeria, there could be no effective West African
community. By reason of its size, population and oil resources, Nigeria
constitutes a core state, with no interest in territorial aggrandisement but
concerned, understandably, with its own security and, therefore, with the
stability of the region. These objectives are best served by policies of
political cooperation, economic integration and adoption of a form of collective
self-reliance. Here Nigeria's perception of its development and security needs
has coincided increasingly with those of the other states within the region.
Particular attention has been given to the Francophone states, who
are the majority within West African and whose changing relationship with
the metropole on the one hand, and with Nigeria on the other, is central to
our analysis. The promise of the Ghana-Guinea Union was finally realised
thanks to the growing cooperation after 1970 between Nigeria and Togo who,
together, formed the nucleus of the West African community in 1972. Economic
Integration in the 'seventies was also facilitated by (a) the reduced importance
of ideological differences within the region; (b) the mounting economic
difficulties confronting states as a result of the global economic crisis and
increased oil prices after 1973, but alleviated by timely Nigerian assistance;
(c) the example of regional integration within the EEC, soon to be expanded
to include Britain; and (d) the successful outcome in 1975 of the Lome
negotiations between the EEC and the African-Pacific-Caribbean states.
The greater part of the thesis is concerned with the formation of
ECOWAS and the negotiations, between July 1966 and May 1975, in which I was
privileged to participate. While my own association with ECOWAS ended
shortly afterwards, in July 1975, there was, fortunately, no such interruption
in the development of the community. It seemed appropriate, therefore, to
extend the scope of the thesis to encompass the first formative years of the
community, 1975-1979, which saw the establishment of the principal ECOWAS
institutions, the adoption of the more important protocols, and the first
difficult steps towards their implementation.
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PART I
1.
CHAPTER 1
REGIONAL INTEGRATION : THEORY AND PRACTICE
Before outlining my own approach to regional economic
integration in the latter part of this chapter, it is first necessary
to examine some of the terms widely used in the literature relating
to economic integration, and then to discuss a number of the more
influential views that have been advanced concerning the problems and
prospects for regional integration, particularly in the Third World and
in Africa.
Concepts and Definitions 
Integration has been defined as "the bringing together of
parts into a whole:" - 	 As such it is likely to have social and
political as well as economic dimensions. But, where Gunnar Myrdal uses
the term so as to encompass integration within as well as between nations, -
others like Balassa, have tried to restrict its usage to the international
context, arguing that "in the present-day world, the problems relating to
integration on the national and international levels differ to a considerable
degree." - For example, whereas the creation of a strong national state
would appear to be a major instrument of national economic integration, it
might also contribute "to disintegration on the international scene." 1/
Balassa's distinction between national and international forms
of integration, however convenient, seems to be far from Absolute since
his category of "total economic integration" would surely require the
2.
existence of a super-state, or supra-national authority with commensurate
powers, able to enforce conformity throughoutthe community over the
stipulated range of monetary, fiscal and other policies: But then total
economic integration is obviously an ideal type of yardstick. However,
an effective economic union, which on Balassa's criteria falls short of
"total economic integration", would itself demand a degree of centrally
coordinated political intervention not far removed from national integration
itself.
Here Balassa tries to sustain his argument by making yet another
distinction between the minimum conditions for the satisfactory operation
of an economic union and the optimal conditions which "will require the
suppression of every conceivable form of discrimination between the
economic units of the member states and necessitates adopting a supra-
national approach that is associated with political Unification, possibly
in the form of a federation of states." -
There is also the problem of distinguishing between economic
cooperation and those activities that can more appropriately be labelled
economic integration, although in practice a good deal of overlap between
the two would seem to be necessary, desirable - and probably inevitable
in the case of functioning regional communities. For Balassa, cooperation
describes arrangements whereby economic policies are harmonised and economic
discrimination between states is lessened, whereas "the process of economic
integration comprises those measures which entail the suppression of some
forms of discrimination", or simply "the abolition of discrimination within
an area." -
3.
While some such distinction is probably necessary, the view
of economic integration presented here seems unduly narrow since, at
least in the developing countries, there is much more to integration
than the elimination of discrimination within the region - even if
the term is construed in its widest possible economic sense. Moreover,
the distinction between cooperation and integration, which is meant to give
"definite meaning" to the latter term, is far from clear-cut. - It is
a distinction neither of kind nor of degree, despite Balassa's claim
that the differences are both "qualitative and quantitative." -
We can only conclude that, unlike cooperation, economic
integration between states implies not only the existence of agreements
that are formal and, presumably, binding, but also the creation of
a specialist administration able to guarantee the continuity of the
community and to ensure the prompt execution of its joint decisions. Such
decisions will involve the removal of existing barriers to trade and the
formulation of policies intended to secure the development of the region
as a whole and its constituent states.
Balassa also distinguishes between integration as a conscious
strategy or "process", on the one hand, and as "a state of affairs" on the
other. The latter simply denotes "the absence of various forms of
9/discrimination between national economies", - whereas integration when
considered as a process is more concerned with their effective elimination.
Even then, however, Balassa has to .concede that the mere absence of
discrimination would not, of itself, enable us to speak of integration
4.
between economies as remote and apparently unrelated as those of New
10/Zealand and Iceland. - Whether thought of as a process or state of
affairs integration surely involves a territorial dimension.
Economic integration among states would seem then to require,
if not contiguity, then some degree of territorial proximity, reinforced
by a sense of common purpose or predicatent, supplemented by a recent
history of social and economic exchange. Hence the concept of regional
integration that Charles Pentland has defined, admittedly in a European
context, as "cooperation and integration among geographically proximate
states which share a sense of their own individual inadequacy in dealing
with problems of security and welfare." ill Such a definition is acceptable
for the purposes of this thesis, provided the scope of the union is
broadened to include problems not only of security and welfare, but also
of development and dependency.
Regional integration is known to encompass a variety of forms,
which together seem to occupy a broad continuum ranging from non-integrated,
discrete national economies at the one extreme, to "total economic
integration" at the other. And associated with this model,employed by
Ealassa, is a useful, if largely static typology, whereby the different
types or manifestations of economic integration are first identified and
then located on the continuum according to criteria which also serve to
12/denote the "varying degrees of integration" to be found among them. -
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Balassa's "types" include the free trade area, where
restrictions on trade have been removed but there is, as yet, no
common external tariff; the customs union, where such a tariff exists
and is being applied; the common market, which is a functioning customs
union, without restrictions on trade or factor movements within the region;
and the economic union, where, in addition, there is "some degree of
13/harmonisation of national economic policies." - Total economic integration
"presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social and counter-cyclical
policies and requires the setting-up of a supra-national authority whose
11/decisions are binding for the member-states."	 It remains to be
seen, however, whether this last "stage" of economic integration can be
reached by any means short of political union.
Indeed, one problem with this typology from our point of view
is the almost complete exclusion of political criteria. Integration
can also be approached largely from a political perspective which the
relevant variable might be the extent to which national sovereignty is
surrendered. "It is sometimes suggested that economic integration would
pass through three different stages - namely, cooperation, coordination,
and full integration - one leading progressively to the other..." But, as
H.Kitamura points out, "so far as the process of economic integration is
concerned, however, the surrender of national sovereignty is only one of the
15/
means to achieve the goal and may not be as important as other means." -
Other writers, more concerned with the relationship between the
political and economic aspects of integration, but also aware of the
6.
problems associated with political sovereignty, claim to have identified
a more explicit kind of dynamic to be encountered in the integration
process. "The theory of economic integration contains in it a certain
dynamic logic which underlies a central concept of the neo-functionalist
16/theory of political integration, the concept of 'spillover'. - Spillover
implies that success in one integrated sector will then lead to advances
across a much broader front, just as the economic achievements of the
European Economic Community have since generated additional pressures
for closer and more effective political as well as economic cooperation.
"Thus, it is argued, once a form of international integration is established
there will always be an inherent tendency to move into a higher form of
17/integration." -
But, as W.A.Axline goes on to point out, the considerations
involved in any such interpretation are not purely economic and, as a
18/
consequence, "only in theory is this movement monotonic and automatic." -
The number of possible variables that can affect the formation and
development of a regional community would tend to militate against the
imposition of an evolutionary "logic" or acceptance of any deterministic
schema. Successful integration would seem to depend not only on the
policies pursued and the institutions created, but also on the prevailing
economic climate, the state of inter-governmental relations within the
region, alternative political and economic strategies available to member
states, and the extent to which leaders are prepared and able to surrender
control over areas of policy.
7.
It would seem then that, while regional economic integration
is only one aspect of economic integration, the economics of regional
integration cannot usefully be considered apart from the political and
other dimensions of "regionalism" - particularly when we are dealing
with countries of the Third World. One has only to consider the fate
of the Mali and Malaysian Federations which collapsed in the 'sixties
because their constituent units were unable to strike a mutually acceptable
balance between their political and economic goals. Senegal and
Singapore wanted a closer economic union, but with loose political ties,
while Mali and Malaya insisted on a tightly centralised political union
as the price for an integrated economic community - and to compensate
for their relative economic backwardness.
In so far as new states are even less inclined than older ones
to surrender control over any area of national policy, regional communities
in the Third World are likely to be based, initially at least, on a sense
of shared economic interest or concern with their common financial
predicament, while the prospects for wider political union are essentially
long term. Nor will economic union proceed any faster than the member
states themselves are prepared to sanction.
By the same token, while regional economic integration may
contribute, along with other inputs, to help relieve some of the more
pressing problems confronting national governments in the Third World, by
itself it can achieve little or nothing. "Integration is not a panacea for
curing all economic ills, however, and its beneficial effects can follow only
if sociological, psychological, and political obstacles to development have
been surmounted.,, 19/
8.
Regional Economic Integration : Costs and Benefits 
Most studies of regional economic integration since World War II
have focussed on Western Europe and, in particular, on the creation
and development of the European Economic Community (EEC). The formation
of the EEC and its undoubted success have inspired other governments to
undertake their own experiments in regional integration, just as they have
stimulated economists and others to examine more closely the workings of
the community and the distribution of costs and benefits among the member
states.
The benefits, often difficult to quantify, have included economic
reconstruction and a long and continuing period of relatively harmonious
cooperation between countries previously in a state of war or international
tension for much of the past century. And if member states are still
far from the goal of political integration or "total economic union", the
success of the economic arrangements to date has generated strong pressures
for the harmonisation of community policies on a wide range of other issues.
Moreover, the member countries can now command greater international respect
and influence than would otherwise have been the case had they remained
discrete national units.
What has most impressed governments in the Third World, however,
has been the success of the EEC not only in fostering trade among its
members, but also in providing a larger market, leading to the more
efficient utilisation of existing productive capacity through economies of
scale and exploitation by industry of external economies. The community
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has certainly stimulated economic growth among its members and has
contributed to the expansion of trade, not only within the EEC but also between
EEC states and countries outside the union.
One measure of the economic benefits conferred by a customs
union on its members, identified by Jacob Viner, is the extent of "trade
/
creation", as distinct from "trade diversion". 2o- The former refers to the
replacement of high-cost production of particular commodities by imports
from other members of the union with lower production costs. Conversely,
trade diversion involves the substitution of high cost products from within
the community for comparable goods produced at much lower cost and previously
imported from outside.
Free market critics have argued, however, that regional
economic integration is destructive of the principle of comparative
advantage, based on international specialisation in production. Comparative
advantage alone, in their view, can give rise to mutually beneficial
commercial exchanges between nations. These exchanges will then generate
increased national income and wealth, resulting in a higher level of
economic welfare for all states, large or small, developed or developing.
The same critics maintain that regional integration, on the
other hand, requires an element of protection which can benefit only a few
states - and even then the benefits are likely to be short-lived as rival
blocs are soon organised and tariff barriers are raised on all sides.
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The result is a sharp contraction in the volume of world trade and
reduced levels of national income and the Third WOkld countries will
be among the first victims. Regional integration then is not only
antagonistic to trade liberalisation and internationalism, but also runs
counter to the trend towards growing inter-dependence among nations,
especially in the economic sphere and particularly marked since the 'seventies.
It is doubtful, though, whether international free trade would
benefit any nations other than those that are already economically powerful
and technologically advanced. And it is these nations and their governments
that have shown themselves ready and Able in the past to shelve the
principle of comparative advantage whenever it has suited them to do so.
One does not have to subscribe to theories of "dependency" to realise that
those who control the means of modern production - capital and technology - have
an overwhelming advantage over countries that may possess the raw materials
but are not so well endowed in these other respects. International free
trade, even if it were feasible, would not enable the weaker countries of
the Third World, with their slender capital resources, to reach a higher
level of development and welfare - let alone begin to a pproximate the
standards set by the industrial nations.
Governments in the Third World, including those in West Africa,
have increasingly came to reject the view that regional or sub-regional
organisation constitutes an obstacle to world trade and development, or
necessarily entails higher tariff barriers and less efficient exploitation
of existing resources. Rather they have come to see regional economic
11.
integration as a practical and, on the whole, a more reliable means
of securing improved living standards within the region. The larger
market should enable under-developed countries to attract increased
investment and on more favourable terms, as well as promoting diversification
of their economies and thereby helping relieve the intolerable social and
political strains created by economic dependency in the decades after
independence. In time separate regional communities may be able to
harmonise their policies and enlarge their frontiers, preparing the way for
wider economic and social groupings, perhaps continental in scale, with the
prospect one day of a new and more equitable world economic order.
Other critics have questioned the relevance of the EEC and its
"lessons" for Third World nations bent on securing rapid economic
development and greater influence in international councils. They are
pessimistic about the likely future of integration schemes among the
less developed countries and are frankly sceptical about the benefits to be
derived therefrom. Some maintain that successful economic integration is
only possible where there are already fully integrated national units,
21/
each with a pluralistic social structure. - Others have insisted
that national exclusiveness is the characteristic trait of states that
22/
are neither industrial, nor urban, nor predominantly modern in outlook. -
In either case the assumption is that regional integration can only be
effective in advanced Western economies.
12.
Others again, more supportive of regional integration in the Third
World, claim that less developed countries can only hope to benefit
from economic integration if they are also prepared to surrender much
of their political sovereignty and to consent to a large degree of
central (Or regional) planning and policy coordination. According to
A.Segal, the price of integration for Third World countries is a reduced
ability to operate as independent nation-states : and this, he concludes,
23/is a price that new states in particular are reluctant to pay. -
A.Eazlewood argues from his examination of the East African Community that
"the fundamental difficulty, of course, is the surrender of autonomy which
4/is involved." 2 - The problem is not, however, confined to the Third World.
All states have difficulty relinquishing any part of their sovereignty
and the problem surely is not insurmountable even for new states.
First, these states must be assured of their effective participation in
all important decisions to be taken - as is the case with the EEC today -
then they must be convinced that the community can and will operate to
their joint and individual advantage.
Whatever the benefits of regional economic integration it seems
clear from the economic literature that these will not be of the
same order for developing countries as the benefits derived by the
industrial nations from the EEC. It is argued that the removal of
barriers to trade within the regional communities of the Third World will not
automatically stimulate commerce and manufacturing where there is little
industry to begin with and where the economies are essentially competitive,
producing much the same commodities at roughly the same unit cost and for the
same European markets. Indeed, a major argument for regional integration
13.
in the Third World is the need to create suitable conditions for
economic diversification so that trade can be re-directed away from
the former metropoles and to new Third World markets.
For the same reasons, it is said, regional groupings of less
developed countries are at first more likely to involve trade diversion
than trade creation. 25/- Their purpose is to encourage the development
within the region of new industries whose initial production costs will
almost certainly exceed those of comparable industries in the advanced
industrial nations. Hence, in considering the benefits to be derived
from regional integration in less developed countries the relevant
criteria tee a much larger market with the prospect of more rapid
industrialisation and the emergence of "poles of economic growth", economies
of scale, trade diversification, long-term input savings, greater monetary
stability, increased foreign investment and more effective utilisation of
scarce resources, including skilled labour.
Even then writers such as A.Segal and R.Hansen have queried_
whether the benefits that may be derived from regional integration,
and which lie mainly in the future, can ever outweigh the almost certain
26/
costs which have to be met here and now. - The benefits from the East
African Community were real and tangible, according to Segal, and would
have been much greater but for the absence of effective political leadership
at the regional level. In developing countries the elimination of
tariffs is not, by itself, enough. Trade liberalisation within a community
of less developed states will, of itself, have little immediate impact since
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commerce remains beset by exchange controls, import and export
licensing, quantitative restrictions and complex and expensive transport
arrangements. But the point of a regional community is that it should
be capable of collective action to help phase out all such obstacles to
trade and to secure major improvements in transport, communications
and infra-structure.
Another problem common to regional communities in the Third
World is largely a product of their very success in attracting investment
and stimulating growing economic growth. In a community of industrial
nations like the EEC all members may benefit from the customs union but
the less developed may benefit disproportionately because of free movement
of factors, cheaper labour and lower production costs. These have been
labelled the "spread" or "trickle down" effects stemming from economic
union. However, in the case of integration among developing states Hansen
has criticised what, following Myrdal, he describes as the "backwash"
effects of regional integration : that the greater the initial disparities
among member states the greater the likelihood that growth and industrialisation
27/
will favour the more developed areas at the expense of the remainder. -
In other words, the regional community will soon come to reproduce, in
miniature, the divisions already to be found between centre and periphery
within the international economy.
'Regional Integration in the Third World 
Such disparities constitute a central theme of W.A.Axline's
valuable and provocative commentary on regional integration as it applies
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to developing states, and particularly in the Caribbean where he notes
that:"
...the benefits of economic integration,
although increasing the welfare of the union as a
whole, do not necessarily benefit each country in
the same degree at each stage.
Here, Axline shares the views of others, like Hansen and Hazlewood, who
consider that fiscal payments and simple monetary adjustments will not
provide adequate compensation for states which are otherwise unable to
attract a reasonable share of community investment and of newly created
industries. He contends, moreover, that such disparities are likely to
become even more marked in those communities still operating at the level of a
free trade area and subject to "market forces". Such communities offer
few opportunities for trade-offs and side-payments and the prospects
for reaching negotiated settlements satisfactory to all "package deals"
are very limited.
Which is why he believes that regional integration in the
Third World, to be successful, must move quickly to the stage where it
can offer not only trade liberalisation and tariff protection ( but also
measures to harmonise industrial policy throughout the region and to
regulate the inflow of foreign investment and the repatriation of profits.
Only joint political intervention, he insists, can provide the impetus
in these circumstances for closer integration and for effective remedial
action to ensure a more balanced and equitable distribution of benefits.
The problem then is how best to secure that intervention and the sacrifice
of political sovereignty that it entails without provoking the disintegration
of the community itself.
16.
There is widespread agreement among commentators that
regional communities are likely to be more highly politicised where
the countries involved are themselves under-developed. Axline sees
such politicisation not only as inevitable but as a major means of
overcoming the risks of polarization or "backwash" and avoiding growing
divisions within the community. Moreover, under-development, in his
view, is a product of international economic forces. Only by close
and effective political coordination can Third World countries hope to
achieve what he calls "collective self-reliance." He does not, however,
underestimate the magnitude of the task and has therefore concentrated
on the kind of bargaining strategies that will be needed if the obstacles
/to closer integration are to be successfully overcome. 29-
As students of the East African CommunitY who are generally
sympathetic to the idea of regional integration, Segal, Hansen and Hazlewood
have all been concerned with "backwash" and with the difficulty of securing
a more equitable distribution of industries, jobs and investment - particularly
between Kenya, the most highly developed of the three East African states
and its (former) partners Tanzania and Uganda. They also identify the
main problem as a political one, emphasising that in the Third World most
economic decisions affecting the allocation of scarce resources are
inevitably assigned to the domain of "high" rather than "low" or "welfare"
politics.
With Kenya attracting what seemed to the other states a
disproportionate share of external investment after independence, it
became increasingly difficult and then impossible for the three East
17.
African leaders to reach a political consensus on the most pressing
issues. Each country tended to perceive its own interests and those
of its partners in a very different light. And there were other problems
to complicate the situation. From the start the Presidents of Kenya and
Tanzania differed over ideology and the type of economic system that each
wanted to implement. And in 1971 a military coup brought a change of
government in Uganda which introduced new political strains into the
community.
Only joint political action in the 'sixties could have removed some of
all of the grievances of the two most disaffected partners, Tanzania and
Uganda, and some such action was indeed attempted. But by the time the
East African Presidents came to sign the Treaty for East African Cooperation,
in 1967, the common currency had been abandoned and the operations of the
customs union were already seriously impaired by quantitative restrictions
30/
on the movement of goods across national frontiers. -
Hansen has complained of "premature" over-politicisation within
the East African Community and has regretted that the regional secretariat
was not empowered to implement an industrial location policy for the community
31/
as a whole. — After independence the community's civil servants quickly
came to refer all important and many unimportant decisions to the three
Presidents, thereby removing a potential source ofconsensus. J.Ravenhill
mentioned similar factors in his acdount of the breakdown of the EAC,
citing in particular "backwash" effects, the need for political mechanisms to
provide more effective compensation, or better to tackle the root cause
of the disagreements, the very limited authority enjoyed by the regional
32/institutions, and the failure of the leaders to cooperate. -
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Segal, too, refers to the concentration of gains in Kenya and in its
capital Nairobi, and to the growing dissatisfaction of its two partners. The
sense of frustration felt by all three political leaders at the constraints
of economic inter-dependence were no way alleviated by the inability of the
community to take effective action to resolve their various complaints.
The matter could be resolved ultimately in only one of two ways : either
by increasing the level of political integration so that the community could
take remedial action, or by reducing the level of economic integration,
3 3/
enabling each state to strike out in a different direction. - It was
the second strategy that finally prevailed.
Segal and Ravenhill have 'both tried to summarise the reasons for
the failure of the AAC (and other regional groupings) and in doing so have
tried to suggest a number of the conditions necessary for the success of regional
integration schemes among under-developed countries. Segal has cited four
such conditions for economic integration. The community;
(1) must offer economic benefits to each unit, including an agreement
on the distribution of benefits;
(2) must not threaten existing beneficial relationships or it must
replace them with new ones;
(3) must not constrain the policy of nation-building;
(4) must not threaten the bases of support of existing national political
elites.	 34/
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Ravenhill lists five causes for the collapse of the gAC -
one very general and four more specific, closely resembling the "conditions"
enumerated by Segal. Like Hansen, however, he wants stronger regional
institutions with more discretionary power - second point - which might be
seen as challenging Segal's third condition. He also points to the absence in
East Africa of effective pressure groups with a vested interest in furthering
regional economic cooperation.- which was something we did try to encourage
in West Africa during the 'seventies. Ravenhill's third point is very
close to Segal's first condition ; That integration can only succeed in the
long term if all parties make net gains and provided these are seen to be
distributed equally. Ravenhill's fourth point regarding what he calls
"asymmetrical inter-dependence" is similar to Segal's second condition, while
Ravenhill's fifth and last proposition relates to the ideological differences
among the East African leaders and presumably corresponds to Segal's fourth
condition.
One problem with this kind of analysis is that conditions
for integration derived from the (unsuccessful) experience of one community
may not be applicable to others elsewhere. Moreover, Segal's four conditions
are so broad and sweeping as to make almost any kind of regional eeonomic
community appear an unrealistic proposition. And, finally, criteria that are
appropriate to an assessment of an economic union of advanced industrial
nations like the OECD may have less relevance for integration in the context
of Third World countries. There the principal goal of regional economic
integration is not peace and security, or incremental gains in welfare, but
development itself, in the sense of a major contribution to the structural -
20.
transformation of their economies. Axline has gone even further insisting
that "because of important basic economic and political differences between
advanced industrialised economies and the economies of under-developed
countries, the theory of economic integration within the context of development
35/is different. -
Creation of ECONAS
Scholars have still to explain why it is that developing
countries, and their leaders, continue to propose and to try to organise
regional economic groupings despite occasional failure and frequent adverse
comments concerning the utility of such bodies, and their ability to
achieve their objectives. The answer is surely that; where developed countries
can choose among a number of options in their conscious attempts to maximise
economic growth and increase welfare, developing countries cannot afford
to neglect any strategy that, given the right conditions, seems to offer
reasonable prospects of accelerated growth and higher living standards.
Trade diversification and industrialisation already figured
prominently among the strategies of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America umuo in the early 'fifties. Import substitution was then
seen as the most direct and appropriate means of achieving those goals and
. substantial progress was made for a time, particularly among the larger states.
But even there the limited purchasing power of the population and the restricted
21.
size of the national markets were an insuperable barrier to further
development by that means alone. Moreover, the proliferation of almost
identical small-scale industries, sheltering behind high tariff walls in
neighbouring countries, failed to make the expected contribution to development
and did not generate the "poles" of industrial growth that were to have
36/provided the impetus for economic "take-off". -
Hence the attractions of regional economic integration and the
subsequent experiments in Central and South America, the Caribbean, and in
South-East Asia where, however, defence and strategic arguments were probably
more important. Because the economic alternatives are few and largely
unattractive the failure of a particular regional community is likely to lead
only to a re-assessment of the conditions for successful integration and
to further experiments using modified structures, and with suitable adjustments
to the regional boundaries and-some alterations in the priorities.
In this respect it is perhaps significant that the Economic
Community of West African States, the most ambitious attempt at regional
economic integration to date, was established in 1975, the year that also
saw the disbandment of the East African Community, probably the most complete
and, for a time, the most successful example of regional integration anywhere
37/in the Third World. - And now there are indications that, nearly a decade
later, the East African leaders are beginning to regret the break-down of
the EAC and are looking for new forms of economic cooperation.
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Meanwhile the Central African Customs Union (UDEAC) has now
been expanded to include Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi, the new grouping to be
known as the Economic Community of Central African States. And, even more
recently, a Preferential Trade Area of some fourteen East and Central African
states has been constituted, with the aim of re-directing trade away from
colonial and European markets and towards neighbouring African states. There
is also a Southern African Development and Coordination Committee whose purpose
is to reduce the economic dependency of the Southern African states on the
38/
white minority regime in South Africa. -
With regard to our own Economic Community of - West African States,
whose formation and establishment is the subject of this thesis, the
comparisons with other regional communities is certainly interesting,
particularly as West African leaders were themselves greatly influenced by
the examples of the EEC and the EAC. Frequently problems encountered in one
community will recur elsewhere, although not necessarily in the same guise
or with the same consequences. But the differences may be even more
significant.
There are a number of features that appear to be more or less
unique to ECOWAS. The number of states involved in other regional communities
has usually been fairly restricted. There were only three in the case of the
EAC, while four countries signed the treaty creating the Central American
Common Market, seven member states subscribed to the Montevideo Treaty
establishing the Latin American Free Trade Association in 1960, and, prior
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to the withdrawal of Chile, the Andean Pact comprised six states. ECOWAS
now includes sixteen countries in all which is every state in the West African
region. It even contains a number of other, distinct sub-regional groupings
ranging from the Francophone West African Economic Community, with four
member states and two others enjoying observer status, to the various bi-lateral
arrangements linking neighbouring countries. (Table 1).
In such a large community there was (and still is) less opportunity
for the emergence of the kind of personal quarrels and ideological rivalries
that did so much to disrupt the EAC, Nor is ECOWAS so vulnerable to political
instability among the states comprising it : a change of regime is unlikely
to paralyse the community in the way that the Ugandan coup of 1971 brought the
EAC to an effective halt. Within West Africa the initial economic discrepancies
were also much less marked than was the case in the Central and South American
groupings and in the Caribbean example described by Axline. Even Nigeria,
with its oil, size and population, had a lower per capita income than several
of its partners, including the Ivory Coast and, for a time, Ghana.
While the poorer, Sahel states in ECOWAS would naturally be
concerned at possible "backwash" effects - which was why .  we envisaged the
Fund for Compensation and Development, which was by no means restricted to
compensation alone - the single most important barrier to be overcome
within our region was not that between more and less developed states, or
coastal and land-locked ones, but between French and English-speaking states.
And the very creation of the community, in 1975, suggested that the linguistic
divide was already much less prominent than a decade earlier. It is to be
hoped that it is even less pronounced now than in 1975.
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TABLE 1
THE COUNTRIES OF WEST AFRICA
Area
(sa.kl.)
Population 1
1975
Density
(per sq.
kl.)
Date of
Independence
Former Colonial
Power
BENIN 112,622 3,112,000 28 August 1 1960 France
CAPE VERDE 4,033 294,000 73 July 5,1973 Portugal
THE GAMBIA 11,295 524,000 46 Feb.18, 1963 United Kingdom
GHANA 238,537 9,866,000 41 March 6,1957 United Kingdom
GUINEA 245,957 4,416,000 18 October 2,1958 France
GUINEA-BISSAU 36,129 525,000 15 Sept.10,1974 Portugal
IVORY COAST 322,463 6,673,000 2 21 August 7,1960 France
LIBERIA 111,369 1,708,000 15 July 26,1857 France
MALI 1,240,000 5,697,000 5 Sept.22,1960 France
MAURITANIA 1,030,700 1,318,000 1 Nov. 28,1960 France
NIGER 1,267,000 4,600,000 4 August 3,1960 France
NIGERIA 923,768 62,925,000 68 October 1,1960 United Kingdom
SENEGAL 196,192 5,085,000 2 26 August 20,1960 France
SIERRA LEONE 71,740 2,729,000 2 38 April 27, 1961 United Kingdom
Tana 56,000 2,222,000 40 April 27, 1960 France
UPPER VOLTA 274,200 6,032,000 22 August 5,1960 France
Source: (1) Demographic Yearbook,1975 (United Nations Publication, Sales
No. E/F.76.XIII.1.1977), Table 3. These figures are mid-year
estimates.
(21 These figures are from the United Nations "Po pulation and
Vital Statistics Report," Statistical Papers Series A,
Volume XXVII, No.4, 1976.
24.
Moreover, the motivations that have inspired governments to
join ECOWAS are, as we hope to show, sufficiently diverse to permit each
and every state to draw some immediate benefit from the community and to
prevent bargaining within the community from ever coming to resemble a
zero - (still less a negative) - sum game. The long-term expectations
of the member governments were similar if not identical - growth and
development ." but the short-term objectives were many and varied and
were amenable to negotiation and, where necessary,compromise.
In the case of the EACd writers have complained of the weakness
of the regional institutions and of the absence of a core state with
sufficient strength, economic as well as political, to provide an element
of leadership for the community as a whole. This was not, however, the case
with ECOWAS. By the 'seventies Nigeria was able to take the initiative,
with several of its neighbours, in mobilising support for the idea of ECOWAS
and Nigerian governments, since 1975, have no doubt continued to be well aware of
their special responsibility with regard to the community - which is as
necessary to Nigeria's future security as it is to her economic development.
We did not, however, envisage a strong regional administration
for the community, or the delegation of substantial powers to its executive
institutions, partly because we felt that the community was not lacking in
effective leadership and a sense of purpose and direction, but also because
it is customary in West Africa for important political decisions affecting
the region or any part of it to be taken by the governments concerned - and
25.
after extensive consultation. A highly developed sense of participation
seemed to promise better and more lasting results both in the short and
long-term - than a brief and pointless display of high-handed efficiency
by bureaucrats who lacked the means to impose their policies.
There was yet another important difference between ECOWAS and the
now defunct EAC. The East African leaders inherited their regional community
more or less complete, from the colonial power at independence. Their new
concern with national sovereignty naturally led them to question many of the
administrative arrangements which, however beneficial in themselves, were
seen as constraints on political action, particularly in the case of the two
less developed states. ECOWAS, on the other hand, was a creation of the
West African leaders themselves, after more than fifteen years of trying to
operate existing structures within pre-ordained frontiers. Far from being a
product of colonial rule it was a reaction against the colonial legacy, and
represented the beginnings of collective self-reliance. ECOWAS was designed
specifically to remove the artificial barriers to trade and development that
was a direct and unfortunate consequence of colonial occupation. There
was little risk, therefore, of West African leaders attempting to undo
their own handiwork and destroy the results of years of painful gestation.
(1S14 Zox3).
My thesis is primarily concerned with develo pments in West
Africa prior to the actual formation of ECOWAS in 1975, largely because
these were events in which I myself was privileged to participate as Head
of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria between 1966 and 1975. And
they were also events in which my government exhibited a.very keen and
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active interest. In the following chapters I have tried to explain the
long gestation of the community in terms that are necessarily simplified
but which do, I hope, serve to identify clearly the main trends and the
principal themes of a particularly turbulent period of West African history;
but also a period that, in retrospect, seems to have marked a decisive turning
point in post-colonial development inside Nigeria and also within the region.
For it was in these years that Nigeria came at last to identify
completely, not only with Africa but also with the region of which it is such
a large and important part and whose complexity is reflected in the geographical
and cultural composition of Nigeria itself. Nor was the identification between
the two either sentimental in character or temporary in duration. It arose
in the 'sixties largely from our need for external security at a time of
acute domestic crisis, it later flourished in the 'seventies under the
impact of sudden economic change in Nigeria and a global economic crisis.
J.P.Renninger has noted that before the 'seventies;
... it was possible to at least envisage
appropriate development strategies for the
small states that did not involve close
collaboration with neighbours. All of this
has now changed and the international environment
must be considered a powerful force propelling
small states towards integration.
It was also a time when our Francophone friends and neighbours
came to see Nigeria increasingly as a prospective partner in economic
development and as a valued allY in the common struggle for equity and
39/
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independence in every sphere - a welcome change from the days when Nigeria
was considered an economic challenge in the leading Francophone states and
was regarded as, in some ways, even more threatening than the radical,
socialist and pan-African regimes of Presidents Nkrumah and Toure: Reviewing
the period as a whole then it is our contention that national and regional
integration were always more closely linked, at least in West Aftica, than
economists like Balassa would seem to suggest, while regional integration
was considerably influenced by the rapid dissolution in the 'seventies of the
international economic order set up in the West after World War II.
By the time the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) was formed national integration had already made substantial
progress among all member states. While Nigeria had always been among the
most enthusiastic exponents of regional economic integration, our country
was unable to play a key role until her own unity was first consolidated, followinc
the successful outcome of the civil war in 1970. At the same time, governments
in West Africa increasingly came to recognise that political sovereignty
itself had little meaning and even less substance in the absence of effective
control over their economic destinies. This was particularly marked among
the second generation of African leaders after independence who were often
military personnel.
Even then it required the departure of General de Gaulle as
President of France in 1969, the abrupt and, for the French-speaking
African states, damaging devaluation of the Franc following the appointment
of the new president, and the global economic crisis in the early 'seventies,
aggravated by the Middle East War in 1973, before many of the Francophone
28.
states came to perceive that their best prospects of development lay in
improved relations with their Anglophone neighbours, especially Nigeria,
rather than in total dependence on France.
Organisation'of the *Thesis
The first part of the thesis deals mainly with West Africa
in the period from independence until the mid-'sixties and with the debate
between advocates of continental unity, largely on a political basis, led
by the Casablanca bloc, and Nigeria's own support for a regional economic
grouping which enjoyed the backing of the Monrovia states. The same period
saw the creation of innumerable groupings, initially sub-regional in
character, but soon becoming continental in scope. Until the creation of
the Organisation of African Unity, in 1963, such groupings tended to be
political rather than economic but the existence of the new political
forum grouping of all African states helped confine the other organisations
within a predominantly economic role.
The second part deals with the second half of the 'sixties,
when most African states were experiencing serious economic problems and
the contrast between political independence and economic dependency was all
too apparent to their leadership. Where the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA) had long been active in encouraging the movement
towards regional economic integration, the first serious steps in that
direction in West Africa were taken during, and immediately after 1966 with
the conference of regional leaders in Niamey (1966), Accra (1967) and
finally Monrovia (1968). These meetings were attended by representatives
of French and English speaking states and their aim was the creation of a
West African Regional Group.
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While the Nigerian civil war, from 1967 until 1970, was
certainly an important, if temporary, obstacle to the realisation of that
worthy ambition - although my government willingly gave whatever support
it could and attended all meetings - it was by no means the only, or even
the principal obstacle. Even more serious was the continuing rivalry among
the Francophone states of the _region,. between the leaders of Senegal and the
Ivory Coast, and between these two states and Guinea. There was also General
de Gaulle's unwarranted intervention in the Nigerian civil war in 1968 and
the decision by the Ivory Coast to recognise "Biafra m and her subsequent
support for the rebellion. These incidents, notwithstanding the loyal
support we received in Nigeria from our immediate Francophone neighbours,
all contributed to the collapse of the Regional Group initiative.
The third part of the thesis is concerned with the efforts
of Nigeria and our Francophone near-neighbour, Togo, to re-launch the regional
enterprise following the Nigerian civil war and in the context of our efforts
to promote reconciliation both at home and abroad, throughout Africa. The
role of Togo was, as I will suggest, crucial in enabling us to circumvent
attempts by the French government and its African allies to pre-empt the
creation of ECOWAS by improvising a new Francophone grouping within the
region, the West African Economic Community (CEAO). The assistance of
Togo and also of Liberia was again invaluable during the many meetings
and discussions held in 1973 and 1974 to prepare for the final inauguration
of ECOWAS. The outcome of these conferences was the Lagos Summit of May 1975,
when the ECOWAS Treaty was accepted and signed by the West African Heads of
State and subsequently ratified by their governments.
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The fourth and final part of the thesis offers an account
of the various ECOWAS institutions and their operation between 1975 and
1982. Although closely associated .with the formation of ECOWAS I have had
no direct contact with that body, or indeed with the Nigerian government, since
leaving my country to undertake study abroad in 1975. My description of
ECOWAS and of its subsequent activities is therefore based on the reports
of the community and documentation concerning it, and on more or less detailed
accounts published in various newspapers and journals.
For these reasons I have not attempted an exhaustive or definitive
account of this latest period. Nor is it my intention to try to emulate
other scholars by providing a balance sheet for the community or attempting to
evaluate its work and progress to date. Unlike the EAC, ECOWAS is by no
means moribund - far from it - and it seems to me much too early to attempt
even a preliminary, let alone a final judgement. In any case by what criteria
would one evaluate its work? There are the goals and objectives of the
community, there are the aspirations of the individual member states in so
far as these are known, and there is the detailed time-table for economic
and social integration set out in the Treaty and the Protocols. (Annex 1 & 5)
The fact that the membership remains intact and loyal, that the
community is very much in being, and that serious attempts are being
made to keep to the original time-table suggests that, despite many initial
difficulties, ECOWAS is. afloat and on course. ECOWAS owes its creation to the
realisation by West African governments that they were, one and all, exceptionally
31.
vulnerable to developments on the international as well as the domestic
scene, developments that were political, military and, above all since 1973,
economic. These are factors over which, as individual states, we have
little or no control. In the mid-'seventies, despite the general upturn
in the world economy after the earlier crisis, most of the West African
40
countries continued to suffer from the .dislocations following from that crisis. -'
The position has not changed much today. Now, as then, the problem
can only be resolved by joint action and a combined effort to work for and
secure changes in the economic order that will favour the less . developed
nations. It may be that the best chance of economic diversification and
agricultural self-sufficiency - at least in edible grains and foodstuffs -
is a formed collective self-reliance. But,as J.P.Renninger has pointed out:
Although ECOWAS can undoubtedly contribute to the
collective self-reliance of the West African sub-
region, it will not, by itself, be able to achieve
collective self-reliance.
This, he explains as "one of the genuine paradoxes of economic cooperation
among developing • countries."
For economic integration to be meaningful and
lead to collective self-reliance, very advanced
forms of integration, such as control of new
technology, importation and industrial location,
are required. Yet such advanced forms of
integration presuppose an abrogation of
sovereignty that, for political reasons, few
leaders of developing countries are willing to
contemplate.
41/
42/
32.
Economists and others are still debating whether developing
countries can still derive important benefits from more traditional
forms of integration such as the free trade area and the customs union
and whether integration, to be effective, does indeed, as Axline and
Rerminger suggest, require a high .degree of coordination and a centrally
43/
administered regional policy. -
	
In any case as Renninger concedes, the
ECOWAS Treaty provides for all these eventualities and it is for the
community's leaders to choose those instruments best suited to their region's
present needs. It is earnestly to be hoped that ECOWAS.will before long realise
its full potential as a force for economic and social development, and that
the West African leaders will continue to provide the kind of political
support that made ECOWAS possible in the first place.
While working on the thesis I had the good fortune to encounter
two excellent books both of which deal exclusively with ECOWAS - those by
4/J.P.Renninger and R.I.Onwuka. 4 - It is an indirect tribute to ECOWAS that
such material is already appearing in published form and I hope that these
books, which set such a high standard, will be the precursors of many others.
There is obviously some overlap between my own account and material to be
found in both books, but their works are largely complementary to my own
since Onwuka has approached the subject with an emphasis on the economic
aspects of the community, while Renninger is mainly concerned with the
activities of the community between 1975 and the end of 1977. There have
also been a number of very useful articles concerned with the formation of
ECOWAS and certain aspects of its activity, and these I have either cited
in the text or included in the bibliography.
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There is one final matter of terminology. Whereas the
Organisation of African Unity, the Economic Commissioniot Africa, and all
official African documentation describes West Africa as a "sub-region"
and ECOWAS is therefore referred to as a "sub-regional" community, this
cre4tes difficulties when one has to discuss groupings of states that are
smaller than ECOWAS in both numbers and territorial extent. I have therefore
tried consistently to use the word "region" when discussing West (or Central,
North or East) Africa and will refer to ECOWAS as a "regional" grouping by
contrast with smaller groupings which are "sub-regional" and larger, more
ambitious ones which I have described as "continental".
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CHAPTER 2
COOPERATION IN INDEPENDENT WEST AFRICA : THE
FORMATIVE YEARS (1958-1960) 
The ratification of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1975 must be seen as the
outcome of long and continuing diplomatic efforts to establish some form
of political and economic community among the West African states. Already,
in November 1958, the leaders of Ghana and Guinea had announced their decision
to combine as the nucleus of a proposed Union of West African States which
would be the first independent attempt at integration in the region. The
political and economic union of the two states was intended to encourage and
direct the anticipated movement by independent countries towards West African,
then continental l unity. It could scarcely be described as a regional or even
sub-regional grouping, however, as the two countries directly involved shared
no common frontier and, despite the ideological affinities of their rulers,
there was little evidence or indeed prospect of convergence between their
political, social and economic systems.
This and even more ambitious schemes for union reflected the
Pan-African aspirations of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first Prime Minister and
later President, and in particular the importance he attached to the political
unity of Africa and to the early creation of a continental administration.
To him, regional unity, while desirable as a first stage, was not sufficient
in itself as only a united Africa could achieve real independence. Even
this qualified support for regional organisation turned quickly to suspicion
and mistrust as neighbouring states failed to respond favourably to his
overtures while others, including Nigeria and the principal Francophone states,
Senegal and the Ivory Coast, would soon act to contain what they saw as the
growing threat from Ghana's expansionist policies. As Nkrumah finally concluded
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that unity in Africa would have to be built from the top down he became an
outspoken critic of regionalism - which partly explains his strong opposition
in 1963 to the proposed East African Federation. -
It was perhaps Nkrumah's misfortune that his territorial base,
Ghana, although larger and initially more prosperous than many other African
states, did not, in terms of its population, size or even resources begin to
match the scale of his political ambitions. He was able, however, to
capitalise on Ghana's prestige as the first black African state to become
independent from colonial rule, and on her comparative social development and
relative affluence which made her, at the time, an important contender for
power in Africa. With most of the continent still under colonial domination
a sovereign and independent Ghana was bound to attract widespread and sympathetic
attention and was soon the focus of more universal aspirations towards
independence and unity. W.Scott Thompson has noted that:
Excluding India, none of the successor states in the
post-colonial era aroused so many hopes as Ghana ...
On attaining independence Ghanaian leaders pledged
to work towards the liberation of the rest of the
continent, accumulating immense political capital in
making their state the Mecca of African nationalism.
Thus Fam-Africanism, an historical movement championing
the cause of black people, was brought to African soil
for the first time.
There is no doubt that this vision of African unity was and
remains a source of inspiration and hope for African peoples everywhere and
a goal no serious leader would wish to ignore. It is the more unfortunate,
therefore, that Nkrumah, having t like other distinguished African leaders
before him, identified closely with that goal, and having done much to
publicise and propagate it, should then have been tempted to utilise it for
more immediate and - to his many critics - less altruistic ends, thus
2/
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provoking the very quarrels and divisions that would be so damaging to his
cause and to Africa. In March 1957, however, such considerations would have
been out of place as African delegations gathered in Accra for Ghana's
independence celebrations. It was rather in an atmosphere of euphoria and
optimism that they discussed and approved proposals for a subsequent meeting of
government leaders and it was Accra that would, a year later, host the first
Conference of Independent African States (CIAS).
Such was their determination to achieve universality and inclusiveneE
that the sponsors contrived to exclude the more controversial items from the
list of proposed resolutions while even South Africa: was invited to attend,
but declined, thereby missing a remarkable opportunity to be associated
3/
at the outset with Africa's political and economic organisation. - There were
the expected resolutions demanding an early end to colonial rule and a rigid
timetable for the independence of the remaining territories, and calling on
the colonial powers to refrain from acts of repression and arbitrary rule and
to end all forms of discrimination. The Conference also accepted a proposal
for joint economic research and consultation among its members with the object,
eventually, of creating an African Common Market. Nkrumah seems, however, to
have been disappointed with the outcome of the Conference, whose leaders were
perhaps too conservative and too independent for his taste, having resisted
his advice to dispense with existing 'colonial' frontiers and move quickly
towards a single continental union. - "At the CIAS meeting in 1958, the
majority of the governments had shown quite clearly that they were not ready for
/Political federation either at regional or continental level/ and that they
preferred to work towards unity slowly by tackling certain common problems
jointly." -
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Searching perhaps for a wider and more accommodating audience
and a more imposing platform for his views, Nkrumah turned from the
handful of independent states with their well entrenched rulers and
sought to align himself more closely with the nationalist parties, now
proliferating in the dependent territories in anticipation of an early
independence. Without the responsibilities of office, their leaders were
likely to be more militant and anti-colonial and, given the difficult
circumstances in which they had to operate,were therefore more receptive
to radical views, particularly when accompanied by material and financial
incentives. In December 1958 it was therefore, an All African Peoples'
Conference (AAPC)thattmet in Accra with representatives of the independent
states this time in a small minority - having only eight delegates
compared with some twenty from the dependent territories.
The radical platform of the AAPC set the tone for future Pan-
African deliberations. This time the resolutions condemned imperialism and
colonialism outright, denounced racialism particularly as practised in South
Africa, and were uncompromising in their opposition to 'tribalism'. There
was also strong and unequivocal support for the African 'Freedom Fighters'.
Other resolutions endorsed the principle of African unity, even if delegates
differed over the form it should take and the method by which it might best
be achieved. There was sympathy, too, for the demands already being voiced
in various parts of Africa for regional groupings of states : but on condition
that they were restricted to independent countries and were in no way
prejudicial to the main objective of a Pan-African Commonwealth or United
States of Africa. They must also conform to the popular will expressed
through a referendum organised on the basis of universal adult suffrage. -
It was "the strong support for the idea of federation given by the AAPC",
7.
that in the opinion of one observer,"had helped to discredit the organisation"
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While the AAPC was more sympathetic to Nkrumah's views than the
earlier CIAS, its deliberations inevitably carried less weight as the majority
of the participants had no governmental responsibilities and the organisers
8/had some discretion in choosing the movements to be represented. - And,
as the debates became more specific and detailed, significant differences began
to emerge among the delegations, reflecting their varied backgrounds, and
composition and the cleavage between those representing independent states and
those without 'official' status. Again it would seem that Nkrumah had not
been able to obtain the kind of disciplined and coherent forum that he required
for his more ambitious proposals. Even in such a selective body as the AAPC
differences emerged that would soon crystallise into divisions which, under
the impact of new issues and external pressures, would then assume a better
organised and more competitive form. In West Africa these divisions would give
rise to political associations as diverse as the Ghana-Guinea Union, the Mali
Federation, the Council of the Entente, the Sanniquellie Agreement, and the
Union of African States. And as events and personalities conspired to drive
radical and moderate groups further apart, Africa would quickly be polarised
into rival ideological camps.
Ghana-Guinea Union and its successors 
It was the last minute decision by Sekou Toure of Guinea to defy
General de Gaulle and opt for independence in September 1958, notwithstanding
the terrible economic and administrative reprisals exacted by the French,
which accelerated the French programme of de-colonisation and at the same time
provided Nkrumah with an early and loyal partner in West Africa. Nkrumah was
willing and for a time able - within the limits of his increasingly straitened
economy - to assist states like Guinea and later Mali, whose youthful and
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perhaps less experienced leaders shared certain of his radical and socialist
•
views and much of his Pan-African vision. At independence both Sekou Toure
of Guinea and Modibo Keita of Mali found themselves and their states more or
less isolated from France and Francophone Africa, estranged from their
immediate and conservative neighbours, and without the means to finance their
administration let alone a development programme. Without immediate and
generous support from Ghana and other sympathetic states they might not have
survived the first weeks of independence or attracted the kind of international
backing that alone could guarantee their political and economic future.
The rapid succession of political groupings which sprang from the
original Ghana-Guinea alliance was, however, a measure of the contingent
nature of such strategies and the extent to which they reflected more
immediate political considerations rather than longer term social and economic
preoccupations. What was announced in November 1958 as "the nucleus of a
Union of West African States", inspired both by the American union and by other,
more recent examples of territorial integration, had, by May 1959, become
the basis for a future Union of Independent African States. But there was
growing doubt about the precise nature and orientation of the grouping and
about the direction in which it was moving. Where the Ghana-Guinea Union had
offered some prospect of ideological consistency, the same cannot be said of
its successor, the alliance of Ghana, Guinea and Liberia, that emerged from
the Sanniquellie Agreement of July 1959. This agreement gave birth to a
curious and predictably still-born union of political incompatibles.
Liberia, like its powerful collaborator, the United States, had
sought to befriend and assist neighbouring Guinea after its break with France.
President William Tubman of Liberia nevertheless shared the profound misgivings
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of other moderate leaders about the recent alliance of West Africa's two
most prominent radicals. He was aware of the growing political divisions
in the continent and of the threat they posed to the stability of individual
states, just as he was concerned, as an elder statesman, to find some basis
for mutual accommodation. Tubman clearly hoped to wean the radical leaders
away from their more extreme Pan-African objectives and, as an alternative to
their vision of a comprehensive and binding political union, he proposed instead
a loose, confederal-type arrangement among the independent states. This
new proposal excluded for the time being any element of supra-nationality and
concentrated instead on political and administrative cooperation, and the
improvement and expansion of existing economic and cultural ties. Nkrumah,
for his part, may have been anxious to establish some kind of wider political
framework as soon as possible, even on less than favourable terms, hoping
thereby to reassure other moderate leaders while retaining the political
initiative for Ghana and her more radical allies.
It was to Tubman's credit that the terms of the Sanniquellie
Agreement closely approximated the consensus the African states would themselves
reach in 1963 in their search for an acceptable form of political union. For
the present, however, the ambiguous language of the Sanniquellie Agreement
served mainly to underline the considerable differences between Nkrumah and
Toure on the one hand and Tubman (and the moderate leaders) on the other. It
appeared that the three associated states would this time constitute the
nucleus of a Community of Independent African States with each retaining intact
its national identity and its constitutional structures. And while the
objective remained the unity of all independent African states, it was not
their intention "to prejudice the present or future international policies,
9/
relations and obligations of the states involved." Moreover, the signatories
acknowledged their readiness to abide by the principle of non-intervention
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in the affairs of member-states, which the radical leaders had hitherto
10/
rejected as a defence of the 'colonial status quo. -
The division over political union was a central issue at the
second Conference of Independent African States in June 1960 - the first
such meeting to be held outside West Africa and, significantly, at Addis
Ababa, future headquarters of the 0.A.U. The confrontation was mainly
between the two principal English-speaking countries in West Africa, Ghana
and, soon to be independent Nigeria, and at the heart of the debate was a
conflict over the interpretation of the Sanniquellie Agreement. The
Ghanaian delegation insisted that the Association or Community of African
States, discussed and accepted by the leaders of qbana, GNal.nea and 'Liberia,
had been intended primarily as a political union.
Such a political Union in their view will provide
the framework within which any plans for economic,
social and cultural cooperation can, in fact,
operate to the best advantage of all.
The concluding remarks were couched in more diplomatic language aimed at
maximising support for the Ghanaian position and refuting accusations of
extremism.
To us in Ghana the concept of African unity is an
article of faith. It is the cardinal objective of
our policy. We sincerely believe that the independent
Africa states can, and may some day form a real political
Union - the Union of African States. It does not matter
whether you start with an Association of African States
or whether with economic or cultural cooperation	 we
must start from somewhere, but certainly the Union can 11/be achieved in the end.
10/
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The Nigerian delegation, while broadly agreeing that "Pan-
Africanism is the only solution to our problems in Africa", nevertheless
supported the more moderate Liberian account of the Sanniquellie Agreement -
which emphasised cultural and economic cooperation between African states
as a preliminary and necessary stage leading eventually to other forms of
union. The Nigerian counter-attack emphasised the radical and visionary
nature of Nkrumah's proposals and concluded that any lasting and beneficial
form of union in Africa would have to be based on common consent.
No one doubts the need to promote PanAfricanism...
but we must not be sentimental; we must be realistic ...
at this moment the idea of forming a Union of African
States is premature. On the other hand we do not
dispute the sincerity and indeed the good intentions of
those people who advocate it. But we feel such a move
is too radical - perhaps too ambitious - to be of
lasting benefit... It is essential to remember that
whatever ideas we may have about Pan-Africanism it will
not materialise, or at least it will not materialise as
quickly as we would like it to if we start building
from the top downwards. We must first pre pare the
minds of the different countries - we must start from
the known /before proceeding7 to the unknown. At the
moment we in Nigeria cannot afford to form a Union
Government with any [other] African states by surrendering
our sovereignty .... President Tubman's idea of the
Association of States is therefore more acceptable for
it is as yet premature to form a Union of States under
one sovereignty ... If anybody makes the mistake of
feeling that he is a Messiah who has got the mission to
lead Africa, the whole purpose of Pan-Africanism will,
I fear, be defeated.
This confrontation between two leading West African states, already
economic as well as political rivals, marked the effective end of the CIAS
which had provided a useful if limited forum for exchanges among African
leaders and at a time when consultation was important but difficult to
organise and when the advice and experience of the elder statesmen was
13/
much needed if not always sufficiently appreciated. - Exchanges like
those over the Sanniquellie Agreement were bound to affect adversely relations
12/
among the English-speaking states of West Africa, particularly Nigeria and Ghana,
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and were scarcely conducive to any form of cooperation within the region
as a whole. Ghana now seemed the more determined to impose her views on
the rest of the continent irrespective of the damage to African unity
and to cooperation at all levels within the region as a whole. The
radical Pan-Africanists were ready at last to abandon the principle of
universality and inclusiveness in favour of "frankly partial organisations"
14/
whose members would share certain common objectives and attitudes. -
Ghana, Guinea and their allies abandoned the search for a modus vivendi
with the moderate and conservative West African leaders in favour of
establishing a more cohesive organisation, or pressure group, which could
act effectively and promptly in any sphere to realise the limited goals
of its members. The immediate need therefore was to secure new allies
with a broadly similar outlook who would help create the nucleus of a
group united by ideology rather than around any common regional attachment.
By December 1960 the Ghana-Guinea combination had attracted
another recruit, following the break-up of the new Mali Federation and the
split between its two constituents. Senegal and Soudan (later Mali),which
then became independent as separate states. A grouping this time of
ideological compatibles, the Ghana-Guinea-Soudan Union, or Union of African
States as it described itself, was launched in auspicious circumstances, with
the promise of a Ghanaian loan to Mali of $11.2 million (1S). The charter
this time provided, optimistically, for mass action in all three states with
a view to developing "a common ideological orientation which is absolutely
15
necessary for the development of the Union.. /- Indeed, it had been a
criticism of the earlier unions that the peoples most directly affected-were
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largely unaware of any change in their immediate environment. There was
even to be provision in the new union for some coordination of the activities
of the various political parties, women's groups, trade unions and youth
organisations active in each state. However, the UAS was soon incorporated
in the wider Casablanca grouping created shortly afterwards. This
interesting, if ambitious/attempt at political union came to an end in 1964
even as the Mali leadership began, albeit tentatively, to draw closer to
France and sought to resume normal relations with their moderate, Francophone
neighbours, notably Senegal.
But the prospects for extending the Ghana-Guinea Union, even
within West Africa, had never been good. Ghana's economic base had been
contracting since the late 'fifties with declining commodity prices, heavy
government expenditures and the rapid depletion of the country's reserves.
It was unlikely that she could continue to compete with, much less outbid,
her more moderate and now more prosperous rivals in West Africa, the Ivory
Coast and Nigeria, for the allegiance of the poorer land-locked states.
Ideology alone has cemented few alliances in Africa although it may have
contributed to the collapse of several. Even the political alliance between
Nkrumah and Tout showed signs of weakening after 1961, particularly following
the deterioration in Toure's relations with the Soviet Union and the East
European socialist states.
Neither the Ghana-Guinea Union nor the later Union of African States,
incorporating Mali, were well placed to realise Nkrumah's ambitions, whether
for political and administrative unity, for economic integration, monetary
cooperation or coordination of their developmental efforts. However
commendable their objectives, however sincere their leaders, it was very
doubtful, to say the least, whether there could be effective linkage between
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states with such recent and contrasting colonial backgrounds belonging
to completely different monetary systems and, in the case of Ghana and Guinea,
with no common border. Nevertheless, just as the Sanniquellie Agreement
anticipated important features of the consensus on whicbthe OAU would later
be contracted, so too the proposed Ghana-Guinea Union foreshadowed later
developments within West Africa. It was the first attempt to tackle and,
at a leadership level at least, surmount what has remained a critical
problem for any scheme of regional integration and the association of French
and English-speaking states with their very different political, administrative,
monetary and cultural traditions. It was Tour's break with France in 1958
and the ideological compatibility between himself and Nkrumah that made it
possible to conceive of such an association. In another sense, however,
Nkrumah did much to confirm the Francophone states in their determination to
remain apart from the rest of Africa. And this unfortunate legacy of
mutual distrust would complicate all subsequent efforts to realise a
Community of West African States - and, not least, the ECOWAS experience itself.
But to be effective any scheme of regional organisation requires
the active and voluntary participation of all states within that region.
It presupposes a willingness to set aside territorial quarrels, ideological
differences, and political rivalries in the interests of peaceful co-existence
and the common pursuit of economic and industrial development. It is
significant that the one union in West Africa to survive from this early
period, the Council of the Entente which grouped the Ivory Coast and three
(later fourl of its Francophone neighbours, owed its relative success and
survival to its ability to combine political advantage with economic interests,
both short and long term. Inevitably, after independence, and in a climate of
intensely competitive industrialisation and strong political and economic
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nationalism, such conditions were neither widespread nor readily forthcoming.
Instead, what unions there were among the African states tended to be
temporary accommodations inspired by political rather than economic motives
reflecting the prevailing emphasis on sovereignty and independence and the
fashionable assumption that where "the political kingdom" was securely
established all else, including economic development and material prosperity
for the masses, would inevitably follow.
To be effective regional organisation had necessarily to work
through existing structures, utilising the talent that was available, while
recognising and trying to remedy any deficiencies. It therefore required
a much broader consensus than seemed to exist among the African rulers just
after independence. It was an enterprise calling for imagination, initiative
and tact; to be successful it had to be a collective effort, however valuable
the contribution of individual leaders; and the emphasis had to be on
facilitating contacts, improving communications and fostering a spirit of
cooperation. But it was here that Nkrumah's role was most equivocal : in
his determination to secure Ghana's early independence he was largely
responsible for the rapid dismantling, in the 'fifties, of the West African
Common Services - a range of common administrative services provided by the
British for their scattered West African territories and now sadly reduced
to a single agency with very limited responsibility in the field of
16/
education. - Later, another generation of African leaders would have to
begin the difficult task of re-constituting or re-creating much of the
administrative apparatus that their predecessors had so rashly discarded
along with the other trappings of an alien colonial state.
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Nkrumah's often intimidating manner, his im patience with those of
a different persuasion, and his seemingly aggressive policies towards
several of his neighbours served rather to defeat his own lofty enterprise.
He set his own sights so high that he often appeared indifferent or
insensitive to the views and feelings of other leaders. Impatient at what
he considered their excessive caution and timidity, and their attachment
to old and traditional ties, forgetful of his own youth and sometimes
reluctant to show the deference due to age and experience in Africa, Nkrumah
tended rather to berate or patronise when he might instead have used his
considerable charm and undoubted political talent to further his own cause
and that of Africa as a whole.
Mali Federation and Entente
Nkrumah was also partly responsible - if only in a negative sense
through his radical policies, his aggressive tactics and his alliance-with
Sekou Toure - for the emergence at the end of 1958 of two further sub-regional
groupings in West Africa. These were exclusively French-speaking in
membership, mainly defensive in character and intensely competitive in
outlook : contending with one another for French support, Western investment,
and African involvement. Each was attempting, but by different means and
with very unequal success, to redress the situation created by Guinea's
independence and her defection from the French camp.
The French reprisals, ill conceived and crudely executed, had
quickly failed in their initial purpose as Guinea was soon able to tap
new sources of support, both African and international. Even as an example
to other Francophone states in the region they were less effective than
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was originally hoped, postponing independence by one or two years at most.
The French government, which was experiencing difficulties with its army
in Algeria and problems with its parliamentary majority back home, soon
had little alternative but to concede to other African territories what
it had so stubbornly refused in the case of Guinea. Confronted by the
challenge from the radical alliance the Francophone states of West Africa
were left largely to their own devices : to improvise what means they could
to contain the dissidence and restore order in a region they had long
considered their own. The result was one of the more successful and enduring
experiments in inter-state cooperation, the Council of the Entente, and one
of the most spectacular and short-lived failures - the Mali Federation.
Underlying these two sub-regional groupings were the growing
divisions in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties among the Francophone
states and their leaders. In West Africa these divisions centred around
the political and economic rivalry of the two principal contenders for
power, Senegal and Ivory Coast. Senegal was traditionally the leader of the
Francophone states as its capital, Dakar, doubled as the administrative
headquarters of French West Africa, the larger of the two federations through
which France ruled her black African empire. During the 'fifties, however,
the Senegalese economy was quickly overtaken by that of the Ivory Coast which
then became, for a time, the major economic force in the region, eclipsing
Ghana but soon threatened in its turn by the enormous size and economic
potential of independent Nigeria. The dominant figure in Ivory Coast politics,
Felix Houphouft-Boigny, had long advocated political devolution in French
West Africa, seeing no good reason why prosperous Ivory Coast should be taxed
to support her impoverished neighbours or to maintain the primacy of Dakar
rather than develop her own ca pital at Abidjan.
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Houphougt-Boigny was a staunch nationalist who seems to have
valued economic prosperity more highly than political independence but
was nevertheless determined to achieve both. To this end he had helped
organise the African Democratic Rally (R.D.A.) in the post-war years with
branches in most of the territories and an early reputation for militancy.
After 1951, however, he saw no disadvantage in quickly coming to terms with
the colonial administration in the Ivory Coast particularly as such limited
collaboration appeared to offer the best means of generating rapid economic
growth and of guaranteeing the social and political stability upon which
continued growth depended. Long regarded as the leader of the conservative
Francophone states in Africa, Houphougt-Boigny was often able to use his
old R.D.A. connections in other states to ensure the support if not always
the loyalty of their leaders. Where party connections were not enough he
might urge the French authorities to apply discreet but firm pressure to
secure the desired result.
The prestige of the Senegalese leader, Leopold Senghor, was perhaps
greater outside Africa, particularly in the French National Assembly where
his contributions on constitutional matters were much appreciated, not least
because of his legal expertise and his emphasis on France's continuing role
in Africa. And this notwithstanding his support for various liberal measures
intended to secure the civil and political rights of Africans and meant to
prepare the African territories for an early independence. Inside Senegal
his authority was secure, although the spectacle of a devout Catholic
at the head of a predominantly Moslem population was a subject of much
comment elsewhere. Outside Senegal, however, Senghor lacked the extensive
party base and the inter-territorial organisation of his main French-speaking
rival, Houphougt-Boigny. His own party, the Overseas Independents (I.O.M.),
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was without mass support in Africa and functioned primarily as a
17/	
Paris-
based pressure group. - Senghor was accustomed to lead but, relying
as he did on verbal skills and intellectual argument, he was less successful
than his rivals in creating a direct popular following for himself or in
giving stable institutional form to his many and overlapping personal
networks - based on ties of friendshi p , language and intellectual affinity.
On the major issues arising before independence Senghor was fairly
consistently out-manoeuvred by the Ivory Coast leader whose conservative
outlook and francophile views, whose voluntary collaboration with the colonial
administration, whose apparent lack of enthusiasm for African independence,
were all much closer to the mood of successive French governments after 1956.
It was as a member of the predominantly Socialist government, in 1956, that
Houphouft-Boigny helped draft the loi-cadre which conceded a broad measure
of autonomy to the territories comprising French West and Equatorial Africa,
thus hastening the ultimate demise of the parent federations. Senghor had
opposed the loi-cadre and, as the pace of decolonisation auickened after
Ghana's independence in 1957, he made a strong and determined bid to reverse
the trend to 'fragmentation' in West Africa and to work instead for the
independence of the Federation as a whole. A new political coalition, the
Party for African Re-grouping (P.R.A.), was formed in Dakar, in March 1958,
with support from a number of R.D.A. leaders, including Sekou Tour, who
18/
were opposed to what they described as the 'balkanisation" of Africa. -
When it seemed, however, that Houphouft-Boigny might yet be defeated
on this crucial issue, Senghor lost one of his major allies and the coalition
began to fragment. Toure's uncompromising decision to opt for immediate
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independence in 1958 not only eliminated one of the more outspoken advocates
of Federation but also removed one of the Federation's more affluent
members, making it that much less attractive to the others. Senghor nevertheless
persisted with his proposal - this time for a Mali Federation based on
existing road and rail links between coastal Senegal and the land-locked
states to the East, and on the social and economic ties that united the
various peoples of the Sahel. He presented the Federation as the one means
by which member-states might achieve an early independence without risking -
as in the case of Guinea - diplomatic and financial isolation. However, when
three other West African states - the Soudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey -
attended the exploratory meeting, held in Bamako in December 1958, to
consider the structure of the future Federation, Houphoudt-Boigny again
intervened, offering his Francophone neighbours what he described as inter-
African "ties of solidarity in the domains of justice, civil service, labour,
19/public health, and tariffs in a conseil d'entente."	 - Where he had
once attacked the Federation for diverting his country's resources to other
and less deserving causes, he was now ready to share those same resources
with any who would identify with the proposed Entente. Even this condition
was made less onerous by the loose and flexible nature of the Entente's
political and economic arrangements, where the Mali Federation, by its
very nature, could not operate without some delegation of sovereign powers
on the part of its constituents.
The appeal of the Mali Federation, as Houphoudt-Boigny rightly
perceived when he sought to counteract it, lay in the material and political
advantages that it offered rather than in any sentimental attachment to the
former Federation or to the ideal of African unity. Neighbouring Soudan
was dependent on Senegal for access to the sea and, consequently, for much
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of its trade and most of its communications. Upper Volta was seeking
economic advantage from whatever source but was anxious, too, to decrease
its traditional dependence on the Ivor y Coast. West African unity also
had attractions for Dahomey whose large surplus of educated cadres had
traditionally found employment within the Federation and at Dakar. While the
old Federation might have been costly, inefficient and remote from the majority
of its constituents, political inde pendence for many of the West African
territories would simply mean increased isolation and even greater economic
dependence on France. Where Senegal and the Ivory Coast could go it alone,
the impoverished states of the Sahel could not, and cannot now, afford to be
left out of any viable grouping of West African states, which is why they
are members of so many of the inter-state organisations active in the region.
Where Toure and Nkrumah had failed to persuade President Tubman
that Liberia should join forces with them, so too Mauritania withheld its
support from the Mali Federation, even accusing its leaders of encouraging
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a secessionist movement in the Senegal River Valley. 20- 	 It was Senegal
and the Soudan who finally combined in January 1959 to form the Mali
Fedbration, intended by Senghor as the nucleus of a much wider grouping of
the Francophone states within the region. The Federation, which received its
independence in June 1960, was structured so that the leaders of Senegal
and the Soudan became the president and prime minister, respectively, of
the new state. Unfortunately, the two constituente_ failed to cooperate
either before or, more particularly,after independence : partly because
of national rivalry, partly because the ideologies of the two ruling parties
were scarcely compatible, and partly because of the marked discrepancy in
their levels of social and economic development. The Soudanese soon came
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to resent the dominant position of Senegal which they believed was working
to their disadvantage.
As the example of the Entente also shows, inter-dependence, especially
between land-locked and coastal states, is as likely to produce tension and
conflict as it is to promote integration. And the disadvantages of operating
a two-member federation, whose units are at different levels of development,
and whose leaders subscribe to opposing economic doctrines, are likely to
off-set any advantages to be derived from camplementarity. Even their
respective size and scale and their geographical location made Senegal and
Mali an ill-assorted pair, despite their common border. The Federation
broke up within eighteen months of its formation and two months after
receiving independence. Its collapse re-kindled old antagonisms within the
region and left a residue of animosity between the two former partners that
persisted long afterwards.
The Federation would probably not have lasted in any case as the
prospect of an early independence with continuing French aid, which was
widely seen as one of its most attractive features, was soon available to all
who requested it and on even better financial terms. The French, having
conceded independence to the new Mali Federation within the Franco-African
Community and without loss of economic privileges, then came under immediate
and strong pressure from members of the Entente to agree a similar but even
more favourable package. Houphoudt-Boigny's success in extracting from the
French the offer of independence for members of the Entente, with improved
financial aid and without the irksome restrictions imposed by membership
of the Community, coincided with the final collapse of the Mali Federation.
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More important, it marked the effective end of the Community as a viable
entity. There was no longer any incentive for African states to join and
with the French unable to exercise their former prerogatives in the matters
of defence, foreign policy and financial affairs, the Community likewise
22/lost most of its appeal for Paris. -
Meanwhile the Council of the Entente, originally conceived as
the Union du Benin-Sahel but with more limited objectives, was established
on May 29, 1959. Houphougt-Boigny was the moving figure behind the alliance
which was organised primarily to counteract the influence of the rival
Ghana-Guinea Union. The Entente constituted a kind of wedge separating
the two radical states and adding a territorial dimension to the French
programme of sanctions designed to achieve much the same end. Eventually
its members would not only form a cordon sanitaire around Ghana but would
also be well placed to offer moral support and material incentives to those
Francophone states most receptive to economic and political penetration
from Africa's most populous state, Nigeria.
In any case the Entente quickly outgrew its origins and evolved
into a flexible, multi-purpose grouping well adapted for a variety of roles,
usually defensive and designed to safeguard the stability of the sub-region
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and the prosperity of its leading member, the Ivory Coast. - There was
the need, firstly, to protect and secure the area's ties with France
threatened by the dissidence of Guinea and her subsequent alliance with Ghana.
It was also i,mportant to minimise and contain the unwelcome pressures arising
from Guinea's independence and her radical policies - in a region already
receptive to the progressive ideas generated by the Algerian war and by the
nationalist movements in Ghana and Nigeria. Even more urgent was the need
to counter the threat to the economic well-being of the Ivory Coast, and
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in particular her ties with Upper Volta, posed by the expansionist designs
of the Mali Federation on the one hand, and Nkrumah's projected Union of
African States on the other. Certainly the Ivory Coast would not again
accept a subordinate position in Francophone West Africa, where Senegal
was likely to remain her most serious competitor.
Finally, Guinea's defection had further weakened the cohesion of
the Francophone states as they were about to confront the challenge from
an independent and strong, even 	 apolitically unstable ,Nigeria. The Entente
was intended to remedy that weakness, and off-set the undoubted attractions
of the Nigerian market for her Francophone neighbours. Nigeria's large land
area, her active and resourceful population, her agricultural surpluses,
her largely untapped mineral wealth and her enormous oil potential, scarcely
realised at independence in 1960, already made her, within West Africa, the
major potential rival to any Francophone grouping or individual country.
Where the threat to the Ivory Coast from Ghana and Guinea was political and
ideological in character but with possible adverse consequences for stability
and economic growth within the Entente, the challenge from Nigeria was
primarily economic, impossible to isolate, more difficult to contain, and,
given a stable administration and effective government in Lagos, was
destined not only to persist but also to grow.
The inspiration for the Entente was (and remains) largely political
in character. Above all there was the need to safeguard the Ivory Coast's
much vaunted economic "miracle" by maintaining the flow of French and overseas
investment while at the same time securing the annual influx of cheap
immigrant labour from the land-locked states to the North, particularly Upper
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Volta, and the desire for other West African states to join his proposed
Mali Federdtion.2 -4/ But, in the short term at least, it was Ghana's
expansionist policy, under Nkrumah, that posed the most serious threat to the
Ivory Coast and to the political stability on which foreign investment depended
The Entente attempted, therefore, turn Ghana's flank by including within the
grouping Niger, on her northern frontier, and later, in 1965, her eastern
neighbour, Togo. Niger, whose leader, Hamani Diori, was a close friend of
HouphoEet-Boigny and an old collaborator in the R.D.A., also provided the
essential link with Dahomey, the remaining member of the Entente. Their
inclusion in the alliance may also have been intended, as we have suggested,
to counter the obvious economic attractions for these Francophone states of
their formidable, English-speaking neighbour, Nigeria. If that was indeed
the object then the Entente was much less successful in that direction.
Although its formation was the result of political factors, the
Entente has nevertheless operated primarily as an economic sub-regional
grouping. It owes its survival mainly to the continuing prosperity of the
Ivory Coast and its own redistributive mechanisms, notably the
Fonds du Solidarite (Solidarity Fund), whereby member-states can share in
the surplus generated by their more successful partner, without themselves
making more than a token contribution. By contrast, the political
arrangements are extremely flexible. The Entente was "fashioned in conformity
with the principles giouphotiet-Boigny7 had expressed in drafting the
25/
Loi-cadre." - From the outset he was opposed to the creation of any
supra-national organisation and insisted instead on maintaining the autonomy
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of each member state. Decisions, taken by the Heads of State or their
representatives, had to be unanimous, while membership was voluntary, based
largely on economic self-interest, and confined to the Francophone states.
Houphouft-Boigny stressed the need for close relations with France and
hoped for some coordination of his partners' foreign policies.
Member states declined, however, to adopt common political
institutions or to harmonise their constitutional arrangements as originally
proposed. The Community Court, intended to arbitrate disputes involving
members, was not set up. Even Houphouft-Boigny's ambitious proposals for
dual nationality, which seemed to offer greater security to the large
immigrant populations of the Ivory Coast, had to be abandoned in 1966
26/
after growing opposition from the ruling party there. -
	 It was
initially expected that the Entente would form a customs union and that
policies on financial affairs, labour, the civil service, health, public
works and telecommunications would soon be harmonised. By the mid-'sixties,
however, the customs union had failed to materialise and it had become
increasingly difficult to formulate common policies even in the technical
27/domain. -
Indeed, the very social and economic ties that bound the Ivory
Coast to its partners, were themselves a frequent source of serious discord.
The land-locked states resented their dependence on the transit facilities
accorded them by the more prosperous coastal states and at a price they
considered exorbitant. Moreover, it was their immigrant populations that
helped maintain the high levels of production in the Ivory Coast and
elsewhere in the South, and yet the same immigrants were vulnerable to
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occasional outbursts of 'Xenophobia and violence, particularly in periods
of economic stagnation and depression. Nor was this confined to migrant
labour from the Sahel. Skilled and white collar workers and traders
from other coastal states were equally liable to sudden and seemingly
arbitrary reprisals, including confiscation of their goods, occupation of
their premises and sometimes expulsion. Even before independence, riots in
Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast, in October 1958, had led to the
sudden departure of large numbers of Dahomeans and Togolese employed there.
Such incidents created tensions between the respective governments and an
atmosphere of mutual recrimination that would persist for years inhibiting
any chance of political or economic grouping or cooperation at a sub-regional
(or regional) level.
While the major colonial languages may have made it easier
for independent governments to communicate with one another - across much
of West Africa and, indeed, at the continental level - they also created
fairly rigid linguistic barriers, particularly between the French and
English speaking states. Fortunately, in West Africa, this barrier was
breached quite early by the 'union' of Guinea and Ghana, based on personal
affinity between their respective leaders and ideological compatibility.
Unfortunately, that same union would soon provoke other, more damaging
divisions, this time largely ideological in character and by no means
confined to West Africa. Although the ideological confrontation began at
last to recede in 1963, the quarrels in West Africa resulting from Guinea's
initial break with France would nevertheless persist, rooted as they were
not only in differences of ideology among the Francophone leaders, but also
in their contrasting personalities and temperaments, and in rivalries that
had their origins in the nationalist movement itself.
•
63.
As the leading Francophone states in West Africa, the Ivory
Coast and Senegal were also those most directly affected by Guinea's
independence and her subsequent alliance with Ghana. The Ivory Coast
borders on Guinea, Ghana and the Soudan (Mali), all of whom would be
associated with Nkrumah's Union of African States. Moreover, the Ivory
Coast and Guinea also shared a history of political agitation in the R.D.A.
where, however, their collaboration had become increasingly strained as
Toure, Houphouft-Boigny's protege, had remained loyal to the party's early
militant and radical traditions long after his patron had abandoned them
in the interests of his country's stability, recognition of his party by the
French, and concessions in the direction of internal autonomy and greater
decentralisation within the West African Federation. It was on the question
of the Federation and its future that Tour e had finally parted company with
his older and more conservative colleague. Where Houphoudt-Boigny saw
the Federation as inhibiting his country's otherwise spectacular economic
growth, Toure had criticised the loi-cadre as promoting "balkanisation" and
perpetuating French rule and influence. Until the eve of Guinea's independence
in 1958, Toure had campaigned vigorously for a re-organised and independent
Federation grouping the Francophone states of the region.
Toure's defiant stand in 1958 therefore removed one of the
strongest supporters of Federation and greatly strengthened those, including
Houphouet-Boigny, working for a separate autonomy for each of the constituent
territories. But Houphouft-Boigny could not be expected to approve a
hastily improvised independence that promised poverty rather than riches,
threatened the region's close ties with France and the-prospect of further
French and Western investment; an independence, moreover, that endangered
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Houphouet-Boigny's country's relations with neighbouring states like
Upper Volta, whose surplus of cheap, unskilled labour was, as we have seen,
a major factor, along with diversification and foreign investment,in the
Ivory Coast's rapid economic development. To Bouphouft-Boigny, the
independence of Guinea seemed at once to threaten both the stability of the
region and the new-found prosperity of his country.
Senghor, the Senegalese leader, who had remained outside the
RDA and considered himself a socialist, was nevertheless among the first
of the African leaders to campaign for independence and an and to colonial
rule. This made it all the more difficult for him to condemn Tour's
decision - although Guinea's independence probably removed the last
remaining chance for the creation of the strong and independent West African
Federation to which Senghor and Senegal were wholly committed. Senghor
nevertheless differed from Toure in insisting that independence could only
be real in the context of an interdependence, both political and economic,
which involved 'meaningful' cooperation between the European nations, or
28/
'northern neighbours', and the 'southern' or African countries. - This
was the very antithesis of the position defended by Sekou Toure, in 1958
and afterwards, and by Nkrumah in his later writings on "neo-colonialism".
But, for Senghor, effective cooperation was possible only between independent
states. Hence the tenor and direction of his political activities in the
'fifties and his opposition to colonial rule which made him increasingly
suspect - not only to the French fighting a long, expensive and ultimately
inconclusive war against the Algerian nationalists, but to those on the
other side who could not appreciate his complex motivation or his continued
identification with France.
65.
The key to Senghor's behaviour was his determination to avoid
any rupture between Africa on the one hand, and Europe - particularly France -
on the other. Otherwise his twin aims in the region were an early
independence for Senegal and the remaining Francophone states, and the
prompt reconstitution of the old West African Federation which had done
much to promote Senegal's economy and to guarantee her long predominance -
within French West Africa. Like Houphoudt-Boigny, Senghor had no wish to
take independence without a guarantee of continuing French economic and
political support. Otherwise, he maintained, Senegal and her neighbours
could have at best only an artificial independence. But, unlike
Houphouet-Boigny, Senghor had every reason to support a revival of the
Federation, in decline throughout the 'fifties, if only because of the
obvious advantages that accrued to Senegal in the form of investment,
industrialisation, and infrastructure - to say nothing of prestige.
By the late 'fifties the desire for independence was already
strong in many of the French West African territories - influenced by the
example of independent Ghana and later Nigeria in the East, and of Tunisia
and Morocco to the North, and by the intellectual ferment resulting from
the Algerian insurrection and from Guinea's bold gesture in 1958. Senghor
may have felt the need to act promptly to neutralise such pressures which
could otherwise be exploited by his - and France's - opponents within the
region. An independent Federation of French-speaking West African states,
participating, alongside France, in a Community of independent and autonomous
states seemed to offer the best opportunity for securing existing links
29/between the two continents and for promoting the idea of Eurafrique. -
The refusal of the French, in 1958, to concede independence as distinct
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from autonomy, led to the sudden withdrawal of Guinea, undermined Senghor's
original design for a large and comprehensive Mali Federation, and was a
cause of continuing dissatisfaction within the Franco-African Community.
It certainly contributed to the failure of both schemes and to the subsequent
tensions within the sub-region.
Despite these setbacks, Senghor would continue to promote re-
groupment at all levels from the sub-regional to the inter-continental and,
in the 'sixties at least, was more sympathetic to cooperation across
linguistic lines than his conservative colleague in the Ivory Coast who
increasingly saw himself as the natural leader of the Francophone forces in
Africa. While both leaders worked to promote Francophone unity, Senghor
was more concerned than Houphouft-Boigny to improve relations with his
immediate neighbours, Guinea and Mali, and to secure their reconciliation
30/
with France and the surrounding Francophone states. - Senghor's problems
with the Gambia, an English-speaking enclave surrounded by Senegal with
independent access to the Atlantic, no doubt also influenced his views and
may have made him more receptive to the idea of a bi-lingual community - not
unlike the Cameroon - joining Senegal and the Gambia in the first instance
and, ultimately, all the states of West Africa.
Meanwhile Bouphoudt-Boigny's energies were directed, instead,
to the consolidation of the Entente and the continued and enforced
isolation of Ghana, Guinea and their allies within the region, and to the
extension of OCAM to include former Belgian Cbut French-speaking) states
like Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) and Ruanda. Given a favourable opportunity
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and a government in Paris sympathetic to the idea, he was even prepared
to attempt the dismemberment of Nigeria, which he saw increasingly as the
real political and economic threat to the Francophone countries of the
region and to the Ivory Coast, the Francophone "shop-window" of West Africa.
Guinea, the other key French-speaking state in the region, and,
like Senegal and the Ivory Coast, linking coast with hinterland, would
appear to have been a willing and likely partner in any scheme for regional
integration : if only because of its isolation after 1958, its exclusion
from the Francophone community, its early dependence on the generosity and
support of others within Africa, and its vast mineral reserves - but with
insufficient capital to secure their effective exploitation. While, for
geographical reasons alone, the cooperation of Guinea and its President,
Selcou Toure, was vital to the success of such a scheme, this should have
presented no great problem as Tour4 was, himself, a staunch Pan-Africanist.
Moreover, his position as President and head of the ruling party in Guinea,
the PDG, was unique and unassailable, the more so as he placed his personal
talents and undoubted popularity at the disposal of the party he had founded,
thereby providing a solid institutional base for his regime.
Cooperation between Toure and his Francophone colleagues and
neighbours was, however, extremely difficult to achieve, not least because of
his pronounced anti-French and anti-imperialist views and his determined and
0
relentless opposition to "neo-colonialism". After 1958 Toure would remain
steadfast in defending the dignitt cif his people and his country's
independence. His Francophone neighbours were often criticised in the harshest
language for their close ties with France and their failure to adopt radical
postures on a variety of important issues. The outcome of all this was that,
while Guinea occasionally enjoyed "normal" relations with either Senegal
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or the Ivory Coast, after 1958 she was seldom on good terms with both
and for much of the time their relations were hostile, poor, or non-existent.
The real rapport only came in 1980, some twenty-two years after independence,
and thanks to the efforts of various African leaders in the region who had
worked hard towards this much needed reconciliation.
Although the first years of independence were dominated by the
debate about African unity, circumstances were not conducive to political
or economic cooperation within the region as a whole. The West African
states and their leaders were deeply involved in the main issues of the day -
Algeria, and soon the Congo and Morocco's claims on Mauritania - but on
=posing sides. The division between French and English-sneaking states,
inherited from the colonial rulers, was complicated by rival alliances
that straddled the linguistic barrier and were largely ideological. Economic
nationalism and political rivalry were soon so pronounced as to afford
little opportunity for serious consideration of the region's long-term
development and of the economic strategies and political arrangements from
which all might have benefitted. Indeed, economic issues were temporarily
overshadowed by what seemed, at the time, more immediate and more urgent
political considerations. Until this imbalance in priorities was corrected,
until the various quarrels were resolved or mechanisms devised to limit
their effects, and until the linguistic and ideological divisions were
somehow surmounted, governmental policies and planning could not begin to
reflect a regional dimension. But a start had been made and the seed of
later sub-regional, regional and continental groupings had been sown. It
only remained for West African leaders to water the seed, tend the seedling,
and encourage its growth to full maturity and final fruition.
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CHAPTER 3 
CONTINUING SEARCH FOR COOPERATION IN WEST AFRICA
1960-65
Sub-regional groupings like the Ghana-Guinea Union and its
competitors were soon to be overtaken by events that seemed to favour
the organisation of wider continental-type alliances - wherein the leading
West African protagonists nevertheless continued to play-the major role.
This new trend reflected the rivalries inevitable among an already large
and quickly growing body of independent African rulers, whose divisions
were aggravated by the great disparities in size, wealth and cohesion of
the units they administered. There was the continuing problem of political
instability and the consequent risk of external intervention - whether from
other African states or from non-African powers. The new patterns of
alliance in the early 'sixties evolved out of a series of distinct but
overlapping issues, involving French-administered or, in the case of the
former Belgian Congo, French-speaking states. They included the protracted
struggle for Algerian independence : the claim by Morocco to a substantial
part of Mauritania, hitherto administered by France but now to receive
independence along with the other French West African territories; and the
chaotic aftermath of Belgian colonial administration in Congo-Leopoldville
(later Congo-Kinshasa and finally Zaire).
These problems, confined as they were to various parts of Africa,
nevertheless raised issues of more general and more immediate concern that
affected not only individual African states but the future of the continent
as a whole. They included not only the pace and manner of de-colonisation; or
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the independence, sovereignty and frontiers of the new states, but also
their relations with one another; and their place within the international
system. Ideology served not only to aggravate but also to perpetuate the
divisions : it soon led to the emergence of rival coalitions while the
issues themselves assumed such importance as to rule out any possibility
of an early compromise. By the end of 1960 even the more radical Pan-
Africanists were ready to abandon the principle of 'universality' in favour
of some degree of 'exclusiveness' as they moved towards the creation of
"frankly partial organisations" - with, hopefully, common objectives
and a shared ideology. Ghana, Guinea, Mali and their North African allies
abandoned the search for a modus vivendi with the moderate and conservative
West African leaders and tried instead to form a smaller, more cohesive group
that could act effectively and promptly at all levels to realise the aims
of its members.
The result was the Casablanca bloc of states, formed in January
1961, continental in outlook but selective in membership. - If ideology
was the major factor in the creation of the group, its small and dispersed
membership, and their often contrasting interests and conflicting priorities,
would later become a serious disadvantage. For the moment, however, and on
the major issues the lines were already clearly drawn. On the Congo the
Casablanca states favoured Patrice Lumumba, the Prime Minister, who wanted
to terminate Katangan secession by the use of force and who was openly
sympathetic to Nkrumah's Pan-African proposals - just as they opposed the
conservative President, Joseph Kasavubu, who supported more conciliatory
policies, clashed frequently with Lumumba and finally dismissed him. On
North Africa the Casablanca group favoured unconditional and immediate
French withdrawal from Algeria and were sympathetic to Morocco's territorial
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claim on Mauritania. At the same time they subscribed to the principle
of African political union and the creation of an Africa High Command. -
Such an aggressive stance soon aroused the opposition of most of
the moderate African states, both French- and English-speaking, whose
numbers were swollen by rapid de-colonisation at the be ginning of the
'sixties. Indeed, the decision to proceed with the formation of the
Casablanca group was itself a major political blunder as the radical leaders
thereby assumed the responsibility for splitting Africa and at the same time
advertised both their isolation and their numerical inferiority. Most
African states were already moving quickly to a position where they recognised
existing frontiers as the only valid ones, rejected force as a means of
settling inter-African disputes, and insisted that any future community of
African states must be based on respect for the sovereignty and integrity
of its individual members. Hence their support for President Kasavubu in
the Congo, their reluctance to sanction the use of force as long as there
remained any prospect of a negotiated settlement, and their rejection of
intervention other than by forces acting under the UN and with the approval
of the Security Council.
The Brazzaville Group 
Whereas the Casablanca bloc, in organisational as well as in
ideological terms, represented a new and radical departure from previous
patterns of African organisation, it was at a distinct disadvantage in
competing with the more 'conservative' Francophone states who had behind
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them a long tradition and experience of administrative integration and
political cooperation, albeit at a regional rather than a continental
level. Given their Shared colonial background, common language and similar
formation, most of the black Francophone leaders were better placed at this
time to operate effectively at a continental level than either their British
counterparts, or the various radical states. Indeed, as the Casablanca
states were planning their new organisation and attem pting to concert their
strategy, a corresponding movement among the black Francophone states was
already, far advanced.
From Brazzaville to Addis Ababa
The black Francophone states, unlike their more insular English-
speaking counterparts in West Africa, had a long experience of centralised
government under the French, with two separate colonial administrations
integrated on a regional basis. - While the trend in the 'fifties had
been away from the large federal units re presented by French West and
Equatorial Africa, and towards the eventual independence of their many
constituents, there remained after independence a substantial legacy of
interdependence and cooperation and not just at the regional level.
This was reinforced by inter-state arrangements such as the Franc zone, grouping
most of West and Equatorial Africa as well as Madagascar, and the various
stabilisation funds - although the latter were quickly phased out after
independence. In West Africa, there was the West African Monetary Union
amvo with its common currency or CFA franc issued by the Central Bank of
the West African States (BCF,A0), and the much less successful West African
Customs Union established in 1961 but on the basis of an earlier French
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initiative of 1959. Political and economic cooperation among the
independent Francophone States was further encouraged by French programmes
of aid and technical assistance while new forms of cooperation were devised
by the African states themselves after independence, one of the more
profitable being Air Afrique, created in 1961 by some eleven Francophone
states in conjunction with the two French airlines already operating
there.
Despite the initial euphoria of inde pendence, which was soon
dissipated, there remained among the Francophone states a certain nostalgia
for the old ties that had united them - at least on a regional basis - under
colonial rule. As genghor later explained:
One always feels a certain nostalgia for a community.
/Which is why? all the states of the former French
West and French Equatorial Africa continue to feel a
sense of nostalgia for the old federation rand why7 such
sentiments play an important part in our proposal for
a Francophone Community.
But the major reason for heightened cooperation and improved inter-state
organisation was, at least initially, defensive in character. B y reason
of their small population and the paucity of their economic resources, most
of the Francophone states were intensely vulnerable to political, economic
and, on occasion, even military pressure. At the same time they were unable
as individual states to influence events in Africa which - in Algeria as in the
Congo, or the dispute over Mauritania - directly affected many of them.
Felix Houphoudt-Boigny expressed this view succinctly after one of his
frequent meetings with General de Gaulle:
5/
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Everyone knows that small and weak states, when
they are isolated, are likely to get rough justice
in this harsh world. Not only does French aid enable
us to develop but, thanks to it, we have a Iheut7 sense
of lour own) strength.
Their continued attachment to France - attested to by the treaties
of cooperation, and in some cases defence agreements, quickly negotiated
and approved by the newly independent African governments - earned them
the hostility of the more radical African states without, however, providing
an unconditional guarantee of continuing French benevolence and military
assistance if and when required. Indeed, the Francophone states were almost
as concerned to secure their political and economic interests against those
of the French Metropole as they were to defend their common frontiers against
armed aggression from hostile neighbours. Already France's continuing
economic integration within the EEC was threatening the privileged trading
position of former African possessions and at a time of rapidly falling
commodity and mineral prices and deteriorating terms of trade. Nor would it
be long before France began to exercise a certain discretion in the choice of
those African leaders whom it would support against their domestic opponents.
The French, for their part, were no less anxious to keep their
commercial contacts and to expand their investments in Africa wherever
possible - even beyond the old colonial frontiers. President de Gaulle,
whose ties to Africa and its leaders were as much personal as political,
attached particular importance to maintaining France's sphere of influence
- in black Africa, seeking to exclude rival powers and always readypas in
Congo-Leopoldville in 1960 and Nigeria in 1968, to try to extend French
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influence at the expense of her West European partners and allies. In
return for French assistance the Francophone states were also expected to
give loYalaf not always an instinted ) support to France in international and
African councils, notably on matters closely affecting French economic and
strategic interests. The French government was visibly upset, and General
de Gaulle personally affronted, by Guinea's last minute defection from the
Projected Franco-African Community and her 'premature' independence. When
a harsh and hastily improvised programme of economic and administrative
sanctions failed to reverse the Guinean decision - and this may not have
been its primary intention - the French hastily reviewed their own policy
on Africa and conceded independence in June, 1960, to the recently formed
Mali Federation without economic or financial penalty. They thereby
removed a strong incentive for other black Francophone states to accept
a limited autonomy within the Community.
Moreover, the break with Conakry in 1958 strengthened General de
Gaulle's now legendary suspicions of British and American involvement in
Africa, as in other areas of the world - apparently confirmed when the
American government offered assistance to the new regime in Guinea - and
his determination, reinforced by African pressure, particularly from the
Ivory Coast, to contain the political 'contagion'unleashed by Ghana's
independence and her subsequent alliance with Guinea. The French, along
with most of the Francophone rulers in Africa, had every reason to oppose
the policies of the Ghanaian leader : not least Nkrumah's socialist ideology
and his growing ties with the East European and Communist states - although
France was herself at this time actively promoting trade and other links
with the same socialist states. But the main basis for French opposition
was Nkrumah's hostility to the kind of cooperation that was such a central
feature of France's policy in independent Africa, coupled with his support
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for opposition or secesSional movements in several neighbouring and
Francophone countries, including Togo, Ivory Coast and Niger, and his
support for liberation movements in territories still under colonial and,
in some cases, direct French control.
Developments in West and Central Africa after Ghana's independence
were hardly reassuring to governments in Paris trying to secure French
interests in those areas. Following the rapid disintegration of their former
African federations and with the Franco-African Community still-born,
they had also to contend with United Nations and American intervention in
the Congo, with the internationalisation of the Algerian war and the
rupture of diplomatic relations with Nigeria over the Saharan nuclear tests at
the beginning of 1961. The French badly needed an African leader able to
mount an effective counter-offensive and re-group
 the remnants of their former
empire. In this connection it is significant that France's Preferred ally in
Africa was not to be Senegal, leader of the old West African Federation, but
the Ivory Coast whose President, Houphouet-Boigny, was, like General de Gaulle
himself, a nationalist of conservative political and religious views, but
also a pragmatist, aware that only economic strength can confer a real
independence and an effective and lasting influence in world affairs. Aware,
too, that economic strength itself depends, in turn, on astute diplomacy
abroad coupled with sound and efficient administration at home.
Already Houphouet-Boigny's Privileged position as a member of the
French government in 1956 had helped him in his campaign to dismantle the
French West African Federation, wherein the Ivory Coast was but one constituent,
important but both politically and economically subordinate to its major rival,
Senegal. Again it was ffouphou8t-Boigny's determination to retain the
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initiative and to outmanoeuvre his West African rivals that led him, in
1960, to demand unconditional independence for the members of his Entente -
when he had previously shown no great enthusiasm for independence at all.
It was Homphouft-Boigny, too,who later caused General de Gaulle considerable
embarrassment by his refusal to lead his own country and his independent
partners in the Entente back into the France-African Community in 1961.
He himself had long expressed a clear preference for a more centralised
7/
community, federal in structure, but acknowledging French leadership. -
Worse, the Entente states subsequently refused a regional defence pact
with France, although all except Upper Volta did finally conclude such an
8/
agreement in 1961. - Houphouft-Boigny's economic and political demands
on France likewise embarrassed the Gaullist government which, until 1962,
had to confront a predominantly conservative and increasingly recalcitrant
parliament opposed to further concessions anywhere in Africa.
Despite these tensions in the early 'sixties and the (probably
inevitable' collapse of the Community experiment, there was a marked and
continuing, if always partial, convergence of views between France and the
Ivory Coast - based largely on mutual respect and a coincidence of economic
and political interest. This had begun with the lot-cadre of 1956-57, for
which Houphougt-Boigny had himself been largely responsible, and would
persist for at least another two decades. Having once secured his country's
autonomy within the West African Federation, having neutralised the implicit
threat from the proposed Mali Federation, and having taken the Ivory Coast
and its partners in the Entente, as independent states, out of the Franco-
African Community, Houphouft-Boigny moved quickly and predictably to strengthen
ties with the Metropole.
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He welcomed French investment and administrative and technical
assistance, while organising, as we have seen, an effective if small
coalition of Francophone-states to counter the threat from his radical
neighbours. His aim here coincided with several objectives of French
presidential policy : to minimise the attractiveness of the Toure e example
in Guinea, and to contain the challenge from Ghana and, more recently, from
Nigeria which had shown a surprising and unwelcome degree of independence -
not so much by rejecting in 1961 the proposed Anglo-Nigerian Defence Treaty,
which was of little immediate concern and no value to France anyway, but
by severing diplomatic relations with France that same year, following the
nuclear test programme in the Sahara, and by looking to her Francophone
neighbours to demonstrate their solidarity. Houphou gt-Boigny's success in
organising the Entente, and thereby securing his own state's relative
prosperity, was followed by his leading role in the Conference of Francophone
States at Abidjan that preceded the formation of the Brazzaville Group in
December 1960. In Paris he had long since been identified as one whose
cooperation was indispensable to the success of French designs not only in
West and Francophone Africa, but increasingly in Africa as a whole.
By comparison, Senghor's intellectual preoccupations, his democratic
socialism, liberal Catholic views and international style and interests were
less likely to recommend him to the French leadership after 1958. His
more imaginative projects, particularly for a French-speaking Commonwealth
or Community of independent states, may have struck a responsive chord
among Gaullists and perhaps even with General de Gaulle himself, who would
have grasped its potential utility but might not so readily have accepted
its egalitarian implications, or the many commitments it could entail, still
less the restrictions it would place on French intervention elsewhere in Africa.
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Consequently, Senegal was at a distinct disadvantage compared
with the Ivory Coast when it came to the economic inducements essential
to successful coalition-building in Africa. Moreover, Senghor's relations
with his immediate Francophone neighbours were always more difficult and
less stable than in the case of the Ivory Coast and its partners, who
formed a rather more homogeneous and somewhat more harmonious unit. Where
radical pressures, both external and internal, helped cement the unity
of the Entente, Senghor's likely partners included radicals like Toure and
Keita, alongside the moderate, if progressive ,President of Mauritania,
Quid Daddah.
Where the Ivory Coast provides a natural focus for the activities
of its neighbours to the North and particularly Upper Volta, the same cannot
be said of Senegal. Mali, despite its rail link with Dakar, was too large
and varied geographically not to experience the rival attractions of states
to both North and South, while Mauritania continued its slow but steady
evolution, begun in the last years of colonial rule, away from Senegal
and black Africa and towards the Arabic-speaking North Africa. Even the unity
of Senegal appeared somewhat precarious with the Gambia, an English-speaking
enclave, driving an unwelcome wedge between Dakar, the capital, and the
highly productive Casamance region in the far South of the country. -
Again, Senegal, with its predominantly Moslem population, and despite its
Catholic leader, was thought in France to be vulnerable to influences from
North Africa and the Middle East which were traditionally unsympathetic,
if not hostile, to French interests. Thus the very factors that had once
made Senegal the first object of French_ military attentions in West Africa,
now operated to discourage further European commercial involvement. French
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investors had little incentive to risk their capital here rather than in
the Ivory Coast with_its social and political stability, its largely
non-Muslim and predominantly Catholic population, and its economic "miracle".
It was therefore under the auspices of the Ivory Coast that
Francophone leaders gathered at Abidjan in October and agreed the agenda
they would discuss at Brazzaville at the end of 1960. The Brazzaville
group of twelve African states, which emerged from that conference, took
0/
shape the following March as the African and Malagasy Union (U
	
12,'
-
It rejected force as a possible solution to Africa's problems and recommended
instead dialogue and conciliation. On the major issues, Algeria, Mauritania
and the Congo, this seemed to place them in clear opposition to the radical
states, just as their conception of inter-African cooperation was initially far
removed from the kind of unity that the radical states wished to see imposed.
The third grouping formed shortly afterwards, in May 1961, was
that associated with the Liberian capital, Monrovia, and the country's
11/
President, William Tubman. - Presidents Hou phouft-Boigny and Senghor
were also closely involved in the preparations and, to some extent, Monrovia
appeared mainly as an extension of the Brazzaville group
 among the moderate
non-French-speaking states, including Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia and
Ethiopia, making a total of twenty out of a total of twenty-seven independent
African states. The aim seems to have been to create the broadest possible
coalition of moderate states on what seemed the most favourable terrain.
The radical states preferred to boycott the conference which nevertheless
marked a turning point in the fortunes of the rival blocs : after Monrovia
the Casablanca states were clearly on the defensive, while the Francophone
states emerged for the moment as the largest and most cohesive force in
African politics.
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Monrovia also marked the entry by an independent Nigeria onto
the expanding African scene. At Independence, in October 1960, the first
Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, had been quick to see and
appreciate the importance of Nigeria in the new scheme of things.
We must realise that Nigeria is emerging into a
difficult world, a world in which as the country
of the African Continent having by far the largest
population, we shall inevitably occupy an important
position the moment we become independent. A country
of thirty-five million people is bound to exert a
powerful influence, especially in its own part of the
world. Our slightest act, our every word, will have
repercussions among our neighbours and I am confident
that Nigeria will prove to be a stabilising force in
Africa and that our example will induce conditions
favourable to orderly progress and development.
Shortly afterwards Nigeria would engage in diplomatic efforts to find an
acceptable compromise solution to Africa's political, economic, social
and cultural problems. Having supported President Tubman's initiative
at Monrovia, Nigeria made another attempt to bring the two opposing African
13/blocs together - in Lagos in January 1962. - The conference was intended
to be a Pan-African gesture bridging once and for all the ideological divide.
However, the Casablanca states again declined to attend citing as a pretext
the absence of any invitation to the Provisional Government of Algeria -
which had yet to gain its independence - while Morocco complained of the
presence of a delegation from independent Mauritania. This was another
serious error on their part as it was at the Lagos meeting that an African
Charter was approved and subsequently ratified by member states. Much of
this Charter was later incorporated into that of the OAU.
Support for a summit conference of all independent African states
quickly gained ground during 1962, particularly as the disputes over Algeria,
12/
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the Congo and Mauritania died away. The Francophone states of the UAM had
no further objection to a continental organisation provided its charter
embraced the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference. The
Casablanca states could no longer be said to constitute a cohesive bloc
while Guinea and Mali were moving towards an early accommodation with the
moderate majority. Ghana was isolated and increasingly beset by domestic
problems, both political and economic, while the initiative had passed to
the Francophone and other moderate leaders. Indeed, agreement among the
Francophone states and their sup port for a conference of Heads of States
now seemed essential to the success of the enterprise. Hence the active
role played by "third parties" like the Nigerian Prime Minister , trafawa Balewa,
and the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, in promoting reconciliation
among the ',4res ennemis P . The President of the Ivory Coast himself was
engaged in constructive talks with both Sekou Toure and Modibo Keita at
14/the end of 1962. -
In May 1963, the Conference of African Heads of State and Government
opened in Addis Ababa and finally agreed a Charter for the Organisation of
African Unity. The Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was
particularly prominent in the proceedings, acting as spokesman for the
signatories of the Lagos Charter, while continuing to work towards the
consensus that had narrowly eluded him at the earlier Lagos meeting - and
in circumstances that were now much more propitious. He observed that:
It has always been our view in Nigeria that
personal contacts, and the exchange of ideas
are the basis of mutual understanding. I am
pleased that, from now on, there will be no
question of the so-called Monrovia and Casablanca
blocs. We all belong to Africa. 15/
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Nkrumah's proposals for a Union Government of African States failed
this time to win open and unequivocal support even from the other
Casablanca leaders. Instead, the conference listened sympathetically
as the Nigerian leader reiterated the views of his country - which
were also those of the great majority at Addis Ababa:
Nigeria's stand is that, if we want unity in
Africa, we must first agree to certain essential
things, The first is that African States must
respect one another. There must be acceptance of
equality by all the States. No matter whether
they are big or small, they are all sovereign and
their sovereignty is sovereignty.
African unity could only be achieved, he maintained, by taking
practical steps in economic, educational, scientific and cultural
cooperation and by:
	
 trying to get the Africans to understand
themselves before embarking on the more complicated
and more difficult arrangement of political union.
My country stands for the practical approach to the
unity of the African continent. we feel that, if 15/this unity
 is to last, we must start from the beginning. -
He considered Nkrumah's pro posal for the creation of an African Common
Market as "a very good idea but I must say that we in Nigeria feel it is
a very complicated matter." While a Common Market would be "good for the
trade of Africa" it was clear from his remarks that he preferred to start
with regional rather than continental economic groupings. He was pragmatic
in his approach opting for functional integration and gradualism, and it
was this policy that subsequent Nigerian leaders have continued. Sir
Abubakar went out of his way to reassure all African states, large and small,
15/
86.
of Nigeria's recognition of their sovereignty and equality. In an obvious
reference to Ghana he warned that they could not achieve African unity
"as long as some African countries continue to carry on subversive activities
in other African countries." 12/
Significantly, Sir Abubakar's cautious and conciliatory approach
won the support not only of the Monrovia states but also of members of the
Casablanca group - as President Nasser of the United Arab Republic joined
more conservative Francophone leaders like Senghor, Bourguiba of Tunisia, and
Tsiranana of Madagascar, in advising against haste and warning that "African
unity cannot be achieved overnight". President Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika
(later TanzaniaI also spoke in favour of the "step-by-step" approach to unity.
Thus the debate about African unity increasingly became a debate about the
virtues of regional economic cooperation which most speakers now saw as
offering the best prospects for the development of the continent.
From Addis Ababa (1963I to Accra (1965)
With the creation of the OAU it was widely assumed that the
various continental groupings, Casablanca, Monrovia and Brazzaville (or UAM)
would be quickly dissolved as the interests of their members could now be
accommodated within the framework of the new body. The first two readily
complied - indeed, the Casablanca bloc had begun to disintegrate long
before the Addis Ababa conference. The Francophone states continued,
however, to debate whether or not to maintain their separate organisation,
or confine it strictly to economic, technical and cultural matters. Sekou
Toure first raised the matter in May 1963, when he recommended the dissolution
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of the UAM in conformity with the views of the African majority in the OAU.
Then, as later, Houphouet-Boigny had shown himself determined to preserve
the UAM intact as a separate platform, within Africa, for the articulation
16/
and defence of Francophone (and French) interests. - N qr was this the last
occasion on which the President of the Ivory Coast would find himself out of
sympathy with a majority of the OAU : differences would arise later in
connection with the Congo (Zaire) in 1964-5 N Nigeria in 1968-9, and over the
question of 'dialogue' with South Africa at the end of the decade.
It must have been obvious to Houphou8t-Boigny that, in a body
like the OAU, with such a large and varied membership, French influence was
likely to be limited, while groupings such as the Entente and even the UAM
would not carry the same weight as before, or command the same respect or
enjoy the same degree of loyalty and cohesion. While the Francophone states
were numerically strong and their leadership was fairly homogeneous, they
were already beginning to diverge on a wide range of issues reflecting
their different regional and national perspectives, while their relations
with the former colonial power were far from uniform. This trend became
even more pronounced once the ideological issues, that had helped maintain
their cohesion at independence, started to recede after 1963. Hou phoudt-
Boigny seems, nevertheless, to have concluded that cohesion could be more
effectively maintained, and vital interests better protected, by retaining
the smaller body with its restricted membership.
But for many Francophone states the UAM and its leadership were
too closely identified either with French interests, or those of a particular
region (West Africa), sub-region (that of the Entente), or state (Ivory Coast).
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While same called for dissolution of the UAM, others would press for reform
o its structures, modification of its functions and a more responsive and
broad-based leadership. Even then the UAM could not be regarded, even by
Francophone states, as a suitable or adequate substitute for the OAU which
was recognised by the United Nations as the approoriate 'regional' agency
and was supported by the totality of independent African states. The OAU
thus had a legitimacy to which no other body, including the UAM, could
ever aspire. Moreover, the OAU offered its members a more imposing platform,
a wider range of options and greater discretion in the choice of allies.
With the result that whereas, after 1960, the Casablanca states had operated
at a clear disadvantage within the broad continental arena they had chosen, the
UAM and its 'successors', while still influential after 1963 and a force to
be reckoned with at all levels, were nevertheless clearly overshadowed by the
larger, more comprehensive body created at Addis Ababa.
It was not surprising then that, on the question of retaining the
UAM, Houphougt-Boigny should soon have found himself in a minority even.
among his Francophone colleagues. More remarkable, perha ps, were the
misgivings openly expressed by several of his partners in the Entente,
signalling a strong undercurrent of disaffection among the weaker states in
that organisation - perhaps because their 'inflated' expectations of
immediate and tangible benefits had so far been disapnointed, perhaps because
the Ivory Coast seemed to have its own reservations about the utility and
effectiveness of the alliance. To the government in Abidjan the Entente now
seemed too limited in scope, the allies too uncertain and infirm of purpose,
and their combined population and resource base too narrow, to provide the
17/kind of African platform that Houphouft-Eoigny now required. - Understandably,
the other Entente leaders did not take kindly to the notion that they might
be displaced by the UAM and relegated, albeit temporarily, to a subordinate
status.
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Even sympathetic critics, like the President of Upper Volta,
Maurice Yam4ogo, warned ffouphougt-Boigny that UAM members would be even
more vulnerable than before to the accusation that they were manipulated
by, and subservient to, French interests. "It must be made clear that
there can never again be two Africas, but only one, for which we must be
ready to sacrifice everything." 12/ Hamani Diori, President of Niger, went
even further than his colleague, maintaining that the Entente itself should
19/
be stripped of its political connotations in favour of the OAU. - Other
Francophone leaders, including PresidentMokhtarOuld Daddah of Mauritania,
reminded HOuphouft-Boigny that Addis Ababa had produced a very different
situation where an exclusively Franco phone body, particularly one with
political objectives would inevitably be seen both as a rival to the OAU
20/
and even as a deliberate affront to the other African states. - It would
advance neither their interests nor those of France nor those of Africa as
a whole. With its formal organisation and elaborate structures, which
Houphou8t-Boigny had initially opposed, and its political functions, which
he supported, continuation of the UAM seemed scarcely compatible with a
strong, effective OAU. Indeed, the Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs
would soon describe the UAM as an "enterprise of sabotage".
The President of Senegal, Leopold Senghor, saw the dissolution of
the UAM, where his principal rival had been so influential, as a means of
strengthening his own position among the Franco phone states and recovering
some of his former influence. Even more important, it was also a pre-
requisite for the full resumption of trade and other links between Senegal
and its immediate neighbours. Where Houphouft-Boigny had support from
Madagascar, which insisted that it needed the UAM to overcome its insularity
and compensate for its isolation from the African mainland, Senahor could
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reply that continuation of the UAM in its present form would just as
effectively isolate his country from the West African mainland. In the
words of a Dakar correspondent : "If the UAM disappears Madagascar would
once again become an island. If it does not	 it is Senegal ... that
will become an island." 21/
On the initiative of Senegal, preparations had been made, in 1963,
for the establishment of a sub-re gional organisation with strictly economic
objectives, i.e. to sponsor development along the length of the Senegal River.
This body, to be known after 1968 as the Organisation of States Bordering
the Senegal River COERS), would initially comprise Senegal, Mauritania, Mali,
and Guinea. It would be financed in the first instance by a five million
dollar grant from the Fonds Sp4ciesof the United Nations, and, from the
interest was seen by its prospective members as the nucleus of "a vast
2/	 •Common Market.' 2 - The river development scheme offered Senegal the best
prospects for early economic recovery and for a notable extension of her
sphere of influence within the region. For states like Guinea and Mali
there was the opportunity for resumption of normal trade and commerce and
for reconciliation with their Francophone neighbours - and with France who
alone could secure their ailing currencies and provide the necessary levels
of aid and investment. Once realised, the new community promised some
relief from their previous isolation and would effectively breach the
cordon sanitaire erected by the Ivory Coast and her Entente partners.
Guinea, however, insisted that it would sacrifice neither principles nor
independence to achieve these otherwise desirable goals. Sekou Toure
also seems to have warned Senghor that continuation of the UAM, in its
present form and with its strong conservative bias, would debar his country
23/from effective membership of the proposed sub-regional body. -
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Mali was more flexible since the break with France was not,
in its case, complete, while Modibo Keita still hoped to negotiate
favourable trade and transit arrangements with both Senegal and the Ivory
Coast, while retaining his close political links with Conakry. Mauritania
was also delicately placed, geographidally - on the extreme north-western
perimeter of black Africa. With her independence now secure, the country's
leaders wanted closer ties with the Arab states to the North and, particularly,
with socialist Algeria. They had no wish, therefore, to remain associated
with an exclusively Francophone community with distinctly conservative
connotations. Transformation of the UAM into an economic, technical and
cultural agency would enable Mauritania to align itself progressively with
the Maghreb countries, while membership of the OERS would serve not only to
confirm the country's vocation as a bridge between black and Arab cultures,
but would also help maintain the delicate internal balance between black and
Berber communities. 24/-
These arguments were not calculated to appeal to the Ivory Coast
leader who would have viewed them as so many additional reasons for retaining
the UAM or even strengthening it. Hounhou gt-Boigny would have no wish to
contribute to Senegal's economic recovery or witness the revival of its
former influence within the region. Nor was he ready for a rapprochement
with the leading radical states, whose activities on his frontiers he
considered a threat to his regime. Where Senghor offered recognition to his
radical neighbours to secure their political and economic cooperation,
and offered to mediate on their behalf with France, Houphouft-Boigny continued
instead to insist on the need for constant vigilance and effective counter-
measures if the threat of revolution was to be contained. It was no part
92.
of his policy that Guinea should emerge from her isolation - just as
he opposed French support for the development of Guinea's economy in
competition with his own. 2 / whereas there had been reconciliation at
Addis Ababa, the Ivory Coast leader had no wish to see a similar reconciliation
within West Africa and he looked to other Francophone states and to France to
cooperate with him in his new crusade. He maintained that the OAU, by itself,
would be ineffective in stemming the revolutionary tide in Africa which already
threatened states like the Congo (Zaire), the Cameroon Republic and the members
of the Entente. Hence the continuing need for an organisation like the UAM.
Notwithstanding French support for his position, the President of
the Ivory Coast was in a clear minority at the meeting in Dakar, in March 1964,
when the UAM and a parallel organisation, the OAMCE, primarily concerned with
economic matters, were both disbanded and replaced by the new African and
Malagasy Union for Economic Cooperation CUAMCE). 26/- As its name suggests the
new body, would be concerned solely with economic, technical and cultural
matters to the exclusion of Politics which was now the responsibility of the
OAU. It was a decision that Houphou gt-Boigny could not (and did not) accept
and the Ivory Coast continued to boycott the organisation during the ten
months of its existence. Three of the four Entente states were also absent
in April when the charter of the new organisation was finally signed -
the exception was Dahomey (Benin) whose leaders were then estranged from the
Entente. Nor was the French government prepared to intercede to secure
compliance by the Francophone states with the provisions of the charter,
notwithstanding appeals to this effect by Senegal and Mauritania. What did
most damage to the UAMCE, however, were the largely ineffectual attempts,
after 1963, to reverse the decline in radical fortunes in West Africa,
culminating in the abortive invasion of Niger in October 1964 by the opposition
Sawaba party in exile in Ghana.
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Ghana's reported involvement in this unprovoked and unsuccessful
attack lent support to the view, not only that the radical states
constituted a grave and immediate threat to the peace and security of
the region, and of Africa as a whole, but also that the fledgling OAU was
unable, despite its charter, to guarantee the territorial integrity of its
members. Earlier, there had been clear signs of division within the Entente,
doubtless encouraged by the Ghanaian leadership. For two years, after 1961,
Upper Volta had tried to operate a customs union with Ghana, while Dahomey
had concluded customs agreements with Nigeria and Togo, in 1962, and
was actively promoting a rival Benin Union that would also include Ghana.2 -
7/
Relations within the Entente may have deteriorated still further,in 1963,
after military intervention had removed the political leaders, first of Togo
and then of Dahomey. After the Niger episode, however, and despite the
evidence of Ghanaian complicity, the unity of the Entente states was soon
reconstituted, while Upper Volta and Niger finally dropped their earlier
support for the UAMCE.
Seizing the favourable opportunity provided by his radical
opponents, and in the atmosphere of crisis following the attack on Niger,
Houphouft-Boigny was able not only to revive and reunite the Entente,
but also, over the opposition of Senghor and those committed to the Senegal
River project, to rebuild a conservative coalition of Francophone states
whose purpose was to exploit the discomfiture of the radical leaders and
secure their continued isolation. He had first to replace the UAMCE with
a more suitable body, similar to the UAM - which should not have been a
difficult task given the weak structures of the new organisation, its lack
of cohesion, the studied indifference of the French and the hostility of
the Entente states. At stake, however, was the viability of Senghor's
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proposed sub-regional grouping and the credibility of Mauritania's internal
and external policies.
At the meeting of Franco phone states at Nouakchott, in February
1965, there was clear evidence of the growing antagonism between Senegal and
the Ivory Coast, the rivalry of their respective sub-regions, and the
opposition between those who wanted a predominantly political body and
those favouring a wholly economic one. It seemed for a time as though the
conference would produce not one but three separate bodies. The first would
comprise the states bordering the Senegal River, which Guinea would then be
free to join; a second would consist of the Entente states, together with
Togo; while the third would include the Central African states and the
Cameroon Republic, whose interests could no longer easily be accommodated
within an organisation based primarily on West Africa. Unity was maintained
only when Senghor agreed, albeit reluctantly, to support the majority decision,
taken by eight of the thirteen states attending, to revive the UAM in the
guise of the Common Organisation of African and Malagasy States (OCAM) -
28/
but with responsibility for economic as well as political cooperation. -'
An immediate result of this decision was a crisis - the first
/
of many - within the pro posed Senegal River Organisation, as Sekou Toure
refused to attend the Summit planned to coincide with the end of the
/Nouakchott meeting. 29- During the next decade he would have frequent
recourse to General de Gaulle's 'empty chair' tactics whenever he wished
to indicate his disapproval of the line taken by the senior and more
conservative Francophone leaders. Toure's growing personal animosity
towards Houphouft-Boigny may well have prevented him from pursuing a more
consistent policy towards Senegal and the Ivory Coast - or, indeed, profiting
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from their continued rivalry. Houphoudt-Boigny was quick to turn this
to his own advantage, exploiting Senghor's difficulties with Toure to
delay or prevent the formation of a rival grou p within the region,
particularly one centred on Dakar, advertising its regional ambitions -
the "creation of a vast common market" - and incorporating radical states like
Guinea and Mali.
Already, in August 1964, when Senghor had arranged a meeting of
representatives of the four Senegal River states to consider how they might
best proceed with the project, Houphoudt-Boigny contrived that same day to
be meeting with Toure, Tubman, and Albert Margai of Sierra Leone, to discuss
the creation of a free trade zone linking their respective states. The
initiative was one close to the heart of the Liberian leader, but Houphoudt-
Boigny had previously rejected as unrealistic proposals for inter-state
30/
economic cooperation, even among Francophone states. - In another attempt
to undermine the UAMCE and prevent the emergence of a new sub-regional
body based on Dakar, Hou phoudt-Boignv later proposed a reunion of former
leaders of the African Democratic Rall y (RDA) - including Toure and Keita,
but excluding Senghor - to discuss reviving the now moribund organisation.
It was difficult to see what purpose that would serve other than isolating
31/Senghor. - The Francophone leaders continued to fight the battles of the
French West African Federation long after its demise.
Having achieved an early and relatively easy success at Nouakchott,
Houphoudt-Boigny proceeded, perhaps under French pressure, to engineer the
admission to OCAM, in June 1965, of Congo-Leopoldville (Zaire) under its
recently appointed, highly controversial and widely unpopular Prime Minister,
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Moise Tshombe. By admitting the Congo to full membership - as the
fifteenth member - the Francophone states seemed not only to be enlarging
their catchment area - and thereby indirectly threatening the legitimacy
of the OAU - but also, and more important, to be accepting Tshombe as the
duly elected head of government. Most OCAM members were reluctant to
approve this new 'coup' by members of the Entente group. Mauritania took
the opportunity to withdraw from the organisation whose support it no
longer required and which, in any case, it now saw as an obstacle to better
relations with the Maghreb states. Even Senghor only agreed to attend
32/
the relevant OCAM meeting at the last moment. - The radical African
leaders resumed their attacks on the conservative Francophone organisation
and with growing support from other states. Finally Tshombe was removed as
Prime Minister in October in what was widely seen as a major reverse for
OCAM and an even more damaging blow to the authority and prestige of the
President of the Ivory Coast.
Houphouft-Boigny's simultaneous campaign to complete the isolation
of Ghana and the radical states by organising a boycott of the Accra
Summitt of the OAU, to be held in October 1965, certainly caused alarm in
the Ghanaian capital-where the President was unusually conciliatory and
multiplied assurances and gestures of aood-will, even to his Entente
neighbours. In Africa, however, this move by the Entente was widely regarded
as high-handed and possibly, as a serious threat to African unity. Nkrumah
attacked the "antics of the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Niger" which were
part of a "carefully worked out imperialist plot directly related to the
33/Congo situation". - Lagos radio itself described the Entente and OCAM
as "inward-looking groups, overly insistent upon deepening the divisions
34/between English- and French-speaking Africa." - The "peace offensive"
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of the Francophone States failed in its objectives. Six of the fourteen
FrancophOne states were represented at the OAU Summit, along with other
moderate states like Nigeria. Indeed, there were more heads of state and
government at Accra than at some previous conferences, and they included
the conservative President of the Congo, Joseph Kasavubu, who had just
dismissed Tshombe. Moreover, the campaign had been counter-productive.
The attempt to isolate the radical leaders had "boomeranged by isolating the
Entente instead and did much to undermine its self-confidence and solidarity
, 35/
as a group.' - Certainly, the Francophone leaders of Central Africa showed
clearly that they wished to dissociate themselves from a campaign whose
focus and objectives were primarily West African. Here, too, perspectives
had changed considerably since the formation of the OAU in 1963.
After the creation of the OAU in 1963, and the disappearance of
the Monrovia and Casablanca groupings, it became increasingly difficult
to maintain a high level of interest among Francophone states in what began
to appear, more and more, and not only to those outside the 'club', as a
parochial, politically divisive and very conservative body of opinion.
Coupled with the elimination of most of the issues and many of the
personalities that had once helped foster a defensive spirit among the
Francophone leaders - and the real but gradual relaxation of the French
'presence' in much of Africa - it was difficult to escape the conclusion that
the OAU, and not the UAM or OCAM, was no the appropriate forum for the
discussion of important political issues.
Conversely, after 1963, economic questions came to assume greater
importance everywhere on the continent, while regional, sub-regional and
national differences became at the same time more pronounced. There was
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now a clear and pressing need for smaller, more specialised groupings
where the relevant governments could consult about ways of tackling
similar problems and cooperate in pursuing common, or at least compatible
objectives. Here the emphasis would be on functional integration rather
than political union, on economic cooperation rather than economic
nationalism.
Where the members of the Casablanca grotp and those of the UAM
had been bound together by ideological affinities and common political
objectives, rather than by a sense of regional attachment or shared economic
interest, the great majority of organisations to be formed in Africa after
1963 would be concerned primaril y with economic cooperation - which could be
more effectively tackled at a regional or sub-regional level, and in a spirit
of negotiation and pragmatism rather than one of confrontation and ideology.
This did not mean that the earlier difficulties disappeared with the formation
of the OAU. Many of the old differences would persist for the remainder of
the decade and into the 'seventies.
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CHAPTER 4
PROGRESS TOWARDS ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN WEST AFRICA,
1965-1968
Until the creation of the OAU in 1963 the central issue in African
politics was unity and this naturally affected the way in which leaders
viewed the related question of economic cooperation across existing frontiers.
For the radical minority there could be no effective cooperation without
political unity while, for the majority, economic cooperation was a necessary
and preliminary condition for any major advance towards political union.
Where the Nigerian Prime Minister had spoken in 1963 of "practical steps
in economic, scientific and cultural cooperation" many other leaders present
at the formation of the OAU, seem to have shared his conviction that economic
cooperation, on a step-by-step basis, with the region as its initial focus,
offered the best and probably only prospect of achieving continental unity.
With the OAU a reality, however, and with the vexed question of union now
in abeyance, African leaders began to value cooperation, not only as an
instrument of political union but more so as an immediate and practical
contribution to economic growth, industrial development and internal
stability.
This change in attitude and emphasis was in large part a response
to the serious economic difficulties confronting the African states shortly
after independence. They found themselves in an increasingly competitive,
industrialising world, with rising tariff barriers, quotas and other
restraints on trade, with unpredictable shifts in the commodity markets,
higher prices for imported goods and greatly diminished returns for their
own produce. There was also the growing problem of internal unrest
aggravated, if not provoked, by the generally poor performance of their
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economies. At stake was the survival of many of these states, their
ability to advance the welfare of their peoples, and secure the political
emancipation of those still under colonial or white minority rule. Despite
the enormity of the tasks ahead, these issues did seem to offer improved
prospects for cohesion and cooperation among African governments and their
leaders. Politically it was a time for reconciliation and rapprochement.
But no less urgent was the problem of organising economic cooperation, at
an appropriate level and within a suitable institutional framework.
In this chapter we are concerned to trace the origins and early
development of regional cooperation and integration among the states of
West Africa - as distinct from the continental alliances and the sub-regional
groupings that were the subject of preceding chapters. It is our contention
that, although ECOWAS was not finally established until 1975, it emerged
not as the result of a sudden inspiration, nor as the work of an individual,
state or group of states, but as the product of a decade and more of patient
debate and continuing discussion, in which each state and every leader in the
region was, at one time or another, more or less closely involved. In
addition to this large body of collective wisdom the West African governments
also had the services of their own specialists and advisers, and the
assistance and encouragement of bodies like the Economic Commission for
Africa, one of many United Nations' agencies active in the continent. (T4).
We were fortunate, too, in being able to draw on the recent history
of cooperation and integration among the West European nations, whose Common
Market stimulated much interest and debate in Africa and in other parts of
the developing world. Nearer home, there were valuable lessons to be learnt
from the experience of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, grouped first in the East
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African Common Services Organisation (1961) and, after 1967, in the East
African Community, a close-knit economic union that survived many vicissitudes
until its unfortunate demise in 1977. The European Common Market, however,
grouped countries with a long history of separate nationhood, while the idea
of an East African Community was first devised and promoted by colonial
officials: the African leaders were confronted at independence with a long
established grouping and an institutional framework that did not always and
at every point reflect thdir own preferences and priorities. We were aware,
too, of the various political and economic arrangements among the Francophone
states of black Africa. These, however, were either continental in scope,
like the UAM and OCAM, overlapping several regions, or were more restricted
in character, like the monetary and customs unions, but with no claim to
regional inclusiveness. They did not correspond to the four regions
designated by the OAU as the appropriate units for social and economic
development.
ECOWAS itself was and remains a uniaue association of states,
with its own background and history, its personnel and procedures, its
problems and not inconsiderable achievements, and these will be the subject
of later chapters. Here we propose to describe some of the major formative
influences in the creation of ECOWAS, not least the contribution of the
Economic Commission for Africa (am). We will then examine the initiatives
taken by individual leaders and governments working towards the goal of
regional economic cooperation within West Africa. The chapter concludes
with an account of the three inter-state conferences, in Niamey (1966),
Accra (1967) and Monrovia (1968), which led to the establishment of a short-
lived West African Regional Group that can now, in retrospect, be seen as
the true precursor of ECOWAS.
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Role and Early'Proposa/s'of the ECA 
The OAU, in Article II of its Charter, had called on member
states "to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to
achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa" and had asked them, more
specifically, to harmonise their general policies in such areas as transport
and communication, health, sanitation and nutrition, and in science and
technology. - For this purpose the OAU had created an Economic and Social
Commission which, in its first report, submitted in December 1963, recommended
an Africa-wide free trade zone, a payments union, a continental communications
system and much closer coordination of national development plans. - But
the optimistic language, the ambitious nature of the proposals and the
absence of rigorous economic analysis did little to advance the idea of
cooperation, while the notion of central control and coordination threatened
to revive the debate about political union. The report was widely criticised
inside Africa and the OAU has since preferred to concentrate on political
issues leaving economic questions, including cooperation and other forms of
collective action, largely to the governments directly concerned and to
various specialist agencies, notably the Economic Commission for Africa and
other United Nations instrumentalities. (ro-bie..4-) •
Given the very wide discretion that most African political heads
enjoy and the absence of any real public opinion on complex economic issues,
bodies created to pursue economic cooperation are likely to meet with some
predictable obstacles : difficulty in establishing their credentials and in
accumulating sufficient independence and authority, let alone finance and
technical resources, to be really effective. Here the United Nations could
and did play an extremely useful role. In the General Assembly, and through
1
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various agencies such as the UNDP, ECOSOC, UNCTAD, IBRD, FAO, WHO and
UNESCO, the United Nations was active in assisting various 'regions' of
the world in their attempts at economic and industrial development. The
Economic Commission for Africa was created by ECOSOC in April 1958 with
functions comparable to those of the Economic Commissions for Europe, Asia,
and the Far East, and Latin America, created a decade earlier.
The ECA remained fairly inactive during its first two years
until, largely at the instigation of African leaders themselves, the
independent African states began to play a more active part in its affairs.
But the major changes in the character of the ECA date only from 1962-3
when, as a result of African pressure, its membership and structures were
drastically reformed, with the exclusion of South Africa and Portugal,
the reduction of the colonial powers, Britain, France and Spain, from full
to associate membership, and the appointment of Africans as permanent
.3
officials /.- With the creation of the OAU in 1963 a more fruitful dialogue
was possible between the independent heads of government and the growing
number of African specialists at ECA headquarters situated, like those of the
OAU, in Addis Ababa. The larger organisation soon accepted the recommendation
of the ECA that, in the interests of more effective coordination of economic
development, the continent be divided into separate regional units comprising
North, Central, East and West Africa. (Table 4).
Theie were organisational problems, particularly in the early years.
The Francophone states were at first critical of the ECA and of the part
played by English-speaking (and sometimes radical) states within the
organisation - whose Executive Secretary after 1962 was the distinguished
Cameroun, Chad, Benin,
Guinea, Ivory Coast,Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, Upper Volta.
West African Subregion
Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal,
Upper Volta
The Gambia, Senegal
Mali, Mauritania, Senegal
UNESCO
ITU
ITU
rru
FAO
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TABLE A
UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE WEST AFRICAN SUB-REGION 
SOME RELEVANT UNDP INTERCOUNTRY PROJECTS IN WEST AFRICA, 1972-1976 
Name of Project
	 Countries Covered Executing
Agency
Flood Control and Warning 	 Guinea, Mali, Niger	 WMO
System on the River Niger Basin
(Phase 2)
Hydrological Forecasting System
for the Middle and Lower Basins
of the Niger River
Program for the Strengthening
of Agromateorological and
Hydrological Services of the
Sahelian Countries : Training
Center for Agrometeorology and
Applied Ayrology.
Onchocerciasis Control Program
in the Volta River Basin Area:
Applied Research (Epidemiology
and Chemotherapy) and Training
Onchocerciasis Control in the
Volta River Basin.
Applied Research on Trypano-
somiasis Epidemiology and
Control.
Regional Center for Postal
Training, Abidjan
Benin, Cameroun, Mali,
Niger, Upper Volta 	 WMO
Chad, The Gambia, Mali 	 WMO
Mauritania, Niger,
Senegal, Upper Volta
Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast 	 WHO
Mali, Niger, Togo, Upper
Volta
Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast,	 WHO
Mali, Niger, Togo, Upper
Volta.
Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria, WHO
Upper Volta.
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, UPU
Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta,
Togo
Documentation Center for the
Niger Basin.
Telecommun±cations Network
Adviser (W.Africa)
Multinational School for Medium-
level Telecommunications
Personnel, Rufisque
Telecommunications Link between
The Gambia and Senegal
Hydroagricultural Survey of the
Senegal River Basin (DMVS)
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TABLE A	 cont.
Name of Project	 Countries Covered	 Executing
Agency
Water Resources in the Lake
Chad Basin (LCBC)
Agricultural Research and
its Application in the
Senegal River Basin ODMVS)
Documentation Center for
OMVS
Livestock Development in
Assale-Servewel (LCBC)
Four Agricultural Centers
in the Lake Chad Basin
Development of the Fisheries
in Lake Chad
Research on Desert Locust
(OCLALAV)
Control of Grain-eating
Birds (Phase 2)
Agricultural Development in
the Senegal River Basin
(Phase 2) (DMVS)
Hydraulic Development of
Pastoral Areas (LCBC)
Creation of Four Forestry
Centers Around Lake Chad
(LCBC)
Implementation of Water
Drilling Program in the
Lake Chad Basin (LCBC)
Applied Research on Tsetse
Control in Dry Savanna
Zones.
Study of the Mano River
Basin : Land Resources
Survey (Liberian Portion)
Cameroun, Chad, Niger, Nigeria,
Mali, Mauritania, Senegal.
Mali, Mauritania, Senegal.
Cameroun, Chad, Niger, Nigeria
Cameroun, Chad, Niger, Nigeria
Cameroun, Chad, Nicer, Nigeria
Benin, Cameroun, Chad, Ivory
Coast, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Somalia, Upper Volta.
Benin, Cameroun, Chad, Ivory
Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia,
Upper Volta.
Mali, Mauritania, Senegal
Cameroun, Chad, Nigeria, Niger
Cameroun, Chad, Nigeria, Niger
Cameroun, Chad, Nigeria, Niger
Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria,
Upper Volta
Liberia, Sierra Leone
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
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TABLE 4	 cont.
Name of Project
	 Countries Covered	 Executing
Agency
West Africa Rice Development Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, 	 FAO
Association (Phases 1 and 2) Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo,
Upper Volta.
ECA/UNCTADWest African Clearing House
Agreement
Benin, Cameroun, Ghana,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper
Volta.
Updating of Prefeasibility	 Benin, Togo.
	
UNDP
Studies of the Mono River
Indicative Development Plan	 Benin, Cameroun, Chad,	 ECA
for Niger River.	 Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, Upper Volta.
Niamey UNDAT	 Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast,	 ECA
Niger, Nigeria, Togo,
Upper Volta
Assistance to Banque	 Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast, 	 ECA
ouest-Africaine de	 Niger, Nigeria, Togo,
developpement	 Upper Volta.
Source:
	 John P. Renninger, Multinational Cooneration for Development 
in West Africa.
Compiled from "UNDP Regional Programme for Africa 1972-1976",
The Projects listed in this table are illustrative rather
than exhaustive.
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Ghanaian civil servant, Robert Gardiner. -
	
However, they were even
more suspicious of the OAU and its Secretary-General, Dialo Telli,
nominated by the President of Guinea. There was also friction between
the OAU and the ECA (and their respective officials) about the role and
competence of the two bodies and this would persist until the end of the
'sixties. The solution adopted was for both organisations jointly to
sponsor the many programmes, projects and conferences relating to the
economic development of the continent. But, invariably, it was the ECA that
was responsible for convening and servicing the various gatherings. Further
reform of the administrative structures of the ECA in 1969 facilitated
cooperation between the two bodies by acknowledging the political authority
of the OAU and permitting the African states and their leaders to be even
more closely associated with the activities of the organisation.
The creation and subsequent reorganisation of the ECA produced no
immediate or dramatic transformation of the African economies. In the
circumstances that was not to be exoected. Its major contribution was a
constant, vigorous and well-documented campaign to persuade African leaders
of the need for and the benefits to be derived from economic cooperation.
Their role was to establish and maintain contact on economic matters between
African states, to provide the machinery for frequent consultation among
the leaders, and to direct their attention to the kinds of cooperation most
likely to provide solutions to their immediate economic problems. By
acquiring and disseminating detailed information about current economic
trends in Africa as a whole, the ECA played a vital supportive role and
was well-placed to influence its sovereign clients. It was not alone
in maintaining that the continent's division into small, often unviable
economic units was impeding its industrial and economic growth, or in
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promoting integration and cooperation as the most obvious remedies. But
it did much to encourage and foster the trend to wider grou pings of a
regional and sub-regional character.
There was now a widespread conviction that, beyond the regional
level, the costs of securing and organising cooperation were likely, at
least for the foreseeable future, to exceed any potential benefits. "As the
limitations of continental action have become evident there has been a
swing back to the idea of regional cooperation, especially ... in the economic
5/
sphere." - Regional integration was not without its problems. Relations
among neighbouring states after independence were frequently strained by
personal and political differences among the leaders, by economic rivalries,
border disputes and the legacy of different colonial traditions. But
the creation of the OAU and the encouragement and incentives offered by the
ECA did make it possible for the governments involved to view their problems
in a broader, less parochial perspective and without the earlier polemics.
Regional organisations were less likely to revive the debate
about political union and the divisions it had entailed; were more likely
to elicit an enthusiastic response from governments otherwise preoccupied
with domestic issues; were easier to administer with the available, scarce
talent; enabled officials to remain close to the realities of economic
survival in Africa; and were more likely to generate projects that would
attract overseas and domestic capital, would benefit the peoples and
governments concerned, and would help generate further economic growth. The
main but not the only emphasis was on the development of modern, large-scale
industries, particularly steel, as a means of stimulating economic activity
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at a number of "growth points". There was also concern with the
availability and exploitation of natural resources, with the production of
cheap electric power, and the provision of more adequate transport. -
Industrial location and the development of resources common to a number of
countries were therefore high among the priorities of the ECA, and as these
entailed political decisions and inter-governmental cooperation the search
continued for suitable institutions and an acceptable and convenient political
framework.
It is an indication of the growing support for the ECA among
African governments that its officials were soon encouraged to use their
initiative in identifying projects where regional or sub-regional cooperation
was feasible and where the greatest benefit might be expected. And that
confidence was reinforced by the establishment of the African Development
. Bank in 1964 - one of the ECA's earliest successes. But there is independent
confirmation of the effectiveness of the ECA from an otherwise not uncritical
observer.
There is no doubt that there is today a great deal
more realism and understanding about the difficulties
and possibilities of African economic cooperation than
there was seven years ago, and a comparison of the level
of debate at the ECA sessions in Tangier in 1960 and in
Nairobi in 1965 shows this very clearly. Ideas of any
grandiose joint cooperation have now been abandoned in
favour of project cooperation at sub-regional level
between small groups of states and there is some hope
that in certain areas at least this may prove successful.
The ECA was not, however, alone in its efforts to promote regional
economic cooperation. While the radical states had been in the forefront
of moves towards political unification, it was the more moderate African
7/
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states, notably Liberia which, through the Conference of Independent
African states, the United Nations, and later the OAU, had first emphasised
the need for a common approach to the outside world and for more effective
coordination of economic policies at a regional level. More than any other
African leader Tubman would devote himself throughout the 'sixties to the
creation of a West African economic community. It was the more unfortunate,
therefore, that he should have died in July 1971, before the formation
of ECOWAS for which he provided so much of the early inspiration. His
policies in this matter were, however, continued by his successor, William
Tolbert, who had long served as the country's Vice-President.
Within Liberia, Tubman had already been active, since 1944, in
his efforts to break down the many barriers between the small Americo-
Liberian elite and the large indigenous African majority. For over a
century the self-perpetuating elite had dominated government and monopolised
political as well as economic opportunities. Tubman perceived that such
barriers, and the restrictive practices that accompanied them, were not
only inimical to the country's social and political development, and
damaging to its external image, particularly among Africans in the neighbouring
colonial territories, but also that they greatly obstructed its economic
growth, discouraged investment, and retarded economic diversification.
While his unification policy of social and political reforms
helped promote greater national unity and de-fuse growing tensions, it was
in the economic sphere that Tubman's policies achieved their earliest and
perhaps most striking success. - By removing the many restrictions on
foreign firms, by acting to help eliminate the social barriers to an
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integrated economy, by providing stable government, a greatly improved
administration, and more equitable and efficient tax structures, Tubman
had ensured a large and continuing flow of foreign investment and loans
into Liberia - mainly American but later also West German, Swiss, Italian
and British. By 1952 he could announce that Liberia was now able to meet
all its financial obligations, both internal and external, and was to that
extent master of its own affairs.
Where an independent Liberia had long been an tmesttratiam tm
African nationalists striving to end colonial rule, it was Tubman's
conviction that the newly independent states could also benefit from his
country's recent experience of integration as an incentive to economic
growth. Liberia had shown that integration and a larger market, without
petty restrictions and controls, could provide a ready incentive for foreign
investment, and that this investment could then be used to promote
diversification and strengthen the country's political as well as its economic
independence. Even before the SanniquellieAgreement of 1959 Tubman was working
to improve his relations with other independent leaders in West Africa,
Nkrumah and Tour, and to convince them of the urgent need for economic
cooperation and the creation of a Community of West African States, as a
first and necessary step towards political union. Thus while the Sanniquellie
Agreement was political in nature, it also had a strong economic undertone.
In his Inaugural Address to the Liberian nation, in January 1960,
Tubman advocated an economic common market for the West African states,
with the early formation of regional, economic and trade councils to
coordinate their subsequent action. Even the largest states, he maintained,
would benefit from association with their neighbours while, for the
smaller states, the advantages to be derived from cooperation were also
/
considerable. 9- The expanded market, increased trade, and the prospect
of greater overseas investment were obvious attractions but Tubman, well
aware of his country's social problems, shared by many others in the region,
also stressed the importance of expanding and improving education, communications
and basic services. The Liberian government would continue to promote
regional and sub-regional cooperation, exploiting the country's unique
historical background and its strategic location to work for better relations
among its immediate and near neighbours, French and English-speaking,
conservative and radical. A key figure in any West African undertaking,
Tubman's guidance was particularly appreciated in the delicate and protracted
negotiations that necessarily accompany the formation of a regional economic
community. West Africa was fortunate to have had the services of such a
skilled, experienced and dedicated statesman.
It was largely as a result of Tubman's initiatives, too, that
the ECA, created in 1958, was transformed into a more effective agency
through which the independent African states could themselves play an
active part in promoting regional integration and furthering their own
development. Here Liberia's role as a foundation member of the United,
Nations and her close ties with the United States were invaluable in
securing international support for African efforts to re-shape the ECA
into an agency that was more responsive to their needs and priorities and
was also able to monitor and coordinate their individual efforts. It
was as a result of these pressures that the ECA was several times reformed
in the course of the 'sixties, while African governments came to be more
closely associated with its activities on a regular and continuing basis.
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Hence the institution in 1969 of a bi-annual Conference of Ministers,
intended to assist the officials of the ECA, to ensure that the views of
the OAU were known and understood and to promote cooperation between the
10/two. -
Despite delays and repeated setbacks Tubman and the responsible
officials of the ECA persisted in the task of educating other leaders
in the need for cooperation while exploring the many different approaches
to the question and attempting to circumvent the major obstacles. At a
sub-regional level Tubman began to canvass the idea of a free trade zone,
grouping Liberia and its English-speaking neighbour, Sierra Leone, as
well as the two adjoining French-speaking states, Guinea and the Ivory
Coast. This would then serve as the possible nucleus of a West African
free trade area - a new Monrovian grouping, but with an economic rather than
a political objective, confined to West Africa, and, hopefully, more
effective in bridging the ideological divide with the inclusion of Guinea
alongside the Ivory Coast. It was the theme of Tubman's Inaugural Address
1to the nation in January 1964. 1/
-
Liberia and Sierra Leone were fairly obvious partners in any
sub-regional venture. Both governments were grappling not only with ethnic
tensions, but also with the debilitating consequences, political and economic,
of the traditional divisions between 'colony' and 'protectorate', 'creole'
12/
and 'native', Christian and non-Christian. - Their proximity, common
language, similar origins and early history - although Sierra Leone soon
became a British colony - set them apart from their larger, French-speaking
neighbours, as well as from the other more prosperous English-speaking states
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of the region. There was also their comparative under-development and
lack of infrastructure and the need for foreign capital to enable them to
exploit their rich mineral and iron ore reserves. It was hoped that
cooperation would also offer more immediate and tangible economic advantages,
an increase in mutual trade, hitherto negligible, and collaboration in
13/industrial and other joint ventures, including the marketing of iron ore. -
As with the Gambia, after its independence in 1965, the sense
of isolation was also a major factor in encouraging the search for wider
groupings and new attachments. It may have been one factor prompting
Liberia's later decision to join the West African Examinations Council,
the only common services agency created by the British to survive Ghana's
independence. Sierra Leone would in turn become the one English-speaking
member of Air Afrique, the Francophone grouping administering the common
external air services. Although this first attempt at sub-regional union
between the two states was not to be successful, incentives such as these
would, in 1973, lead to the creation of the Mario River Union, whose objectives
were by no means confined to the development of the river that separated
Liberia from Sierra Leone. President Tolbert himself remarked, in 1974, that
the union should have come ten years later and was careful, like his
predecessor, to insist that membership of the proposed free trade zcne
14/
remain open to all other countries in the region. -
In August 1964 Tubman, with the active encouragement of
Houphougt-Boigny, convened a meeting of interested leaders to discuss
the proposed free trade zone. The Ivory Coast and Guinea were represented
in Monrovia alongside Sierra Leone and Liberia. It is difficult, however,
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to gauge the nature and extent of the support offered by the two French-
speaking states. If Tour‘ appeared to support the scheme in 1964 it may
have been either to strengthen his hand in negotiations with Senghor
over the projected Senegal River scheme or, more likely, to bolster Senghor's
wavering opposition to a renewed Francophone political grouping. On the
other hand, Toured had long been an advocate of political union and was likely
to encourage any venture that did not contradict his principles or weaken
his country's independence. His relations with the Liberian President were
cordial and he and Houphoudt =Boigny had both availed themselves of Tubman's
'good offices' in the course of their many disputes.
It has been suggested that Houphouat-Boigny lent his support
more in the hope of splitting the members of the incipient Senegal River
group and thus preventing the emergence of a sub-regional body that would
not only rival his own Entente but aspired to form the nucleus of a wider
15/West African economic community. - And yet, as the most industrialised
member of the proposed free trade zone, the Ivory Coast was also likely to
16/derive the greatest benefit from the new grousing. - Indeed, the Ivory
Coast had several times suggested such a zone and may have taken the
initiative in recommending the four-state conference in Monrovia. Both
Francophone states might at this stage have regarded Tubman's proposed
groupings as a means to achieve other, unrelated sub-regional goals, or
simply as offering some prospect of economic advantage and mutual benefit
and at no great cost to themselves.
A further meeting of the four states, in February 1965, saw
agreement on the creation of an Interim Organisation for Economic
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Cooperation and a formal document was signed in Freetown in May 1965;
this supported the principle of a sub-regional community whose members
were pledged to remove trade barriers and foster cooperation in almost
every field. However, the French-speaking states became more reticent
as the grouping began to take administrative shape; they had in any case
resumed their former quarrel, which would intensify in the course of
1966 and precluded any form of close collaboration between them. There
were later prospects for cooperation between the two English-speaking states,
as Liberia provided the secretariat of the new organisation in September
1965 , while Sierra Leone appointed the first Administrative Secretary.
Their union failed, however, to survive the 1967 election in Sierra Leone,
when the government of Albert Margai was defeated and the country was
subsequently plunged into political turmoil - from which it would not begin to
16/
recover until the end of the decade. -
More significant from the viewpoint of the future ECOWAS:vas
Liberia's involvement in another and earlier ECA proposal for a common
industrial policy for the states of the West African region. This would
entail a broad measure of agreement among the interested governments
concerning the location of new industries in the most appropriate sites,
where they might make the maximum contribution not only to the development
of the countries directly involved, but also to the region as a whole. Although
based essentially on economic criteria this did, nevertheless j amount to a
delicate political operation, particularly as the ECA proposed to begin
with the establishment of an iron and steel complex, whereas-several.states
in the region, including some of the more influential, already had plans
for just such an enterprise. The complex would be located, possibly in
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Liberia, and its output would then be supplemented by production from
several smaller plants and by additional rolling mills processing
/
semi-finished steel or scrap. 17- Such proposals were at the centre of
the Lagos Conference on Industrial Coordination in West Africa, held in
November 1963, itself one of the earliest attempts at securing economic
cooperation in the region.
There was no immediate sequel to the Lagos meeting, although
subsequent developments, including Tubman's initial success with his
proposals for a free trade zone within the region, encouraged the ECA,
along with the FAO, to sponsor a further conference at Bamako, in October
1964 - again on the theme of industrial coordination in west Africa.
This time various other industries were also considered while there were
more specific recommendations regarding the creation of a large steel
complex in Liberia. However, there was dissatisfaction at this decision
on the part of other prospective hosts, namely Guinea and Mali, while
Mauritania declined, to be bound by decisions of the conference and the
Ivory Coast preferred not to attend. There was criticism, too, of the
18/
ECA report when findings were said to be incomplete. - A decision was
nevertheless taken in favour of the Liberian site.
It was at that apparently favourable juncture that President
Tubman advised postponing implementation of the decision until a further
meeting could be held in Monrovia in August 1965. There it was proposed
and agreed that industrial development should not be confined to any one
industry but should instead be considered in the context of "general
19/institutionalised economic cooperation" within the region. - This
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resolution was particularly significant as it marked the beginning of - and
offered a suitable basis for - a regional economic grouping of the West
African states. In that sense it was the forerunner of ECOWAS. The
proposal was followed up during that and the following year, receiving
administrative and technical support from the ECA. A draft treaty for the
West African Iron and Steel Community was signed and a provisional council
appointed to supervise the project later in 1965. However, despite apparent
agreement on the principles that should govern the development and coordination
of future industries to be established in the region, including iron and
steel, there were serious differences at the next meeting of the Interim
Council in Freetown, in April 1966. The iron and steel proposals were then
finally shelved, after indications that countries such as Senegal and
Guinea would, in any case, proceed with plans for the creation of their
/
own steel works, processing scrap or imported billets. 20-
West African Regional Group 
In 1965-6 the ECA sponsored a series of meetings in each of the
four African regions to stimulate the governments concerned to practical
measures of economic cooperation. The meeting in Niamey, Niger, in
October 1966, was the last of the four, and followed on from the earlier
West African conferences on the more limited themes of economic coordination
and a common industrial policy. Fourteen West African states were
represented in Niamey where delegates considered a document prepared by the
ECA and setting out details of a "project of association". The aim was to
expand existing areas of economic cooperation and identify others such as
transport or the utilisation of energy resources, where common policies
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might fruitfully be pursued. - The countries involved agreed, at the
end of the meeting, to pursue these exploratory contacts. Articles of
Association would be drafted, circulated and approved, at the latest
within six months. And if nothing more specific emerged from the
conference it was nevertheless significant as the first meeting to be
attended by every independent state in the region. It was also the
first occasion on Which delegates from the former British and French states
met together primarily to discuss economic integration in its broadest sense.
The choice of Niamey as the venue for such a historica conference was
symbolic in two senses: first, as a recognition by the ECA of the need
to gain the confidence of the Francophone states - Niger, was not only a
member of the Entente but its leader, Hamani Diori, was also President of
OCAM -and secondly, as an indication of the importance which the ECA
attached to Nigeria's membership of the future West African community, since
Niger had consistently worked since independence for improved relations
with her large southern neighbour.
A second meeting was organised in Accra, Ghana, in April/May
22/1967, just within the deadline specified at Niamey. - Two states,
Guinea and the Gambia,were not represented on this occasion. Gambia's
absence may have been due to its problems with Senegal which had yet
to renounce its ambitions to annexe the smaller country - The Gambia
later signed the Articles of Assocation. Guinea.was also absent from
Accra and its government declined, moreover, to approve the Articles of
Association adopted there - reflecting the current hostility between
Ghana and Guinea following the overthrow of Nkrumah in February 1966.
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The ECA again played a leading part in the preparations for the
conference, whose principal business was to approve and sign the proposed
Articles of Association. The opening speech, by the Ghanaian President,
General Ankrah, called for the removal of trade barriers as quickly as
possible, and it was his intention and that of most other delegates to
move rapidly towards a more permanent and more visible form of collaboration.
An Interim Council of Ministers was appointed to prepare a treaty for the
approval of the next conference, with Leopold Senghor as Chairman, while
Accra became headquarters of the provisional secretariat.
The Articles of Association were, in many respects, very similar
23/
to those later adopted by ECOWAS. - The aims of the proposed community
included the expansion of trade, the inter-change of goods and services
among the meMber states, and the promotion of "a coordinated and equitable
development of their economies". Article 2 listed ways in which these aims
might best be secured, including "consultation on a continuous basis",
coordination and harmonisation of economic policies, progressive elimination
of customs and other barriers to the expansion of trade, and joint
developments in the areas of industry and agriculture, transport and
communications, and the exploitation of energy resources.
Article 3 was particularly significant and ifm.ia later-be
retained by ECOWAS as it served to protect those member states who wished
to pursue other forms of cooperation either within the community, at a
sub-regional level, or outside the community, perhaps in association with a
former Metropole. This concession was necessary to secure not only the
support of the Francophone states, but also to reassure the growing number
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of states that belonged to functional groupings such as the River and
Lake Development agencies or which were engaged in other forms of bi-
or multilateral cooperation. Provided such commitments did not "prejudice
the aims of the Community" they did not require the approval of member
states as a whole.
Article 5 defined the membership of the Interim Council of
Ministers and thereby of the Community itself and in terms that coincided
with those used by the ECA and the OAU. While there had been some early
ambivalence on the part of the ECA about the Eastern boundary of the West
African region, this had since been clearly defined to exclude the states
of former French Equatorial Africa. In Accra there seems to have been
complete agreement on the territorial limits of the new grouping and on the
extent of the proposed membership. Article 6 stipulated that decisions
by the Interim Council would be taken by simple majority vote, although
it is unlikely that any significant initiative could have been approved
without a broad consensus among the membership. The principal task
of the Council was to prepare and draft the Treaty that would finally
establish and govern the proposed Economic Community of West African
States and Article 7 authorised the Council to remain in being until the
Treaty itself became effective.
The first meeting of the Interim Council was in Dakar, Senegal,
in November 1967, with Leopold Senghor in the Chair. 242 From the
outset Senghor seems to have been particularly concerned to meet the
probable objections from the more militant of the Francophone states, who
viewed the ECA proposals and the prospect of closer,
 collaboration with the
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Anglophone countries with considerable misgivings not untinged with
hostility. However, Senghor was not himself among the critics and in
his opening speech he recalled his consistent support for regional groupings
since the inception of the OAU. But for his country's recent rapprochement
with the Ivory Coast, and unfortunate memories of the Mali Federation, he
might also have reminded visiting Ministers of his long-standing attachment
to the principle of federation and, in particular, his close identification
with the French West African Federation and his efforts in the late 'fifties
to secure its independence as a single political unit. In the decade
that followed he had moved far towards acceptance of the need for broader
regional integration and a political and economic community open to English,
French and Portuguese speaking states. Such groupings, "in our case from
Mauritania to Nigeria", would have "the advantage of homogeneity, from
the triple standpoint of geography, ethnic affinity and culture."
Senghor's endorsement of the proposed new community also owed
much to the renewal, in November 1967, of cooperation among the members
of the Senegal River Basin group, a projected free trade zone which had
been unable to function normally after the sudden withdrawal of Guinea
early in 1965. The return of Guinea, an enthusiastic advocate of political
unity and economic integration, gave new life to the group and renewed
its ambition to become the nucleus of a wider West African economic
community.
In his opening speech Senghor made clear his position and that
of his allies in the Senegal River group, "Upon reflection the wonder is
not that we should be meeting here today but why we did not begin to meet
until 1966." He summarised the main argument for integration: "It is
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plain, nowadays, that each of our States, taken in isolation, is too
small to form a worthwhile, viable economic unit, including the broad-
acred Nigeria." There were problems, and differences, but they were not
insuperable. "It happens that the deepest cleavage is not between
Arabo-berbers and Negro-Africans, but between Francophones and Anglophones.
Yet, to our mind, such differences are not obstacles but are on the contrary
springboards for our development". Their two European languages, "which are
the expression of two great cultures", should be viewed as complementary assets
rather than fighting weapons. "It is time to look beyond the spirit of
Fashoda, that is, the spirit of French-English rivalry."
Senghor paid suitable tribute to the ECA "for taking the
initiative of helping to translate into facts what, in 1963, was only
an idea". The programme of studies long associated with the ECA had enabled
African governments to approach their own problems "no longer simply within
the narrow framework of local affairs, and from the standpoint of strictly
national interests, but on a broader basis, within the perspective of both
regional and African development." The Niamey meeting provided an
invaluable opportunity for the twelve states of West Africa to become
"conscious of their common interests, if not of their common culture."
Accra had "marked a second and more significant stage towards the realisation
of a future West African Community, by working out a 'Protocol of Association'
signed by twelve states." Dakar, however, would be a different kind of
meeting and marked "a turning point" in their evolution : since it was
a conference of African Ministers and therefore a "projection of the government
of our twelve states of West Africa, which in the meantime have become fourteen,
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It signified the end of the ECA's preliminary work and the assumption
of the responsibility for cooperation by African governments "which have
now become conscious of their common interests and have decided to face
them squarely, in a new setting, and one freely chosen by themselves."
These remarks were apposite in view of the misgivings that
many Francophone states still entertained about the role and function of
the ECA. Indeed the latter body had again been responsible for a series
of detailed reports and recommendations including a preliminary draft
of-a proposed Treaty for possible adoption by member states as the basis
for the future Community. ECA thinking continued to be influenced
by the model of the EEC and more particularly, by the long established Coal
and Steel Community, both as an exercise in regional and industrial
integration, and as the forerunner of the Common Market itself. The ECA
was likewise concerned to remove or reduce trade barriers between
Francophone members of the UDEAO and the other West African states so that
exports from the latter would be subject to the same fiscal regime as
goods emanating from France and her EEC partners. This proposal seems
to have aroused considerable hostility on the part of UDEA0 members, who
insisted that it would involve sweeping changes in the Treaty of Association
with the EEC which they and other African states had signed at Yaounde' in
1961. They also resisted suggestions from the ECA for the removal of
restrictions on capital transfers between African states, as well as
proposals for a payments' union and a 'common accounts' currency.
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Having attempted to conciliate the critics of the ECA,
Senghor proceeded to describe the business of the conference which was
to clarify the objectives and define the outlines of the future Treaty that
would bind what were now fourteen states "into a great economic unit".
The meeting had also to pronounce on the shape and function of the community.
"You will have to say which form the community will adopt : whether it
should be a kind of free trade area or a common market." There were the
difficulties to which the ECA had already alluded and they were "by no
means negligible to begin with."
'Among our states, some are linked with France,
through the Customs Union of the West African
States (UDEAO), others are linked to Great Britain
by means of the Commonwealth. On top of this most of
us are associated with the European Economic Community.
The choice was therefore a difficult one.
It is likely that you will not be able to decide
straight away by a yes or a no. In fact, if we
want to be realistic and at the same time display
powers of creative imagination, it will be a
question of beginning with a sort of free trade
area and finishing, step by step, with an integrated
community."
He was also careful to emphasise that any liberalisation of
inter-community trading must not be at the expense of "the agreements made
earlier with other partners, particularly with the former Metropoles."
Progress towards integration would be gradual, "step by step", involving
"mutual concessions" made, perhaps "after lengthy confrontations". But,
"it is preferable to advance methodically, on sure ground, rather than to
attack impetuously, certain problems that were not yet ready for consideration
and action by the community." A pre-requisite for success, however, was
the creation of a political authority for the new community, albeit within
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the terms of the OAU Charter. Only such an authority could "ensure
that political directives at the highest level and given from time to
time to the Interim Council of Ministers and its Secretariat for the
achievement of quick results." In this sense, commented one Nigerian
observer, the future Community is "not only intended to provide the
catalyst for economic cooperation but also to serve political purposes
under the auspices of the OAU." The same observer suggested that an area
of particular concern to the Francophone leaders and to their English-speaking
counterparts was the widespread social and political unrest in the latter
part of the decade, which appears "to have ushered in a long period of
serious instability in many West African countries and to have temporarily
impaired their ability to develop rapidly." 221 Political instability in
many states, coupled with civil war in Nigeria, suggested the need for
"measures for collective security".
The conference concluded with a series of recommendations that,
despite Senghor's warnings, did not perhaps take sufficient account of
the hesitations of the Francophone states and the opposition of some of
their leaders, notably the Ivory Coast and some other members of the Entente.
Where the Ministers favoured an integrated common market, rather than a
more limited free trade area or customs union, this would require far-reaching
changes and a complicated timetable so that common policies could be
approved and implemented in successive stages. The conference also asked
that barriers to inter-state trade be removed and that future development
plans be coordinated, while education and research were identified as
obvious areas for future cooperation.Once the preliminary studies had been
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completed and the relevant proposals formulated, the provisional
secretariat would proceed with the preparation of the Treaty. This
could then be presented for approval and adoption at the next conference
of Heads of State in Monrovia, in April 1968. It is clear in retrospect
that Dakar, like so many other early gatherings of this nature, promised
considerably more than it could ever hope to deliver. While the Francophone
states included prominent advocates of regional integration, like Senghor
himself, the majority were not yet ready to abandon their primary allegiance
to France and the benefits they derived therefrom - in favour of an
incipient regional community that offered little as yet in the way of
tangible rewards.
The third summit of the West African states met in Monrovia,
Liberia, in April 1968, following extensive lobbying on behalf of the
conference by President Senghor, as Chairman of the Interim Council of
Ministers, and the other leaders of the Senegal River group. President
Mokhtar-'0uld Daddah of Mauritania was particularly active, having been
delegated by his colleagues "to consult other West African Heads of State
for the creation of a Regional Group embracing all of the West Africa
26/
States." -' In the course of his extensive travels in the area, Ould Daddah
visited Nigeria to solicit our continued support for the regional
experiment. In welcoming Quid Daddah I was able to signify our "complete
agreement" on the need for closer cooperation within the West African region and
in the context of African unity. 27_/ In our joint communique it was stated
that "the Nigerian Head of State confirmed that Nigeria has always
supported any proposal which brought African countries together. The proposed
Regional Grouping will help promote greater economic cooperation and unity
in West Africa." I therefore agreed - in principle to participate in the
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Monrovia Conference. Urgent domestic considerations, unfortunately,
prevented me from being there in person, but Nigeria was represented
by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Council,
assisted by a very high-powered delegation.
The purpose of the Conference, which had the enthusiastic
support and approval of President Tubman, was to establish the new community
and approve the proposed Treaty which, together with the Articles of
Association, would govern the Regional Group. The success of the meeting
depended on the ability of West African leaders to resolve their differences
satisfactorily and cooperate in the spirit of regional and African unity.
An important step in this direction had been the return of Guinea to the
Committee of Senegal River States, in November 1967, preceded by Tour's even
more unexpected overtures to France and his Francophone neighbours in
October. In Paris, in April 1968, Senghor saw both President de Gaulle and
Houphomebt-Boigny in the hope of effecting a reconciliation between Guinea and
28/
France; -	 at the same time he suggested coordinating the activities of the
Entente and the Senegal River states with a view, perhaps, to their
cooperation within the proposed West African Regional Group. 22/
Until shortly before the Monrovia Conference began there was
uncertainty as to which states would be represented and by whom. It
was thought increasingly unlikely thatthe Entente states would attend
since, at a meeting of the UDEAO, prior to Monrovia, Diori had again
emphasised the budgetary and fiscal problems that would ensue were the
Monrovia Conference to endorse the position already taken at Accra and
Dakar. Coopekation should, in his view, be limited initially to such
areas as transport, communications, health and student exchanges. 3Q/
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In January 1968 the Entente had already decided, prior to an OCAM meeting,
to retain and even develop its "privileged ties" rather than dissolve
31/itself within a wider body.
	 In the event only the President of
Upper Volta, General Lamizana, was present at Monrovia, thereby dissociating
himself from his Entente partners. Senghor was there, but the Sierra Leone
delegation had to return home following military intervention in that
country. Hence only nine of the fourteen states signed the Protocol finally
agreed in the Liberian capital.
This began by echoing Senghor's previous insistence on the
need for a political authority competent to make the necessary decisions
which the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat could then translate
into policies and decisions.
Convinced that only the direct intervention of
the Heads of State and Government can give the
necessary impulse and direction to the historic
efforts to establish the West African Regional
32/Group and to achieve its objectives..:.
In the absence of four of the five Entente states, however, further
progress seemed impossible - the political will was not yet there.
Already seriously divided over their attitude to the attempted secession
in Nigeria and the continuing civil war, the Entente countries may have
been the more concerned to avoid further public differences - although
there was further evidence of their divisions at Monrovia. The appearance
of the President of Upper Volta was highly significant in this respect - as
was the claim, by absent Togo, that the government supported the idea of
regional economic cooperation and was ready to join in the new union once
it materialised.
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In his opening address Tubman could not refrain from
indirectly criticising those who had absented themselves. The various
conferences inspired by the ECA had yet to produce positive results,
thanks largely to "powerful elements within and outside the West African
sub-region which have in the past tended to thwart all meaningful efforts
at cooperation." Once again he stressed the need for economic integration
in the region and reminded his audience that most of the African states were
among the least developed in the world. He conveyed a sense of urgency and
of the direction in which they must move.
We must now mobilise our search for effective
and practicable cooperation measures which can
be taken together not in some distant future
but in the months immediately ahead. I hope
that the soecific practical cooperative steps
we may take will move us towards our ultimate
goal of full and effective cooperation, among the
nations of the West African sub-region.
He would be entrusted by the conference with the delicate task of contacting
the absent states with a view to encouraging them to join the new Regional
Group.
The achievements of Monrovia were not, however, confined to the
adoption of the Protocol. There was a further decision to delegate
34/
specific tasks to various groups of states. -
	
Thus Senegal and Liberia
were invited to draft the Treaty that would hopefully inaugurate the new
economic grouping. It was their work on the constitutional issues and on
the shape of the future customs union that seems to have resurrected Senegal's
(and France's) interest in the now dormant UDEAO, and thus prepared the way
for the Francophone West African Economic Community (CEAO) that would be
33/
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launched in 1973 - in anticipation of our own ECOWAS. Although Senghor
had failed in his efforts to persuade Houphouft-Eoigny to attend the
Monrovia summit and provide a secure Francophone majority within the
proposed Regional Group, he may well have concluded that a West African
customs union, confined to French-speaking states, was now the best of
the available options. It would at least have the merit of preserving
(or reviving) something of the earlier spirit of Francophone cooperation
and did not altogether preclude the more ambitious kind of project with
which Senghor had been so closely associated in the 'sixties. Int when
the President of Senegal returned to the theme of economic integration,
in the mid-'seventies, it was as the advocate not of a regional group,
but of one that would extend the entire length of the Atlantic coast,
up to and including an independent Angola, and incorporating West as well as
Equatorial Africa. The alternative, in his view, would be an African
community dominated by the new economic strength of a re-united oil-rich
Nigeria.
For their part Nigeria and Guinea were invited to prepare a
detailed report on those areas of economic, social and cultural cooperation
that should receive priority in future deliberations by the community.
The Nigerian and Guinean representatives met in Lagos, in June 1968, and
agreed a set of recommendations for the next summit in Upper Volta, in 1969.
Their preliminary studies had taken them to the various West African
countries and interestingly it was these contacts and the ensuing
recommendations that seem to have convinced President Eyadema of Togo of the
benefits to be derived from regional cooperation. Although not present at
Monrovia, Togo subsequently indicated her interest in joining such a grouping
and the basis was laid for the joint Nigeria-Togo initiative of 1971-72 that,
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in turn, would lead to the creation of ECOWAS some three years later.
Thus, where the Monrovia Conference had marked a pause in the movement
towards regional cooperation the work of our two joint committees did point
the way within the region to the major economic initiatives of the 'seventies,
the CEAO on the one hand, and ECOWAS on the other. Where the first would
be limited in membership and influence, and restricted to a number of
Francophone states, the second was to be all-embracing, cutting across
linguistic, cultural, economic and political barriers, and ultimately
bringing together sixteen independent West African states.
The next summit of the Regional Group had been due to convene in
Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, in March 1969. This was intended as a gesture
of appreciation and encouragement to the one Entente state which had
defied Francophone pressures to attend the Monrovia meeting. Unfortunately,
it proved impossible to hold the 1969 summit, due largely to events elsewhere
35/in Africa and the continuing crisis in Nigeria. - Although the Federal
Military Government was preoccupied with pressing domestic issues, we
nevertheless continued to do everything in our power to assist the cause
of West African integration. As we pointed out to other African leaders,
however, the cause of West African integration-would not be helped by the
36/disintegration of its largest political unit. - Fortunately, only a few
leaders ever pretended that it would.
132.
REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES 
1. Charter of the OAU in Z.Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity 
Africa and the OAU, Appendix 2, pp.228 -235.
2. Cervenka, p.36.
3. C.Hoskyns, 'Pan-Africanism and Integration', in A.Hazlewood (ed.),
African Integration and Disintegration, pp.388-389.
4. R.H.Green and K.G.V.Krishna, Economic Cooperation in Africa, p.118.
5. Hoskyns, p.368.
6. P.Robson, 'Economic Integration in Equatorial Africa', in Hazlewood (ed.),
p.63. Also N.G. Plessz, Problems and Prospects of Economic Integration 
in West Africa,  pp.69-72.
7. Hoskyns, p.390.
8. C.Clapham, Liberia and Sierra Leone : An Essay in Comparative Politics,
pp.11-12.
9. Melady, Profiles of African Leaders,  pp. 109-110.
10. Cervenka, p.181.
11. R.I.Onwuka, Development and Integration in West Africa, p.54.
12. Clapham, pp.18-21.
13. Liberia was one of five African countries and three foreign firms
who in 1973 subscribed capital for the development and exploitation
of iron ore deposits in Guinea, close to the Liberian border. The
other African countries involved were Algeria, Nigeria, Zaire, and
Guinea herself. West Africa, 19 Feb.1973.
14. West Africa, 21 Oct.1974.
15. Le Monde, 11 may 1964; also J. Baulin, La Politique Africaine d'Houphoudt-
Boigny, p.145 ff.
16. Green and Krishna, p.40; Plessz, p.65. Plessz also points out that
where Liberia and Sierra Leone operated a large free enterprise
economy, that of the Ivory Coast was more interventionist, while Guinea
was approaching a centralised, planned economy. Guinea's currency was
unconvertible and she had strong links with the Eastern bloc countries;
the Ivory Coast belonged to the Franc Zone and the BCEA0 and applied
EEC preferences, while Sierra Leone adhered to the Commonwealth
preferential system and was a member of the Sterling Area. Liberia's
currency was the dollar and she enjoyed close financial and trade
connections with the United States. pp.63-64.
17. Green and Krishna, pp.40 -41.
133.
REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES cont.
18. There were complaints that the basic ECA study "had not covered
Mauritania at all and was inadequate on Guinea", both of which
(like Liberia) had rich iron ore deposits. Francophone suspicions
that the ECA favoured the English-speaking states were reinforced
as a result. Green and Krishna, pp.40-41; Onwuka, p.56. (Ivory Coast
absent.)
19. J.P.Renninger, Multinational Cooperation for Development in West Africa,
p.31.
20. Onwuka, p.59.
21. The "ambitious agenda" included "studies on the development of forest
industries, food and other agricultural industries, chemicals and
fertilisers, cement and small scale industries, as well as the
possibilities for coordinating transport and energy development.
There was also a proposal to establish "elaborate inter-governmental
machinery for sub-regional economic cooperation". Plessz, p.72.
22. Le Monde, 6 May 1967.
23. Articles of Association for the Establishment of an Economic Community of 
West Africa (initialled 4 May 1967).
24. Le Monde, 23 Nov. 1967. The following paragraphs are based on
The President of the Senegalese Republic's Address for the Opening of the
Interim Council of Ministers of Economic Affairs in West Africa.
25. Despatch from the Nigerian Ambassador in Dakar.
26. A document signed by the four Presidents of the countries (7 Nov.1967)
participating in the Senegal River grouping was circulated among the
other West African countries -part of it reads as follows:
"The necessity presenting itself more and more for our peoples to
constitute viable economic and political entities leads us to
re-affirm our determination to face the task of creating a
Regional Group. To this effect, a consultation at the highest
level seems to be the best and shortest way to achieve positive
results."
27. The relevant paragraph in my speech reads:
"Permit me to say that Nigeria has always supported fully any
proposal which will bring togegher and promote deep understanding
among African countries. In the context of continental unity,
Nigeria has always believed that the countries in West Africa
should work more closely for the development and the safety of
their peoples. It is in our interest to promote economic
cooperation and develop a common approach to the problems of
security and political instability in our part of the world.
I recognise that we must do this under the umbrella of the OAU
whose Charter enjoins us not to interfere in the internal affairs
of member states."
134.
REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES cont.
28. Le Monde,	 4 Oct.1967. (Toure's overtures to France); 8 Nov.1967.
(Toure attends Bamako Conference of Inter-State Committee for the
Development of the Senegal River Basin); 26 March 1968 (creation of
the Organisation of Riverine States bordering the Senegal River -
OERS); 10 April 1968 (Senghor and Bbuphoudt-Boigny meet in Paris).
29. The report of our ambassador in Senegal advised that Senghor was in
Paris and "campaigns for the resumption of all traditional relations
with France and Guinea for the benefit of Senegal River States
Organisation of which Sekou Toure is the Chairman. Senghor seeking
Houphoudt-Boigny i s support while in Paris with discussions of
cooperation possibilities between Senegal River Organisation and the
five Entente States Council. You may wish to consider the impact
nine Franco-philes against five others including Nigeria at the
imminent Monrovian Economic Summit." (Telegram received 13 April 1968).
30. Onwuka, p.63.
31. Le Monde, 19 Jan. 1968 (OCAM, Niamey); 20 Jan.1968, (Entente to
keep 'privileged ties').
32. Protocol Establishing the West African Regional Group (signed 24 April,
1968).
33. Onwuka, p.64.
34. President W.V.S.Tubman to the Nigerian Head of State, 22 July 1968.
35. In a letter dated 27 Nov. 1968 the Foreign Minister of Senegal had
reported to his Liberian counterpart that he had "mailed to his
colleagues of the eight French-speaking African States the draft
treaty and had expressed the wish that they should submit their
observations on the treaty to him by October 31. However, up to
November 27 he had not received any reactions from his colleagues."
Furthermore, "discussion of the draft treaty by member states of the
Senegal River States should have taken place on November 21 but the
meeting was re-scheduled for December 8 and L62 referred to recent events
in West Africa."
36. "We all realise that if Nigeria is allowed to disintegrate, it
will set a tragic precedent for other West African countries. The
break-up of Nigeria will definitely be inconsistent with the current
move for a regional grouping in West Africa."
Welcome Address by the Head of the Federal Military Government on 
Official Visit of the President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.
PART II
135.
CHAPTER 5
TEMPORARY SETBACKS TO COOPERATION IN WEST AFRICA,
1966-1970
The failure of the West African Regional Group was a serious,
if temporary setback to our hopes of regional integration. Although
regrettable, it was not altogether unexpected given the magnitude of the
problems confronting us, the meagre resources then at our disposal, and
the deteriorating political situation which, in the second half of the
'sixties, was conducive neither to cooperation nor to accommodation. During
these years the region was a prey to domestic instability and external
insecurity, with seven of the fourteen independent states experiencing at
least one military intervention.
There was civil war in the largest state, Nigeria, from 1967 until
1970, and a serious and prolonged constitutional crisis in Sierra Leone
during 1967-8. There was also a continuing and increasingly successful
war against Portuguese rule in Guinea-Bissau, waged by African nationalists
with support mainly from neighbouring Guinea : one consequence of which was
the unsuccessful invasion of Conakry, the capital of Guinea, in 1970 - with
incontrovertible evidence of Portuguese, if not French, complicity.
Meanwhile diplomatic incidents and hostile verbal exchanges were
also frequent, contributing to the general sense 6f insecurity. They
involved Guinea and her more conservative Francophone neighbours, as well
as Guinea and the new military rulers in Ghana, after the removal of Nkrumah.
There was also tension between Senegal and the Gambia, an English-speaking
enclave that became independent in 1966.
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Among the Francophone states there was growing alarm at the
direction taken by French diplomacy during these years, coupled with
uncertainty about the probable consequences of political and social change
in France itself, including her rapid integration within the EEC. Nor
were they reassured by the unexpected resignation in 1969, of General de
Gaulle, who had commanded the respect, loyalty and affection of many
French-speaking African leaders. But it was the civil war in Nigeria and
the threat of external (mainly French) involvement that was largely responsible
for the mounting tension within the region and which briefly but effectively
interrupted our progress towards regional cooperation and integratI6if,..
From the perspective of West African integration and ECOWAS,
however, there were other, more encouraging, developments in this same period.
The French decision in 1968, to become involved in the Nigerian civil war
was taken without regard for the UN Charter and that of the OAU - and without
consideration for the views and interests of our Francophone neighbours who,
from the outset, had adopted what seemed to us a responsible and correct
attitude. The result of this French initiative was to accelerate rather
than arrest the steady decline in Francophone solidarity that had begun
with the independence of Guinea in 1958.
The fact that the preparatory meetings of the West African Regional
Group took place at all testifies to the relaxation of the French hold and
presence in Africa. So long as French influence on the Francophone states
was pronounced, however, there could be little prospect of effective or
permanent cooperation across former colonial and linguistic frontiers. But
in Nigeria, in 1968, the French seemed to have seriously misjudged the
situation - perhaps to the lasting detriment of their ties with Africa.
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French influence persisted into the next decade (and beyond), but the trend,
by the end of the 'sixties, was already towards a much more assertive and
independent role for the Francophone African leaders. ECOWAS and the
West African states themselves would be the principal beneficiaries.
Nigeria survived the civil war with her economy and polity not
only intact but greatly strengthened, and with the Federal Military Government
more than ever convinced of the need for an active, forward-looking foreign
policy and, wherever possible, for improved relations with our West African
neighbours. Reconciliation at home was the first and immediate priority to
be followed, at the earliest opportunity, by reconciliation with the few
African leaders who had not shared our conviction that the struggle for
Nigerian unity was also the struggle for African unity. We also believed
that a regional community was the best means to safeguard the one and
advance the other.
1. Nigerian Civil War 
Where Central and Northern Africa had been the main areas of
.crisis in the early 'sixties, West Africa would be the focus of international
attention in the second half of the decade, beginning as early as 1963 with
military intervention first in Togo and then in Dahomey. The critical year,
however, was 1966, when the military also assumed responsibility for government
in Nigeria, in January, and in Ghana the following month. The tragic death
of the Nigerian Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and the substitution
of a military government under General Ironsi, brought no immediate change
to the country's policy of fri6ndship and cooperation with all its neighbours
and with the other West African states.
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There may have been some in the administration who, then as
later, were convinced that Nigeria's interests could best be served by a
more aggressive pursuit of her own interests in the region at the expense
of her immediate neighbours. Certainly the advisors, and the military,
who wished to impose a unitary system on Nigeria, regardless of the wishes
of the peoples concerned, were unlikely to show much consideration for
smaller and weaker states with very different cultures, traditions and
outlooks. - In any case, Ironsi's term of office was too short to permit
any change in foreign policy - even had he been prepared to sanction it,
which is far from certain.
The temptation to 'go it alone' was certainly strong as a
united Nigeria constituted a formidable political and economic unit whether
considered in terms of her population and potential market, her manpower and
range of technical skills, her present wealth and future prospects. It was
these same factors that had at first aroused the misgivings, and even fears,
of the smaller West African and Francophone states at the prospect of Nigerian
independence. It was to the credit of Tafawa Balewa and his personal
diplomacy that he was quickly able to allay most of these fears and to
.establish cordial relations with all our neighbours.
When I assumed the responsibility for leading Nigeria's military
government in August 1966, our first priority was to restore law and order
at home and revive the sense of loyalty and discipline throughout the body
politic. Following two bloody coups and the erosion of confidence between
and among the various groups that made up the country, one could only pray
for the sympathy and understanding of our neighbours and colleagues. And this
we did receive and very promptly.
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The Presidents of the Cameroon and Niger were the first to
visit Nigeria and their example was soon followed by other West African
and African leaders. I began a series of 'Know Your Neighbour' tours
which soon took me to our immediate neighbours and even further afield.
In this way we began to build a new sense of trust and confidence and had
no difficulty thereafter in winning support from our neighbours for our
initiatives; indeed, reviewing the speeches of Tafawa Balewa, it is clear
that we were both working towards the same end. The more senior leaders
of the region, who had worked closely with theformer Nigerian Prime Minister,
could once again relate to our policy without difficulty.
The support of these leaders would be critical during the years
of civil conflict that were to follow. During 1966 and early 1967 Nigeria
was moving towards the internal conflict that would absorb most of our
attention and energies until its conclusion in 1970. In that time the
Federal Military Government welcomed any initiative that might lead towards
the creation of a West African Economic Community and participated, as
actively as events would permit, in all the meetings and conferences designed
to further that end.
We were primarily concerned, however, with ending the domestic
crisis, as it was (and remains) our belief that the greatest contribution we
could make at that time to the cause of regional integration and African
unity and the independence of the African states, was a strong and united
Nigeria under effective central leadership. The disintegration of Nigeria
would have robbed black Africa of an influential and respected voice in
international affairs and the result would have been a considerable addition
to the African population living at a subsistence level and in conditions of
economic dependency.
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The civil war in Nigeria was a major test of our diplomacy
and of the loyalty of our immediate Francophone neighbours who, despite
the very considerable pressures on them, from France and some of her
closest African clients, nevertheless remained true allies of Nigeria
and firm in their commitment to the Charter of the OAU. At the end of
June 1967 Houphouft-Boigny had already confided to General de Gaulle his
growing concern about the deterioration in the political situation within
Africa, notably in Nigeria. He again saw de Gaulle briefly in March 1968,
when the question, then pending, of relations between France and Guinea
was apparently not discussed - but the "problem of Nigeria" was -
The Ivory Coast and France were 'both anxious about the growing
economic strength of Nigeria and were not averse to exploiting her internal
tensions. But support for secession was contrary to the spirit and the
letter of the OAU Charter, as was intervention in the affairs of an
independent, sovereign state. Unless the rebellion had a reasonably good
chance of success there was, therefore, little point in needlessly offending
the great majority of African leaders.
Presumably for tactical reasons, then, the Ivory Coast preferred
to postpone any independent action leaving the responsibility to another
African state, better qualified perhaps by reason of its radical and
socialist orientation, its previous British associations and its geographical
location - remote from West Africa. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was the
first to recognise the secessionist regime in April 1967 with support, shortly
afterwards, from Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. - Only then did the Ivory
Coast leader issue a statement, from Switzerland, approving Nyerere's
6/
7/
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decision as "an act of great political courage" - while declining to take
an official stand himself until his return to the Ivory Coast, -
presumably to avoid the accusation of colluding with or being manipulated
by France on this issue.
Houphouft-Boigny was clearly aware of the sentiments of our
Francophone neighbours and in particular of Niger, a member of the Entente.
Diori had earlier insisted that "there is no question of Niger recognising
Biafra", and the Presidents of Mali and Upper Volta had likewise confirmed
their opposition to such a move. - Upper Volta was, like Niger, a member
of the Entente and General Lamizana was uncompromising in his condemnation of
secession.
It seems to us that ... just at a time when
we are trying to form larger and more coherent groupings,
the break-up of Nigeria is an example neither to be
encouraged nor imitated.
According to Modibo Keita it would be:
A very serious precedent for the political
unity of every country. Mali's position is
clear. At a time when we are discussing African
unity, a grouping of the African peoples, it
seems inconsistent to encourage secession on a
tribal basis.
The strong stand taken so promptly by Niger and Upper Volta
was a serious setback for the Ivory Coast - which in any case had yet
to give official recognition to "Biafra" - and for the unity of the Entente.
In May, President Ahidjo of Cameroon likewise indicated "there was no
question of recognising Biafra"; - and, given his country's proximity
142.
to our own Eastern Region, that support was invaluable for without it
the rebellion might have continued much longer than it did. Among the
Francophone states Houphouft-Boigny's only support came from his close
colleague, President Bongo of Gabon, who began by appealing for "prudence"
and "patience", insisting that it was "still too soon to talk about it",
but concluded that "many African states would want to give serious
consideration to the public stand just taken by M.Houphouet-Boigny." 9/
After several meetings with Houphouat-Boigny, in Paris, Bongo
declared in May 1968 that "it was utopian to believe that Nigeria with its
10/fifty million inhabitants, could remain in its present form." -
Recognition of Biafra by Gabon followed two days later. Doubtless
frustrated at the failure of his other colleagues to respond, Houphouft-Boigny
next day gave vent to his "indigation" -about the "incomprehensible and
culpable indifference of the entire world" concerning the war then taking
11/place with "Biafra". - But it was mid-May before the Ivory Coast was
12/itself ready to accord official recognition to the regime, - and.it was
another two months before there was any indication in the Ivory Coast of popular
support for the President's stand. One French journalist wrote of an
13/impression of 'general indifference". -
There was a conference of all five Entente leaders, in July 1968,
in an effort to harmonise their position on Nigeria before the scheduled
meeting of the OAU Consultative Committee that had been set up to examine
the question. It was already clear, however, that the new military President
of Togo, Etienne Eyadema, and the Presidents of Upper Volta and Niger
14/
remained convinced that recognition of "Biafra" was not the correct policy. -
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Even President Emile. Zinsou of Dahomey would soon admit that "it is
a delicate and difficult problem", insisting that his government was
"against the secession and against the war") ' 	the end of September
he again repeated his opposition to secession, trying to justify his
16/
country's aid for "Biafra" on"humanitarian" grounds. -
Elsewhere in West Africa President Senghor was anxious to
mediate in the Nigerian conflict but, mindful perhaps of his country's
large Moslem majority, and the close bonds linking the populations of the
Sahel, and aware of his role and status as a founder-member of the OAU, he
steadfastly declined to support the cause of secession. Senegal could not,
on the other hand, stand aside and ignore developments in Nigeria which
17/
"seriously call into question the basis of our action for African
In July 1968 Sgkou Tourg of Guinea openly criticised the Ivory Coast leader
maintaining that, but for the discovery of oil in Eastern Nigeria, "there
would not be so many ready to talk of humanitarian problems in Nigeria when
those same people could apparently, and with a good conscience, remain
18/
silent over Vietnam." -
Despite the perhaps unexpectedly weak response to the orchestrated
campaign for recognition of "Biafra" and dismemberment of Nigeria, and
despite the evident misgivings of the Quai d'Orsay in Paris, General de Gaulle
at a press conference in September 1968 revealed that his government had
"in so far as we are able", been assisting "Biafra", but that it had so
far refrained from recognising that regime since it considered that "the
administration of Africa is, above all, a matter for the Africans."
While some East African states - in fact two, Tanzania and Zambia - had
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recognised "Biafra', "others seem to be moving in that direction"; France
had not taken such a stand but might yet do so. In conclusion, General de
19/Gaulle suggested that Confederation might be preferable to civil war. -
But the African answer to the diplomatic activity of the Ivory
Coast, and that of France, designed to split Nigeria into units that could
more easily be accommodated within the West African pattern of small
Francophone states, came at the Algiers summit of the OAU, also in September
1968. There, after an eloquent opening address by the Chairman, Houari
Boumedienne, the African states voted overwhelmingly for a Nigerian-sponsored
resolution, with only four states approving a motion sympathetic to "Biafra" -
Tanzania, Zambia, the Ivory Coast and Gabon - and two abstentions, Botswana
20/
and Ruanda. -
The Ivory Coast was the only West African state to oppose us in
this way. It seemed that General de Gaulle's statement, far from rallying
Francophone support for the Ivory Coast position, may even have alienated
some English-speaking states, until then undecided. The reat majority
of leaders attending, however, were convinced either by Nigerian diplomacy,
Boumedienne's uncompromising statement of principle at the opening session,
or simply the realisation that every African state was vulnerable to secession.
After the Algiers summit one of Houphouet-Boigny's closest colleagues
openly criticised his stand. President Tsiranana of Madagascar summed up
the feeling of the meeting by insisting that "African unity begins with
the unity of each state". 211 President Ould Daddah of Mauritania, himself
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an experienced jurist, concluded that "we cannot renounce the principle
22/
of the territorial status quo set out in the Charter of the OAU." -
The diplomatic campaign to destroy Nigeria seemed to have reached a dead
end, just as the civil war was itself drawing at last to a conclusion.
Already African (and European) leaders were beginning to look
ahead and revise their views about the likely role of a re-united and prosperous
Nigeria within an African and West African context. Houphougt-Boigny
received no additional support at the OCAM conference in Kinshasa in
January 1969. The next month he was again received in Paris by General de
Gaulle who, having now presumably decided against formal recognition of
"Biafra", nevertheless commended the Ivory Coast President as "the champion
of a just and noble cause, that of 'Biafra', for which we give you our
23/
unqualified support." -
It was encouraging that only one country in our region actually
supported the secession in Nigeria - which resulted in a break in diplomatic
relations between ourselves and the Ivory Coast. And even the Ivory Coast
only became deeply involved in the Nigerian crisis after May 1968 - while
attempting at first to shelter behind the views of East African leaders who
were poorly placed to understand or appreciate the real nature of our problems.
Otherwise the West African region remained more or less intact and pulled
together remarkably well during the crisis. The movement towards regional
integration continued, with our full support, until Houphouft-Boigny's
recognition of the rebel regime made it difficult for the Ivory Coast to
continue to participate in conferences attended by Nigeria.
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While the Ivory Coast remained isolated in this way within
West Africa, there were certain other countries in the region whose
support for us was increasingly uncertain, from 1968 onwards, notably
Sierra Leone under Sir Siaka Stevens, Ghana under Dr.Kofi Busia, and
Dahomey under Dr.Emile Zinsou. Where Moslem opinion in West Africa was
overwhelmingly favourable to the cause of One Nigeria and to the Federal
Military Government, the Christian populations of the coastal states
were more ambivalent in their attitude, including many who were sympathetic
to their co-religionists in Eastern Nigeria, irrespective of the real
issues at stake. This was the case in Sierra Leone where Siaka Stevens,
the new Prime Minister after April 1968, not only inherited many political
and economic problems from his predecessor, but, as a result of the country's
recent experience of military intervention and the subsequent break-down
of discipline within the army, had grown exceedingly wary of military
commanders and of military governments in general. Perhaps for this
reason too he proved more responsive to the "Biafran" leaders, civil and
military than to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria.
The secessionists were given a base in Sierra Leone and seem
to have enjoyed exceptional rights of entry into and exit from the country
and its capital. Criticism of Nigeria's policy from the Sierra Leone
delegation of the OAU summits of 1968 (Algiers) and 1969 (Addis Ababa)
would provoke me into a somewhat harsh reply at the latter conference.
Moreover there were clear indications that, by January 1970, Sierra Leone
prepared a recorded statement for transmission by the BBC which, had it
been delivered, would very seriously have damaged relations between Sierra
Leone and Nigeria. Instead the rebellion in Nigeria collapsed on January
12 and the Federal Government formally accepted the "Biafran" surrender
on January 15.
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Nigeria's relations with Ghana, never very cordial under
Nkrumah, improved greatly with the formation of military governments
in both countries early in 1966. It is true that our contacts with
General Ankrah, the first Ghanaian military Head of State, became strained
in the early years of the civil war, largely as a result of his somewhat
patronising and even hectoring manner, particularly at meetings of the OAU
Consultative Committee:, which was trying to help us resolve our national
problem. There he increasingly gave the impression of wishing to dictate
terms to the Federal Military Government. However, 	 relations with
his successor, General Afrifa, who replaced him in 1969, were extremely
cordial, helped perhaps by our similar background and our common experience
at Sandhurst where he, too, had been an officer cadet.
It was only late in 1969, after the military had withdrawn in
favour of elections and a new civilian government had been formed under
KOfi Susie, that Ghana's attitude to the Nigerian civil war began to give
us some cause for concern. More serious, however, was the decision by the
Ghanaian government in late 1969 and early 1970 to expel, at very short
notice, all foreigners living and working in the country, including
perhaps as many as half a million Nigerians. Coinciding as it did with
the end of the civil war and the beginnings of reconstruction and re-
settlement, it seemed to point the need for greater cooperation among
West African governments, while at the same time making that cooperation
even more difficult to obtain.
The major success of Nigeria's earlier diplomacy was the
steadfast support of our immediate neighbours who might otherwise have
been tempted to align themselves with the Ivory Coast and France. Here ...
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our only misgivings in the course of the war concerned the attitude
of Dahomey and then only briefly during the administration of
Dr. Emile Zinsou in 1968-9. But even he rejected secession as a solution
to Nigeria's problems although, under pressure from France and from
international agencies like the Red Cross and Caritas, engaged in
humanitarian operations, he did make available facilities within his
country for relief supplies to the rebel enclave - to which we strongly
objected on security grounds while suggesting alternative arrangements.
Given the cooperation and understanding shown by neighbouring countries
through the civil war, West Africa was saved the prospect of a deep and
damaging rift that would otherwise have severely restricted future
cooperation within the region. After the war our task of effecting
reconciliation at home and abroad was the more easily encompassed and,
with the assistance of Togo, we were then able to take up the question of
regional integration, interrupted after the Monrovia conference of April
1968.
2. West Africa after the Nkrumah Regime 
The Nigerian civil war was the most important, but by no
means the only source of tension within the region after 1965. The
overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, in February 1966, within a
month of the Nigerian coup, and the emergence of a military government
under General Ankrah not only overturned the earlier partnership between
Guinea and Ghana, but also aggravated the already poor relations between
Guinea and the Ivory Coast, while at the same time improving the prospects
for cooperation between the Ivory Coast and Ghana.
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Guinea, Ghana and the Entente 
Nkrumah was given sanctuary in Guinea, where he was welcomed
as joint leader of the Union of African States, although his political
responsibilities in Guinea seem to have been negligible and much of
his time was spent writing and travelling Abroad. Meanwhile Sekou Toure
threatened to restore Nkrumah to power in Ghana, using force if necessary
and, presumably,routeing his army through the Ivory Coast. 21/ The threat,
as Houphouft-Boigny later conceded, was barely credible, although the
Ivory Coast troops were nevertheless despatched to the frontiers where
they remained until April - and where they were poorly placed to imitate
the example of their colleagues in Ghana.
Among the Entente partners, however, there was a clear sense
of crisis in February and March 1966, as Houphouat-Boigny hastily sought
assurances from the French and from his colleagues in the Entente -- that
in the event of an invasion by Guinea they would honour the terms of their
/
mutual defence agreements. 25- But by mid-April the Ivory Coast President
was sufficient reassured to dismiss the threat of invasion as "a lot of
0
hot air from Sekou Toure" who had, he claimed, neither the roads, the
transport, nor the supplies necessary to sustain a military expedition
on a sufficient scale and in hostile tertitory. 26/- In any case Guinea
had more than enough problems policing its frontier with Guinea-Bissau,
Where Toure was supporting the nationalist PAIGC against the Portuguese.
The Ivory Coast army was finally withdrawn to barracks after April.
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The coup in Ghana greatly strengthened the unity of the
Entente, at least for the present, and also enabled Togo to make its
formal entry into the grouping as a full member, in June,1966. After
independence Togo had felt increasingly threatened by a territorial
dispute with Ghana, with rival and ever more ambitious claims being
advanced by both sides. As a former trusteeship territory, administered
partly by Britain and partly by France, and because of Britain's ties with
Ghana, the Togolese leadership had looked to the Ivory Coast and the
Francophone states to guarantee the country's security.
The issue with Ghana had arisen as a product of colonial rule
and the division of the coastal Ewe population between the two adjacent
states. On the eve- of Ghana's independence, following a UN sponsored
referendum, there was a further transfer of territory and population -
with the incorporation within Ghana of British-administered Togoland and
its Ewe population. Then, with the independence of French Togoland, there
developed among the Ewe of Ghana a-cotnter movement - to join or rejoin
their compatriots in what was now the Republic of Togo.
The territorial dispute, which continues unresolved to the
present, has occasionally threatened the peace of the sub-region, most
notably in the period just before and after the assassination of the
first Togolese President, Sylvanus Olympio, himself an Ewe, in 1963.
However, despite the importance of the Francophone connection and the
sense of assurance and the financial assistance that it brings, the long-
term interest of Togo has been rather to exploit its strategic location
between Nigeria and Ghana and to promote detente in the sub-region as a
condition for increased inter-state trade.
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Thus the new leadership after 1963 was under considerable
domestic pressure, not least from commercially-minded Ewe constituents,
not to antagonise the Nkrumah government unnecessarily by accepting
membership of the Entente. But, with the removal of Nkrumah, Togo could
balance the future prospects of a potential grouping of Benin states,
incorporating both Nigeria and Ghana, against membership in the existing
Entente, where a possible Ghanaian presence was already receiving serious
consideration. Her preferred strategy was to join the Entente, while
exploiting her distinctive colonial background to develop useful political
and economic connections across linguistic barriers - with other African
states, notably Nigeria and Ghana, and with a variety of West European and
international partners.
The new rulers in Ghana were anxious for a speedy rapprochement
with the Ivory Coast. There was talk of fraternal cooperation, while
the military government spoke of the need for tolerance among the African
states and acceptance of the principles of the OAU.Charter - clearly
designed to distance the new regime from its civilian predecessor. All
outstanding differences between Ghana and the Ivory Coast seemed finally
to have been settled with the despatch of a good-will mission from Accra
to Abidjan, accompanied by the exiled "King of the Sanwis", whose pretensions
to independence from the Ivory Coast had been encouraged by Nkrumah, but who was
27/
subsequently pardoned by Houphouft-Boigny. -
Under pressure from some of the Ivory Coast's partners, the
Entente agreed, in April, to strengthen cooperation with the new government
in Ghana, 28/ - but there was no indication that the Ivory Coast government
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saw Ghana as anything but a serious economic rival, whose inclusion
in the Entente would directly threaten their own leading position.
Where Hamani Diori of Niger, then president of the Entente, at first
welcomed the prospect of Ghana's membership, he soon qualified that
support : "it is clear that the Ghanaian economy is a reality that we
have to tak	
29/
e into account." -
It took weeks of hard bargaining before the frontier between
Ghana and the Ivory Coast was finally re-opened - having been closed long
before by Nkrumah. Another factor preventing a closer rapprochement
between the two regimes was Bouphoudt-Boigny's rejection of military
rule as an acceptable and permanent pattern of government in West Africa.
It was not until the military in Ghana had withdrawn, in 1969, in favour
of an elected civilian government under Dr. Kofi Busia, that relations
between the two countries did improve markedly.
Following Nkrumah's removal, the government in Guinea found
itself increasingly isolated, although numerous African states did voice
their opposition to military intervention as a means of resolving political
and social problems. Even Modibo Keita of Mali, a former member of the
Union of African States, gave no visible encouragement to Tour's proposal
30/
to resolve the issue by force. -
Diplomatic relations were severed with the new military rulers
in Ghana, which was the reason for Guinea's absence from the Accra meeting
of the West African Regional Group, in April/May 1967, despite her
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enthusiastic support for the principle of African unity. It was
also the explanation for Guinea's subsequent failure to sign and
ratify the Articles of Association of the Group, approved at the Accra
conference. Guinea was, nevertheless, represented at the Monrovia
meeting the following year, together with Ghana, after energetic mediation
by the Liberian President. It is probable that Guinea was the more
anxious to attend in 1968 given ,
 not only the change of venue and her
good relations with Liberia, but also the knowledge that all but one of
the Entente states would boycott the proceedings.
Guinea's relations with the Ivory Coast, consistently bad in
the past, continued to deteriorate after Nkrumah's removal as Tourt
threatened military action to restore him to power. After February 1967
citizens of both countries were detained in a series of retaliatory moves
that threatened to escalate into something even more serious, particularly
with the seizure of Guinea's Minister of Foreign Affairs and other prominent
31/
nationals, while in transit at Abidjan airport. -
It was July 1967, however, before the Ivory Coast would agree
a meeting with Guinea to settle this, the most urgent of their many
outstanding disputes - and that was only after protracted efforts by
32/President Tubman, assisted by Hamani Diori and Modibo Keita. - An
exchange of detainees finally took place in September accompanied by
•	 33/renewed attacks by Toure on his former political patron. -
Guinea and the Senegal River Organisation 
Meanwhile, in June 1966, Tour e had contributed to his growing
isolation by attacking Senghor - whose country had received perhaps as
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many as 300,000 immigrants, refugees from Guinea who were unwilling
4/
or unable to return h	 3ome. - Guinea and Senegal were also divided
by their support for rival nationalist movements in Guinea-Bissau, while
Senegal's threats forcibly to incorporate the newly independent and
English-speaking Gambia encouraged closer ties between that small state
and Guinea.
By October 1966 relations between Senegal and Guinea were
reported to have been "frozen" at the insistence of Senghor. 35/ - In
January 1967 Guinea formally suspended its participation in the Inter-
State Committee that administered the affairs of the Senegal River Basin
Organisation - on the grounds that "Guinea cannot cooperate with M.Senghor
until such time as his positions reflect the defence of African and
Senegalese interests rather than that of French policy towards the
36/African countries." -
A resumption of sub-regional cooperation by Guinea was made
conditional on a pledge from the other three member-states that they would
37/
not in future allow foreign powers to disrupt their fraternal relations. -
However, as the four leaders of the sub-regional body had not met together
since before February 1965 and the creation of OCAM, Toure's ultimatum had
no more effect than his suspension of Guinea's participation.
Guinea's uncertain presence in the Senegal River Basin Group
had been, and would remain the principal reason for the group's turbulent
history which, in turn, retarded its economic progress. Where Guinea's
geographical situation, potential wealth and importance as a market made
it a most desirable partner, particularly for the more developed Senegal,
its inclusion also demanded a more ambitious prospectus (and greater funds)
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than development of the Senegal River along most of its length would
otherwise have warranted. But the main reasons for Guinea's inclusion
were as much political as economic, with their origins in the rivalry
between Senegal and the Ivory Coast, as the former struggled to retain
its primacy among the Francophone states of the region.
Guinea's defection from the French camp in 1958 was, as we
have seen, a serious blow to Senghor and his ambitions for regional, if
not African leadership. Guinea's membership of the Senegal River Group
was designed to help restore the status quo ante and redress the political
and economic balance within the region in favour of Senegal. However,
where Senghor may have hoped to tame a difficult and often intractable
neighbour and hasten Guinea's return to the Francophone alliance, Toure
probably saw the River Basin Organisation rather as an extended base for his
own radical options and a potential source of allies. Such contrasting
calculations were not a promising basis for lasting cooperation.
Toure's isolation, both regional and sub—regional, was all
the more complete given the contrasting evolution at this time of his
socialist neighbour, Mali. In December 1966, as Tour's relations with
Senegal deteriorated, Modibo Keita made his first visit to Dakar since
38/the break—up of the Mali Federation in August 1960. — Mali was now
seeking, largely for econothic reasons, to renew its collaboration with
France and with its Francophone neighbours.
Senghor,himself, had every interest in supporting this move
since the Senegalese economy needed the stimulus that could only be
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provided by economic cooperation within the sub-region. During 1967
there were prolonged discussions between representatives of the French
and Mali governments aimed at facilitating Mali's return to the Franc
Zone, if not her immediate reintegration into the West African monetary
39/Union (UMOA). -
It may have been the example of Mali, or the near suspension
of American financial aid to Guinea during 1967, which provoked the apparent
reversal of that country's policy in October 1967. At the eighth congress
of the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG), Toure made his much publicised
speech indicating his willingness to "reestablish an honest and fruitful
/
cooperation with France." 42	 There had been similar overtures at the
beginning of the decade but they had been quickly overtaken by events in
Guinea itself, and in the rest of Africa. This new statement was, however,
the first in a series of attempts by Guinea to escape from its isolation
and to come to terms with the French government and with its Francophone
neighbours.
Senghor promptly seized the opportunity to re-launch his
sub-regional enterprise and November 1967 saw the first meeting since
1964 of the four Heads of the Senegal River Basin Organisation. The
meeting, a very cordial one, took place at Bamako, in Mali, where,
according to Keita, "it was a question of associating the members around
a programme of economic development" aimed not only at the exploitation .
of the Senegal River Basin, but eventually at securing "total economic
integration within the framework of the sub-regional grouping:" 411
Events moved quickly thereafter as the four leaders at last found it
possible to concert their activities and to agree common goals.
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In March. 1968 the Senegal River Organisation ODERS) was formally
established at another summit meeting of the four leaders, this time
in Labe, Guinea, where Tour e in his opening address maintained the
earlier emphasis on unity and integration. And at the end of the proceedings
he reminded his colleagues that they were now firmly committed to the
cause of unification. "First and foremost the citizens of Senegal, Mali,
Mauritania and Guinea are citizens of the OERS",and henceforth "nothing
42/
must be done that is contrary to the interests of all four states." -
In April Tourg would take the opportunity of an official visit
to Guinea by his colleague, Keita, to suggest publicly a union of their
two states to form "one and the same nation, one and the same state".
Keita pledged Mali's support for union but, doubtless recalling the
unfortunate experience of the Mali Federation, reminded his host that, to
43/be successful, it would require "a solid preparation". -
But it was Senghor who was particularly concerned to maintain
the pressure for unity and cooperation. It was probably at his prompting
that, after the Bamako meeting of November 1967, the four heads of the
sub-regional group signed a joint letter to interested governments in the
region indicating that they viewed their small community as the nucleus
of a wider economic grouping. It was:
Their major preoccupation to extend our cooperation
through the creation of a Regional Group embracing
the whole of the West African States. It is increasingly
necessary for our peoples to constitute viable economic
and political entities and it is this that leads us to
reaffirm our determination to face up to the task of
creating a Regional Group. 44/
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The success of Senghor's scheme, however, depended on his
ability to overcome General de Gaulle's antipathy to Tour:, while allaying
Toure's intense suspicions of France, with which he had severed diplomatic
relations in 1965. Where Guinea, confronted by growing economic difficulties
and an acute shortage of capital, had taken the initiative in October 1967
in seeking a reconciliation with France, Senghor worked hard on Tourg-'s
(and Senegal's) behalf in Paris in the Spring of 1968 - just as earlier
he had facilitated the return of Mali to its former allegiance. But Mali
had not broken all ties with the Metropole in the way that Guinea had.
And it was soon evident that, where Guinea was concerned, reconciliation
with France would, at the very least, be conditional on reconciliation
with the Ivory Coast.
As Houphouft-Boigny had little, if anything, to gain and
much to lose from such an accommodation, Senghor's strategy had little
chance of succeeding - certainly not while Jacques Foccart i now very
close to the Ivory Coast leader, remained at the Elysee Palace as
Secretary-General for African and Malagasy Affairs. There was official
scepticism in France and the Ivory Coast about Toure's motives in seeking
to improve relations with the formerly despised Metropole. Paris claimed
to see it as a ploy to obtain the resumption of American aid - and at
45/its previous generous level. -
It is also possible that Senghor did not improve his chances
by raising with Houphouft-Boigny and with the French President the
proposed formation of the West African Regional Group, although as
envisaged by Senghor and his allies, the Group would include both the
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Entente and the Senegal River Organisation, providing a secure institutional
46/framework with a fairly safe Francophone majority. - French critics may
not have been so easily convinced about the cohesion and effectiveness of
that majority. And, given its subsequent attitude, it is unlikely that
the French government would have relaxed its traditional opposition to
collaboration of any kind across former colonial boundaries - where it did
not directly serve the interests of France.
The failure of Senghor's mediation between Guinea and France,
and the renewed differences between the two following General de Gaulle's
public endorsement of "Biafran" secession, re-kindled the earlier
antagonisms among the French-speaking states of West Africa. Toure's
isolation was practically complete following the military coup in Mali,
47/in November 1968, and the removal of his colleague, Modibo Keita. -
Although careful at first not to condemn the enterprise, by January 1969
Toure was accusing France and other OCAM countries of complicity in the coup
48/
and of a further plot to eliminate himself. -
In February 1969 he resumed his attacks on General de Gaulle
and criticised the "undignified" conduct of certain African leaders who
were only too ready to visit Paris to solicit favours. "In France they
49/
are well aware that Guinea is no beggar." - There was evidence
that same year of collaboration between individual army officers in Guinea
and the Portuguese authorities in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau. But, in
the light of evidence later uncovered in Lisbon, there is no doubt
that Portugal was heavily involved in the abortive invasion of Conakry
in November 1970, using Guinean exiles, perhaps with French complicity.
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The break with Senegal at the end of 1970 was real, if
never quite complete, as Senghor refused to comply with Tour's demand
for the extradition of exiles condemned in their absence in Guinea for
0/their alleged role in the invasion. 5-	 By December 1971Sengharwas
ready to confirm the collapse of the OERS, after the prolonged and
51/
continuing absence of Guinea from the organisation's ruling councils. -
Even the patient, unremitting efforts of President Ould Daddah had failed to
effect any reconciliation.
The only available option was to reform the organisation, with
three rather than the original four members, and with suitable revised
objectives - this time confined to the development of the river basin
•
itself and excluding the more ambitious proposals for the complete economic
integration of the sub-region. And that was the decision later confirmed
at a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the OERS, in Nouakchott at
the end of 1971.
The situation in West Africa after 1966 was not then conducive
to schemes of political cooperation and economic integration, whether
regional or sub-regional. The Entente was deeply divided over its
attitude to the Nigerian civil war, with the Ivory Coast all but isolated
and enjoying only the moral support of Dahomey, which was anything but
certain. After a brief and spectacular revival, in 1967, which incidentally
gave a much-needed boost to earlier proposals for West African integration,
the Senegal River Basin Organisation failed to survive the end of the
decade.
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It was a decade, moreover, that had begun with the independence
and then the collapse of the Mali Federation, followed by that of the
Franco-African Community, all projects witb_which the Senegalese leader
52/
had been, at one time or another, closely associated.- The West African
Regional Group was itself a victim of the civil war in Nigeria, the
renewed divisions among the Francophone states elsewhere in the region,
and the continuing hostility of the French, determined to preserve and
strengthen their own influence within black Africa. It was now more than
ever clear that regional integration in West Africa would depend for its
success not only on the return of peace to Nigeria, but also on the
ability of other African states to determine their own future in the
context of national interest rather than the interests, political and
economic, of the former Metropole.
"Francophone
While the Nigerian civil war was a major obstacle to West
African integration in the short-term, a more serious, long-term problem
was the close - and one-sided - relationship between France and her
former colonies in the region. The end of the civil war was but one
condition for the successful creation of a regional economic community;
a second condition was the relaxation of the French presence in West
Africa and, indeed, in Africa as a whole.
It was General de Gaulle's policy to strengthen and expand the
Metropole's influence in black Africa and that policy survived his
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resignation in 1969 and continued under his successor, Georges Pompidou.
However, the brief inter-regnum provided by the Senate President, Alain
Nailer, in 1969, offered 'a foretaste of things to come when the
Secretary-General for African and Malagasy' Affairs, Jacques Foccart,
was temporarily-removed from the Elysee Palace; but he would be replaced
finally only in 1974, after the election as President of the Conservative
leader Giscard d'Estaing.
Despite the impression of continuity in French policy, events
in the 'sixties were not altogether reassuring for those Francophone
states who, above all else, feared a reduction or cessation of French
economic aid and technical assistance. De Gaulle's re-election in 1965
gave some guarantee of continued French investment, cooperation and perhaps
even military support. However, the large vote for de Gaulle's opponents
on the first ballot, the uncertain outcome of the 1967 legislative
elections, and the brief paralysis of the administration following the
first "events" of May 1968, emphasised the precarious nature of a regime
so dependent, apparently, on a single personality.
Meanwhile the French government was under growing domestic
pressure to reduce the level of its economic commitments abroad. The
apparent indifference or hostility of many French to the predicament of
their former colonies, expressed through the doctrines of Cartierisme, were
a constant source of anxiety to her Francophone allies in Africa, as was
de Gaulle's express endeavour to retain influence, and his new campaign to
counter Anglo-Saxon influence in the Americas. Moreover, severe cuts in the
French budget for overseas aid and cooperation were inevitable in the
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aftermath of May 1968, given the demands for increased domestic spending
to alleviate the social unrest.
There was also the growing reluctance of the French authorities
to commit troops in support of African leaders under pressure at home.
There was the abrupt reversal of France's traditional alliances in the
Middle East — in 1967, if not beforer— and in any case well in advance
of most of the Francophone African leaders who would retain their links
with Israel until 1973, when economic and other considerations forced
a revision of their policy.
Finally, there was the unexpected and controversial decision
to devalue, taken at the end of 1969, after de Gaulle's departure from
office, and without prior consultation with France's partners in the Franc
Zone. All of these pointed the way to a very different relationship
between France and her former African territories during the next decade.
De Gaulle's defeat in the 1969 referendum merely accelerated the French.demise
as did his subsequent death, and that of Pompidou in 1974.
Where economic assistance and technical cooperation was the
central consideration for most, if not allothe Francophone African leaders,
Houphouet—Boigny and Senghor had more ambitious design which apparently
required the approval and support of the French President. By 1967,
as Nigeria moved towards civil war, the Ivory Coast leader wanted French
backing to help secure our division into several smaller states, more
compatible with the size and resources of his own country and with his
ambitions for leadership within the region.
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Senghor at the same time wanted de Gaulle's support for the
creation of an international Francophone community, or "Commonwealth",
with. active French participation, wherein be might play a leading role.
While Senghor withheld his support from the first scheme, Houphouft-Boigny
was privately critical of the second - although, as further evidence of
their recent reconciliation, neither would openly disavow the other's
proposals.
In neither case was it clear, however, to the French that
their interests would be served by precipitate Car indeed any) action,
and de Gaulle, receiving conflicting advice, was content to leave the
initiative to the African leaders themselves. When he did intervene
it was not in quite the way that the African leaders had wanted or
expected. His outspoken support for self-determination for the French-
speaking population of Quebec, in 1967, while failing to arrest his own
government's declining popularity at home, seriously damaged France's
credibility abroad - most notable with multi-lingual states such as
Canada, Belgium and Switzerland, all possible members of a Francophone
community. It would take all the good sense of the Canadian Federal
Government and the combined efforts of such prominent Francophone leaders
as Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Senghor and Diori, to mend the diplomatic
breach.
General de Gaulle's late intervention in Nigerian affairs
the following year in support of secession but withholding French
recognition of "Biafra', was likewise counter-productive, and left the
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French- and the Ivory Coast governments no option in the end but to come
to terms with the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. Again our
Francophone neighbours had exerted themselves, firstly to prevent an outright
diplomatic break between ourselves and France, and to dissuade the French
President from his proposed course of action, and later to effect a
reconciliation as soon as possible.
De Gaulle's distrust of the Anglo—Saxon powers, already obvious
during his visits to Canada and the Americas, and in his attitude to former
British territories like Nigeria and Ghana, was again in evidence a month
after his celebrated "Vive le Qu'ebec Libre" speech. In August 1967 he made
it clear that France would not agree to Britain's entry to the European
Common Market. When Harold Wilson nevertheless persisted with his
application for British membership, the French Foreign Minister delayed
consideration of the request by the Community until de Gaulle, apparently
anticipating the decision of his European colleagues, delivered his formal
veto at a press conference in December.
That decision, coming after the meeting in Dakar of the Council
of Ministers of the proposed West African Regional Group, and just before
the OCAM summit in Niamey and the critical Monrovia conference of the
Regional Group, may well have reinforced the Ivory Coast and its Entente
allies in their view that association across linguistic lines was desirable
(and practicable) only in certain very restricted fields. It was paradoxical
that, after 1965, when French policies and events in Africa itself were
pushing many of the Francophone leaders towards a more independent political
line, and towards diversification of their political and economic ties,
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African leaders, such as Presidents Bourguiba and Senghor, should have
expended so much effort in promoting a new association of Francophone
states, similar in many, but not all respects, to the British Commonwealth.
Senghor was concerned, as ever, to maintain, 	 close ties
between Africa and Europe - particularly with France. Bourguiba was
at the same time also anxious to repair diplomatic relations with France,
disrupted by his government's resumption of European estates in May 1964.
Neither had the same conception of the future community since Bourguiba,
perhaps in deference to his Maghreb neighbours, wished to confine it,
at least initially, to the area of technical (and educational) cooperation,
while Senghor hoped for a broader cultural and economic community and
resisted proposals to separate out the various aspects of cooperation.
Both, however, were anxious to get a definite commitment to the
scheme from the French. But support in France was patchy at best and came
at first from pOliticians and economic groups closer, perhaps, to the
53/Conservative than to the Gaullist leaders. - Nevertheless, the leading
French protagonists of Francophonie were able to tap the historical ties
between de Gaulle, Gaullism, and former French Africa.
Francophonie was discussed at the OCAM summit in Madagascar in June
1966, when Senghor outlined his proposal for a community to comprise black
African states, Madagascar and the Maghreb countries, together with Belgium,
Switzerland and Canada, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The suggestion seems
to have won general approval, althoughAfrican leaders were almost as
54/
reserved in their comments as was the French government itself. -
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Nor was it clear precisely what kind of framework Senghor had
in mind since this would clearly depend on the nature and extent of the
French commitment, to say nothing of the character of the association as
a whole. The apparent lack of enthusiasm on the part of the French President
was ascribed to his sense of "discretion" : it was a matter for Africans
themselves and it was not his place to appear to be dictating to them.
France was said to have "a certain interest" but the initiative must come
55/from the African leaders themselves. -
Certainly no one in Africa wanted to revive the French Community
in its old form - the sense of nationalism and independence was already
too strong. It was largely anxiety about their deteriorating economic
situation and uncertainty about the future direction of French policy
when de Gaulle was no longer there that provided what support there was
in Africa for the Senghor/Bourguiba proposals. The Francophone leaders
were reluctant, as yet, to see the advantages of inter-African trade and
cooperation as an alternative to continued dependence on France - although
it was already clear that a number of them, at least, entertained serious
doubts about the wisdom of the latter policy.
Efforts by OCAM's President, Diori, to sell the idea of a
Francophone community to the Algerian government met with a rebuff.
President Boumedienne insisted that his country would retain its independent
culture and values and expressed concern about any move that would "impair
the unity that must regulate relationships among the newly independent
56/
countries." - Morocco, although seeking better relations with France
after the Ben Barka scandal of 1964, had serious reservations about the
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proposed community, as did Mauritania which. had left OCAM in 1965
after that organisation had assumed political as well as economic
/5
responsibilities. 7-
Guinea was even less receptive and, in January 1967, Toure
described francophonie as "an attempt to betray African interests. All
states, all governments that betray Africa will pay dearly for it;"
Et was an attempt to maintain in economic subjection countries that were
58/trying to free themselves from the colonial yoke. - It was also said that
even in Central Africa "no one is unaware of the lack of enthusiasm of
59/the Cameroonian leaders" - not surprising, perhaps, in a country that was
itself bi-lingual in composition and therefore unwilling to be integrated
into a purely French-speaking community.
There seems to have been little or no response from the Indo-
chinese countries and the problems of attracting support from the multi-
lingual European states and Canada were not alleviated by de Gaulle's
trenchant pronouncements about the right of cultural minorities to self-
determination. Nevertheless, the Canadian government did enjoy good
relations with a number of African states, including Tunisia, Tanzania
and later Niger, while the Belgians retained their former interest (and
investments) in Zaire and Central Africa, while extending their economic
support to several other African countries, one of which was Tunisia.
By the middle of 1968 the question of piancophonie was overtaken
t•
by the more pressing question of the Nigerian civil war which found the
Francophone leaders themselves divided, with the Ivory Coast and its allies in
a clear minority. The difficulty of reaching consensus on political issues
such as Nigeria meant that OCAM had voluntarily to delete such matters from
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its formal agenda, although they continued to be discussed informally.
Some such compromise was inevitable after Mauritania's departure in
1965 and given the open reluctance of Congo-Brazzaville, under socialist
leadership, to approve a draft Charter for the organisation that would
in any way limit the country's political options.
OCAM also confronted other problems in the late 'sixties which
further eroded its cohesion, particularly on political matters. There
was the growing problem of integrating military leaders in what had once
been the preserve of civilian politicians. It would be 1968 before
Houphoudt-Boigny was ready to welcome "a new generation of leaders" to the
OCAM summit. Previously the fiction was maintained that the military
regimes were there on a temporary basis only.
Again, the inclusion of Zaire, a former Belgian territory, had
almost destroyed the organisation at its inception; there, too, military
intervention and the arrival in power of Joseph Mobutu, in 1965, created
additional problems, despite the efforts of the Francophone leaders to
accommodate his forthright, if not always predictable, demands. His
differences with some of his former Belgian and French neighbours, notably
Ruanda and Congo-Brazzaville, tested even the ability of such skilled
mediators as Houphouet-Boigny and Senghor.
There was the problem, too, of preserving the cohesion of the
"French club" while accommodating certain other states whose presence
was thought desirable either for reasons of French policy, or because
170.
of the local or regional circumstances. While the organisation was open
in theory to all independent African states, the Kenyan Vice-President was
dissuaded from attending the OCAM summit in Madagascar, in 1966, as an
/
observer. 60- Tanzania, however, sent an observer to the Niamey summit
in January 1968, and a year later it was announced that Mauritius, despite
its membership of the Commonwealth, would also be admitted to membership
61/
of OCAM. - Already, however, the differences within OCAM threatened
to become insurmountable, despite the new-found consensus after 1966 between
the principal West African leaders.
If the French were not notably enthusiastic about francophonie
it may be because economic problems in Africa itself were pushing African
states in the direction of the former Metropole, despite their insistence
on their political independence. The French, for their part, perceiving
the importance of economic ties, were prepared to be a little more conciliatory
over their political differences with their African partners. At the end
of 1966 Mall moved to improve its relations with France with a possible
view to re-entering the Franc Zone - an indication of her growing economic
difficulties and the attractions of French support and a more stable and
convertible currency.
These negotiations continued for over a year, with active support
by the Senegalese and from President Senghor, who wanted closer economic
ties between his country and his large neighbour. Meanwhile economic ties
between France and another socialist state, Congo-Brazzaville, were "normalised"
in September 1967 : aid was to be increased and debts to France re-scheduled
after what the Congolese President described as "a catastrophic economic
62/
crisis." -
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In October 1967 there was Toure's speech to the eighth
congress of his party, looking forward, witb_what turned out to be
unwarranted optimism, to renewed collaboration with the Senegal River
States and to "an honest and fruitful" cooperation with France. Tunisia
and Morocco were likewise seeking improved relations with France, disrupted
in the first case by the nationalisation of European settler lands in May
1964, and in the second by the aftermath of the Ben Barka assassination.
Discussion of francophonie continued in a rather desultory
fashion until the OCAM summit of January 1968, when President Diori
announced a forthcoming meeting of Education Ministers from French-speaking
countries - to be held in Niamey before the end of the year. There would
be invitations to the Maghreb countries, and to Switzerland, Belgium and
Canada - for transmission to Quebec - as well as to the black African states. 63/ -
But a conference of African Ministers of Education, later that year in
Libreville, Gabon, produced another diplomatic incident when the Education
Minister of Quebec was invited to attend, but in the absence of a Canadian
representative. 64/-
It was February 1969 when the international conference of
Education Ministers finally convened in Niamey, attended by some thirty
states, with Algeria, Mauritania, Guinea and Switzerland the only absentees.
Showing greater tact and more diplomatic skill than either the French
government or that of Gabon, Diori invited both the Canadian and Quebec
governments, thereby successfully de-fusing that issue and guaranteeing
increased support for his own country from a grateful Canadian government. 65/
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There was much speculation about France's apparent support
for a concept about which she had long entertained considerable doubts.
The prospect of Sharing the burden of African aid with other developed
countries may have become increasingly attractive given France's own
growing economic problems — which would force devaluation before the end
of the year in circumstances that did little to enhance Francophone solidarity.
Many African states were likewise concerned at the prospect of further
falls in the French budget for cooperation and may have hoped to recuperate
some of that aid from other, more prosperous donors.
It was our view throughout that dependence on the former colonial
powers could never offer a satisfactory or lasting solution to the economic
problems of the African states. Only cooperation, organised at first on a
regional basis, could provide the stimulus to trade and investment that would
produce more stable economies and provide some prospect of sustained economic
growth. While foreign aid and assistance were welcome and, in the short
term at least, necessary, the political ties and economic dependency that
frequently accompanied them were not. If a re—united and more prosperous
Nigeria could provide moral and economic support for her West African neighbours
and encourage them to look beyond their former colonial ties and at the
opportunities that only a regional economic community could provide, then
that alone would provide ample justification for our prosecution of the
war to maintain our national unity and our own independence.
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CHAPTER 6
• APPROACHES TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION : THE N/GER/A/TOGOLESE 
PERSPECTIVE C/970-721 
This, and subsequent chapters, are concerned with developments
from the end of the Nigerian civil war, in 1970, until the establishment
of ECOWAS in 1975. In the intervening years the earlier obstacles that had
impeded the movement towards closer economic cooperation within the region,
were largely overcome by new forces, external and internal, working this
time mainly in the direction of greater unity. The result was not one
but two separate and overlapping organisations, one regional in name
only where the other was regional in character and composition. They
Shared similar economic objectives but employed very different approaches -
at least in the short term.
The West African Economic Community (=0) was conceived in
May of 1970 in Bamako, Mali, to replace the defunct and long ineffective
Francophone Customs Union (JDEA0). The new community was formally
constituted at Bamako, in June 1972, and became operational the following
April, after a meeting in Abidjan, the Ivory Coast. Exclusively Francophone
in composition, it comprised six of the seven members of the former UDEAO, while
Benin (Dahomey) remained outside, together with two other Francophone states,
Togo and Guinea, who had not subscribed to the old Customs Union. It
was obviously an attempt to forestall our efforts to create a more
comprehensive sub-regional economic community. Building on existing
structures, and benefiting from a long experience of fiscal and other
forms of economic cooperation, the CEA° aimed at achieving a high degree of
integration within a relatively short period of time.
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There was also our own Economic Community of West African
States mamml, inaugurated in Lagos in May 1975, with the participation
of all fifteen states of the region, Prench, English and Portuguese speaking.
ECOWAS was thus heir to the earlier regional movements of the 'sixties
and successor to the rich_ pan-African tradition. It was clear from the
start, however, that integration on such-a scale would be a complex,
difficult and necessarily protracted task, but also a rewarding and,
in our view, essential one. Similar in some respects to a common market,
ECOWAS also incorporated elements of a:customs union.
We, too, had assimilated a body of valuable experience, including
the lessons of the Regional Group and of other and earlier proposals
by the ECA for regional development and integration. It seemed to us
advisable, this time, to focus initially on a manageable range of issues,
and to secure preliminary agreement by member states to a certain number
of tangible objectives. These should not encroach too far on national
sovereignty, or impose a new and substantial burden on any one government
and they should be linked wherever possible to specific projects - beneficial
for the region as a whole, with the shortest possible gestation time and,
as far as possible, utilising available resources and existing manpower.
Pressures towards Regional Cooperation 
Reconciliation
The more promising outlook for West African unity, in the 'seventies
owed much_ to the end of the Nigerian war. While not alone responsible for
the failure of previous attempts at integration, the war had certainly
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contributed to the growing insecurity within the region, threatening
the fragile consensus just beginning to emerge and weakening the sense
of trust inseparable from most successful multilateral groupings.
However, our policy of reconciliation at hame and abroad helped, I believes
quickly to dispel any remaining doubts about Nigeria's commitment to
regional cooperation and to good relations with_ot vler African states.
The desired response was not always immediately forthcoming,
even in West Africa, but the visible trend towards unity seemed to confirm
my view that the differences within our region were neither as deep-rooted
nor as intractable as they might sometimes appear. With the decline of
ideology as a basis for inter-state alignment, the most tenacious and
serious obstacle to regional cohesion was the linguistic barrier, complemented
and reinforced, particularly in the case of the Francophone states, by
multiple external linkages, political, military and economic. But even
that problem began, in the 'seventies, to yield to new economic imperatives,
arising from the deteriorating global situation, the North-South debate, and
the greater need for African and for West African solidarity.
More Prominent Role for Nigeria 
It was in this changing international context that Nigeria, which
had long been associated with the movement for economic cooperation in Africa,
assumed much.greater significance in continental as well as in world affairs.
This enhanced stature reflected not only to its size and population, but
also its renewed sense of unity and purpose; it was a token of the
international respect that Nigeria could now command with the end of the
civil war and the resumption of oil exploration and extraction on a much
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larger scale than before. Production of crude oil peaked just as the
Shortfall in world supplies and the activities of OPEC combined to push
prices to unprecedented levels.
Our large and affluent domestic market soon attracted the
attention of the major industrial powers, while neighbouring countries
sought to share in the benefits of this expanding trade and to capture
some part of the Nigerian market for their own agricultural and industrial
produce. By 1973-4 Nigeria was not only a major source of a commodity
in short supply throughout the western world, but was also prepared, in
the interests of regional cooperation, to negotiate favourable terms for
its sale to our West African partners.
Global Economic Crisis
Coinciding with our sudden prosperity and economic expansion
was the global recession that followed the collapse of the Bretton Woods
agreement and the energy crisis ushered in by the Middle East conflict of
1973. Nigeria was to a large extent insulated from the worst effects of
the first recession of the 'seventies, which were otherwise felt throughout
Africa and particularly by the non oil-producing countries - which were
the great majority. In several West African states the situation was even
more critical on account of the severe and prolonged drought which, since
1968, had affected the Sahel zone and whichmould persist, in some cases,
until 1975.
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African and West African governments could now see more clearly
than before the advantages of cooperation in a world where others were
preoccupied with. their own survival and where the least developed countries
had not only to pay more for their oil and imported goods, but were unable
by conventional means, including the production and sale of raw commodities,
to generate sufficient foreign exchange to finance these essential purchases.
While the economic recession tended, therefore, to set Nigeria
and other African oil-producing countries apart from their neighbours and
from the rest of the Third World, we were determined to show, both by our
words and by our actions, that Nigeria would continue to identify with the
needs and the interests of the under-developed states and, in particular,
with those of our less fortunate West African neighbours. Nor was this
simple philanthropy on our part.
Nigeria's Identification with West African needs and interests 
Nigeria was a populous state, still under-developed in many
respects, with inadequate infrastructure, a population still largely
illiterate and a per capita income that was low even by some African
standards. Our own previous experience and that of others suggested that
we could not expect our present good fortune to continue indefinitely.
Whether we liked it or not our future was bound up with that of our
African neighbours. We had a vigorous and expanding industry which was
already looking for new markets, and a long history of successful trade which
was-by no means confined even to West Africa. But trade and commerce were
highly vulnerable to domestic pressures, political and economic, in other
African states.
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After the civil war the Federal Military Government tried by
various means to promote economic, social and cultural inter-change
across existing frontiers and thus, hopefully, convince our prospective
partners of the advantage of stable and continuing cooperation within
a regional framework. We revised our foreign policy to ensure that high
priority would in future be awarded to African and West African relations.
We entered into numerous hi-lateral arrangements with_ our neighbours in
such areas as transport, communications and energy, and covering investment
as well as trade.
A proportion of our oil revenues was set aside for relief in
the drought-affected states of the Sahel and, by 1975, we were providing
crude oil, on favourable terms, to many of the coastal states. We also
let it be known that, in future, support on this scale would be forthcoming
on a multi-lateral rather than a hi-lateral basis. By which means we
were able to create a vocal and effective regional lobby on behalf of
ECOWAS - one that included Francophone governments, notwithstanding the
opposition of France and of prominent Francophone leaders.
Change in French Leadership and in Franco-African Relations 
We were assisted indirectly, by the changes of government in
France at this time. The resignation of President de Gaulle, in 1969,
and his death shortly afterwards, generated widespread demands among
African states for revision of the cooperation agreements - military,
economic and technical - that they had signed with France just after
independence. And in almost every case the pressure was in the direction
of greater political and economic independence, notwithstanding the
international recession.
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After an initial hestitation, the new French administration,
under President Pompidou, responded in a suitably pragmatic and conciliatory
way, emphasising the economic rather than the political benefits of continued
association with France and with the EEC. Here, however, the entry of
Britain into the Common Market in January 1973, just as the Francophone
states were again preparing to re-negotiate their arrangements with the
EEC - in what was referred to as Yaounde III - provided new allies and much
needed support and encouragement for the Francophone countries in their
quests for independence and economic advantage - not least from Nigeria
and other former British colonies.
Nigeria's readiness, at the end of 1973, to join in the complex
negotiations in Brussels and act as spokesman for the African, Caribbean
and Pacific states, now collectively negotiating their association with the
EEC, and the favourable outcome of the discussions, again demonstrated
the practical value of African and Third World solidarity. It also
strengthened our case for cooperation across existing boundaries and in the
context of regional groupings like the proposed ECOWAS.
The new ascendancy of economic issues and France's belated
recognition, in 1973, of the need for regional structures in Francophone
Africa where such issues could more regularly and more appropriately
be discussed, made it difficult for others to continue to refuse cooperation
across former colonial boundaries and to dispute the necessity for groupings
like ECOWAS. Moreover, economic issues usually lent themselves more
readily to negotiation and compromise than those with a political or
military bias. And in the deteriorating economic climate there was also
184.
the prospect that, sooner or later, the greater economic potential of
ECOWAS would overcame the initial anxiety of CEA° -members about their
incorporation in the wider body.
Change in *West African Leadership 
The changes of leadership in West Africa, which reflected the
growing political role of the military, although more abrupt than those
in France and occasionally a threat to political stability, likewise made
an independent and, on the whole,an important contribution to regional unity.
Where previous attempts at integration were unable to surmount the ideological
quarrels, feuds and personal rivalries so long associated with members of
the African political class, the advent of a new generation of military
leaders, shortly after independence, served often to focus attention on
economic issues, on the value of inter-state cooperation, and on the region
as the appropriate arena for such cooperation.
Which is not to say that all military leaders felt or acted
alike, or that national differences and priorities were entirely eliminated
in the interests of regional harmony and effective collaboration. The
willingness of military leaders to cooperate would seem to depend on their
age, experience and background, on the pattern of civil-military relations in
each. state, and on the nature of the problems that they inherited from
their civilian predecessors.
Usually, however, military leaders were less constrained by
traditional enmities based on party, creed and personality, less vulnerable
to domestic pressures and local power configurations"' able, in many cases,
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to take a somewhat broader and longer-term view-of their country's
economic and administrative requirements ' and more likely, therefore,
to respond to advice of economists and other specialists who shared
their concern wit the development of the continent, and their preference
for policies and structures that would produce beneficial and lasting
results for all.
Bridging the Remaining Divisions in West Africa 
A final, but also vital, ingredient in the successful creation
of regional groupings in West Africa, and of ECOWAS in particular, was
the disappearance, in the 'seventies, of some of the more serious divisions
that had previously made economic cooperation difficult if not impossible.
For historical, political and geographic reasons, these differences had
been most pronounced among the Francophone states. Ironically, it was
the emergence of Nigeria, after the civil war, as the major political and
economic force within the region which I believe finally precipitated
the reconciliation between Senegal and the Ivory Coast, with the meeting
of their respective leaders in December 1971 - ending decades of intense
rivalry.
But it was this reconciliation that, in turn, made possible the
emergence of a new Francophone grouping, the West African Economic Community
CCEA01 :evidence not only of Nigeria's new strength and importance within
the region, but also of the waning appeal of many of the earlier Francophone
organisations, whose rationale had been political rather than economic.
Before long, however, our policy of reconciliation had succeeded in bridging
even this new
	 to regional cooperation.
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I was also able to use My good offices and friendship with
Sekou Toure to effect a reconciliation between Guinea and Ghana, after
the death_in 1972 of Kwame Nkrumah. And, in my capacity as Chairman of
the OAU during 1973-4, I was required to mediate in a number of disputes
including that between Guinea and Senegal. Essentially these were
collective efforts undertaken on behalf of the OAU by various African
leaders.
Our main success was, perhaps, to secure the presence in
Brussels of a representative of Guinea in October 1973, alongside the
other African, Caribbean and Pacific nations, during the negotiations of
1/
the terms of their association with the EEC. - This marked the beginning
of the end of Guinea's isolation within Francophone Africa. Nine months
later a French. minister visited Conakry and Guinea, and France opened
2/
discussions in Paris that would lead to rapprochement in 1978.-
The Theme is Reconciliation
The final drive towards economic cooperation in West Africa
began with the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, in 1970, and our cordial
invitation to former opponents to accept the hand of friendship and help
usher in a decade of reconciliation and unity. The movement received
a further stimulus at the 1972 OAU summit in Rabat, convened under the
auspices of 'reconciliation' and 'liberation', when disputes affecting
various African states were resolved so that ihe process of de-colonisation
might be brought to a speedy and successful conclusion.
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Later, as chairman of the OAU in 1973-4, I made a point of
pursuing an active diplomatic role outside Nigeria, seeking to de-fuse
those issues that would otherwise compromise African unity and weaken
our international bargaining position. Our conduct of the negotiations
with the EEC - on behalf of and in conjunction with the forty-six ACP
countries - was itself, I think, a major achievement on the part of
those directly involved, with substantial benefits for all concerned; and it
confirmed Nigeria's role as an international spokesman for African and
Third World interests. Even the French were forced to acknowledge the
benefits that the Francophone states had derived from our mediation.
The meeting in May 1975, in Lagos, where representatives of all
fifteen West African states, including Guinea-Bissau, finally approved
the establishment of ECOWAS, carried reconciliation in the region to
what seemed a logical conclusion. Thus, when the need for unity within
Africa was particularly pressing, given the global recession, the collapse
of Portuguese resistance, and the sudden isolation of the white regimes of
Southern Africa, and at the very time that the East African Community was
unfortunately succumbing to political, ideological, and economic rivalries,
the West African leaders set an example that would hopefully serve as a
future point of reference for other states in other regions.
Reconciliation Begins 
The interval between the Monrovia meeting of May 1968 and the
revival of the movement towards West African economic cooperation, in 1972,
was usefully employed in discussions within the region, at various levels
of government, advancing the arguments for and trying to counter those
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against the proposed grouping. In this way sufficient interest was
generated to enable me and the Federal Military Government of Nigeria,
in conjunction with General Eyadema of Togo, and his government, to
undertake a new regional initiative.
January 1970 saw the end of the civil war in Nigeria, and
the start of an unprecedented era of peace and reconciliation. Within
Nigeria, the Federal Military Government embarked on reconstruction and
development in all twelve of our states, in the conviction that unity was
best served by a policy of generosity to our former opponents and an
equitable distribution of the country's new-found wealth and resources.
Outside Nigeria it was my contention that regional cooperation
provided the only secure basis for our own continuing unity and for the
independence and development of our African neighbours. Hence the Nigerian
decision, taken at the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, in 1970, to extend
reconciliation to those countries that had recognised and supported the
rebellion and had thus incurred the displeasure of the Federal Military
Government - and a break in diplomatic relations.
I was particularly pleased with this 'unilateraldecision taken
in Addis Ababa against the advice of all my officials. The enthusiastic
reception accorded the speech was such as to convince even the most critical
that the initiative had been timely and correct. Our former opponents
themselves were taken unawares by the move. Reconciliation was extended
in this way not only to the /vary Coast, with whom relations had been severed
in 1968, but to other West African states whose attitude to Nigeria
during the civil war had been hostile in all but name.
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The new decade thus began in a happier and more cooperative
mood as our efforts and energy were directed	 towards the goal of
regional cooperation and multilateral organisation. The tenth anniversary
of Nigerian Independence, also in 1970, afforded us a unique opportunity to
canvass support for our ideas before a distinguished audience representing
most African and West African governments — in itself a tribute to Nigeria's
new role in African and international affairs. We took advantage of the
occasion to express our gratitude to members of the OAU for their loyal support
throughout the civil war, while reminding our West African neighbours that
security and stability were essential for development and could best be
achieved within a framework of regional cooperation.
In the past we had tried to achieve this cooperation mainly by
various bi—lateral agreements and, with the conclusion of the civil war
and our country's rapid economic recovery and growth, there were numerous
requests from other African states for unique trading privileges and diplomatic
facilities. It seemed to us, in Nigeria, that while bi—lateral relationships
were to be encouraged in the absence of any alternative form of cooperation,
multi—lateral arrangements were preferable, particularly at the regional level
where the OAU and ECA were anxious to encourage closer integration.
Apart from the enhanced economic opportunities for all, there
was a desire on our part to avoid unnecessary du plication and minimise
the risk of new conflicts and rivalries emerging within the region. Until
1972, therefore, and beyond, every opportunity was taken, in the context
of normal diplomatic activity, to emphasise our determination to persist
with the idea of a regional grouping and to encourage others to coordinate
their activities towards this end. Almost every communique included some
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reference to our belief that "only a regional approach to the question
of an African Common Market is realistic".
Our activities in this direction after the civil war, were
well summarised in a lecture by the Commissioner of External Affairs,
Dr. Okoi Arikpo, to the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs:
Within the few years, Nigeria had concluded trade
agreements with seven neighbouring countries in the
West African sub-region, air services agreements with
five, and economic cooperation agreements with another
five. We have also established telecommunication links
with five OAU member countries in the sub-region, and
joint customs posts with three others.
Or again,
Cash grants of over four million naira have been made
available to eight member countries of the OAU, in
addition to over a million naira worth of grain and
other foodstuffs donated to the Republic of Niger.
Nigeria continues to make the facilities at her ports
and airfields available to the United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organisation free of charge for the
purpose of transporting relief material to the neighbouring 3/
countries.
In our first exploratory discussions with other West African
leaders and interested parties the two studies commissioned by the
Monrovia conference, in 1968, provided a useful point of reference
and later furnished the basis for more serious negotiation. They comprised
the joint study by Liberia and Senegal, concerning the nature, form and
content of the proposed customs union, and the document prepared by
Nigeria and Guinea, dealing with other aspects of economic cooperation
and the relative priority to be accorded them. Where the first document
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also helped inspire the rival CEAO, it was the second that had favourably
impressed the Togolese leadership, and created the basis for our
collaboration after the civil war. Thus our joint proposals with Togo,
prepared in 1972, owed much to the earlier efforts of the Nigeria-Guinea
team.
Nigeria and Togo as the Nucleus of a West African Economic Community 
Togo, whose interest in trade with Nigeria, and between Nigeria
and Ghana has already been mentioned, had for some time been assisting
in our efforts to promote regional cooperation. The friendly relations
between our two states, which began at independence under civilian leadership,
had continued under their military successors. Si-lateral agreements
signed by Nigeria with Togo, in 1964 and 1966, contained provisions not
unlike those later included in the ECOWAS protocols.
Thus the 1964 agreement permitted citizens of either country
to enter the other without a visa. The trade agreement of 1966, similar
to many concluded in West Africa at about the same time, extended "most
favoured nation treatment" on a reciprocal basis which did not, however,
affect the privileges that either partner enjoyed as a result of a separate
agreement with a third party, or which derived fromit's membership in
another sub-regional grouping. There was also the right of free transit for
commercial goods originating in one of other state.
As a former trusteeship territory, like the Cameroon, Togo
had never been a member of the French West African Federation or, indeed,
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of the 1959 Francophone Customs Union (JJDAO), reorganised in 1966
as the UDEAO. Invited nevertheless to join the CEAO, after the
dissolution of the customs union in 1970, Togo agreed only to send an
observer and subsequently declined membership in the new body. This was,
to some extent, a continuation of the policy that had kept Togo out of the
Entente until the removal of Nkrumah in 1966. In the meantime, however,
Nigeria had replaced Ghana as the chief prospective partner.
Even in agreeing to host the OCAM summit in Lome, in April
1972, Eyadema had proclaimed his government's intention to avoid
alliances-that might impair the establishment of useful, Mt-lateral
relations with non-OCAM countries such as Nigeria and Ghana.
And, in an unprecedented gesture of solidarity with Nigeria, and illustrating ti
strong belief in a West African regional grouping, Eyadema declined the offer
of the presidency of OCAM - for which, admittedly, there were at the time
few contenders. -
The Togolese President also engineered an astute diplomatic coup
to coincide with the OCAM summit in his capital. As it was also the twelfth
anniversary of his country's independence he invited both myself and General
Ignatius Acheampong, who had recently taken power in Ghana, to visit Lome
and meet the Francophone leaders. I could then take the question of
reconciliation a stage further by appealing for a combined effort, once and for
all, to bridge the old colonial divisions within the region and mend our
previous differences. Appropriately, Eyadema's speech of welcome emphasised
the need for cooperation to achieve economic independence and overcame what
economists described as the under-development of the region; he also
underlined my own government's efforts over the years in that direction. 5/
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The discussions in Lome were exploratory but did mark the
beginning of a new and more intensive phase in the diplomatic
campaign to win support for our regional proposals. Where Eyadema took
the opportunity for an exchange of views with the new Ghanaian Head of
State, / tried to convince the Francophone leaders not only of our genuine
wish to reconciliation but also of our earnest desire for a regional
community that would transcend existing barriers to trade and investment
and would encompass a wide range of social and economic functions. They
were assured of Nigeria's cooperation and assistance in any enterprise
that would increase African independence, improve the terms of our
international trade, and promote the welfare of everyone within the region.
From my discussions with Hamani Diori and others, in Lome, it was
clear that there was considerable support for our project among most of
the Francophone leaders, while only a few were openly hostile and close
to France in that respect. My colleague, General Eyadema, was well placed
to appreciate the strength and character of French opposition - amply
confirmed, in any case, by our own experience to date. The haste with
which the CEA() was improvised, after 1970, betrayed the extent of French
concern about Nigerian influence and was evidence of their determination
to secure their own position and that of their closest allies in the
region. They had even appropriated, in French translation, the title
we had hitherto used to designate our proposed community - The West
African Economic Community (CEAO).
It was Eyadema's view that a fat accompli was the best and
perhaps only means of neutralising such opposition, overcoming the
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resistance of some and the reticence of others. He urged that our
two countries should, then and there, and without further ado, conclude
a formal treaty establishing the West African Economic Community. He could
then announce this to his Francophone colleagues before their departure from
the Togolese capital. The proposal reflected the strength of Eyadema's
commitment to regional cooperation, his obvious enthusiasm for the project
in hand and his impatience to see it realised. But it may also have
derived from his analysis of current trends within francophonie as they
affected the balance of forces in West Africa and the prospects for regional
integration.
There was a strong case, which I readily accepted, for a prompt
and decisive initiative on the part of Togo and Nigeria and in favour of
our own regional proposal. Franco-African relations were still in some
disarray following the resignation of General de Gaulle in 1969, while
the leading Francophone states, the Ivory Coast and Senegal, who were
opposed to our scheme, had not yet fully recovered from the sudden and
unexpected collapse of "Biafra" in early 1970 (January 12) - and had been
embarrassed, more recently, by the strength of African opposition to 'dialogue'
with the South African regime. While Senghor had been careful not to
align himself fully with the Ivory Coast on either issue, both states lost
influence as a result - not least among their former West African 'clients".
Despite their formal reconciliation in December 1971, Senegal
and the Ivory Coast again encountered opposition within the region to the
proposed CEA° - from Francophone states anxious to reassert their
independence of Paris, Abidjan and Dakar, and well aware of the benefits to
be derived from closer cooperation with Nigeria. Meanwhile, Britain's
proposed entry into the EEC, following her adherence to the Community Treaty
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in January 1972, completed the discomfiture of the two Francophone leaders
who had linked their new regional initiative with the re-negotiation of
the existing convention between the former French states and the EEC.
What began as 'Yaounde III' soon gave way, in 1973, to the Brussels
negotiations and finally, in 1975, to the new convention concluded at Lome
between the EEC and the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) states.
Within West Africa the Sahel states, and Niger in particular,
were actively campaigning for a broader community that would include
the Anglophone states, while Benin (Dahomey) was increasingly reticent
about the CEAO and Togo had rejected all but observer status. It must
have seemed to Eyadema that to delay further the creation of our regional
community would only provide our opponents with the time they badly needed
to recover their former influence, regroup their supporters and resume
their offensive against Nigeria. It would discourage our own Francophone
allies and increase the likelihood of the CEAO becoming operational in the
near future.
Such. arguments were not to be dismissed lightly. On reflection,
however, I concluded that an initiative along the lines suggested by Eyadema
was, to say the least, premature. Precipitate action of this kind - in
the absence of further consultations with other leaders about the nature,
organisation and purposes of the new community - would amount to an ultimatum.
It could only result in the complete and definitive rejection of our
proposals by all other governments in the region. It would antagonise
the English!-speaking countries, which had shown considerable interest in,
and enthusiasm for the project, and must provoke an adverse reaction
from the French-speaking states. Francophone unity would be quickly
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re-constituted without Togo; the differences that had delayed the
establishment of the CEAO would be set aside for the present; and our
hopes for a genuine regional community in West Africa would again be
frustrated - while interest would not easily or quickly be revived.
While Nigeria greatly valued Togo's collaboration and saw
our two countries as the nucleus of a future West African community,
it was not desirable to give the impression that the community would
operate at two levels, or that Nigeria would entertain privileged
ties with one state at the expense of others. Moreover, it would be
rash, and counter-productive, to launch. a regional grouping with only
two countries which, however important in terms of their combined
population, revenue and resources, were scarcely representative of the
region as a whole. With so many and such varied states only a consensual
approach offered any prospect of an early and successful economic union.
While Nigeria could not agree to form a multi-lateral organisation
with Togo as our only initial partner, we did agree instead that our two
countries, with their long history of cooperation, should constitute the
nucleus, or embryo, of the future economic community - and that this
decision might form the basis of our joint communique. President Eyadema,
himself, was realistic and gracious enough to concede the wisdom of this
approach- Although couched in diplomatic language no one, least of all
the other West African leaders, could mistake the significance of that
communique and the message contained therein.
It constituted a solemn, public and binding commitment, by our
two states, to the early creation of a regional economic community. In
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that sense the decision we had taken was irrevocable : there could be no turnin,
back on our part after Lome whatever the final response to our initiative.
But no one state, government or leader could complain that they were
being asked to join an organisation created by fiat, whose structures,
functions, procedures and personnel had been determined in advance. It
was not a fait accompli, still less an ultimatum : but an invitation to
our West African colleagues to join and assist us in the crucial deliberations
that alone would determine the future shape of the community andthe
prosperity cif our region.
Some press reports gave a misleading account of our conclusions
in Lome, implying not only that the new community was well and truly
launched, but also that our two governments were in the process of defining
its structures and modus operandi. However, on this point the terms of
the communique are quite explicit as the relevant paragraph (4) of the
communique clearly showed:
The two Heads of State emphasied the need to promote
cooperation among African countries at all levels -
bilateral, regional, and multilateral - as a positive
means for achieving African Unity. To this end, they
agreed to establish an economic community made up of
their two countries as a nucleus of a West African
Economic Community. They directed that officials of
their two countries Should meet at Lagos in June,1972
to consider ways and means of establishing the Togo/Nigerian
Economic Community and submit recommendations to the
governments of the two countries for study.. 	 6/
The June 1972 meeting of the officials of the two countries
took place as proposed in Lagos from2VJune-2 July and a deflnite_step
was then taken to involve all the countries of the West African sub-
region at the earliest possible opportunity - with Togo and Nigeria
giving the lead. -
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Meanwhile, in Lome, bi-lateral treaties of friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance were signed on behalf of Nigeria and
Togo, and we agreed to consider ways of improving our commercial relations
within the framework of the 1966 Treaty. But bi-lateral relations, however
valuable, were no longer seen as an end in themselves. Instead they were
offered as further evidence of our commitment to economic cooperation
within the region as a whole and across the old linguistic and colonial
frontiers.
They did not signify the creation of a distinct sub-regional
grouping, like the Entente or the proposed Mano River Union, that would
persist as a separate body within the wider regional community. Nor
were they intended as the basis of a hypothetical Benin Union, grouping
Nigeria and its western neighbours, Togo and Benin (Dahomey) and possibly
even Ghana, although such a union was seen, in 1972, in Nigeria and
elsewhere, as one possible response to the creation of a CEAO excluding
the Anglophone states. The one and only aim of our talks in Lome was the
creation, at the earliest possible opportunity, of a single, comprehensive
regional community, whose economic functions would initially complement
but would later incorporate or supersede all other forms of sub-regional
organisation. It would eventually become one, and perhaps the most
important regional component in the African Common Market to which the
OAU and the ECA were both committed. Finally, Eyadema and myself devised
a new name for our proposed community - the Economic Commuty of West
African States, ECOWAS or, in French, CEDEAO.
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ECOWAS and Nigeria : "The Great Debate" 
Our West African policies encountered almost no opposition
from public opinion inside Nigeria, where reactions from interested
groups and from the public generally were mostly favourable - although
there was some dissent in a few academic circles. If there was so little
disagreement it was not that our style of government was either arbitrary
or autocratic. On the contrary, our deliberations were widely publicised
and our decisions were not infrequently attacked in national and local
newspapers, which enjoyed a large circulation and a considerable degree of
editorial freedom. Rather, the technical nature of the issues involved,
and the complexity and high level of negotiations, all tended to confine
the discussion for the most part to specialists, administrators, those
responsible for government and others with a particular and direct interest
in the final outcome.
Government in Nigeria was military and decision-making was,
therefore centralised - in the Federal Executive Council and the Supreme
Military Council. Much also depended,here as in other countries, on the
Head of State. But the Nigerian administration was federal and our
institutions, at each level of government, enjoyed as much discretion as
was consonant with the effective conduct of public affairs. Important
decisions were the product of considerable, sometimes protracted discussion,
and the Federal Military Government actively encouraged and even canvassed
the presentation of a wide range of viewpoints.
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Thus during the latter part of the civil war, as the outline
and objectives of.the Second National Development Plan (1970-74) were
finalised, we sought the opinions of various departments and ministries
concerning not only the shape of the plan, and its various priorities
and commitments, but also about the implications for our own future
development of the proposed West African Common Market. The merits of the
proposal were recognised everywhere within government and the administration,
particularly the prospect of greater diversification and increased
specialisation within the region, and substantial economies of scale
within a much larger market; also the less tangible but very real benefits
of a more secure and stable environment. Any reservations concerned not
so much the community itself, but future regional programmes and their
possible impact on Nigeria. The long-term advantages were conceded, despite
some reservations, about their precise nature and extent; what aroused
most debate was a consideration of possible and immediate costs rather than
8/
of subsequent benefits. -
There was understandable anxiety lest Nigeria should find
herself bound, at some future date, by agreements that would limit her
control of her own resources, particularly access to and the marketing of
her oil. It was clear already, however, that the structure of the
proposed community would not permit community decisions affecting the
vital national interests of any one member without that country's prior
consent. Our position in relation to Nigerian oil would be similar to that
of Britain and North Sea oil after she joined the EEC. Others were
doubtful of the prospect of greatly increased trade within the region,
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given the very limited market in West AFrica for minerals and raw
materials, other than oil, and the fact that our economies were competitive
rather than complementary. Moreover, Europe, America and Japan were
likely to remain Nigeria's major markets for the foreseeable future.
But it was precisely in order to begin to reduce our dependency on
existing markets, and diversifying our economy, that we, and others, had
proposed and supported regional cooperation in the first place.
There was also discussion about the nature and extent of the
proposed benefits that Nigerian industries would derive from participation
in a regional community or common market. While aware of the limitations
of more traditional 'import substitution' policies, some favoured continued
expansion of the domestic market rather than the quest for new markets
elsewhere in the region. There was a preference, too, for developing
certain forms of industry, particularly iron and steel and petro-chemicals,
and a fear that community policy in those areas tight one day retard our
own industrial development. Far from excluding or delaying such development,
however, a regional community would not only provide the necessary and
obvious market for such expansion and diversification, but would also
guarantee a secure and convenient source of many of the raw materials that
would then be required, particularly iron ore for the steel industry.
Others, again, were reluctant to enter any community with
extensive Francophone participation, perhaps fearing some repetition
of French action in favour. of secession in 1968. But a major argument
in favour of the community was that it would help stabilise relations
within the region, reducing or eliminating external intervention, and
guaranteeing the territorial integrity and independence of each member-
state.
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Where elsewhere small industries and manufacturers:-heve
tended to be opposed to programmes of regional integration that
was certainly not the case in Nigeria. Our own manufacturers seemed
to welcome the challenge of wider competition and the opportunities
that the proposed community offered them. Thus Chief Henry Fajemirokun,
the then Chairman of the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines
and Agriculture, was an enthusiastic supporter of the government's
proposals from the start and remained so until his death. It had long
been our government's policy to encourage Nigerian and African enterprise
and industry — not only by providing a larger regional market and reducing
and eventually eliminating existing discriminatory measures discouraging
trade within the region, but also by pursuing policies aimed at 'indigenisatio/
In 1972 the Federal Military Government by means of the Nigerian
Enterprises Promotion Decree, had restricted foreign and overseas
investment to those sectors where Nigerian technology and skills were not
yet adequate or where sufficient capital investment was not otherwise
available. These and earlier measures had considerably strengthened
Nigeria's industrial base as overseas investors moved out of retailing
and small scale commerce and manufacturing and into larger scale and
more capital intensive industry. Manufacturers elsewhere in the region
were not slow to see the possible benefits to be derived from West African
cooperation and, in November 1972, at a meeting in Abidjan, the Ivory Coast,
a Federation of west African Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
was formally constituted. Its principal tasks included a cam paign to
convince other governments, and . industry elsewhere in the region, of
the benefits to be derived from ECOWAS. They would at the same time try
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to ensure that the leaders of the future community were themselves
aware of the needs and requirements of African entrepreneurs and would
give some preference to goods originating within the member-states.
Once the Federal Military Government had committed itself
to ECOWAS the nature and focus of discussion shifted away from the policy
and towards its implementation. Here again our relatively advanced
institutional development coupled with our size, and complexity, created
difficulties that other governments in the region were probably spared.
There may have been, and may still be, some in Nigeria who believe that
the country can be administered efficiently like a large army, by command
alone, perhaps tempered by a certain flamboyance of personality and an
indiscriminate use of appointment and promotion procedures, but such
methods were unlikely, in theshort or the long term, to bring about
important, beneficial and lasting changes.
It was our view that sound administration pre-supposed a
willingness to delegate important tasks to competent officials who
were nevertheless accountable to the government of the day and thereby
to the country as a whole. Like other modern governments we were
dependent, to that extent, on the administration for advice and the
implementation of our decisions. We were also vulnerable to the kind of
disputes that inevitably arise wherever there is administrative specialisation
and division of labour.
However, the Federal Military Government was determined from
the outset that such disputes should not be allowed to persist and develop,
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let alone reach the stage where government itself was affected, or where
policy-making had to be suspended pending an administrative 'cease-fire' -
as had happened all too often under the First Republic. Our objective
was to achieve de-centralisation of administration and delegation of
functions without at the same time impairing the principles of effective and
responsible government.
It was in this spirit that we approached the conflict that soon
enveloped much of the federal administration in Nigeria once it was clear
that the creation of ECOWAS was noiT only a matter of time. It was a
question of designating the ministry that was to have overall responsibilit
within Nigeria for the new project. From previous experience we knew that
such disputes, affecting the tasks and engaging the loyalties of different
ministries and officials, would quickly escalate unless resolved at once
and with a minimum of coercion. It would not only delay implementation
of our plans, here and in other sectors, but could in the end prove much
more damaging to ECOWAS than any amount of external opposition to the scheme.
Moreover, a compromise solution, splitting the responsibility
for ECOWAS either between or among various ministries, while initially
attractive, would only lead to further friction and perhaps foster endemic
rivalry within the civil service establishment. Such unrestrained
bureaucratic competition would, sooner or later, undermine the authority
of the Federal Military Government and deprive ECOWAS of the very substantial
contribution that Nigerian officials could otherwise be expected to make.
The Nigerian civil service was easily the largest in West (or black) Africa
and ECOWAS would undoubtedly be heavily dependent, at the start, on the
skills and experience of our bureaucrats.
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Throughout 1972 and until the creation of ECOWAS there was
constant communication and frequent contact between myself and General
Eyadema, and between Togolese and Nigerian officials. In the early stages,
the Commissioner for External Affairs, Dr. Okoi Arikoo, was the leader of
the Nigerian delegation at all joint meetings of officials of the two
countries. Our team also included representatives of the relevant ministries -
Economic Development, Finance, Trade, Industries, Agriculture, and of course,
External Affairs. The two most important ministries in this connection were
Economic Development and Reconstruction and External Affairs and, from the
outset, both disputed the control of the inter-ministerial committee
representing Nigeria in the joint talks.
External Affairs maintained that all matters affecting other
countries were their particular responsibility. Moreover, as they were
already represented in each of the states within the region, they could more
effectively monitor developments as and when they occurred. The Ministry
of Economic Development argued instead that all issues with an economic
content, whether domestic or foreign, should be their sole responsibility.
They considered ECOWAS primarily as an economic venture and one directly
affecting Nigeria's own future economic development. Any decisions by
Nigeria regarding the regional community should therefore, it was said,
reflect our domestic situation and our present economic priorities.
It was clear that this issue would have to be resolved before
we, in Nigeria, could enter the next phase in the campaign for ECOWAS.
Hitherto the Commissioner for External Affairs and his Ministry had been
responsible for the intense diplomatic effort that characterised the
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period 1970-72 and which provided a secure foundation for our subsequent
activities in the region. But as we moved, after 1972, from purely
diplomatic contacts to decide more detailed preparations, it became
necessary to consider which ministry in Nigeria should be entrusted with
the new enterprise. This then gave rise to what observers described at
the time as "the great debate".
Traditionally, any question touching on Nigeria's relationship
with another country had been the constitutional responsibility of the
Ministry of External Affairs, irrespective of the subject matter. In
this way the Ministry had consolidated its position after independence
and had even developed a certain expertise in areas outside the normal
run of diplomatic activity. Experts from other departments were usually
attached to, or posted to the Ministry to advise the diplomats on more
technical questions. This was the precedent that we followed in the case
of ECOWAS until after 1972.
Meanwhile other ministries and departments had emerged in the
1 seventies with interests extending far beyond Nigeria and with an
expertise and competence that, in certain areas, rivalled or exceeded that of
External Affairs. The Ministries of Trade and Industries and, even more,
the Ministry of Economic Development, began claiming the right to speak
and act on behalf of Nigeria in matters pertaining to ECOWAS. Given the
importance that the Federal Military Government attached to regional
cooperation, the resources that had been allocated, and the prestige and
influence attendant on success in this area, ministries naturally
207.
perceived ECOWAS to be a major growth area and at a time of considerable
administrative expansion. And each was soon able to marshal cogent
and persuasive arguments in defence of its position.
The Ministry of External Affairs claimed constitutional right
and historical precedent; they maintained that they had the necessary
competence in the areas to be covered by ECOWAS, and warned against
allowing other ministries to make pronouncements outside Nigeria on
matters of government policy. During the first Republic there had been
a serious row between the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry
of Information concerning responsibility for the release of government
statements. The matter was temporarily resolved by a compromise whereby
External Affairs were entrusted with the dissemination of information outside
Nigeria while Information would be responsible for publicity within Nigeria
their releases would then providetheataterial for all statements by the
Ministry of External Affairs.
Where the Ministry of External Affairs had considerable
experience, the other ministries cited their greater expertise in areas
that would be central to ECOWAS. Where the External Affairs had an
extensive network of diplomatic contacts, the other ministries claimed
to be able to represent effectively the views of the government in the
other West African states. They asked that External Affairs be made to
relay their views and policies instead of trying to impose its own. The
issue was finally resolved in favour of the Ministry of Economic
Development, responsible for the country's Second National Development
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Plan, 1970-74, and preparing already for the Third Plan, 1975-80,
which not only envisaged an expanded role for state and private investment
within Nigeria, but also provided for greater participation by Nigeria
in the economic welfare of the whole region.
The intimate relationship between domestic and regional
development seemed to militate in favour of a single ministry with
responsibility for both areas. As the Ministry of External Affairs could
hardly be expected to undertake economic development within Nigeria,
it was the conclusion of the Federal Executive Council that responsibility
for ECOWAS should in future be entrusted to the Ministry for Economic
Development. External Affairs grudgingly accepted this decision, after
it was pointed out that most major decisions on ECOWAS, as it affected
Nigeria, would be taken within the Federal Executive Council - and that
any ministry, department or official could make their views known there
without risk of recrimination or reprisal. Ours was an open style of
government, based on a consensual approach, where all were expected to
contribute - and this would continue to be the case with ECOWAS in the
future.
Earlier in the "great debate", the Ministry of Trade and
the Ministry of Industries had wisely consented to transfer to the
Ministry of Economic Development all matters pertaining to ECOWAS,
conceding that theirg were but two of the many areas to be covered by a
regional economic grouping. They appreciated that there was more to such
a union than specific economic projects and that the political, economic,
social and moral development of the region required a comprehensive outlook
and total commitment from each and every department and official. It
was therefore essential that responsibility be confined to a tingle
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ministry which, in any case, would be under the constant supervision of
the Head of Government who along with his Government had staked their
reputation on the success of ECOWAS.
In our joint deliberations with Togo, therefore, and in all
negotiations affecting ECOWAS after 1972, it was the Ministry of Economic
Development and the new Commissioner, Dr. Adebayo Adedeji who had
charge of our interministerial committee. Adedeji brought with him a
new zeal and dynamism and a wealth of new ideas, determined as he was
to succeed both as Commissioner of Economic Development and as leader
of the Nigerian delegation at the joint Togo-Nigeria Ministerial Committee
on ECOWAS. He was at once extremely popular with the Nigerian and
Togolese delegations, and soon proved a capable leader.
Working at the same time on the comdetion of the Second
National Development Plan and the preparation of the Third, he was
already familiar with most of the issues involved and had ready access
to the available economic and statistical data, which he could then make
available to the government for appropriate action on any relevant topic,
national or regional. With so many and such heavy responsibilities
Dr. Adedeji worked himself hard and expected to find a similar sense of
dedication in his civil servants, senior and junior. Whatever the
achievements of the West African leaders, at the 'summit', the important
role of our officials and advisors certainly deserves special mention.
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In Lome, where ECOWAS became the responsibility of the
Presidential Office, decisions seemed to be made more quickly and more
easily-than in Lagos, where various departments and officials and other
interested parties had first to be consulted and where the approval of the
Federal Executive Council was required for all important decisions.
Collaboration between the two teams, however, was smooth and effective.
Dr. Adedeji spent much of his time commuting between Lagos and Lome,
and travelling to the other regional capitals, explaining to the leaders
and officials of those countries the issues involved, noting their advice
and recommendations, and keeping them in touch with our progress to date.
His efforts were certainly much appreciated by the other leaders, which was
one reason why his later appointment as Executive Secretary to the ECA
was universally popular within the region.
But before we turn to the last stage in the formation a
ECOWAS, it is necessary to review developments taking place elsewhere
in the region, particularly among the Francophone states, without whose
cooperation there could be no effective regional economic community.
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CHAPTER 7
FRENCH-AFRICAN RELATIONS AS THEY AFFECTED REGIONAL INTEGRATION
IN WEST AFRICA (1969-74)
The majority of West African states were Francophone and their
cooperation was as crucial to the success of our regional experiment as
that of the other states, including Nigeria. While we were assured, from
an early stage, of the support of the English-speaking governments,
however, we could not be so confident of securing the approval of all
our Francophone colleagues. It was our aim, nevertheless, to avoid, as
far as possible, the creation of rival and competing economic blocs
within the region, which would further divide the West African states and tax
the loyalties of individual governments and of the population at large.
Hence our insistence on the maximum consultation before the establishment
of ECOWAS, and on effective participation by member-states in all subsequent
decisions.
The main purpose of ECOWAS was to promote cooperation within the
region while reducing the extent and the levels of external dependency.
West Africa was not, however, a self-contained unit, either socially or
politically. We derive many of our institutions, much of our technology
and the greater part of our investment from outside, mainly from Europe
and the United States of America. ECOWAS would not quickly change these
patterns although it would certainly expect, in time, to modify them. Nor
could our region be considered in isolation from the rest of Africa. The
proposed West African community was one of the several regional unions,
to be created within the framework of the OAU and with the intention of
cooperating, one day, in the development of an African Common Market.
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A decade after independence West Africa remained closely
involved with the affairs of the West European states. Where the former
British_states were members of the Commonwealth, with its special commercial
and diplomatic arrangements, the Francophone countries had their own distinctive
forms of association, both with France and with their African neighbours.
These attachments would also survive the creation of ECOWAS — although
diversification of trade, investment and diplomatic relations was already
a major objective of most African governments.
For reasons already mentioned, the ties between France and Francophone
West Africa were much closer than those between Britain and her former
territories in the region. The English—speaking states had not, in colonial
times, formed a single, homogeneous political and administrative unit, while
they had long since been accustomed to a degree of independence, in economic
as well as political matters, that was sometimes the envy of their Francophone
neighbours.
Where the British government, preparing for its entry into the
EEC, in 1973, would welcome the prospect of ECOWAS, doubtless hoping
to secure wider markets for British exports in West Africa as well as in
Western Europe, the French, although anxious to expand their trade with
Africa, and with Nigeria in particular, would naturally be sensitive to
any proposal that might affect their privileged status within the region.
Whatever the French reaction, it was clear to us, in Nigeria, that the
Francophone states would be influenced,in varying degrees, by the attitude
of the new administration in Paris, after 1969, while their views would to
some extent reflect the changing pattern of Franco—African-relations during
the early 'seventies. These, then, form the main themes of this chapter.
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Franco-African Relations after de Gaulle
De Gaulle's defeat at the 1969 referendum, his subsequent
retreat to Colombey, and his death shortly afterwards brought to a
head the various, sometimes contradictory, pressures at work in Francophone
Africa during the previous decade. The new president, Georges Pompidou,
himself a former prime minister, was more familiar with the conduct of
domestic and economic rather than external policy, which had been reserved
for de Gaulle and his closest advisors. He did not have de Gaulle's
international stature, or his close acquaintance with the African leaders,
civil and military, or the historical ties that the General had forged
with Africa during and immediately after the Second World War.
Nor did he enjoy the same unconditional support from the ruling
part in France and from its notables. Some prominent Gaullists held him
personally responsible for de Gaulle's defeat, while they and others were
also critical of what they considered to be his departures from Gaullist
"orthodoxy" - his proposed constitutional changes, however minor, his
more open and relaxed foreign policy, with the prospect of closer if very
limited collaboration with NATO and its Atlantic ally, and his conciliatory
gestures towards Britain and France's European partners, culminating in
Britain's formal entry to the EEC in January 1973 - perhaps as a counter-poise
to the strength of the West German economy.
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There were important changes, too, in African policy, but
more in the execution than in the objectives. Where some detente was
evident in France's relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries, in a
European and to some extent an Atlantic context, and where France was
evidently anxious to repair some of the damage to her trading position
in Nigeria after the civil war, colonial frontiers remained sacrosanct in
Francophone Africa, to be disregarded only where it was to France's advantage
to do so.
Continuity of policy was the first consideration and it was
significant that Jacques Foccart was brought back as Secretary-General for
African and Malagasy Affairs, after his brief expulsion from the Elysee
under the interim president, Alain Poher. While accepting a token change
in his designation, mainly to satisfy his domestic critics, he quickly
resumed his former contacts and soon recovered much of his old influence -
until his final replacement after Pompidou's death, in April 1974.
But it was soon clear that some change of emphasis and even
direction was needed if the French presence was not to vanish along with
General de Gaulle who for many years had been the personal embodiment
of the concept. Where relations with France had been virtually frozen
during the past decade, subsumed under the broad headings of aid,
cooperation and technical assistance, the problem was now to change the form
without necessarily altering too mudh of the content, or undermining
the essential objectives of the policy.
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Where African policy in the 'sixties had been based on a very
few general principles, applied uniformly and fairly consistently throughout
most of Africa, with the collusion of a handful of key African figures, such
simple and effective administrative expedients would no longer serve a
decade later, given the growing disparities between different regions and
among individual African states - disparities in their reserves and natural
resources, relative wealth, external linkages and strategic importance
for the former Metropole. It was political rather than administrative
decisions that were now required if the French were to contain the pressures
for change that had accumulated in Francophone Africa. The longer such
decisions were delayed, the greater the likelihood of Guinea's example
being followed by other, non-radical states.
At the centre of the growing debate in the 'seventies, between
France and her African partners, were the various treaties of cooperation -
economic, technical, military - signed shortly after independence. The first
demands for revision coincided with the departure of de Gaulle and relations
between the two sides deteriorated further as the new administration in
Paris refused to countenance any marked departure from existing policy in
Africa. Despife several discreet requests from Niger for re-negotation
of her agreements, beginning in March 1969, there was no reaction at all
from Paris - until Diori publicly raised the issue during Pompidou's visit
1/to Niger, in February 1972. -
Meanwhile Cameroon had made a similar request at the beginning
of 1972, and the movement for revision soon spread through Central and
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West Africa - then to Madagascar after the 'events' there in May 1972.
The French_could no longer ignore the pressure of demands from black
Africa and sought instead to minimise their impact on Franco-African
relations. This they hoped to achieve by opening separate negotiations
with each country, spreading bi-lateral discussions over a number of
years, and firmly resisting any proposal for collective re-negotiation
of all or any of the treaties.
Thus an earlier attempt by Niger to interest the Entente in a
joint approach. to the French Government met with opposition from the
Ivory Coast and brought little or no response from the other partners.
OCAM was not even permitted to raisd the issue as to do so would, it
was claimed, infringe the sovereign rights of its members. This argument
carried some weight where military and defence agreements were concerned
but was much lefts relevant in the case of the other treaties. Only recently,
during 1969-70, the same OCAM states had, with French encouragement,
jointly re-negotiated the Yaounde Convention with the EEC. -
In any case,the movement for revision had less to do with the
treaties themselves than with the mounting sense of economic dependence,
political subordination and even cultural inferiority that in most cases
accompanied them. Francophone leaders were increasingly sensitive to the
apparent contrast between their own rather limited autonomy and the much
wider independence enjoyed by the former British colonies. To many of
them a stable and convertible currency may have seemed a poor compensation
for the numerous constraints on development imposed by membership of the
Franc Zone. France's unilateral devaluation in 1969, which entailed an
automatic and corresponding devaluation of the CFA franc, helped undermine
even this argument in favour of monetary discipline.
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The call for revision of the cooperation agreements did not
constitute an outright rejection of the former Metropole, still less
a renunciation of French aid and assistance, but expressed the growing
desire among the Francophone states for a new equilibrium between centre
and periphery, on terms more favourable to the latter. This had earlier
been an important ingredient in the demands for a French 'Commonwealth';
now it was linked with the controversy surrounding 'cooperation', just as
later it would fuel the debate between advocates of the Francophone CEA°
and those French—speaking leaders who supported our own ECOWAS.
The Pompidou administration lost valuable ground at the outset
by failing to respond more promptly and with greater generosity to the
requests of their African partners. The French quickly perceived, however,
that they could change the form and style of cooperation without threatening
either the content or the structures. Indeed, without some reform there
would soon be no structures to preserve. The withdrawal of Mauritania
from the West African Monetary Union (TmtaA), in 1972, to create its own
currency, and the subsquent collapse of negotiations for revision of her
cooperation agreements with France, were precedents that the French were
anxious should not be repeated. However, after May 1972 and a change of
regime locally, it was the turn of Madagascar to demand similar concessions
and again negotiations with the French broke down, not so much over the
issue of a separate currency as over the question of future military
facilities.
Elsewhere in black Africa the French were more successful
in resisting the new pressures, assisted perhaps by the extreme poverty
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of many of their 'clients' and the rapidly deteriorating economic
situation as the effects of the western recession began to spread to
other parts of the world. With the revival of the French economy,
following the 1969 devaluation, many of the African states were now
prepared to settle for much. less than they had originally demanded - or
even expected. Moreover, the prospect of an independent currency, backed
only by a country's reserves and natural resources, soon lost much of its
appeal for the small Francophone states. As if to underline the message,
President Pompidou warned, in terms reminiscent of General de Gaulle in
1958 : "One can certainly envisage states taking off on their own, but
in that case France can no longer guarantee the stability of their currency." -
As France's influence in Africa was now to be secured by economic
rather than political means, cooperation began to assume a new character
and significance. In November 1962 Pierre Billecoccv junior minister
responsible for Cooperation in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, spoke of
"a second wind of change" in Africa, and of "a new phase of cooperation"
when French involvement would no longer be so pronounced. - A meeting
of five (of the six) West African leaders summoned to the Elyse, a
year later, to approve the new treaty regulating-the activities of the
central bank of the region (BCEAO), also took the opportunity to discuss
a wider range of issues. They approved a proposal by Hamani Diori that
there should, in future, be an annual conference of Francophone African
leaders, with a flexible agenda, and in the presence of the French
President. -
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These developments were accelerated under Pompidou's successor,
Giscard d'Estaing, who was elected President in 1974 and proceeded at
once to appoint a senior minister, Pierre Abelin, to the new Ministry for
Cooperation. By then the new style was so far advanced and so successful
that the President of Cameroon, who had been the first to insist on
re—negotiation of the cooperation agreements, could now comment : "Anything thal
6/
can reinforce cooperation is a good thing for Africa." —
The French even conceded a package of minor economic reforms
which included further decentralisation of the monetary institutions, more
rapid Africanisation of their cadres, and great flexibility in the
application of monetary policy where African states had accumulated
substantial reserves. For the poorest countries, who were unlikely to
benefit from these changes, there would be slightly enlarged borrowing
facilities, at lower rates of interest, for approved developmental projects.
The trend was towards greater regional differentiation with
separate policies for West and Central Africa. However, the object
remained the same. The French were not about to dismantle the Franc Zone,
or surrender control of policy and the various monetary instruments.
They were, however, prepared to devolVe much of the work of administration
which would require new regional structuresvmore frequent and regular
consultation among governments at that level. Meanwhile the French would
continue to rely on national differences and external pressures to maintain
the Francophone governments in their present subordinate position.
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The French.. counter-attack.. was conducted on a broad political
and economic front. While Pompidou was in Upper Volta busily cultivating
West African Francophone leaders, the Finance Minister, Giscard d'Estaing,
was despatched to Brazzaville and the Central African states to reassure
leaders there of France's continuing concern and interest in and its
awareness of their own distinctive problems. 	 It was a holding operation,
which did not, however, disguise the fact that the Francophone states, even
the most moderate and including some of those closest to France in the past,
were dissatisfied with their present status. They were increasingly
unwilling (or unable) to subordinate their countries interests to those
of the Metropole, and were well aware of the new and greatly enhanced
economic importance of Nigeria, as an affluent and expanding market for
their own produce, and as an alternative source of oil - shortly to be
offered ,in special circumstances on favourable terms.
They saw no reason why trading relationships in Africa should
not now be pursued across linguistic frontiers, particularly as France and
8/Britain would, after January 1973, be partners in the EEC, - and as France
herself was encouraging a collective approach to the EEC by the Francophone,
and later the African-Caribbean-Pacific countries. But their sense of
detachment from francophonie, although growing, was by no means complete.
Senghor's cultural arguments based on francophonie and eurafrique, and
his increasing tendency in the 'seventies to assimilate and even confuse
the North-South division with that between richAnglo-Saxon and poor
FrancOphone states and, by implication, between a prosperous Nigeria and
her impoverished Francophone neighbours, could still - as we will see
strike a responsiVe chord among Francophone leaders. The battle for
ECOWAS had, in that sense, yet to be fought and won.
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But it was no longer possible, for any length of time, to
subordinate economic to cultural arguments. France, for example,
was well aware of the new economic significance of Nigeria, as was the
leadership of the Ivory Coast ,
 and both hoped to resume normal diplomatic
relations and develop their own commercial ties with Nigeria. Ironically,
Senghor seems to have chosen this moment in time to turn sharply away from
his former support for rapprochement in Africa, across linguistic boundaries,
to defend an under-development thesis based on cultural rather than economic
criteria.
The Decline of OCAM
The new strains in Franco-African relations were also quickly
evident inside OCAM and at two levels. There was the growing regional
division between the West and Central African states, as the latter
complained of their previous neglect by France and now of the subordination
of their interests to those of the more prosperous, if not always better-
endowed West African states. Within West Africa there was also increased
tension between the coastal and land-locked states and even among the
land-locked states themselves - the result of earlier and long-standing
disputes aggravated by a prolonged drought and a rapidly deteriorating
balance-of-payments situation, and reflecting their dependence on oil
and on goods manufactured abroad, mostly in France.
Where the Entente had once provided the core and much of the
inner cohesion of OCAM, the sub-regional group had itself split over its
attitude to the Nigerian civil war. With the end of the war there came
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further divisions, following the appeal by Souphouet-Boigny, in November
1970, for a new and peaceful initiative vis-a-vis the South African
regime. As other states, including Nigeria, prepared for a concerted
offensive, within the United Nations and elsewhere, against the white
minority regimes of southern Africa, the Ivory Coast President announced
that "the only invasion of South. Africa that I would like to see should be
that of African diplomats." 2/ Such a statement could only strengthen
apartheid and damage African interests - just as international attention
began again to focus seriously on the problem of southern Africa.
This new initiative by Houphouet-Boigny was again supported
by the French, which was not surprising in view of France's extensive
trade in arms with South Africa and the return of Jacques Foccart to the
•
Elyse followingrortpidou's election. But now the African response was
even more critical and less encouraging than in 1968, when France, he
allies and Foccart had embarked on the campaign to split Nigeria. Within the
Entente only Dahomey and Niger openly supported the move, while Togo and
Upper Volta observed a discreet silence, reserving any criticism for
private meetings of the group. Of the remaining Francophone states only
Gabon and Madagascar approved and Gabon was the one Central African state
/to do so. 10- In West Africa, besides the two Entente states already
mentioned, Houphouet-Boigny's only other ally was Dr. Kofi Busia, head
of the new civilian government in Ghana, who was later received in Paris by the
French President.
The Ivory Coast leader may have hoped to use OCAM to secure a
full debate on the issue within the OAU which could only serve to weaken
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and discredit that organisation. But the 	ne threatened to split the
Francophone organisation even more effectively and more completely than
the earlier question of support for the Nigerian rebellion. The OCAM
11/
summit, in January 1971, declined even to discuss the matter. -
Senghor, trying to preserve a facade of Francophone unity, was content
to call only for "a dialogue about the dialogue" - and that placed an
additional and unwelcome strain on relations with neighbouring Mauritania,
12/
whose President was then acting as chairman of the OAU. -
During 1972 the civilian regimes in Ghana, Madagascar and Dahomey,
which had supported 'dialogue' were all overthrown by more radical military
leaders hostile to the South African regime and, in the case of the last
two, critical of their country's former dependency on France. That, and
the condemnation of 'dialogue' by a large majority of the OAU, led by
Nigeria, were the most serious of the diplomatic reverses suffered by France
and the Ivory Coast in the decade after 1963.
For many Francophone states continued membership in the OCAM
had been conditional on an agenda from which all controversial political
issues were excluded and a context that did not give undue prominence to
the French connection. The controversy surrounding the admission to
membership of the Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) in 1965, over the Nigerian
civil war in 1968, and, most recently, over 'dialogue' with South Africa,
convinced a growing number of Francophone states that their inclusion in
OCAM was more of an embarrassment, domestic and international, than an
advantage.
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Zaire itself withdrew early in 1972, followed by Cameroon and
Chad in July 1973, after both.had previously complained of domination
of the organisation by certain West African states. The President of
Chad had also called for discussions with- the English-speaking states
about the terms of their possible future association with the EEC. "We
want to keep our privileges (drotite acquiel but, above all, we wish to
collaborate with the A	 13/:nglophone states." -
The resignation of President Tambalbaye of Chad as president
of OCAM, and before the completion of his second term, left the organisation
temporarily without a leader - although. Tombaibaye had insisted he had
1 4/
never been more than "a figurehead". - But the defection of Cameroon
removed the organisation's headquarters, until then in Yaounde. Finally, in -
August,1973, the new military government in Madagascar opted out of OCAM,
followed by Congo-Brazzaville, whose ties with the organisation had always
been tenuous.
Even in West Africa and among the Entente members, the President
of Togo refused to accept the presidency of OCAM despite hosting the 1972
15/summit in his capital. - Two years later the Togolese were more openly
critical of the Francophone organisation.
OCAM must disappear to make room for an institution
that would be less political and more technical;
less subject to external influence and more African;
less subservient to the will of certain states and
more egalitarian; and not so exclusively based on
language. 16/
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Dahomey, under its new military leadership, after 1972, was
openly dismissive of the organisation and its "really negative featured"
17/
and proposed drastic structural changes and a new name. - Here the entry of
Mauritius, in 1969, subsequently-proved convenient in that, when Madagascar
witharew, there was no immediate need for a change of name or designation
what had briefly-been described as 'OCAMM' reverted to its former title.
The entry-of Mauritius, however, was also a turning point in that its
dual membership of OCAM and the Commonwealth served to remind others of
the artificial nature of the linguistic division and its dubious relevance
in Africa a decade after independence.
The French West African Federation (AOF) Reborn 
But if OCAM could no longer remain "a French club", or serve
to expand the frontiers of francophonie - as with the inclusion first
of Zaire and the other former Belgian territories, and later of Mauritius
and the Seychelles - the French at least had no further use for it. Thus
a Gaullist minister, Joseph Comiti, conceded that OCAM might be both "too
large" and "too small" - a comprehensive diagnosis of its shortcomings,
following on	 the Mauritius summit of the organisation, in May 1973,
18/
which was attended by only three Heads of State and two Heads of Government. -
The same minister also confirmed that new initiatives and new
structures were probably required if the Francophone states were to retain
their distinctive character and these former associations. These structures
Should perhaps be regional in character, providing closer, more frequent
and more meaningful contacts among the leaders, and permitting a greater
/
concentration on economic problems. 19-
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Such- proposals accorded well with. the views of Llopold Senghor, who
had campaigned long and vigorously on behalf of regional cooperation in
Africa, closely associated in his view-with federal and confederal forms
of government. But where the French were now ready to abandon OCAM, the
Senegalese leader insisted on keeping it. As a broad, confederal framework
it would, he argued, impart a sense of coherence and continuity to the
operation of the future regional bodies. These in turn would regroup the
Francophone states of West and Central Africa, and possibly even the islands
of the Indian Ocean.
At an emergency meeting of foreign ministers of the ten remaining
OCAM states, in August 1973, Senghor won a reprieve for the organisation,
from an otherwise rather critical audience, by citing the conference of
Commonwealth Prime Ministers, then taking place in Ottawa, and pleading
for a comparable show of solidarity by the Francophone states. These, he
reminded the ministers, were neither as large nor as populous as some members
of the Commonwealth, nor as wealthy and influential as some members of the
Arab League, and could not, therefore, afford to neglect their own cultural
20/
affinities or abandon their remaining organisational ties. -
The Francophone states, he concluded, had no reason to feel
apologetic or defensive about their cultural heritage or their continuing
and close ties with France, as OCAM had helped its members resist "the
naturally imperialist and colonialist tendencies", not only of French
capitalism, but of all the capitaliAms of the developed societies. "If
OCAM did not exist it would be necessary to invent it•" 21/
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Thus Senghor, who had initially opposed the creation of OCAM
became, in 1972, its president and spokesman - in the absence, it is true,
of any more suitable and more willing candidate - and briefly set about
its reform so as to ensure its survival. At the same time, for reasons
we will examine later, Senghor retreated from his earlier proposals for
regional cooperation across colonial frontiers, which he had eloquently
defended in 1967-8, to a more exclusive conception of regional integration
confined initially to the Francophone states, and based on language, culture
and existing monetary arrangements.
These changes in policy and the crisis within OCAM were not
unrelated - coinciding, as they did, with the end of the Nigerian civil
war in 1970. Nigeria emerged from the war as an important power in its
own right, determined to have a role and influence, in Africa and elsewhere,
commensurate with its size, population, wealth and military potential.
Embarrassed, perhaps, by the sudden and unexpected collapse of 'Biafran'
resistance, France and her leading African partners were even more
surprised by our rapid economic recovery after the war, culminating in
the oil 'boom' of 1973.
The divisions within francophonie themselves reflected, to
some extent, the centrifugal pressures building up in West and Central
Africa, where Nigeria and Zaire,respectively, acted increasingly as poles
of economic attraction for their smaller and less affluent Francophone
neighbours. The French evidently feared a substantial reducticn in their
influence, further fragmentation within the French,-speaking community, and
the relegation of their principal African allies to a subordinate role and
status.
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It was not only the future of OCAM that seemed to be at stake,
but the survival of other Francophone institutions and, perhaps, of the
French_presence itself. Such fears, however, exaggerated as they may
appear now, reflected growing uncertainty in France, in the 'seventies,
about developments elsewhere in the world, particularly as they might
affect our domestic economy. After 1973 the main priorities were:
(1) To ensure continuity in the supply of oil and other essential commodities
from abroad, and
(2) To secure existing markets from foreign competitors, while increasing
exports and generally maintaining a favourable balance of trade.
The solution adopted by the French was to develop and extend their own
economic relations with the two large, mineral-rich and independent African
powers, Nigeria and Zaire, while providing alternative structures for the
former 'dependencies' so as to minimise the risk of further economic
penetration and possible political 'contamination'.
Where OCAM was no longer effective at a continental level, the
French experimented, after November 1973, with a West African proposal
for a less formal conference of Francophone leaders, meeting each year
with the French President, usually outside France, to discuss matters of
mutual interest and concern. After an inauspicious opening the first
sunmit in Bangui, in March 1975, attracted more favourable attention when
it recommended the creation of a Fonds de Solidarit Africain, with France
22/to subscribe half the total capital. -
But if OCAM was "too small" in that sense, it was also "too large"
in the context of the regional economic groupings now favoured by the French
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in West as well as Central Africa. It was here that they found the most
challenge although_ it was here too that they could apply some of their most
effective monetary and fiscal sanctions. The French were particularly
concerned at the success of our efforts, after 1970, to revive the earlier
movement towards regional integration. The strong support we received from
Togo, and the interest shown by our neighbours in closer cooperation soon
convinced them of the need for a viable, Francophone alternative.
The unsuccessful West African Customs Union (YDEA0) was
finally buried, without further ado, in May 1970, while French officials
and their African counterparts attempted to mobilise support within the
region for a formula that would integrate the Francophone states more
effectively, while continuing to exclude Guinea and the English-speaking
states. With such all populations and such limited resources the only
plausible coalition was one comprising Senegal and the Ivory Coast and
as many as possible of their respective 'clients'.
The problem was, firstly, to reconcile the two principal
Francophone leaders, Senghor and HOuphouet-Boigny, and, secondly, to
regroup successfully the remaining Francophone states in such a way as to
guard against further encroachment by Nigeria. In December 1971, Senghor
made an unprecedented visit to Houphouft-Boigny in the Ivory Coast, ending
23/decades of rivalry between the leaders and their respective states.- Growing
fear of Nigeria had at last achieved what even the French had not previously
been able to accomplish. This much- publicised reconciliation then provided
the basis for the new Francophone grouping, the West African Economic
Community 07E.A01, and was the signal for more open competition between
advocates of the rival schemes.
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The object of the French, and those like Senghor who now
cooperated closely with them, was to recover the initiative they had recently
lost to Nigeria, so as to guarantee that the terms and conditions of any
future regional community were acceptable to France and her African allies.
The new alliance was clearly defensive : to confine Nigeria's economic and
political influence where, formerly, the Entente (and OCAM) had served to
isolate and contain the pressures from Ghana and Guinea.
Once Nigeria and Togo announced their intention, in April/May 1972,
to create the nucleus of the future ECOWAS, the issue was joined — as the
French and their partners intensified their efforts to ensure that their
organisation would be first in the field. The CEAO was officially launched,
in June 1972,at a conference where prospective members could agree on nothing
more than the name and the decision to regroup. Nigeria's exclusion was
criticised by some of our Francophone neighbours as an unnecessary and
provocative gesture. 24/
The central problem for the sponsors of the CEA() was to make
such a restricted organisation attractive to the majority of the Francophone
states within the region. Coinciding, as the initiative did, with the
most serious drought in recent history, affecting all the Sahel states,
and with considerable uncertainty about the international economy, the task
was not an easy one. Where more positive inducements failed there were the
negative arguments based on fear of Nigeria, its size, population and
wealth. Our Francophone supporters were then advised that the entry of
Nigeria and the English.—speaking states was not a practical proposition
during the formative phase of the community : that the administrative and
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other problems were too great and would take years to overcome. Other
members might, however, be admitted at a later date once the organisation
was operative.
The implication was that Nigeria and the English-speaking states
would join the CEAO, if at all, only on terms already decided by their
Francophone colleagues, and approved by France. Like the British joining
the EEC in 1973, we would be at an additional disadvantage in having to
subscribe to an organisation whose personnel, policies and procedures had
been established in advance and could not, therefore, easily be modified
to meet our own requirements. In these circumstances it was our task,
and our duty, to try by every honest and fair means to convince the
Francophone states of the greater advantages to be derived from the wider
regional community - the English-speaking states already being favourably
disposed towards cooperation across linguistic and colonial barriers.
France, Senegal and the Ivory Coast managed quickly, in the
'seventies, to agree a common solution to a common problem : Nigeria.
They responded to our initiatives with a defensive alliance, reminiscent
of their earlier attempt to contain the radical, pan-African pretensions
of Ghana and to minimise the effect of Guinea's rebellion. Then they had
replied in kind, with political as well as economic weapons, including OCAM.
Now further economic incentives were required while the only viable
structures to hand were regional - a legacy of colonial administration in
French West (NOF) and Equatorial Africa (NEF).
But Nigeria, unlike Nkrumah's Ghana, did not threaten the
sovereignty or integrity of its Francophone neighbours - who were among
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our leading supporters in the region. We wanted instead to retain their
goodwill and strengthen their independence as the best guarantee of our
own security. It was to this end that the Federal Military Government
proposed economic cooperation and not territorial annexation. We even
agreed with Cameroon to a new maritime boundary between our two states
so as to achieve a lasting and secure peace in this sensitive border zone.
I believe that our policies after 1970, emphasising mutual
assistance and the promotion of trade and other forms of cooperation, were
and still are the most effective means of achieving economic growth in our
region and Africa. They were also better attuned to the region's needs
and aspirations than the monetary policies imposed by the French, or the
vague panaceas offered by radical politicians in the past.
To retain their influence within the region the French had
to concede much of our case. They were forced to rely less on political
leverage and more on economic incentives, and to give greater priority
to regional rather than continental cooperation. Having conceded the
principle and the utility of regional cooperation, in West and Central
Africa, there was nothing to justify either the creation of new sub-
regional groupings or continued opposition to our own regional proposals. 25/
Moreover, the case for economic exclusiveness within West Africa was even
less convincing and more open to criticism than the earlier defence of
territorial segregation based on a form of linguistic or cultural apartheid.
However ambitious its economic goals, any West African grouping that did
not include Nigeria could carry little weight either inside or outside the
region.
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CHAPTER 8
FORMATION OF THE COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE DE L'AFR/QUE 
OCC/DENTALE (CEAO) 1970-1973 
From our observation,. France and the Ivory Coast, starting from
slightly different premises, managed, early in the 'seventies, to agree
a joint solution to their mutual problem, namely Nigeria. They then tried
to solicit the cooperation of Senegal in this regard and with limited
success. Their concern stemmed not so much from our rapid recovery and
vigorous economic performance after the civil war, as from our determination
to share that good fortune with our neighbours by enlisting their cooperation
in creating a broad-based, regional community, open to all West African
states. It seemed to them that Nigeria would dominate any such West African
economic grouping.
Our proposal did not seem to be well received b y the French, who
immediately began considering alternative and rival schemes for economic
integration in the area - but at a sub-regional rather than a regional
level, and within rather than across linguistic boundaries. Appropriating
the title that, until then, had been used to denote the wider West African
Economic Community (WAEC, or CEAO in French), they opted, instead, for a
'regional' grouping which came eventually to include only six of the nine
Francophone states, and could not hope to match our own project either in
size, population, level of economic activity or volume of trade.
Where our regional initiative was the product of long deliberation
and embodied the lessons of the previous decade, France and her West African
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partners were content to improvise yet another variation on the theme of
Francophone cooperation, more restricted in membership than OCAM, but
also more ambitious in scope than either the Entente or the Organisation of
Senegal River States (OERS). The new community would, in the end, comprise
members from each of these sub-regional groups.
It has been our endeavour, and that of most other African leaders,
to help fashion a region and a continent where African interests would
predominate, where policies would correspond to African priorities, and
where political structures would faithfully reflect African aspirations.
But the French and their allies seemed to want only to salvage something
from the wreck of the former West African Federation (A0F) and the later,
but equally abortive, Customs Unions (UDAO and UDEAO).
Their object was a limited economic integration, largely confined
to the Ivory Coast, Senegal and their respective 'client' states. This
may have seemed the best, the quickest, and perhaps the only way to contain
Nigeria's growing influence within the region. But, to be successful, they
had first to convince the remaining Francophone states that their future
development could best be served by continued dependence on France, and on
other external powers, including members of the EEC, rather than by uniting
in a voluntary association of all West African states.
Our opponents and critics perhaps failed to realise that, if
Nigeria was now more influential within the region, and in Africa as a
whole, it was not just that we had acquired considerable economic strength
and military capability, important though that was. There was certainly
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no show of force or display of economic coercion on our part although,
wherever possible, we did try to direct our own economic development
into those channels that might be of benefit to particular countries and
to the region as a whole. Rather, our influence sprang from the economic
difficulties confronting African governments at this time, and the growing
conviction that they could not have real independence and development
without consenting to a degree of economic cooperation and a measure of
political consensus. Without Nigeria, however, there could be no meaningful
integration within the region now, and no successful African Common Market
in the future.
France and the CEA°
French support for a new regional community in West Africa,
to be confined, at least initially, to the Francophone states, was evident
from the start. It was soon. apparent, too, that it was Nigeria's economic
strength and influence within the region that were the main cause of French
anxiety. That was clear, not only from President Georges Pompidou's three
successive tours of West and Central Africa, in 1971-2, but also from his
remarks to Hamani Diori, during his visit to Niger, , in January 1972.
In Niamey he was reported as saying:
It is only logical that French and English-speaking
African states should cooperate more closely. And
I believe that the entry of Great Britain into the
EEC will facilitate such cooperation.
239.
1/
But it "should not be in one direction only" and "a fair balance must
be maintained".
'It is therefore appropriate that the French-speaking
countries should harmonise their views and coordinate
their efforts, vis-a-vis English-Speaking Africa and
Nigeria in particular, so as to ensure that any subsequent
decisions are taken on a basis of equality and by mutual
consent.
That also seems to have been the tenor of his remarks in the other African
capitals that he visited although the discussions elsewhere were not so
fully reported.
The Ivory Coast and the CEAO 
Meanwhile Houphouft-Boigny was himself ready, by the 'seventies,
to return to the theme of sub-regional organisation. He was doubtless
disillusioned with OCAM, which had declined to consider his proposals either
for recognition, in some form, of 'Biafra', in 1969, or for 'dialogue' with
South Africa in 1971. Moreover, pressure from within the organisation for
closer contacts with the English-speaking states was becoming a source of
embarrassment, as was mounting criticism of French and Ivory Coast policy.
Finally, there was the sudden and rapid contraction in membership; the
defection of most of the Central African states left OCAM leaders with the
taxing and delicate problem of trying to accommodate countries at opposite
ends of the continent - seeking to reconcile West African interests with
those of the islands in the Indian Ocean.
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Where Senghor would attempt to do just that, in his pursuit
of international dialogue at a continental level, Houphougt-Boigny was
not a leader to cherish vain illusions and certainly not for long.
Although in no hurry to quit an organisation he had been instrumental
in founding and which remained in existence, despite its many problems
and vicissitudes, the President of the Ivory Coast was already considering
other possible forms of Francophone cooperation, drawing on his long
experience of the relatively successful Entente.
But the Entente was now too small to provide the necessary
stimulus for further industrial growth on the part of its leading member.
Nor could the Ivory Coast continue to rely on its own economic performance
to counter the growing influence of a re-united Nigeria on other members
of the group, notably Niger, Dahomey and Togo. Which may well account
for Houphoudt-Boigny's support for the 'regional' alternative being
widely canvassed by the French.
While the greater prominence now enjoyed by Nigeria, and also
Zaire, may have constituted a challenge to the French presence in West
and Central Africa and to the cohesion of °CAM, Houphougt-Boigny was
probably much more concerned with the potential threat that Nigeria
posed to the Entente and by that means, to the future development of the
Ivory Coast. Our immediate and near neighbours not only comprised a
majority of the Entente but were also among the most active supporters
' of a regional community across linguistic lines.
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Moreover, the group was so constituted that the defection of
any one member might well lead to the loss of others. Thus an alliance
between Nigeria and Togo, the most recent member of the Entente, would
soon isolate Dahomey, whose withdrawal would then create serious problems
for Niger, while a similar decision by Niger would inevitably have
implications for neighbouring Upper Volta.
The collapse of the Entente would leave the Ivory Coast and its
economy in a very exposed and vulnerable position. And in 1970 the Entente
was already in decline. It had been created a decade earlier, partly to
dissuade neighbouring countries from developing even closer ties with
Nigeria, partly to prevent Upper Volta, crucial to the Ivorian economy,
from joining either the Mali Federation or the Union of African States,
and partly to isolate the radical regimes in Ghana and Guinea.
But it became increasingly divided following the advent of
military government in Upper Volta, in January 1966, the removal of
Nkrumah the following month, and the outbreak of rebellion in Nigeria
in 1967. The boycott of the Regional Group summit in Monrovia, in 1968,
had been its most recent and most important collective act, and even that
was essentially negative and far from unanimous. What was initially
envisaged as a political body, with responsibility for coordinating the politics
and the policies of member-states, both domestic and foreign, was increasingly
confined to economic issues of mutual interest to the members, and to
a style of reciprocal bargaining that was not conducive to any form of
large-scale innovation.
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By 1970, however, the Ivory Coast president seems to have concluded
that it was time to breath new life into the Entente, even if it involved
some limited extension of its fairly narrow activities, the release of
additional funds from the Ivory Coast for projects in the adjoining states,
and consideration of other countries as possible candidates for future
membership. For the first time since 1966, Houphouft-Boigny was once again
prepared to invest considerable time, effort and additional finance to
secure the continued support of his sub-regional partners.
Thus, at a meeting of the Entente in Abidjan, in mid-May 1970,
it was agreed that the 'seventies should be designated the decade of
'regional cooperation'. And to mark the occasion Ghana, under Dr. Kofi Busia,
was given observer status on the Entente's Land Transportation Committee,
while Mali made a limited entry to the organisation, via the new Common
Market for Meat and Livestock (Communaute economique du betaiZ et de La
viande). -
In the past the marketing of beef had been a lively and contentious
issue in Francophone West Africa, particularly as Upper Volta and Niger,also
major producers, were full members of the Entente and therefore enjoyed
privileged access to the Ivory Coast and French markets. Mali belonged
to the rival Senegal River Organisation which did not have comparable
processing and marketing facilities. Accordingly, and with some justification,
Mali complained that this discriminatory arrangement was contrary to the
spirit if not the letter of the West African Customs Union (UNEAO).
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But the main purpose of the meeting in Abidjan was to try
to coordinate the policies of the members prior to a conference in
Bamako, Mali, where the future of the West African Customs Union was
to be debated. The Union had long been ineffective, largely because of the
intense rivalry in the past between its two principal members, the Ivory
Coast and Senegal. But there was now pressure from the French and from
other interested parties, to re-structure the Union as the basis of a new
regional grouping. In this way the Frenchhoped that their African partners
could regain the initiative and, at the very least, dictate the manner and
the pace of future integration in West Africa.
Member states were all agreed that the existing Customs Union
served no very useful purpose and had failed in almost every respect.
Where they differed, however, was in their conception of the community
that was to replace it. Where Senegal and the Sahel states continued to
favour a community that would be regional in character as well as in name,
grouping all the West African states in the manner of the earlier Regional
Group, the Ivory Coast and the French wanted an organisation regional in
name only, and confined, at least initially, to the Francophone states.
It is likely that Houphouet-Boigny already envisaged some form
of collaboration with Senegal, Mali and Mauritania, to produce an
organisation more regional in appearance than the existing sub-regional
groupings, and with a more viable economic base and greater opportunities
for growth. An organisation, moreover, that would be secure from the kind
of divisions that had destroyed the UDEAO, would be better Able to attract
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support from the poorer, landlocked states of the Sahel, and would also be
capable of withstanding growing Nigerian pressure from the East and
renewed Algerian pressure from the North. -
	 Such a community would
also be well placed to bargain with the French for the declining receipts
from the Ministry of Cooperation.
By the 'seventies the Ivory Coast was already beginning to pay
a much higher price for its dependency on French investment and personnel.
Hence the new emphasis by the government on l indigenisation' and its
insistence that, in an increasingly competitive and uncertain world, 'unity
is strength'. Where the Ivory Coast had been largely responsible for the
'balkanisation' of French West Africa in the 'fifties, when it had seemed
the best and only way to accelerate its economic development, Houphouft-Boigny
was now apparently convinced that further growth would depend on greater
cooperation - which should not be confined to the Entente but extended to the
other Francophone states of the region. If there was to be a new regional
and French-speaking community, however, he was determined that the Entente
should have the same central and privileged place that it had occupied
within OCAM.
Senegal and the CEA° 
Senghor, for his part, had already begun the long process of
disengagement from his country's domestic politics which was the result
of his growing preoccupation with global issues, now mainly economic, and
was reflected in his sponsorship of ambitious schemes for international
dialogue. It was from this vantage point that Senghor judged the relevance
and utility of an organisation like OCAM, which he now resolutely defended,
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despite his early opposition and the disproportionate demands it made
on his time and energy.
While campaigning for greater international understanding and
cooperation at the 'summit', Senghor nevertheless remained attached
to his view of development as being culturally determined, and as
radiating outwards from Paris, Dakar, and other world centres in a
series of concentric but overlapping circles. 	 Thus his new global
interests did not detract from his continuing concern with regional
cooperation, particularly in West Africa.
Senghor had been a consistent advocate of integration at almost
every level of government during the 'fifties and 'sixties, when he
could be described as a leader whose ideas were well in advance of his
time. One unfortunate consequence, however, was that almost all his major
initiatives were unsuccessful. The Mali Federation had broken up within
a year of its creation, but not before its early independence had brought
about the collapse of Senghor's other important initiative at the time,
the French Community. The West African Customs Union of the 'sixties
was no more successful in the end than the West African Federation that
had preceded it. The West African Regional Group failed shortly after
Senghor had assumed the responsibility for reviving it.
After a successful conference in Niamey, in 1969, ftancophonie,
which failed to get de Gaulle's unequivocal approval, nevertheless suffered
from his resignation that year, his death in 1970, and the changed economic
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climate of the new decade. Defeated over the creation of OCAM, in 1965,
Senghor was left struggling in the 'seventies, virtually alone, to keep
the organisation in existence. Finally, the Organisation of the Senegal
River States MRS), launched under another name in July 1963, and
reorganised in 1967, withmore ambitious goals, never managed to fulfil the
initial hopes of its founder.
The main reason for the failure of the sub-regional body was
the fluctuating relationship between Senghor and the President of neighbouring
Guinea. Where Sekou Toure had frequently refused in the past to attend
meetings of the ruling body, this attitude hardened into a prolonged and
systematic boycott of the organisation following the Portuguese-mounted
invasion of Conakry in November 1970. Senghor had little alternative but
to abandon the organisation at the end of 1971 so as to form a new body,
the OMVS, without the participation of Guinea and with more modest economic
objectives. - Meanwhile, Mali's new but limited participation in the
Entente, after May 1970, and Mauritania's membership of the Maghreb Union,
in 1972, further restricted Senghor's op portunities for manoeuvre within
the region.
The Ivory Coast and her African partners, and also France,
were not without some responsibility for the failure of several of these
schemes, including the West African Regional Group in 1968. Indeed,
Senghor may well have concluded that no future regional initiative stood
any chance of success without French and Francophone support, and the
backing of the Entente. His first priority in the 'seventies was to try
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and secure that support. Events seemed initially to favour him as, without
Senegal, France and the Ivory Coast could nct stem the mounting pressure
within the region for a West African Economic Community.
Senghor, himself, seemed increasingly concerned about the
feasibility of reconciling the interests of the smaller Francophone
states with those of Nigeria and its English-speaking partners. There
had evidently been no such problem when he despatched President Quid Daddah,
of Mauritania, to seek our continued support for the Regional Group, at
the end of 1967. But circumstances were very different then, with civil
war and armed conflict in Nigeria and our economy looking decidedly
vulnerable.
The 'seventies however, presented another and very different
picture. The Francophone states were themselves experiencing economic
crisis, partly the result of drought, but also a consequence of the world
recession, while francophonie, itself, was now a prey to internal division.
Nigeria, however, was not only secure in its rediscovered unity, but was
experiencing an economic boom with rising oil exports accompanied by a
substantial increase in oil prices. And just as the civil war had shown
the need for greater cooperation within West Africa on a more stable and
permanent basis, the Federal Military Government was now able to give
full and substantial support to the regional movement.
It was no coincidence that Senghor, at the same time, moved away
from his earlier unequivocal support for a distinctively West African
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grouping to a more complex and increasingly ambivalent position. In
the first and formative stage of regional union he came, like France
and the Ivory Coast,to favour a purely Francophone Community. This
night' later provide the basis for a more comprehensive grouping,
across linguistic frontiers, extending "from Mauritania to Zaire"
and even beyond. - The aim, of course, was not to overcome national
differences, as Senghor claimed, but rather to try to secure the entry
into the community of Zaire, and other Central African states, so as to help
balance the admission of Nigeria. More ambitious and even less plausible,
was his later support for an Atlantic Community of African States - which
was West African only in the sense that it would not include East and North
African countries, while South Africa would presumably be excluded. -
Creation of the CEA()
In the latter part of May 1970 Senghor seemed ready for a
new regional initiative encompassing the Francophone states but aiming at
the progressive and rapid incorporation of the other countries, including
Nigeria. Following the earlier meeting of the Entente and probable
discussions between Senegal and Mali, members of the West African Customs
Union (UDEAO) assembled in Bamako, the Mali capital, at the invitation
.	 /
of President Moussa Traor. 7e -
There was general agreement from the outset that the customs
union was not functioning in a satisfactory manner, just as there was widespread
support for Traore's suggestion that itshould be replaced by a new West
African Economic Community (Canmunaute' Economique de 1-',Afrique OccidentaZe,
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or CEA01. This would then be open to all West African states, including
Togo, whichwas not a member of the UDEAO but was represented in Bamako
by an observer.
The objectives of the CEA° were to improve transportation
and communication links among the member-states, and to promote
industrial development throughout the new community, while favouring
trade in agricultural products as well as in manufactured goods. Members
would have to devise appropriate fiscal and customs measures that would
enable them to achieve these objectives within a limited period of time.
A protocol of agreement was then initialled on May 21, and a farther
meeting was proposed for November 1,1971, also at Bamako, when the Treaty
would be discussed and signed and the detailed arrangements would hopefully
be finalised. That conference did not take place until June 1972, while
the CEAO only became operational in April 1973.
After the meeting the unsuccessful West African Customs Union
was finally buried, without further ado, while French officials and their
African counterparts attempted to mobilise support inside the region
for a formula that would be more effective than the UDEAO and also more
attractive to potential members. With such small populations and such
limited resources the task was not an easy one.
The first problem was to reconcile the jerS'res ennemia . the
Ivory'Coast and Senegal, which was one reason for President Pompidou's
decision to visit both states in the course of 1971. Mali, too, had a
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key role to play on account of its consistent support for schemes of
regional integration, its membership of the Senegal River Organisation
and its recent links with the Entente. Mali's pivotal situation in the
western half of the region and its evident interest in diversifying means
of access to the coast, made that country a major protagonist of
reconciliation between Abidjan and Dakar and the two rival sub-regional
groupings.
The next problem was to regroup the remaining Francophone
states so as to guard against any further 'encroachment' by Nigeria.
The French, in particular, were ready to exploit fears of Nigeria's
size and economic potential in order to win backing among the smaller
Francophone states. For them the object of the exercise was to forestall
our own attempts at promoting regional integration across former colonial
frontiers, and to ensure that any future West African community would
need the prior approval of the Francophone states, acting together under
their customary chefs de file.
From the outset there was a sense of urgency and a spirit of
improvisation about the CEAO - while its development closely reflected
the rhythm of our own preparations for the formation of ECOWAS. Among the
principal advocates of the proposed Francophone community were experienced
French advisers, notably M.Jacques David, architect of the Central and
also the West African Customs Unions (UDEAC and UDEAO), Who had been
active in Francophone Africa since 1947, and was a well-known critic of
integration across linguistic (and monetary) lines. -
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In his view the lesson to be drawn from previous West African
failures, in the area of economic integration, was not to try to expand
into more complex unions, with the participation of English-speaking
states, but instead to devise new and more effective methods of cooperation
within the Frenchspeaking fraternity. Fear of Nigeria on account of its
size and economic strength, was cited by David as a sufficient and pressing
sm	 units. 9/reason for the aller Francophone states to ite. - And as the title
of the CEA() was that usually reserved for the wider regional grouping,
it was difficult to escape the conclusion that the aim of French policy
at this time was to pre-empt the Nigerian initiative then being widely
and openly discussed throughout West Africa.
Whatever the ultimate object of the CEAO, its immediate purpose
was not to replace one failed customs union with another.- since it was
now agreed that common external tariffs were difficult to operate between
countries at very different levels of development. Rather, the intention
was to substitute a more complex and integrated structure, reflecting the
experience of other, more successful, economic experiments undertaken,
not only by the EEC, but also by the Francophone states of Central Africa,
particularly the Central African Customs Union (YDEAC).
Francophone leaders felt that UDEAO had failed
because it was concerned with the technicalities
of customs arrangements rather than with the real
issues of economic development and regional integration.
Looming behind, and encouraged by some old French hands
from the pre-independence period, was the desire to
re-constitute the erstwhile AOF, the great ensemble of the 10/
colonial era.-
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Within the proposed community there would be a "zone of
organised trade" for agricultural produce, and a system of preferential
treatment for industrial goods originating within the sub-region - with
the least developed and least industrialised states receiving pre-
determined levels of compensation for the resulting loss of customs revenue.
While the Ivory Coast and Senegal and some of the other coastal states
stood to benefit most from the provision for an industrial common market,
it was hoped that the creation of a Community Development Fund, to equalise
economic opportunities throughout the region, would be sufficient to ensure
the support of the other, land-locked states. The Fund was modelled on
similar provisions in the UDEAC and its incorporation in the CEA° was
designed to neutralise the opposition that was already beginning to
11/
emerge among some of the states of the Sahel. -
Reconciliation between the Ivory Coast and Senegal 
There remained the question of cooperation between the Ivory
Coast and Senegal without which the community would be still-born. This
seems to have been the purpose of Pompidou's visit to Dakar in February
12/1971. - It is likely that the French president took the opportunity
to underline his fears of Nigeria's growing influence in the region
and his own preference for a Francophone grouping, rather than one
organised along the lines of the abortive Regional Group.
In Senghor, and among his circle of advisers in Dakar, he would
have found a sympathetic audience. The two leaders had once been fellow
students at the Edole NormaZe Sitprieure, in Paris, and Senghor had often
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credited his conversion to socialism to the influence of the man who
would later became de Gaulle's successor as President of France. They
shared similar academic and literary tastes and a common interest in
preserving the cultural heritage of francophonie. Poet, scholar and
jurist, and 'liberal' in his political views, Senghor was undoubtedly
closer in many respects to the new French President than he had ever been
to de Gaulle, whom he revered, but who was nevertheless cast in a very
different mould.
Whatever Pompidou's message to Senghor in February 1971,
the latter was not slow to press his own case for increased French
assistance to Senegal and her neighbours. Senghor explained that, given
the severe and continuing drought, which had halved his own country's
agricultural production, and given the changing patterns of international
trade and their adverse effect on the economies of the region, he was
more than ever convinced that Senegal's "future cannot be conceived other
than in union with its neighbours and that France can play a very important
role in helping to effect these rapprochements.-. 1Y
For . Senghor then, the emphasis was still on cooperation within
the region, beginning with his immediate neighbours. In particular he
wanted assistance in financing important inter-state projects, mainly in
connection with the Senegal and Gambia River development schemes. He
was not yet altogether reconciled to Guinea's departure from the OERS and
proposed, meanwhile, to revive the project for a federation with the
Gambia, and to work for even better relations withMali and, following
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14/
a dispute over their common river boundary, with_Mauritania. -
Visiting Nigeria in the course of the year, to receive an honorary degree,
Senghor seemed keen to develop cooperation within the region, and across
linguistic frontiers.
In our discussions the President of Senegal indicated his
wish to improve the terms and conditions on which. some nineteen African
states were associated with the EEC. Although Nigeria had not concluded
an agreement of association with the European Community, we nevertheless
pledged our support for any initiative that would strengthen the position
of African governments and provide a more equitable and more reliable return
for the producers. At the conclusion of the talks we both agreed to the
creation of a Joint Commission to promote trade between our two countries
on a preferential basis.
Towards the end of 1971, however, there was a perceptible change,
not so much in Senghor's views on regional organisation, as in his approach
to the creation of a West African community and the delineation of its
boundaries. And, on this issue, the immediate effect was to align Senegal
with France and the Ivory Coast rather than with Nigeria. Indeed, the
change seems to have coincided with a meeting between the Presidents of
Senegal and the Ivory Coast at the end of the year.
Immediately after a state visit to Mali, in December 1971, 15/ -
Senghor made an unprecedented journey to see Houphoudt-Boigny, in Abidjan,
ending decades of bitter rivalry between the two leaders and their
16/
respective states. - The courtesy was returned by the Ivory Coast President,
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17/
who travelled to Dakar some two years later. - It was significant,
however, that the initiative for the meeting came from Senghor rather
than from Houphoudt-Boigny, although_ both_ leaders were under strong
pressure from the French and neither was secure any longer within his own glib-
region. Significant, too, that Senghor had worked hard just before the visit
to minimise the extent of their recent differences, particularly in the
matter of 'dialogue' with South. Africa.
The Sengalese leader was still opposed to direct contacts
with the South African government until it had formally renounced its
apartheid doctrines - although, in March 1975, he did finally agree to
meet the South African Prime Minister John Vorster, but in Abidjan rather
than Dakar. Now, however, he insisted that there were other means
available for changing South African policy without recourse to violence.
And, to that end, he wanted an extraordinary meeting of OAU leaders,
the following February, to explore the prospects and implications of
'dialogue'. 11/ The joint communique issued after the Abidjan meeting
underlined the wish of both leaders to pursue "dialogue" and work together
for a peaceful and "neutral" Africa. They also confirmed their opposition
19/
to "ideologies foreign to the continent". -
This, in turn, reflected Senghor's distrust of the big powers,
beginning with the Soviet Union, his belief in the cultural unity of black
Africa, and his conviction that Ettrafrique offered the best hope for the
future of the African states. It is doubtful if Houphougt-Boigny shared
all of these views, although his opposition to Communism had been manifest
since his break with the French Communist Party in 1950.
256.
Nevertheless there was a growing alignment of their foreign
policies even when these continued to reflect differences in the situation
of the two countries. On economic issues there was broad agreement about
the need for more cooperation on the part of the African and Francophone
states if they were to achieve a greater measure of independence, and both
leaders were critical of existing economic relations between their countries
and the EEC.
In Abidjan Senghor also appears to have consented to some revision
of his earlier views, which had favoured economic integration within the
region and across linguistic boundaries. After 1971 he seems to have
became partially reconciled with the views of France and of the Ivory Coast,
who had a much narrower conception of the new community and its future role,
and wished to confine it to the Francophone states.
In the formative stages of the CEAO Senghor was now prepared to
restrict membership to the Francophone states of West Africa, even if he
wanted, later, to extend its boundaries to encompass all of West and much of
Central Africa and even to include an independent Angola. The two objectives
were not, however, easily compatible. Where Senghor cited administrative and
various economic differences between the English and French-speaking states
as obstacles to the immediate creation of the broad West African community
that we then advocated, he apparently had no such misgivings about his
ambitious 'Atlantic' grouping of states, which was even more heterogeneous
in terms of language, culture, history and institutions.
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The Federal Military Government did recognise the many
difficulties in the path of any future regional community, but it was our
view that the sooner these were identified and tackled the better for all
concerned. To postpone the question of economic integration or, worse
still, to proceed with the creation of rival groupings, would serve only to
increase the differences and to make a lasting and successful economic
union that much more difficult to achieve.
Conversely, to attempt to span the length and breadth of the
continent, or even its western half, without first securing a large measure
of integration within our own region, seemed to us unlikely to advance
either the cause of economic integration or the interests of the other
regions involved. An African Common Market was a highly desirable but
still remote goal which was better promoted by regional cooperation than
by continental confusion. Senghor's expansive designs for future economic
cooperation could only serve to forestall the creation of a West African
grouping, with the participation of all the states within the region, and making
the involvementtof Nigeria and the other English-speaking states conditional
on the inclusion of Zaire and most of Central Africa.
The Federal Military Government was able to express its misgivings
about the direction taken by Senegalese policy on regional integration during
Senghor's visit to Lagos, in November 1972. I again emphasised the urgent
need for economic cooperation within Africa and, most appropriately at the
regional level. In the absence of such_ cooperation neither negritude nor
talk of cultural unity would suffice to give us equality with other parts
of the world and ensure that Africa and Africans were treated with the respect
they deserved.
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'Let our experts begin to examine the impediments
that exist in our way of promoting meaningful
economic cooperation between our two countries and
the other states of West Africa. Let us work. towards
free movement of capital, labour, and goods throughput
West Africa. In effect, and consistent with your
life-long preoccupation, let us recapture the spirit
of Monrovia of 1968 and work for the creation of West
African Economic Community across linguistic barriers
and free from colonial legacies.
The joint conference between Senghor and Eouphouet-Eoigny
resulted in sufficient agreement on preliminary matters to enable the two
leaders to give their formal consent and blessing to the creation of the
CEAO. Despite the domestic problems that both countries faced in the
'seventies, considerable pressure was obviously required to effect even
this limited reconciliation. We have already discussed the intervention
of France in the form of a series of personal tours by the new president,
Georges Pompidou. Without Nigeria there would have been no need for and
probably little likelihood of reconciliation.
Mali also made an independent and Important contribution
reflecting its continuing interest in a fusion of the two sub-regional
blocs, the OERS and the Entente. Traditionally sympathetic to wider
African groupings, Mali's policy was a direct response to geography and
its pivotal situation in the western part of the region, coupled with
the endless search for new markets and for alternative routes to the coast.
In return, President Moussa Traore had been appointed first Chairman of the
CEAO.
20/
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The rapprochement between Senghor and his former rival was
also accelerated by pressure from another and younger generation of
Francophone leaders within the region, military rathPr than civilian,
less receptive to more traditional appeals ., less responsive to arguments
couched in historical and cultural terms, less tolerant of external
pressures, particularly from the French and the metropole, and visibly
lacking in the customary deference accorded to the educated products of
the Edole William Panty, in Dakar, and the Sorbonne.
The familiar, almost traditional leadership of Senegal and
the Ivory Coast was at last being contested, not only within the wider
framework of OCAM, but also within West Africa and particularly by the
governments of the poorer, land—locked states. The growing stature of
Samani Diori, President of Niger, both as a regional and Francophone leader,
and the more independent attitude displayed by Presidents Lamizana and Traore,
were evidence of increasing dissatisfaction among younger leaders with their
more senior colleagues and growing impatience at their tedious and sterile
quarrels.
Where the Central African states were the first to challenge
West African predominance within the Francophone community, the Sahel
states were no longer prepared to adopt a passive attitude with regard to
their more prosperous coastal partners. However, it was not until Pompidou's
death, in April 1974, and following Diori s s removal that same month by a
military coup,that the French, under Giscard d'Estaing, began to look in
21/
other directions and in other quarters for their African collaborators. -
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Despite continuing pressure from the French and from
other European interests, it was not until June 3, 1972, following our
own meetings with Francophone leaders in Lome, that the preliminary
agreement to set up the CEA° was finally signed, again at Bamako. The
tenor of that conference was not, however, quite what the sponsors wanted
or, indeed, anticipated. The new mood of independence among the Francophone
leaders, and the economic hardship resulting from the drought in the Sahel,
would help account for their evident reluctance to accept the recommendations
of the elder statesmen who, for their part., could no longer conjure with the
name of General de Gaulle.
In Bamako ... neither the Ministers nor the Heads
of State could agree on a text for the Treaty.
After many hours of deliberations, therefore, they
signed only an 'agreement in principle' announcing
the creation of the CEAO, to be ratified and finally
signed in December 1972.
The CEA() : a Regional or Francophone Community 
One of the key issues threatening the talks in Bamako was the
strong and vocal opposition to any union that would exclude the English-
speaking countries or make rapprochement more difficult with countries
outside the region, particularly in North Africa. Houphoudt-Boigny was
now as anxious to keep Nigeria out of the CEA() as he had been determined to
exclude Ghana from the Entente, following Nkrumah's removal in February 1966.
Senghor was increasingly preoccupied with azrafrique and with
the forthcoming negotiations with the EEC - Yaounde III - when he would
act as spokesman for the nineteen associated African states. Although anxious
to coordinate the views and positions of the different African leaders, he
was, on the whole, less concerned with horizontal relations within Africa,
than with cementing the unity between Africa and Europe.
22/
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When it seemed to Senghor that Nigeria's inclusion in the
CEA() was unlikely to strengthen unity between the two continents and
would undoubtedly antagonise both the French and the government of the
Ivory.
 Coast, he preferred to temporize. The new Treaty of the CEA° would
not exclude other African states which might still be admitted by a- vote
23/
of existing members.- That, however, was 'unacceptable to Nigeria
and the other English-speaking states who, excluded from the initial
and decisive meetings, were being confronted with a fait accompli.
According to Segghor the problems experienced by the Francophone
states, in reaching agreement on a successor to the UDEAO, showed the
wisdom of restricting membership during the formative stages of the C
	
24/EAO. -
And this then became the basis of the "by stages" formula, advocated by
Houphouft-Boigny, accepted by Senghor, and finally adopted by the Francophone
states, although not without considerable and heated debate.
Views of the Sahel States 
Mali as the host state, was in a difficult position as it was
that country's traditional policy to support African unity and to participate
in any grouping that would contribute to such unity. Under Keita, Mali
had been one of the three members of Nkrumah's Union of African States.
This was still the official view at Bamako, in May 1970, when it was agreed
25/that the CEA() should be open to all interested states. -
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By the end of 1971, however, Mali and Senegal had somewhat
modified their views in an attempt to accommodate the French. and the
Ivory Coast, who wanted a purely Francophone community, at least in the
I.
initial phase. Thus President Traore, himself, came to question the
viability of a customs union between states with_ different languages and
separate monetary arrangements.
By June 1972, Mali had came fully to accept the notion that a
CEAO, limited to Francophone states, was but a first and preliminary stage
in the construction of a more ambitious West African grouping. The following
year Traore insisted that:
Nigeria, whichknows our real position, will not
consider the creation of the CEA() as an affront
and is aware that this is only a stage.
•
Traore was likewise aware of our view that the proliferation of rival
economic groupings was not - at this or any other stage - in the interest
of West African countries, least of all the poorest. But it is doubtful
whether Mali had much. choice in the matter.
Surrounded by former French or Francophone territories, Mali was
attached to Senegal, by rail, and to the Ivory Coast by road - although
more recently there had been efforts to connect Mali with the Algerian
highway network. The riverine link towards Nigeria, which accounted for
Mali's membership of the River Niger Commission, was much less important
than the direct routes to the coast through. Senegal and the Ivory Coast,
particularly as the Niger flowed eastwards and was not navigable for its
entire length. Again, the Obvious market for Mali's beef production was in
the adjoining coastal states or, via the coast, to France and Western Europe.
26/
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Mali had much to gain, then, from the rapprochement between
Senegal and the Tvary Coast, and from the proposed, if limited fusion
between countries of the Entente and Senegal River groupings - as *as
shown by her recent inclusion, alongside Upper Volta and Niger, in the
Entente's Common Market for Meat and Livestock. Mali had received
little benefit from the UDEAO, not only because of continuing rivalry
between the Ivory Coast and Senegal, but also on account of the Ivory Coast's
special relationsip with. her Entente partners, Upper Volta and Niger, which
did not, of course, extend to Mali. Creation of the CEA() would, however,
rectify that situation. As Traore remarked in Paris, in April 1972:
It has always been Mali's wish that the two
sub-regional groups should come together to form
a West African Economic Community.
Mauritania
Mauritania, while close to Mali and Senegal and a member of the
Senegal River Organisation, had also applied for membership of the Maghreb
Union and been accepted in 1972. President Ould Daddah therefore wanted
recognition, from his Francophone partners, of his country's special
status and vocation, as a 'bridge' between Black and Arab Africa. While
anxious to keep one foot firmly planted in Black and West Africa, he was
also determined that nothing in the composition or structure of the CEA()
should prevent his country extending the same preferential treatment to
its new North African allies.
27/
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In yet another display of national sovereignty, the president
also hoped to revise his country's cooperation agreements with France,
so as to have the right to an independent currency while remaining a member
of the West African Monetary Union (UM0A1 and enjoying the privileges and
benefits of the Franc Zone - a request that the French and the Um0A
28/
subsequently rejected. - Meanwhile Mauritania, although still attached
to the principle of a broad-based regional community, was in no position
to decline membership in the CEAO, whichhad strong support from the French
and backing from Mauritania's powerful southern neighbour, Senegal.
Niger 
Niger, on the other hand, had for several years been distancing
itself from the Ivory Coast, its partner in the Entente, while demanding
renegotiation of its cooperation agreements with France and better terms
from the predominantly French interests involved in the extraction and
29/
marketing of uranium. - At the same time Niger, like Mauritania and Mali,
had also been developing links further North, with Algeria and Libya, which
30/aroused further misgivings on the part of the Ivory Coast and the French. -
Our country's relations with Niger had been extremely cordial
since independence. As early as 1961 there had been talk of an economic
union between the two states that might eventually lead to political
integration. Both countries were represented on such bodies as the River
Niger and Lake Chad Commissions and, in this and other ways, had demonstrated
their commitment to the goal of economic integration within the region.
After the civil war we had created a Joint Commission for Cooperation with
Niger, to accelerate our mutual development. In January 1972 there was
a further agreement, whereby Nigeria undertook to supply Niger with
electricity from the Kainji Dam project.
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Niger had no reason, therefore, to relax its ties with Nigeria
and every interest in expanding trade and improving diplomatic and
commercial relations. With the probability that Togo and Dahomey would
wish to join with_us in our proposed regional community, it was perhaps
difficult to conceive of Niger doing otherwise, as her main access to
the coast was either through Nigeria or Dahomey. Which might help to
explain why, at Bamako, in June 1972, President Diori was described as
31/
"the chief protagonist of the anglophone cause". - His determined
opposition to Nigeria's exclusion from the CEA° even threatened to disrupt
the proceedings.
It was only when a last minute compromise, signing
an 'agreement in principle' was suggested, that
President Diori agreed to maintain the appearance of 32/
unity.
However, while Niger could afford to take a more independent
line than the other Sahel states, Diori was not prepared to risk a break
with the Entente, whose leader, Houphouft-Boigny, had long been a close
personal friend and political associate. Nor was he willing, apparently,
to allow his relations with the French to deteriorate still further. The
compromise formula devised in Bamako seems to have been designed, not only
to maintain a facade of Francophone unity, but also to relieve at least
some of the pressure on Diori, who was widely expected to support the
Nigerian-Togolese initiative. My personal view was that Diori was also
trying to influence the new grouping, as a whole, in the direction of the
wider regional grouping.
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As Diort later explained in an interview:vd.th.Fraternit Mdtin,
the Ivory Coast newspaper, in December 1972 : it "would not be realistic
to build an economic community that ignored the anglophone countries." 32/
But already-Niger was beginning to move a little closer to the Ivory Coast
and Senegal, as Diori, himself, opted for safer ground : giving more
cautious and qualified support for our entry and that of the other English-
speaking states. The CEA° was to be an integrated community and not just
a common market, and so the Francophone states would first have to
ascertain "whether they 47.e. the English-speaking stateg were interested
in participating in such a community and if they really wanted to cooperate
34/in the full sense of the term and not just to expand trade." -
Upper Volta 
The remaining Sahel state, Upper Volta, had already shown a
considerable degree of independence in attending the Monrovia conference
of the West African Regional Group, in 1968, despite the absence of the
other Entente states - and in agreeing to host the abortive 1969 conference
in the country's capital, Ouagadougou. Upper Volta was also one of the
states most dependent for trade and communications on its African partners
and most interested, therefore, in inter-state cooperation.
Where Mali now maintained that a customs union across linguistic
lines, and with no previous experience of close cooperation, was unlikely
to be viable, and where Niger contended that, without Nigeria, it would
lack credibility, Upper Volta wanted anglophone participation with a view to
developing closer links with Ghana and relieving its chronic dependency on
the Ivory Coast.
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Meanwhile Upper Volta needed the Ivory Coast as an outlet for its
surplus labour and as a market for its rural produce; the Ivory Coast also
provided not only transit for essential imports but the means with which
to purchase them. This made it all but impossible for General Lamizana
to persist, for any time, in a policy that did not have the approval of
the Ivory Coast government. And as a Sahel state, seriously afflicted
by drought since 1968, she was unable to remain outside any grouping,
regional or sub-regional, that offered any prospect of external assistance
or relief from extreme under-development.
The Coastal States : Dahomey 
Of the other Entente states, Dahomey was moving towards an even
closer accommodation with Ghana, on the one hand, and Nigeria on the other.
The Nigerian connection was an old and valued one and a customs agreement
had been signed by both countries as early as 1962. Our relations with the
three-man Presidential Council of Dahomey, during 1971-2, were cordial and
it was then that our governments negotiated the establishment of a common
customs office, harmonisation of our postal services, and the inauguration
of a direct telecommunication service between our two countries.
At the end of 1971 a trade agreement was signed providing 'most
favoured nation' treatment for the products of our countries. The transit
tax on goods passing between Dahomey and Nigeria was lifted, while we
also worked for the removal of similar barriers to trade between Dahomey and
Togo. By the end of 1972 we had completed the highway link between Lagos
and Porto Novo and had offered the government of Dahomey a substantial,
interest-free loan.
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Although_ sympathetic to the Nigeria-Togo proposals for a
West African economic community, Dahomey- nevertheless initialled the
preliminary agreement creating the CEA() in Bamako, in June 1972. However,
by adhering to such_ a policy,Dahamey's leaders risked losing the substantial
revenues and other advantages their country would have derived from
increased trade in the sub-region,following the establishment of ECOWAS.
Nigeria nevertheless continued to assist her western neighbour with a
variety of joint projects that would eventually benefit both economies,
including a sugar refinery and a cement industry.
The more radical military regime that came to power in Dahomey,
in October 1972, under President Kerrekou, was more outspoken in its views
on regional unity and more critical of linguistic separatism.
Dahomey does not believe in a regroupment of
African countries based exclusively on linguistic
criteria. The separation between anglophones and
francophones ceased to be relevant after independence.
Why is it that, in Europe, Britain can be admitted to
the EEC while Africans are expected to reject the 35/entry of anglophone countries into the CEAO?
Kergkou was soon reviving the idea of a Benin Union, comprising Nigeria,
Togo, and his own country. Our interest, however, was in economic union
at the regional level, rather than in the proliferation of sub-regional
groupings, however useful these may have been in the past.
Here, too, the new government seemed much. closer to the Nigerian
position. A senior officer was able to quote, with approval, the comment •
in a Nigerian journal that : "to build the West African community without
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36/Nigeria is to play' Hamlet without the Prince." - Thus, where Dahomey
had initialled the preliminary agreement that created the CEAO, in
Bamako, in June 1972, she was not a signatory of the Treaty that finally
established the new Francophone community - in Abidjan, in April 1973.
At the end of the proceedings her status at the meeting was defined by her
representative as that of an observer rather than an active participant.3Z/
Two
Togo's support for the wider West African economic community was,
as we have seen, a product of historical circumstance, economic interest,
and a growing conviction on the part of its government that, without closer
economic cooperation, the African states would experience neither development
nor independence. Never a full member of the Francophone community, Togo
had looked increasingly to Nigeria for possible protection - mainly against
her neighbours. While relations with Ghana, once very strained, had
improved considerably in 1966 with the removal of Nkrumah, those with
Dahomey were almost invariably bad and their border was frequently closed.
It had long been the aim of successive governments, in both
Togo and Dahomey, to boost trade and commerce within the sub-region, and in
the context of a Benin Union. However, the mutual antipathy and chronic
rivalry between the two countries was itself a major obstacle to the
realisation of this objective. Nigeria had worked consistently to try to
overcome these problems and one of the aims of our proposed regional
community was to provide a more stable and secure environment wherein
trade might expand and cooperation be developed to the advantage of each and
every member state. Indeed, the benefits to be derived from membership
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in the larger community would be more than sufficient to outweigh any
narrow considerations of relative advantage.
On that point General Eyadema of Togo and the Federal Military
Government were in close agreement. The Nigerian delegation that arrived
in Lome, in April 1972, at the invitation of the Togolese government, to
help celebrate the tenth anniversary of the country's independence, was
therefore both_large and experienced. It was an indication both of the
importance we attached to our joint deliberations with Togo, and of the
determination of our two states to proceed with ECOWAS. And, as we have
seen, a joint communique was signed at the end of our deliberations, firmly
establishing the nucleus of our future regional community.
Eyadema's support for economic integration in West Africa was
the more valuable as it was evidence of the ability of two states, who
were not otherwise immediate neighbours, to cooperate across linguistic
boundaries, notwithstanding the difference in their respective size and
situation. Dahomey, whatever the current state of its relations with
Togo, was now more likely to cooperate with us, as the alternative was
comparative isolation and at least some disruption or interruption of her
interstate trade. With the support of Togo and Dahomey there was every
chance that Niger, too, would join with us, while Ghana's inclusion was
also probable, particularly after the government of Dr. Kofi Busia was
replaced by that of Colonel Ignatius Acheampong, in January 1972.
The Togolese President had had discussions with Acheampong while
we were all present in Lome for the independence celebrations. Togo and
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the new military government in Ghana had agreed, in March 1973,
to reopen their common border post, at Aflao, on a permanent twenty-four
hour basis while, at the same meeting, both leaders formally approved
the creation of a joint commission for cooperation. They also agreed
to take steps to coordinate agricultural and industrial programmes,
expand trade relations, promote educational contacts and establish road
and telecommunication links. Such measures were adopted in the context
of the 1972 Nigeria-Togo proposals and with a view to "facilitate the
38/
early setting up of a West African economic community." -
With Togolese support, therefore, we could feel much more
confident about the future of our incipient economic community. Meanwhile,
the Joint Commission of Nigerian and Togolese ministers and officials had
met, as scheduled, from the end of June until early July 1972, in Lagos,
"with a view to submitting for the consideration of their two Governments
proposals aimed at establishing between their two countries an Economic
Community as a nucleus of an Economic Community embracing the whole of
West Africa." 32/
Dr. Adebayo Adedeji led the Nigerian delegation and M.Jean Tevi,
that of Togo. In the opening session Dr. Adedeji was critical of the
opponents of regional integration who were obsessed with what were
essentially artificial barriers to further cooperation. The new community
recognised no such barriers, and was o pen to all, but time was pressing
and the creation of the community could not be delayed indefinitely.
Meanwhile it was agreed that the Economic Community, "even though set in
motion by Nigeria and Togo, will be guided by an open-door policy which
40/
will enable other sister countries in the West African /region/ to join." -
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And, on behalf of the two governments-, I was invited to issue invitations
to the remaining countries of the region to attend a summit meeting to
be convened at the earliest possible opportunity. It would be preceded
by a conference of relevant Ministers, to be held on or before November 1972.
In fact, given the large amount of preliminary work to be completed, the
first summit did not take place until December 1973 in Lomg.
At the same time the Nigerian and Togolese delegations agreed
"to adopt a pragmatic approach in the pursuit of limited objectives capable
of easy realisation and expressed their determination to succeed in such
41/
objectives." — Confidence, it was believed, would grow with each success,
increasing still further the prospects of economic cooperation. It was
also agreed that officials of the two countries should meet as and when
necessary:
To produce working papers incorporating the broad
areas of cooperation : namely — Improvement of
transport, telecommunications and other links,
trade liberalisation, industrial harmonisation,
institution of suitable payments arrangements and
facilitation of movement of factors of production
between them.
President Eyadema had already advised me of the forthcoming meeting of
the CEAO, in Bamako, in June 1972, and of Togo's intention to be present
but only as an observer. Hence it came as no surprise to us, in Nigeria,
when the Togolese delegate declined to sign the preliminary agreement at
the end of those proceedings.
42/
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Guinea
Guinea was the one Francophone state in West Africa that
was not invited to Bamako for the meeting of the CEAO in June 1972.
Guinea's relations with Senegal and the Ivory Coast had deteriorated sharply
following the Portuguese-mounted invasion of Conakry, the country's capital.
In November 1970, Guinea had severed diplomatic relations with Senegal in
April 1971 and had helped precipitate the collapse in December of the Senegal
River Organisation COERSI by boycotting its proceedings throughout the year.
Senghor, for his part, seemed increasingly reconciled to a smaller
sub-regional body, without Guinea, and with more modest objectives. He was
unlikely, therefore, to press hard for Guinea's membership of the CEAO. Nor did
there seem much prospect of an early reconciliation between Guinea and the
Ivory Coast. After the Bamako Conferente, Houphouet-Boigny did agree to a
meeting with Sekou Toure, apparently at the invitation of the Guinean leader.
But that was at the end of July 1972, and any hope of a new and lasting
accommodation between the two leaders was short-lived.
In any case Toure was not likely to be sympathetic to an
organisation sponsored by his Francophone opponents, which enjoyed the
active support of the former colonial power, and was calculated to reinforce
the linguistic divide in West Africa. He had worked consistently for greater
African unity and for closer cooperation at every level. It was his ambition
to secure a real independence, both political and economic for the African
states.
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Hence his country's support for Nigeria during the civil war,
which we were shortly afterwards to reciprocate, by condemning the attempted
invasion of Guinea, in November 1970, and by offering such practical
assistance as we could then provide. On these issues there was sufficient
unity of purpose and identity of outlook to cement a firm alliance between
our respective countries.
Early in 1972 Guinea and Nigeria had concluded agreements on
economic, scientific and technical cooperation. We had also formed a joint
ministerial commission, to meet each year to discuss matters of mutual
interest. When I visited Guinea in March 1972, Toure confirmed his continuing
support for economic unity within the region and his opposition to the
arbitrary linguistic boundaries derived from colonial rule.
It is ridiculous to describe an African country
as Francophone or Anglophone, when barely thirty
per cent of the people of these states understand 43/French or English ... We must remain faithful to
ourselves.
Later that year, when Nigeria acted as intermediary during the
protracted negotiations for the removal of Nkrumah's body from Guinea and
its return to Ghana, Toure had written to me proposing a federation of truly
independent African states which was to include many of Guinea's economic
partners, i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Cameroon and Zaire. While
we welcomed this indication of Guinea's willingness to draw closer to ourselves
and the other African states, whether French, English or Arab speaking, our
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first and most immediate concern, was still with West African economic
union.
Here, I took the opportunity of my meetings with Toure to
suggest that successful cooperation pre-supposed the peaceful resolution
of existing disputes within the region, particularly those involving
neighbouring states. Whether as a result of these promptings, or perhaps
in response to some other, independent initiative, the Presidents of Guinea
and the Ivory Coast announed a reunion scheduled for the end of July 1972 -
their first such encounter since 1964. And, significantly, it was
Houphouet-Boigny who went to Guinea, and to Tour's home town of Faranah,
44/
for what was described in advance as a meeting of reconciliation. -
It may well be that Toure was again anxious to improve relations
with France and with his Francophone neighbours, after the upheavals at the
and of 1970; it is also possible that Houphouft-Boigny was now ready for
some kind of accommodation with his former ally in the African Democratic
Rally (RDA). It is possible, too, but much less likely, that he envisaged
the entry of Guinea into the CEAO, or perhaps some less formal arrangement
- associating Guinea with the Entente, similar to that concluded with Mali
in 1970.
The meeting began well as Houphoudt-Boigny, arriving in Guinea,
announced that their two states were "compelled (conciamn6s) by circumstances
to work together in pursuit of the same objectives" - "despite certain
previous differences" and "notwithstanding our various commitments and
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45/distinctive options". - Toure, himself, had spoken warmly, if guardedly
of the "Common will" and "common awareness" of their two peoples,
"obliged (condar4s) by God and Environment to live together, as neighbours,
struggling for the same cause - that of dignity and self-respect." 11/
Despite this aukoicious opening, however, the meeting ended not in rapprochement
but in a prompt resumption of verbal hostilities, as Toure once again accused
the Ivory Coast of complicity in the 1970 invasion of Conakry.
The next attempt at reconciliation with Guinea came neither
from Senghor, nor from Bouphouft-Boigny, but from President Pompidou, himself,
who in November 1972 publicly regretted "the administrative misunderstanding"
48/
that had led to the break between Guinea and the Metropole in 1958. -
France now seemed ready to come to terms with Guinea even if that country's
neighbours were more cautious, less confident of the propsects for
co-existence, or just reluctant to share their few remaining privileges
with another partner.
But there was to be no final or effective reconciliation in this
part of the region until after Guinea-Bissau became independent, in 1974,
when the government of Sekou Toure could at least feel secure from external
aggression. Without such a sense of security it was clear that the potential
for economic cooperation within the region could not be fully realised.
At the same time there was also a growing conviction within the area that
a regional economic community could usefully be undertaken to guarantee the
security of its members, to provide for their common defence and to safeguard
their present and future independence. Accordingly, when the authorities
in Guinea had cause to fear yet another invasion by mercenary troops, early
in 1974, the Federal Military Government gave limited military assistance
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under the terms of the OAU Charter as an indication of our firm and
continuing commitment to the principle of regional security.
Establishment of the CEA()
The question of membership and the exclusive nature of the CEAO
as a Francophone community were not the only issues confronting the leaders
in Bamako in June 1972. Other tensions were already apparent despite the
limited size and restricted composition of the new sub-regional grouping.
The states of the Sahel were concerned lest the CEA() should simply
provide new incentives for economic growth in the coastal states largely at
their expense. Even the institution of a Common Development Fund might do
little more than temper the injustice of fiscal arrangements that would
otherwise favour states with an industrial base.
In their opinion, the same malaise which plagues
Africa's relations with the EEC would perpetuate
itself in the CEA() - with the rich getting richer
under a protectionist regime and the poor getting
poorer despite some handouts from the Common
Development Fund for their development.
It was mainly a question of the goods to be taxed, the way the
tax was to be levied and the distribution of the resulting revenue among
the member states. Further consideration of this and other controversial
matters, including the text of the Treaty and the various protocols -
community budget, fishing agreement, meat and cattle community - were
postponed until the end of the year to give member-countries the opportunity
49/
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to submit amendments to the published proposals. But, such were the
outstanding differences that it was April 1973 before the Council of
Ministers of the CEA() was able to meet in Abidjan to review the final
50/treaty, which was then approved and signed by the Heads of State. -
Prior to the 1973 summit, the sponsors of the CEAO, the Ivory
Coast and Senegal, were themselves growing impatient at the delay in setting
up the new structures. There were reports that the CEA° might be constituted
with only four members, the core states, the Ivory Coast and Senegal,
together with Mali and Upper Volta. This was now seen in some quarters
as additional pressure on Hamani Diori to secure the inclusion of Niger,
in the new community, and to ensure acceptance in the Sahel States of the
51/proposed arrangements. - Indeed, the future of the CEA() was very much in
Diori's hands as he was the most senior and experienced of the leaders of
the land-locked states. He also had the best bargaining position, having
access to Nigerian markets and Nigerian ports, while Upper Volta and
Mali were heavily dependent on trade and communication links with the richer
Francophone states of the coast.
Diori's election as Chairman of the CEAO, at Abidjan in 1973,
after Toure had declined to continue in that position, was an astute
move intended not only to confirm Niger's place within the community and
to ensure acceptance of the protocols by the other land-locked states,
but was also presented as a token of appeasement towards Nigeria and the
52/
other English-speaking states. - Thus, if Diori finally came to accept
the notion that the community, in its initial stage, should comprise only
279.
Francophone states, it was with evident reluctance, and only after the
other members had themselves acknowledged the urgent need for broader
forms of economic cooperation, encompassing the region as a whole.
At this stage it was necessary first to consolidate
what we already have, we who share the same
monetary system, language and culture, and then move
on to achieve more cohesion in this part of Africa. 53/
In his relations with Nigeria, Diori continued to insist that
his objective was the prompt integration of the other West African states
into an expanded regional community, which could be accomplished more
smoothly once the Francophone states had resolved their own differences and
had laid a solid basis for future cooperation. In Abidjan he also appealed
to the other Sahel leaders in the earnest hope that "understanding and
solidarity within the organisation will be maintained, in particular between
54,
the coastal countries and the less favoured states of the interior." -
Where Niger's leader was ready to make certain concessions to
Francophone sentiment, the younger, military leaders of Togo, and Dahomey
were not. As we have seen President Eyadema of Togo was co-sponsor of ECOWAS,
while Togo continued to be represented at meetings of the CEA° only as an
observer. The new military regime in Dahomey, after 1972, had already
indicated its wish to pursue a more independent line than its predecessor
and did not consider itself bound by the previous government's decisions,
including its support for the CEAO.
280.
Major Alladaye, largely responsible at the time for the
country's foreign policy, was reported as saying, in April 1973:
So far, I have failed to discover what good
Dahomey has derived from membership in OCAM
and other such groupings. At the same time,
our relations with Nigeria are based on concrete
and pragmatic mutual interests. I am going to the
CEAO summit with a view to examining what is there
for my country in this organisation, but we shall
not be bound by sentimental ties, left-overs from
colonial days.	 55/
In the event, Dahomey sponsored an amendment to the proposed
Treaty providing for the admission of other states to the CEAO by majority
vote, rather than by unanimous decision. This was rejected, although
another amendment by the Ivory Coast, restricting future membership to
56/
West African states, was carried. - At the end of the summit Dahomey announced
its decision to reduce its participation in the community to that of an
observer since, as Alladaye maintained:
Language is only language. I may speak French
and the Nigerians may speak English, but this is
merely a technical problem. What matters is that
I feel that Cotonou is nearer to Lagos than to
Dakar. We ought to leave our options open to an
all-azimuth cooperation.	 57/
The CEA° treaty was finally signed on April 18, but by only six
states, three of whom were members of the Entente while the other three
58/
belonged to the Senegal River Organisation. - Their combined population was
less than thirty million, compared with a potential membership of at least
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one hundred and fifty million for a wider West African Community.
The annual volume of trade among the CEA() states amount to only
$5-6 million, including $3 million in bilateral trade between the Ivory
Coast and Senegal. (Table 5).
All revenues during the first five years of the organisation
would, according to Souphoudt-Boigny, be distributed among the poorer
states : but as the revenues themselves were small, the benefits were
59/likely to be equally restricted. - Such was their financial predicament,
however, that the land-locked states had little alternative but to join
the CEAO with the satisfaction, at least, that membership in this, as in
other organisations, was not incompatible with future membership in a
60/genuine regional community. -
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CHAPTER 9
"ESTABL/SHMENT OF-ECOWAS JULY 1973-MAY '1975
Preparatory Meetings : Lomg (1973), Accra C19741, Monrovia (1975) 
The establishment of the CEAO, during 1972-3, made it even
more imperative, in our view, to try to hasten the formation of the wider
regional body, rather than risk the permanent division of West Africa
into two mutually exclusive economic zones. Experience already suggested
that sub-regional organisations, like the CEAO, however useful in the
short term, or in a very limited capacity, could not begin to compare in
efficiency or results with a grouping whose terms of reference would encompass
the region as a whole.
We, in Nigeria, therefore preferred to view the CEAO, not so
much as a rival to ECOWAS, still less as a viable alternative to our
regional community, but rather as another manifestation of the desire for
increased cooperation so evident within the region after 1970. As J.P.Renninge2
has pointed out, of the thirty-sub-regional organisations listed as active
in West Africa during the 'seventies, no less than eighteen, including the
1/
CEAO, were formed after 1970. - Economic hardship had brought home to
governments the substantial benefits to be derived from mutual association,
while the relaxation of former colonial ties made it possible, at last, to
envisage a growing economic and cultural exchange across monetary and
linguistic frontiers.
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On the political front, however, it was essential that West
African governments, and their leaders, should continue to focus their
energies and attention on the wider entity, and that the drive towards
economic cooperation in the region should be sustained. Thus, in keeping
with the decision taken in Lagos, in June-July 1972, at the meeting of
ministers and experts from Togo and Nigeria, officials of the two countries
were active during the next twelve months preparing working papers on various
aspects of ECOWAS and its proposed role and structures, in the expectation
that these would later serve as a basis for further discussion by all the
governments concerned.
It was then my task to try to arrange a conference of Ministers
from all the West African states when our joint proposals could be more
fully considered and conclusions could be drawn. To this end, in July and
August 1973, a joint Togo-Nigeria ministerial delegation toured all states
in the region, other than Guinea-Bissau which was not yet independent, to
deliver copies of the working papers and to consider comments and proposals
therefrom. Meanwhile, in a letter to West African Heads of State on llth
July 1973, introducing the delegation, I intited them "to become foundation
members" of the new community.
We have had the opportunity to discuss, on a
number of occasions, the need for us in this
region of Africa, the West African Region, to
coordinate our efforts, not only at the political
level but more so, to organise ourselves into a
viable economic region cutting across linguistic, 2
financial or any other barriers.
288.
Our joint recommendations were only preliminary and thus
constituted "a progress report". It had been our intention, from the
outset, to ensure that each and every government in the region would
participate fully in every phase of the development of the community
and in all important decisions affecting its future. ECOWAS could not
then become the exclusive property of any one state or group of states,
nor would there be different categories of membership.
... it was agreed that all the fourteen countries
in the West African sub-region would be invited to
become foundation members, and that Nigeria and
Togo would serve only as a preparatory Committee to
produce working documents on the proposed Community
for further consideration by the appropriate Ministers
of the countries in the /legion/.
The letter despatched to the six Heads of the CEA0 states
contained an additional paragraph, acknowledging the creation of their
own new community, but at the same time pointing out the advantages of
a continuing dialogue among all states to secure further economic
cooperation within the region.
Our two governments are not unaware of the recent
creation of CEAO, an organisation of which your
Government is an honoured member. We appreciate the
lofty ideals thatinspiredits establishment and fully
understand your genuine intentions. Our two
governments, nonetheless, believe that an opportunity
for the exchange of ideas and information between us
and your Government on intra-African economic
cooperation will prove both fruitful and highly
rewarding to all of us. It is in this spirit that our
two Governments considered it necessary to send a joint
Togo-Nigeria Ministerial delegation to hold discussions
with your Government. It is my fervent hope that it 	 3
will receive your blessings.
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The initial response to the letter was encouraging : not least
the replies I received from leaders of the two states that had long been
identified with unitary aspirations, Ghana and Guinea. - Colonel Acheampong
of Ghana testified to the new mood of cooperation within our own sub-region
and his own country's continuing support for the regional economic community.
In our discussions with President ,Eyadema earlier
this year, and with President K4rekou last week,
we stressed the need for the West African Economic
Community and agreed that any meaningful economic
grouping in West Africa should embrace all countries
of the Region. We were proposing to follow up the
meeting with President K4r4kou last week with another
attended by the four Heads of State of Nigeria, Dahomey,
Togo and Ghana.
President Tours was eloquent in his support for the proposed
community:
We should say unequivocally at once that whenever
we are presented with such a project the Guinean
response is invariably that she is ready to associate
with African states to build a new Africa because our
people have decided to make history rather than just
continue to submit to it.
He cited the recent establishment of the Mifergui-Nimba venture, to
exploit Guinea's extensive and still largely untapped iron ore reserves,
with joint investment "by Algeria, Liberia, Nigeria, Guinea and other
foreign partners", as proving "that we can harmonise our efforts and develop
our resources - and it is Africa which always gains in the process."
Guinea would therefore "participate largely" in the proposed West African
summit and was "ready to go as far as possible and as far as our partners
will allow us."
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The outcome of our joint efforts with. Togo was a Ministerial
meeting in Lome, in December 1973, where all countries in the region
were represented, including Guinea-Bissau, and whose purpose was to
examine the principles for the evolution of ECOWAS as set out in the
preliminary documents. President Eyadema opened the meeting with a speech
stressing "the need for regional cooperation as a first step towards
continental unity", thereby acknowledging the identity between our objectives
5/
and those long since approved and recommended by the OAU. -
Perhaps with the Francophone ministers particularly in mind,
who had often expressed reservations about this kind of exercise in the
past, the Togolese President went on to emphasise that he, himself, had
no illusions about the nature and extent of the difficulties that lay
ahead.
'The realisation of the West African Economic
Community was dogged by serious problems including	 0
those relating to the diversity of languages, the
disparity of currencies and the different levels
of economic and social development...
But "these obstacles could be overcome, given a guiding political will
and the determination to move ahead and make progress."
And there was considerable progress at Lod, where the
conference ended with general agreement about the institutions that the
future community would require, together with suggestions about possible
areas of cooperation and the form that cooperation might take. From the
start there had been considerable interest in the reaction of the ministers
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from the CEA° states, whose presence at Lome' was itself an advance on
Monrovia in 1968. The success of the conference seemed further assuxed
when the Mauritanian delegate, acting in some sense as their spokesman,
raised no objection to the idea of a regional economic community which
indeed he warmly supported in principle.
Se seemed mainly concerned lest the activities of ECOWAS might
encroach on the operations of existing sub-regional bodies and therefore
called for the creation of an all-embracing and outward-looking community
of states.	 Tiis was in no way inconsistent with our own objective
as Nigeria was itself a member of several such groupings and had no wish
to preclude other states from making similar arrangements - provided, of
course, that the goals of the sub-regional organisation were compatible
with those of the wider West African community. Nevertheless, we made
no secret of our hope and our conviction that, before very long,ECOWAS
with its many advantages would come to absorb most, if not all the
functions and responsibilities of the smaller bodies. (Table 5)
At the close of proceedings in Lome, Nigeria and Togo were
invited to prepare a draft treaty for ECOWAS which would then be
considered at a further meeting of experts from the fifteen countries,
to be held in Accra, Ghana, in January 1974. There would then be a
second meeting of ministers in Niamey, Niger, in March 1974, to examine
and pronounce on the results of the Accra deliberations, after which the
final treaty could be ratified at a regional summit in Lagos.
Back in Lagos, after the conference, there seemed to be every
justification for the enthusiasm of our Federal Commissioner for Economic
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Development and Reconstruction, Dr. Adedeji, who described the Lome/
meeting "as a positive success", whose achievements included "the acceptance
of a pragmatic approach to the problem of economic cooperation in the
sub-region and the drawing up of a working timetable."
Contrary to speculative reports, member states
agreed that neither the existing economic groupings
nor the differences in language and level of
development was a _barrier to the establishment of
an effective community embracing the countries of
West Africa. In this regard he cited the European
Economic Community within which there were many
countries and other economic groupings...
At further meetings of Togolese and Nigerian officials, in
December 1973 and January 1974, in Lagos and Lame respectively, a draft
treaty for ECOWAS was prepared - with advice and assistance from the
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). From 11-15 February,1974, a little
later than expected, economic experts and officials from ten of the
fifteen countries in the region assembled in Accra, with representatives
of the ECA, to examine the draft treaty and formulate their recommendations
for the second meeting of Ministers. The Accra meeting therefore took
place in the absence of five of the six CEA() members, while the sixth,
Mali, attended only on the last day.
The CEA° members had already asked for and been given a
postponement of the meeting to give them sufficient time to study the new
Nigerian-Togolese proposals. When the Ivory Coast asked for a further
postponement, citing other commitments and the need for the CEAO members to
meet first to consider their joint approach to the proposed community and
the draft treaty, "Ghana, in conslaltation with the Nigerian and Togolese
Heads of Missions in Accra, and with the approval of both General Eyadema and
myself, decided to convene the meeting which finally took place in
7/
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February 1974." -a/ Failure to convene the meeting would have entailed
considerable loss of face on the part of the sponsors and, even worse,
would have cast considerable doubt on the seriousness of our enterprise.
The events were well summarised by a senior Nigerian official
in the Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction.
At the Accra meeting only nine out of the fifteen
countries were represented on the first day when
all the CEA° countries were absent. Mali, albeit,
showed up on the last day. Before the Accra meeting,
the Ivory Coast had asked for its postponement because
the CEA() countries had already scheduled another meeting
for 25th of January where a decision was expected to be
taken on their attitude towards the ECOWAS project.
After consultations by the Ghana Government with the
Nigerian High Commissioner and the Togolese Ambassador
in Accra, it was decided that the meeting should be
held since it had been postponed once, otherwise,
people would begin to doubt the seriousness of the new
proponents of the Community idea.
Niger's . absence from Accra was particularly unfortunate
as it seemed to threaten the time-table previously agreed at Lomg by
ministers representing all the West African states, including members
of the CEAO. Those same ministers were now due to reconvene in the
Niger capital, Niamey, in March to consider the draft treaty of ECOWAS
-
along with the recommendations made by the experts in Accra. By the
end of the first week of March, however, the authorities in Accra had
still received no reply from President Diori to their request that Niger
10/
should convene the second meeting of West African ministers. -
Ghana then proposed that Guinea should be invited to host
the conference should Niger decline to do so. My own strong preference
9/
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at the time was that, if at all possible, Niger should be persuaded
to host the conference. Given the strong pressure by the French to
dissuade the Francophone states from embracing ECOWAS and the sentiment
underlying it, I felt that Niger was the most appropriate venue for
such a crucial ministerial meeting.
I was well aware of Diori's views and convictions regarding
a regional grouping of West African states across linguistic frontiers
and believed that, as current chairman of the CEAO, he was particularly
well placed to influence other CEA() members by his example. General
Eyadema was in full agreement with me on this matter and ap proved my
subsequent approach to Diori who,despite the many and conflicting pressures
on him, finally consented to host the donference. Niger's ambassador
in Lagos subsequently called on Dr. Adedeji and assured him that Niamey
would sponsor the meeting, scheduled originally for March, but deferred
11/
until Apri1 - 25-30, and now 	 until May. -	 As Diori was
Chairman of the CEA() it seemed reasonable therefore to assume that all the
members of that body would be represented at the ministerial conference.
Then, on April 15, President Diori was overthrown by Colonel
Seyni Kountchel, following a coup d'etat in Niger. Our relations with our
northern neighbour became somewhat strained as a result, particularly in view
of the close personal relationship that had existed between myself and
Diori. Indeed, the sudden and unexpected removal of such a key and widely
respected political figure in West African politics, and at this critical
stage in the formation of ECOWAS, seemed even to threaten the future of
the organisation.
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Nevertheless, it was not our policy to interfere in the
domestic affairs of member African states. Accordingly, we accepted
the change in Niamey and consented to work with. the new leadership there
in the interests of West Africa as a whole. We recognised and made allowance
for the problems stemming from the change and acceded to Kountche's request
for a respite in which to reorganise the government and return his country
to a normal, stable existence.
Until July 10 there was considerable uncertainty about
the intentions of the new Niger Government regarding the Niamey meeting
of ministers. Reluctant to embarrass the leadership in Niger by holding
them to the earlier commitment to stage the conference, we discussed with
Ghana and Togo the possibility of approaching Mali to see if we could secure
Bamako as an alternative venue. After all ' Mali had been the one CEA° state
to send a delegation to the Accra meeting l and Traore had several times
expressed his country's support for regional economic integration. On
the other hand we also felt that we should still give Niger and the new
rulers the chance to fulfil their obligation. In this way we hoped to
ensure that Niger and its aovernment remained fully committed to ECOWAS.
Above all we were anxious that nothing should be done to alienate
or antagonise our northeraneighbour.
In the end it was decided that, before communicating with the
Mali Government, a joint delegation of Nigeria, Togo and Ghana would
approach Kountche, or his representative, at the Mogadishu Summit of the
OAU, to ascertain whether or not his country would host the forthcoming
conference. 12/
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The problems arising from the coup in Niger are well
conveyed by the following official account of subsequent discussions.
Reports received about the same time suggested
that the new Regime ii.e. in Niger) was anxious to
host the Ministerial meeting and that the new Head of State
had issued appropriate instructions. This would appear
to have been confirmed in discussions between the Nigerian,
Togolese and Niger delegations in Mogadishu. Consequently
a message was despatched to Niamey asking the Nigerian
Embassy to seek confirmation that the new government of
Niger was willing to convene the meeting from 30th July 13/
to 3rd August, 1974."
It was only on July 10 that the Nigerian Embassy in Niamey
advised us that Niger had formally indicated it was unable to host the
meeting and had instead approached the Togolese Government asking it to
act for a second time as host to the West African ministers. As we were all
determined to spread the responsibilities for ECOWAS, however, Togo
declined and instead approached the Malian authorities to inquire whether
Bamako would provide facilities for the conference.
On August 2, 1974, I then addressed a message to Colonel
Moussa Traore, the Mali leader, through Dr. Adedeji, inviting him to
14/host the meeting. - Although agreeable in principle, Traore had his
own domestic problems, both political and economic, not the least of which
were the consequences of the protracted drought in the Sahel zone. On
reflection Mali was finally unable - if not altogether unwilling - to
oblige and, rather than risk another protracted lull in proceedings and
the prospect that our movement might, before long, begin to lose its
momentum, I addressed an appeal to President Tolbert of Liberia, who
was known to share his predecessor's strong commitment to regional
integration.
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We had almost exhausted the number of possible sites for
the conference. Togo had sponsored the Lome meeting and Nigeria hoped to
host the final summit. Accra had already provided facilities for the
meeting of cbnstitutional experts in February. Of the Francophone
states Guinea was undoubtedly willing but wouldnot, unfortunately, have
been acceptable to some at least of its French—speaking neighbours. The
Sahelian countries were sympathetic but were understandably reluctant
to assume additional administrative and financial burdens at a time of
severe drought and given the sensitive state of their relations with
France and their CEA() partners. Senegal seemed to be excluded because
of that country's known stand on ECOWAS at this stage, while we were
doubtful whether the Ivory Coast would wish to dissociate itself so far
from Senegal as to provide the venue for an important ECOWAS meeting.
Other than Liberia there was only Sierra Leone, the neighbouring state
of Benin or The Gambia. Much therefore depended on the reply from
President Tolbert. My letter was couched in friendly and respectful
terms indicating our recognition of Liberia's total commitment to ECOWAS
and our appreciation of its valuable contribution to regional integration,
both in the past and, more particularly in the recent Lome and Accra
meetings.
	 The relevant parts of the letter read as follows:
As Your Excellency is aware, our two countries have
been collaborating with other countries in West Africa
in the drive towards the establishment of an Economic
Community in West Africa with the aim of consolidating
our independence, accelerating the economic and social
development of our various countries and increasing
the friendly and mutually beneficial contact between
our people.
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To this end, our respective Ministers responsible
for economic co-operation met in Lome, Togo, last
December to consider the basic document drawn up
jointly by the officials of Nigeria and Togo. Your
country's delegation made positive, useful and
noteworthy contributions to the success of that
memorable meeting which drew up a time-table for the
evolution of the Community, the final stage of which
would be a meeting of Heads of State here in Lagos
to consider and sign the Treaty establishing the
Community. Our officials have been working very hard
to meet the deadlines set by that time-table and their
work culminated in the meeting of experts and jurists
held in Accra, Ghana, between llth and 15th February of
this year. I am informed by my officials who attended
the meeting that the delegation from your country took
a very active part in the deliberations of the meeting.
The next stage in the evolution of the Economic Community
is the convening of a Ministerial Conference which was
to have been held in Niamey last April, hut whidn &la not
take place owing to the change of Government in Niger. Due
to its preoccupation with heavy domestic problems, the
new Government of Niger has now indicated its inability
to provide host facilities for the Second Ministerial
Conference. We have just approached the Government of Mali to
kindly host the meeting, but they also are no“or good
reasons, apparently drought problems, able to oblige.
Arising from the need to avoid a lull and press on to
our goal and bearing in mind Liberia's past laudable role
and worthwhile initiatives in matters affecting the destiny
of our peoples in Africa, I have decided to invite the
Government of the Republic of Liberia, through Your Excellency,
to be so good as to assume the burden of providing host
facilities for the second Ministerial Conference which 15/
will consider the Draft Treaty proposed in Accra.-
President Tolbert's reply on 28th October was as prompt as
it was welcome. As voted by R.I.On	 16/wuka the appropriate passage read: -
"Your Excellency has alluded to my Government's unflinching
faith in economic co-operation among the States of West
Africa as crucial for the economic independence and
advancement of the peoples of this region. Today, as
in the past, we continue to attach. paramount importance
to the establishment of such. an economic community,
particularly since it is envisaged that it will transcend
linguistic, cultural, and other barriers.
299.
My Government would be failing in its commitment
not only to inter-African co-operation in the
West African sub-region but also to the greater
unity of our continent if we failed to offer our
modest facilities for the holding of a consultation
seeking to advance the realisation of these laudable
objectives. Therefore, as a further manifestation
of this commitment and of our ardent desire not to
permit the momentum we have achieved since the
Ministerial Meeting held in Lome, Togo, last December,
to wane, I am gratified to inform you that the Government
and people of Liberia will be delighted to host the
Second Ministerial Meeting of the Economic Communit y of
West Africa during the latter half of January 1975.-
The meeting was now scheduled for 27-30th January 1975
and the Federal Military Government received the invitation to participate
on December 18, 1974. I replied on January 2oth acknowledging President
Tolbert's letters and confirming that a Nigerian delegation would attend
17/
on the dates suggested. -	 We were represented at Monrovia by a
nine-man team, led by Dr. Adedeji, who was accompanied by officials of
the Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction and the Ministry
of External Affairs (Economic Department), with Chief Henry Fajemlrokun,
President of the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, as an
adviser.
The purpose of the second ministerial meeting was to prepare
the final text of the draft treaty for consideration by the Heads of
State at a summit scheduled to be held in Lagos later in 1975. On his
return to Nigeria, Dr. Adedeji reported favourably on the outcome of
the deliberations and particularly commended the role played by President
Tolbert and his skilful management of the conference. Adedeji, in the
same report, advised me of "the cordiality and the spirit of amity that
permeated the deliberations of the Second Ministerial Meeting of ECOWAS." 18/
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From all accounts it was a highly successful gathering,
attended by all.countries in the region other than Mali which was
unavoidably absent. Reviewing the Commissioner's report, I was particularly
impressed by the fact that "the decisions taken during the consideration
of the draft treaty were made unanimously and without any reservation
whatsoever." And, as I pointed out in a subsequent letter to West African
Heads of State, this seemed to "augur well for the Economic Community
which we are on the threshold of setting up." In the same letter I
therefore expressed my appreciation for the valuable contribution of each
/1
of the ministers present. 9-
After Monrovia, it only remained for me to contact the
Heads of State of the region, during February 1975, reminding them that
the original time-table agreed in Lome had provided for a summit of
West African leaders, to be held in Lagos. Saving regard to their onerous
responsibilities and tight schedule, and the need to bring to early
fruition a scheme so close to our hearts, I suggested the following dates
for their consideration : either May 19-21, or May 26-28. I asked for
an early reply and an indication of their preference, promising to
20/
respect the majority view. - And in a special letter to President
Traori of Mali I also expressed regret "that it was not possible for your
21/
country to be represented at the [Monrovia? Conference." -
At this stage I had little reason to doubt the successful
outcome of the forthcoming Lagos summit. Admittedly, much had still
to be decided and everything had yet to be approved by the various
leaders and their governments. There was firm and continuing opposition
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to our proposed arrangements from the Senegalese President who now
wanted an even larger community and was busily canvassing support in
West and Central Africa. But the satisfactory outcome of the recent
Monrovia Conference, attended as it was by all the CEA° states other
than Mali, and favourable developments elsewhere in the world, where
Nigeria's influence and stature continued to grow, all suggested that our
hopes for a West African community were about to be realised.
Thanks to Monrovia, West Africa had successfully avoided a more
permanent and damaging division into rival economic blocs, based on former
colonial attachments. The CEAO and ECOWAS could henceforth develop in
harmony, each in its respective sphere, rather than persisting in a sterile and
pointless confrontation. At the same time acceptance of the principle of
dual membership, for those wishing to belong to both communities,or Other
similar sub—regional grouping, also implied that the objectives of the two
organisations were and would remain compatible. With this proviso it would
have appeared extremely churlish to have tried to deny the poorer states whatever
benefit they might appear to derive from a community whose objectives were
so similar to our own.
It is true that the proposals emerging from the Monrovia
meeting undertook to recognise the contractual rights and obligations of
member states and to respect their various commitments to other states
outside the region and to other groupings within it. To my mind the most
serious threat to ECOWAS, after its formation, would not come from the
CEAO, nor from principle of 'derogation', with its risk of divided
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and therefore attenuated loyalties. The CEA() was itself a relatively
restricted body whose development had been punctuated by crises and
problems no less serious than those experienced by, our own - the ECOWAS.
The main threat would come rather from any failure
in the sense of commitment to regional cooperation and the spirit of ECOWAS
from member states as a whole. And here, Nigeria, as the largest, most
populous and prosperous state, had a special obligation - if only to
set a good example to others. In more prosperous timPs there was always
the temptation to maximise one's own advantage, with little care for the
well-being of the region as a whole and its future security. On the other
hand, economic depression has also often been the signal for short-term
measures seeking to cut costs, irrespective of the consequences, and for
minimising external commitments, perhaps to win a momentary popularity
at home at the risk of destroying the good will that has been so patiently
achieved elsewhere. More recent developments and events in the region
and particularly in Nigeria, in 1983, are examples of the kind of problems
that can arise. We must avoid decisions that would make it difficult or
nearly impossible for the intra-regional grouping to achieve greater
harmony.
With the meeting in Monrovia in January 1975 the West African
grouping had also weathered its first incipient crisis and had successfully
overcome the serious problems arising from the sudden change of government
in Niger, in April 1974. We had not only averted a serious, if temporary
threat to the future of ECOWAS but, more important, had established a valuable
precedent for dealing with future constitutional crises in any member state.
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With the overthrow of Hamani Diori the principle was soon clearly
established that, however important and even essential are the personal
relationships between individual Heads of State, they must never be allowed
in any way to endanger the orderly development and effective functioning
of the West African economic grouping that is being created. We were
determined that, come what may personalities must at all times be subordinated
to the well-being of the community as a whole.
Niger provided the first opportunity to put our doctrine to the
test in this otherwise highly sensitive area. Later and, indeed, within
months of the establishment of ECOWAS in May 1975, there would be another
even more critical test, with my own removal in the coup of July 29th, 1975.
As was only to be expected there was some initial uncertainty about the
direction and prospects of ECOWAS, and some delay in pursuing our agreed
objectives and in adhering to the original time-table. But ECOWAS survived
then just as it has since survived a number of sudden changes of government -
in Ghana, Mauritania, Liberia and Upper Volta. There was to be no repetition
in West Africa of the damaging effects of the Amin coup on the East African
Community after 1971.
Indeed our relations with Niger were soon normalised, particularly
after Kountche's visit to Lagos in November 1974, when we, for our parts
agreed to provide further aid to help relieve the worst effects of the drought
in Niger. At the same time President Kountche was anxious to remove any
misunderstanding that might have arisen from his country's failure to host the
second ministerial meeting in Niamey. At the end of the visit he assured us
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that his "country was ready to support and contribute its quota towards
" 22/
the success of the economic development of the region of West Africa. -
Before describing the Summit of May 1975 which saw the actual
birth of ECOWAS, it will be necessary to look in greater detail at a number
of events in the preceding years which may help explain the collapse of
opposition to ECOWAS from within the Francophone camp and also contributed to
the spirit of reconciliation within the region that finally made West African
cooperation a reality.
Obstacles to the ECOWAS Summit. Removed 
The Monrovia meeting of Ministers o in January 1975, differed in many
important respects from the earlier Summit there in 1968 - and not least in
the presence of representatives from all West African countries, French,
English and Portuguese-speaking. There was no 'boycott' this time, or any
likelihocdof such an action succeeding. If there was still opposition
to ECOWAS within the region our opponents had not the numbers to defeat or
the strength to obstruct our proposals. Nor would they be willing to expose
themselves to the embarrassment and probable humiliation of an open vote by
the governments of the region. At best (or worst) they might mount a delaying
operation. There was no doubt in my mind, therefore, that, provided the
meeting was held ,and promptly, such was the support for a West African
Economic grouping that there was no question of failure.
There had evidently been a significant transformation in the views
and attitudes of governments within the region, and particularly among the
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Francophone states. We have already suggested some of the reasons for this
change and it only remains to enlarge on these and to explore developments
in the years-immediately preceding the formation of ECOWAS in 1975. One must
start with the growing international economic crisis and its impact on the
new and developing states of the Third World, coupled, after 1973, with the
effects of the oil price rise and the beginnings of the North-South debate.
Within Africa there was the relaxation of the French presence that accompanied
the widespread and vocal campaign for the revision of the cooperation
agreements between the French-speaking states and the metropole, starting in
1972.
French-Nigeria Relations Reviewed 
President GeorgesPompidou, although himself a Gaullist, had taken
the measure of the new forces at work in Africa and elsewhere in the world
and had already begun, before his sudden death in April 1974, to sanction
certain changes in France's African policy. But his main contribution was
in Western Europe, with the removal of the veto on Britain's entry to the EEC.
In Africa and in West Africa his administration, still directed by M.Jacques
Foccart, had come down strongly - and without much regard for consistency -
against cooperation across linguistic boundaries. There was, nevertheless,
some improvement in France's relations with Nigeria, following the visit to
n
Lagos, in February 1973, of M. Andre Bettencourt, ministre delegue in the
French Foreign Ministry.
The purpose of that visit according to the French was to clear up
"certain prejudices and certain misunderstandings." 221 On the eve of
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Bettencourt's arrival our External Affairs Commissioner, Dr. Okoi Arikpo,
had recalled that during the civil war "France did us a wrong" but that
there was now a desire for "greater understanding" on both sides.
'It would, in any case, "be unwise to ignore each other"
given that we are literally surrounded by French-speaking
African countries in which French influence is still strong
and in which French commercial, economic and technical
activities are still going on ... We realise it will
certainly help our relations with these countries if we 20
bring our relations with France on to an even keel.'
The French Minister expressed the earnest hope that, henceforth,
relations might become "confident", 252/ while a Nigerian official preferred
31/
to speak of "good relations based on mutual suspicion". - Certainly, the
French were left in no doubt about the strength of our commitment to the
proposed West African grouping and our conviction that strong French pressure
had been and was being exerted t&orevent the development of that community.
In an interview with Agence hiance-Pt.esse, Dr Arikpo had pointed out that
cooperation, as interpreted by the French, and existing economic ties
between France and her former African colonies were considered by us to be
"limiting factors", impeding the "very worthy objectives" of coordinated
development and the promotion of trade among the African states themselves. 2-I/
Both directly, and indirectly, through the EEC and EEC officials
such as M.Jean-Francois Deniau , a member of the European Commission in
Brussels, and, after April 1973, French Secretary of State for Cooperation,
the French had worked for the creation of the CEA() and had supported the
policy of West African "unity through stages". This policy advocated by
Presidents Senghor and Bouphouft-Boigny, envisaged the rapid construction
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of a regional grouping limited initially to the Francophone states - whose
main purpose was to obstruct our own efforts to create a broader community.
We, in Nigeria, had made it abundantly clear that we "would prefer to be on the
bus from the beginning, rather than get on when it is moving." 22/
We were, nevertheless, somewhat encouraged when M. Bettencourt,
on leaving Lagos, admitted that "African cannot develop without a more direct
/
cooperation between English and French-speaking countries." 29- Through
our Commissioner for Economic Development, Dr. Adedeji, we had tried to
convince the French that the proposed West African Community would be a
"prosperous trading partner with Europe" as well as representing the best
30hope for the development of all the states of the region. 0-i' 	 the
communique issued by the French, after the visit, simply recorded that "the
31/different projects for regional organisation in West Africa were discussed." -
But France's main concern was to explore the growing Nigerian
market, particularly as the balance of trade with France now favoured Nigeria.
The new concern in France with improving the country's export performance
had prompted a search for markets outside the traditional Francophone
community while our new-found prosperity and our new importance as a major
oil producer called for a revision of earlier attitudes based on prejudice
and an unreasoning fear of Nigeria's very size, population, and potential.
We were able to indicate to the French that our own interest lay in expanding
trade with Europe, rather than participating directly in the French aid
programme, whose administration, in our view, left much to be desired.
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By developing trade, however, we ho ped to diversify our own
existing markets, thereby enhancing our development and at the same time
securing our independence and control of our own affairs. For these reasons
we could only applaud the new policy being cautiously elaborated in France
in the 'seventies and encourage its extension to the rest of Africa. For
the same reason we made it clear, in February 1973, that, despite Britain's
recent' accession to the Treaty of Rome, Nigeria would reject any form of
association with the EEC that was not concluded voluntarily and on a basis
32/
of complete equality. - The Lagos Treaty of 1966, that would have linked
Nigeria's economy to that of the EEC, had not been ratified because of French
opposition after the outbreak of civil war the following year. It had been
negotiated by the previous military administration and was not considered
appropriate to our post-war circumstances.
Nigeria and the EEC 
The terms of the second Yaounde Convention, concluded with the
EEC in 1969 and ratified by some eighteen (later nineteen) African states,
were considered an affront to the dignity of a sovereign and independent state
and would, in any case, have seriously hampered our own future industrial
development. A simple trade agreement therefore seemed to us the most
suitable and mutually beneficial type of agreement with the EEC. We recognised,
however, that other African states were not in the same fortunate position
and, left to themselves, would have little choice in the matter. We did not
oppose association for them but indicated, instead, our readiness to encourage
and support a concerted attempt to negotiate much better terms.
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The formal incorporation of Britain, Ireland and Denmark into
the EEC in January 1973 made it increasingly difficult, if not impossible,
to defend the continued division of Africa along linguistic lines. Just as
Britain and France could now cooperate within the EEC it seemed reasonable
to look forward to increased cooperation among their former African colonies.
The negotiation of a new agreement with the EEC would evidently require
considerable coordination on the part of the new states if they were to have
any hope of securing their vital interests. The immediate constitution of
ECOWAS would have provided just the kind of arena where African states could
elaborate their demands and concert their future tactics. But, although
circumstances were increasingly favourable to ECOWAS, there were still
important obstacles to be surmounted.
The best way of removing those obstacles was to show our African
friends and future partners the extent of the benefits to be derived
from economic cooperation in this as in other fields. While disclaiming
any selfish interest on our own part, Nigeria therefore took a stand against
the more discriminatory provisions of the old Yaounde Conventions, particularly
in the matter of 'reverse preferences' and argued the need to extend and
liberalise the operations of the European Development Fund. In our view the
new agreement, by bringing together the African and other developing states,
could provide a new and more fruitful basis for future North-South relations.
And in this we soon had the support not only of most African states, but of
much of the Third World, as well as the sympathy of some EEC officials and
33/
several of the European states. -
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Hitherto, Senghor had been conducting preliminary negotiations
in Brussels and elsehwere on behalf of the eighteen associated African
states, mostly Francophone, and his objective was the conclusion of a new
but improved Yaounde agreement - Yaounde III. Meanwhile, in 1972, the
Commonwealth Secretariat had organised meetings of the various Commonwealth
states affected by Britain's entry to the EEC. And it was our aim in these
meetings and in the discussions that continued during the following year
to try to broaden the terms of reference to encompass first the African
states as a whole and later our colleagues in the Pacific and the Caribbean.
While circumstances might differ and situations might vary, our problems
were not usually so very dissimilar.
While the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) had published
some useful and critical accounts of the Yaounde Convention, the OAU, itself,
seemed a more appropriate forum where African states and their leaders
could consider the sensitive and often critical issues that would affect
their future development and well-being for years to come. Robert Gardiner,
Executive Secretary-General of the ECA, had himself spoken of the forthcoming
negotiations with the EEC as a "peculiarly African" problem determining the
continent's future economic relations with Western Europe.
Europe needs Africa as much as Africa needs Europe.
In the past Africa was led to such conferences by
metropolitan powers. For the first time we have
the option to enter such discussions on our own.
Never before has our continent been confronted with
such a challenge. We cannot avoid it and we cannot 341
afford to fail.
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We soon had the support of other Commonwealth states in Africa
and a decision to transfer the meeting to the OAU was carried by a majority
35/
at the Accra meeting of the ECA in February 1973. - Accordingly, in
May, a conference of Trade, Finance and Development Ministers met in Abidjan
under the auspices of the OAU and there the Nigerian delegation worked
patiently to reach a consensus which could then be considered by the OAU
summit in Addis Ababa, later that month. Abidjan thus provided the first
real opportunity for a meeting between African 'associates' and the so-called
'associables'. The many differences that were revealed between and within
the various groupings, made a compromise not only inevitable but also desirable.
The OAU summit, reviewing the Abidjan resolutions,was able
nevertheless to take a more forthright stand,unanimously approving the "eight
principles". The first of which was "non-reciprocity for trade and tariff
concessions given by the EEC." While not completely rejecting reciprocity,
this did effectively exclude the application of reverse preferences. In
keeping with the Nigerian position, all African states were urged to
coordinate and harmonise their stand during the subsequent negotiations and
36/
to avoid decisions that might in any way be prejudicial to African interests. -
And, as the newly elected Chairman of the OAU, it then fell to myself and the
OAU officials to try to implement these decisions.
Yaounde, with its narrow, smug, paternalistic assumptions, which
confirmed existing colonial 'spheres of influence' within Africa - and sought to
perpetuate economic dependency, was largely incompatible with the sentiments
of most African governments in the 'seventies. Nor were the majority of
African states prepared to support the demands of some Francophone leaders
for separate treaties and differential terms, discriminating between 'associates'
on the one hand and potential 'associables' on the-other.
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West African leaders again occupied a prominent position in the
debates that followed although the decisions taken would affect most of
Africa and much of the Third World. Senghor and Houphouft-Boigny led the
resistance to the OAU policy seeking to defend existing forms of association
with the EEC, while recognising the need for some improvement in the terms,
especially regarding trade and the provision of economic aid. A series of
statements by Senghor in the course of a tour of West European capitals,
early in 1973, offer a clear and concise account of his views on Africa's
relationship with Europe, notably his ardent defence of the concept of
E4rafrique.
In an interview in France he spoke of an "ancient symbiosis"
between the two continents, while elsewhere he warned that "to abandon
Africa for mirages would not be realistic for the Europeans."37
-/ Where
Europeans could never hope to match American influence in Latin America,
or Russian and Chinese influence in Asia, the Americans and the Chinese,
to say nothing of the Russians, were extending their influence in Africa,
presumably at the expense of Europe. Returning to Africa in April he
admitted that:
Some European countries were cool towards
Association, but he said he had tried to
convince them that 'Eur-Africa' was in the
interests of Africa and Europe;
On balance he maintained that the Yaoundg
 system had served the
associated states well and was also in the best interests of other African
countries.' "We hope that the greatest number of Anglophones, all nineteen
if possible, join the Yaounde association." Failing that, it might be
38/
313.
necessary to differentiate, for a time, between those who accepted the
principles of association in advance and other states which might prefer
unique arrangements to suit their own individual circumstances. Finally,
Senghor insisted that he had nevertheless been working towards West African
cooperation in the broadest sense of that term. In Brussels he had explained
to members of the EEC Commission that:
He had been trying to organise information meetings
at ministerial level between associated and associable
states and that he had elaborated a draft treaty
foreseeing a progressive economic integration in the
Atlantic states from louakchott to Kinshasa. The
adherence of the greatest possible number of African
states to the future Yaoundg Convention would help 39/this great project.
Senghor's defence of reverse preferences, to which we and other
Commonwealth and African leaders were strongly opposed, was bound up
inextricably with his advocacy of continued and increasing European
involvement in Africa. They were a means of securing and retaining the
attention of the European states, offered some scope for future bargaining
on the part of the African states, were a symbol of the essential equality
of the two sides, and were the basis of "a Europe-Africa free trade area."
In any case they were only partially enforced and by those states who
40/perceived their true value. -
The concern of the Francophone leaders with the European connection
and their anxiety lest existing ties with France, already weakened in the
previous decade, might succumb to pressure by the former British colonies
for a new type of economic agreement, at once more open, more flexible and -
more equitable, was perhaps understandable. But their position was
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We were therefore happy with the subsequent decision, of OAU
Trade Ministers, meeting in Dar-es-Salaam in October 1973, that the role
of African spokeman and Chairman of the Council of Ministers should rotate
every three months. Such an arrangement could only help to cement the common
front of African governments forthe approaching negotiations in Brussels.
Despite the efforts of the Senegalese Minister, the conference in Dar-es-Salaam
refused to entertain the notion of reciprocity and was not enthusiastic about
the Ivory Coast proposal for a Europe-Africa free trade area. Nor was it
sympathetic to Diori's suggestion that the present and the prospective
associates should co-habit within two separate groupings for the next five
41/years, when conditions for a possible fusion might have improved. -
negotiationsIt is difficult to exaggerate the significance of these .
for the dignity and independence of the African and other developing states,
for the future of North-South relations, and for the success of economic
cooperation in West Africa and elsewhere. And as the East African Community
entered its terminal phase - the result of prolonged ideological tensions
and personal incompatibilities - the impetus for renewed cooperation now came
from inside West Africa which had itself long been a prey to artificial,
colonial boundaries and, more recently, to economic policies described as
'neo-colonial'.
It was left to Julius Nyerere to point the lesson of the conference
at Dar-es-Salaam and of the previous meetings in Lagos, Addis Ababa and Abidjan:
Africa had been able to speak with one voice in
Brussels in July, and at the Gatt meeting in Tokyo
in September. It should not be diverted from its
purpose by default, by internal divisions, or by
half-hearted and ill-prepared positions...
The negotiations must result in an equitable arrangement,
for the African states in years ahead need to breathe
freely and they cannot be expected to be placed in an 42/institutional straightjacket.
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nevertheless untenable, even in the short term, given French approval for
Britain's entry to the EEC and given the growing concern among African and
other Third World states about their independence, the imbalance economic
development of world trade, and their future economic development.
Once other African states had accepted our view that only the
OAU was competent to take a decision on their behalf, the only possible
outcome was joint negotiations for a new agreement with the EEC, and on
a basis very different from that:Of the previous Yaounde Conventions. To
try to perpetuate the division of Africa along essentially colonial lines
was no longer practical politics as it could only undermine the evident need
for African solidarity in such vexed areas of policy as price stabilisation,
aid to the poor and landlocked countries, and industrial and resource
development - where inter-African cooperation was seen by all to be of
vital concern.
By the same token, there was widespread support for and acceptance
of the decision to invite Caribbean and Pacific states to be represented at
an Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) conference in Lagos, on July 7-9,1973.
And it was there that our Commissioner for Trade, Wenike Briggs, was chosen
as African spokesman for the subsequent negotiations in Brussels. Nigeria,
however, had no wish to appear to dominate proceedings, especially as our
aim was not to become an associated state, but rather to assist other
governments in their concerted attempt to improve the terms of trade with
Western Europe and to remove the stigma of 'inferiority' attached to the
earlier agreements.
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The final outcome of the negotiations, whose conclusions were
embodied in the Lome Convention ratified in February 1975, was widely
acclaimed, in Europe, Africa and the Third World generally, as a major
advance on the previous arrangements. Once and for all the new agreement
confirmed the value of cooperation in securing recognition of African heeds
and interests. It also conferred a new sense of dignity and purpose on the
peoples of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific 4tates. Even our Francophone
critics could only approve the final agreements from which they, too, would
greatly benefit.
Some of the concessions secured at Lomg directly favoured our own
West African proposal : for example, ten per cent of EEC aid was now to
be reserved for regional development projects. Evidently, the value of
cooperation was recognised in West European as well as in African capitals,
while other provisions likewise encouraged efforts at regional cooperation
and self-help and a greater measure of integration.
Lome represented a series of tangible concessions for the most
part wrung from the European governments after hard and protracted bargaining,
and not without several attempts to exploit and widen our differences so as
to reduce our effectiveness. While the new arrangements were far from ideal
they did point the way to a more positive approach in the future. And, just
as important from the view point of ECOWAS, Nigeria's close and continuing
involvement in the negotiations, her support for pragmatic solutions and her
efforts to secure unity through compromise, but not at the expense of principle,
did much to allay earlier fears of Nigerian domination or an Anglo-Saxon
hegemony. This would shortly prove to be of inestimable value in the final
negotiations for the creation of ECOWAS. As a Nigerian academic has aptly
remarked:
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'Mutual respect and trust developed; 'the spirit
of Lome' became the slogan. A political climate
and economic structure had been brought into being 431
which allowed ECOWAS to be concluded.
	
4
The French themselves were among the first to recognise these
changes and their implications for future policy in Africa. The Lome
agreements, following as they did the Monrovia meeting of West African
Ministers, effectively abolished the distinction in the economic matters
between the Francophone and other African states - at least where the EEC
was concerned. To a considerable degree it also abolished, at least on the
surface, the special economic and uolitical relationship that had endured
between France and her former African colonies since their independence in the
'sixties.
Nigeria and the New French Administration 
Although the direction of events had been clear since the
resignation of General de Gaulle in 1969, if not before, the French
administration was able to adapt more readily to the new situation after
the election in June 1975 of Valery Giscard d'Estaing as the third President
of the Fifth Republic, following the sudden and unexpected death of Georges
Pompidou. Although Finance Minister under Pompidou and associated therefore
with many of the new economic arrangements concluded between France and
her former colonies in the early 'seventies, Giscard d'Estaing was a
Conservative and not a Gaullist leader. He favoured a much more pragmatic
approach to the question of relations with Africa and could more easily
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accept the principle of a loosely-knit, French-speaking community of
states, whose leaders met regularly, usually outside Paris, and on a basis
of mutual equality. Hence the creation of a new Ministry of Cooperation and
the appointment of a 'liberal' minister, Pierre Abelin, himself a former
44/
associate of the new President. - The new aims and priorities of French
policy in Africa were soon elaborated and approved by the government in Paris.
Relations between the metropole and the Francophone states would
be on a basis of "strict equality". Cooperation programmes, aid and technical
assistance would reflect, wherever possible, the preferences of the recipients
and would conform to their own pre-existing policies and programmes. The
essential diversity of interests within the Francophone community would be
respected since "the fact of speaking the same tongue may facilitate
45/
communication but is not necessarily conducive to any uniformity of thought." -
The new administration formally recognised the urgent need for some form
of structured dialogue between industrialised and developing nations, but on
a basis of shared or complementary rather than antagonistic interests.
More important, perhaps, than any abstract statements of principle,
were the actions of the new government, symbolised by the removal of the
Secretary-General for African and Malagasy Affairs, M. Jacques Foccart, an
old opponent of Nigerian unity, believed to be hostile to ECOWAS, and long
associated with a tough, interventionist stand by France in the affairs of
46/
many African states. - That act alone did much to help reconcile France
with some of her more critical and outspoken Francophone partners, as well as
with former opponents like Sekou Toure, in Guinea, who would soon resume normal
diplomatic relations with the metropole and with his Francophone neighbours.
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Nigeria, too, looked forward to a better relationship with
France and the resumption of full normal relations. Here the visit
of Dr. Arikpo to Paris, in November 1974, the first by a Nigerian Foteign
Minister since the civil war, was described by one commentator as the
beginning of an 'age of reason' in relations between the two countries.41
-/
And with the end of the Gaullist era France could now approach Nigeria from
the viewpoint of economic self-interest rather than political advantage.
'Although some sentimental attachment to France's
'glorious role' in Francophone Africa survives in
some circles, the pragmatic President Giscard d'Estaing
seems to be eager to deal with Nigeria, and for that
matter, with any Anglophone African state on the basis
of equality not paternalistic sentiment.'
ECOWAS and the Francophone Leaders 
Largely as a result of all these	 developments the prospects for
ECOWAS improved considerably between 1972 and 1974. As we have seen, the
successful meeting of West African ministers from all states in Monrovia,
in January 1975, to be followed a month later by the negotiation of the Lode
Agreements, left no doubt in our mind as to the formation of ECOWAS within the
very near future.
The major change between 1972 and 1974 was not in the attitude of the
English-speaking governments, which had consistently supported the idea of
a West African economic community, but in the views of the Francophone leaders,
whose support for the community was so crucial. At the beginning of the
'seventies we were confronted by the combined opposition of the Ivory Coast
and Senegal, Houphouft-Boigny having successfully persuaded Senghor of the
need for a Francophone community within West Africa, if only to try to counter-
balance the new and growing influence of Nigeria and to defeat our efforts
to create a broader economic grouping.
w
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By the middle of the decade, however, the situation had changed
significantly and it was Senghor who was now searching for pretexts to
postpone the formation of ECOWAS, while Houphoudt-Boigny seemed increasingly
reconciled to and even enthusiastic about the prospect of the new community
and the role that the Ivory Coast and her partners might play therein.
It is possible, and even probable, that Houphoudt-Boigny responded more
promptly than Senghor to the subtle changes in French policy during these
years. And the most visible and striking change in the attitude of the
Ivory Coast government was between December 1972 and December 1974.
The visit of our External Affairs Commissioner, Dr. Arikpo, to
Abidjan, in December 1972, certainly seemed to have dispelled some of the
misgivings there concerning relations between the two countries after the
civil war and the nature of our interest in the proposed West African grouping.
While I had offered reconciliation to our former opponents as early as 1970,
I had not thought it appropriate to include Abidjan among the capitals
that I visited in the course of my West African tours. Arikpo's visit,
however, was evidence of our good-will towards other states in the region and
the sincerity of our efforts to promote a lasting reconciliation. As a
result there was a distinct improvement in relations between our states which
49/
continued during 1973. -
In August 1973, following the establishment of the CEAO, we naturally
included Abidjan in the list of capitals to be visited by the joint Nigeria-Togo
delegation whose purpose was to revive interest in the broader scheme for a
West African economic community. Dr. Adedeji and the Togolese Trade Minister,
Henri Dogo, were able to make contact with their Ivorian counterparts and to
communicate to the President our cordial invitation to be represented at the
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forthcoming Lome conference of West African Ministers. Houphouft-Boigny's
statements to foreign journalists at that time were distinctly encouraging.
He indicated not only that the Ivory Coast fully supported the idea of a
fourteen-nation community in the region, but also pointed out that there
was no incompatibility between our own ECOWAS and the smaller CEAO.
Everything must be done to make what we have created
work. It is not a question of sabotaging what we have
done, but on the contrary, it means developing it into a
much bigger ensemble. The Ivory Coast is full of goodwill
for the emergence of a great West African economic grouping.
By October 1974, this attitude of cautious approval had evolved
into something approaching a definite commitment to ECOWAS, prompting an
editorial comment in West Africa to the effect that:
It is now believed that President Houphouft-Boigny
of the Ivory Coast, long a champion of the view that
economic unity of the Francophone states should precede
any wider grouping, has come round to the view that a 51/
union of the whole area is desirable."
The paradox was that Senghor, who had championed West African
economic integration in 1968, now continued to pay lip service to that
ideal while multiplying his criticisms both of ECOWAS and of Nigerian
involvement in it.
- Ironically some quarters seem to feel that there
is now more cautiousness in Dakar about the larger
grouping than in Abidjan, which, if true, is a reversal
of roles, as President Senghor had played an important 521
role in bringing about the Monrovia meeting in 1968.'
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Or again,
Now, it seems, it is President Senghor of Senegal
who has to be persuaded both that a purely Francophone
grouping can make little contribution to the real economic
needs of the area and that the wider 'Atlantic' grouping
(which would now presumably include even Angola), which he
has mentioned is unrealistic.
It is perhaps easier to explain the change of policy in the
Ivory Coast than to account for the evolution of Senghor's views after 1970.
Once reassured that Nigeria harboured no lasting resentment against the
Ivory Coast and its government, and that our regional project was not directed
in any sense against the Francophone states or the Entente, Houphouft-Boigny
was more likely than Senghor to be influenced by economic and political
realities both in Africa and elsewhere in the world.
Under pressure from his Entente partners, including Togo, Dahomey
and above all, Niger, aware of the drift of French policy, and anxious to
expand the market for his new industrial output, Houphoudt-Boigny prepared
to accept ECOWAS, at least in principle. His acquiescence turned to enthusiasm,
in the course of 1973, following the establishment of the CEAO and when it
seemed that our own West African project was well under way with some prospect
of becoming a reality.
Given that membership of the ECOWAS was not incompatible with that
of the CEAO, the Ivory Coast, like other Francophone btates, had much to gain
and little to lose by becoming a foundation member of both organisations.
As such it would have privileged access to the two major West African groupings
and an important share of the institutional patronage - although, to his
credit, Houphouft-Boigny has always disclaimed any interest in the latter,
either for himself or for his country.
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Senghor's seeming opposition to ECOWAS was unfortunate and is
less easy to explain in view of his previous energetic commitment to
regional organisation across linguistic lines:
Senegal's own political tradition is very much
on the side of enlarged contact with neighbouring
states, and President Senghor has frequently spoken
of his dream of a larger grouping stretching from
Nouakchott to Kinshasa.
Admittedly he had encountered many practical problems in his earlier
attempts at regional and sub-regional integration, which may have made him
the more determined to succeed this time but within a narrower constitutional
framework. His growing preoccupation with the difficulties of securing
economic integration on a regional scale may also have been reinforced
by his recent experience of the problems of trying to regroup just the
Francophone states of West Africa.
He might have concluded, as we ourselves had done, that inter-
dependence had advanced so far in West Africa that regional structures now
offered the best and perhaps the only chance of success. Instead he proposed
by means of sub-regional organisation to arrive one day at a vast Atlantic
grouping of states whose only rationale was to undermine our own regional
proposals. Hence the emphasis by Senegal, in the 'seventies, on "unity by
stages".
According to the Senegalese Information Minister,
Dr. Daouda Sew, the Senegalese government agreed in
principle to the wider grouping, but felt that it was
better to proceed by stages and first group together
countries in the same cultural areas.
54/
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At the other extreme, there was Senghor's new commitment to
OCAM in the 'seventies and his growing preoccupation with dialogue
and cultural exchange on an inter-continental scale.
Possibly the burden of trying to breathe new
life into the ailing OCAM, to which the Senegalese
President is currently devoting his considerable
political skills may have diverted his attention from
the wider political vision which he himself has so
imaginatively portrayed in the past.
From this vantage point the idea of a continental grouping of Atlantic
states may have seemed more attractive to Senghor than our own West African
proposal, although it was difficult to square this with his continuing
insistence on the obstacles to effective integration at the regional level.
Finally, there was Senghor's life-long commitment, not only to
Francophonie„ but to the related idea of Ettrafrique, which explained
his adherence to the principles of Yaounde and his support for the idea,
which he shared with Houphouft-Boigny, of a free trade area between
Western Europe and Africa. This, in turn, involved the application of
reciprocity in the shape of reverse preferences. Senghor welcomed
Britain's membership of the Common Markets as a prelude to greater cooperation
among African states of different colonial backgrounds and language,and
as forging closer ties between the two continents. But he was much less
happy with Britain's efforts to involve the EEC in the future development
of the Caribbean, Pacific and Asian nations.
56/
Senghor shared our concern to defend the dignity and independence
of the African states but he believed this could only be done in the context
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of inter-dependence between Africa and Europe and saw Nigeria's opposition
to Yaounde as a conscious attempt to subvert that inter-dependence.
Despite his obvious attachment to the liberal principles f inherent in the British
political and legal systems,he remained suspicious of the Anglo-Saxon world
with its wide ranging interests and frequent insensitivity to European and
African aspirations to shape their own future. While his relations with Nigeria
remained correct and cordial he was perhaps too ready to listen to those who,
for their own dubious reasons, attributed motives to our actions that would not
otherwise bear serious examination.
Less concerned than Senghor with global visions, Houphougt-Boigny
would have seen the entry of Britain into the EEC as signalling the need
for a further reappraisal of his country's relations with the English-speaking
African states, beginning with Nigeria which was the largest and most
prosperous. Whatever fears the Ivory Coast may earlier have had About a
Nigerian hegemony within West Africa, its leadership had by 1973 concluded
that its economic future lay in a closer association with all the other West
African states, rather than in splendid isolation or in restricted groupings
of ideologically compatible states. Despite the recent reconciliation
with Houphougt-Boigny, at the end of 1971, Senghor soon found himself defending
theses that were no longer shared by the Ivory Coast, or indeed by the French,
and which left himself and Senegal increasingly isolated within West Africa.
Inter-dependence must begin in Africa 
West African leaders were by now familiar with Senghor's arguments
in favour of closer cooperation between Europe and Africa which involved, among
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other things, the creation of a free trade area linking the two
continents. They were aware too, of his warnings of a possible
contraction in European investment should they continue not only to
press their demands for improved terms of trade but also to insist on
the removal of reciprocity from future agreements with the EEC.
By 1975, however, the great majority were also aware that
inter-dependence between Europe and Africa was by no means confined to
cultural and scientific exchanges, which might be mutually advantageous,
but that, in the all-important economic sphere, it often meant an extreme
and pernicious form of dependency, which worked mainly, if not exclusively,
for the benefit of the former colonial powers. And, like us, they
were now convinced that the best, and perhaps only hope of reversing this
trend was to develop cooperation and inter-dependence among the African
states themselves, beginning at the regional level. This then was our
first priority.
There was no question of Africa turning its back on Europe or
the rest of the world, or of African governments entertaining extravagant
illusions about an early self-sufficiency, or wilfully depressing living
standards in the ruthless pursuit of 'boot-strap' development. Europe
would obviously continue for some time to provide the major markets for
most African products, and would continue to furnish the bulk of our
capital investment and a high proportion of our imports.
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Our aim was not just to modify the terms of trade with
Europe but also to transform the pattern of that trade, by developing
our own industries, diversifying the range of our exports, and reducing
our dependency on European imports to ensure that only essential needs
were provided for in this way, while we would no longer import items
that could eventually be produced or marketed more cheaply and efficiently
in Africa itself. The first and foremost consideration, therefore, was to
explore fully the potential for economic cooperation within Africa and, in
our case, West Africa, rather than perpetuate or even increase our dependency on
others.
Such cooperation was intended, of course, to strengthen our
independence and further our development, both individually and collectively.
There was no question of exchanging one form of dependency for another, or of
accepting the domination, political or economic, of any one West African
state or group of states. Fears of Nigerian hegemony, often disseminated by
our European opponents, were - as I have already tried to show - entirely
groundless. Any attempt to dictate to our prospective partners would have been
self-defeating and counter-productive. By weakening the community as a whole
it would have negated the many other benefits that we, in common with the
other West African states, hoped to derive from the new arrangements.
However, in all successful regional experiments there have always
been some states who, by reason of their situation, experience or resources,
are expected to contribute more than their partners, whether in material
terms or in the supply of administrative skills. Without such a political or
economic core the community as a whole would be the poorer - in dynamism,
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cohesion and sense of direction and purpose. Such states have a
particular contribution to make in the formative stages of the community
and, again, in times of severe crisis and adversity. At all times, however,
cooperation includes a political as well as an economic dimension, and,
to be effective, each and every state must be seen to participate actively
in all stages of the community's development.
Nigeria and Togo were certainly prominent in the movement for
West African economic cooperation after 1970, but had no wish to monopolise
its councils or to claim a disproportionate share of the credit for its
final success. I have already emphasised that ECOWAS was not the work
of any one state or individual leader, but was the outcome of years of
experimentation and much hard and patient effort on the part of many
governments and of leaders from every country within the region - to say
nothing of the invaluable contribution made by agencies such as the
Economic Commission for Africa.
The role of Nigeria and Togo was not to 'invent' the idea of
regional economic cooperation, or to try to impose it on others, but
rather to demonstrate that economic cooperation in West Africa was both
highly desirable and, given the will, perfectly viable. More than that - it
was indispensable! Which seems an appropriate point at which to return
to our account of the events following the meeting of West African Ministers
in Monrovia, in January 1975, and culminating in the Lagos Summit in May
and the formal inauguration of ECOWAS.
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Convening the ECOWAS Summit 
My letter of February, addressed to the other Heads of State,
had suggested alternative dates for the forthcoming Summit in Lagos, and
most of the recipients had already replied by the end of March. I was
particularly moved by the prompt response of Ould Daddah of Mauritania,
and his cordial wishes for the "total success" of the meeting; and by the
letter from President Dawda Jawara, of The Gambia, who articulated so
well the sentiments that motivated all of us.
In accordance with our policy to strengthen the
bonds of friendship with all our neighbours in
Africa and to seek closer and more effective
relations in this region, my Government has always
attached paramount importance to the idea of creating
a West African Economic Community. It is clear to
us that in a world beset by rampant inflation, recession
and the ever deteriorating terms of trade, our economic
emancipation lies in the meaningful regional integration
of our economic, industrial and technological resources.
It gives me great pleasure therefore to offer you my
warmest and sincere congratulations for your initiative
in this great endeavour and for the steadfast and
purposeful way in which you have pursued the matter to a
successful conclusion. It is a source of pride and
satisfaction to all of us that the Second Ministerial
Meeting of ECOWAS in Monrovia in January this year
completed its business with such unprecedented success.
I am confident that the same cordiality, mutual trust
and accommodation will prevail when we meet in Lagos to
set the seal on this great achievement.
All the replies received were positive with the single exception
of that from President Senghor of Senegal, who expressed some reservations
about our proposed meeting, while attempting to introduce some novel
58/ideas at this late stage in the proceedings. - Since the beginning of 1974
Senghor had been conducting an intense diplomatic campaign to persuade the
57/
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Francophone states of Central and Equatorial Africa to lend their
support to his proposed Atlantic grouping of states, to extend from
Mauritania as far as the borders of Angola.
In January 1974, the Senegalese Prime Minister, Abdou Diouf,
had visited Cameroon, while in February it was the turn of Senghor,
himself, to visit the Congolese Republic (Congo-Brazzaville), Gabon and
59/the Central African Republic. - In June of that year the Congolese
Prime Minister was the guest of Senghor, in Dakar, and August saw a
meeting of the OCAM Summit in Bangui, capital of the Central African
Republic.60-/
It was already clear to us, in Nigeria, that few, if any,
of these states wished to be full members of an economic community
which also included the West African countries. As early as 1972 we
had invited two of our eastern neighbours, Cameroon and Chad, to participate
in ECOWAS, but were then advised that, while not wishing to be altogether
excluded from the West African grouping, their main economic interests
lay elsewhere, with the Central African Customs Union (UDEAC) and with the
other states of that region.
Nevertheless, Senghor persisted with his policy right up until
the eve of the Lagos Summit itself. In his reply of March 5, he referred
to my earlier letter of February 12, which had suggested "two dates for the
forthcoming Simmit of Heads of State to study the proposed Community of
West African States" (his emphasis). He continued:
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You know what the attitude of Senegal is as far
as this problem is concerned. We are always ready
to participate in all the meetings convened to
examine this problem, either at the Ministerial
level or Summit level. The serious objection which
we continue to raise is that this Community should be
parallel to that of East Africa and that it should
extend from the North of Mauritania to the South of Zaire.
In the absence of this, it would cut West Africa into two,
whereas if united, this West Africa would constitute
the most powerful Community because it would be the most
populated and the richest, with the most qualified high-level 6;31
manpower in the whole of Africa:.
Senghor indicated in the same letterthathe-could not be in Lagos
at either of the times suggested - as they coincided with an official visit
he was to make to Mexico, which would be followed by a brief stay in the
United States, as guest of the American Writers' Pen Club, when he also
proposed to meet President Ford. He was therefore unable to attend a
West African Summit before May 28 and had inquired from our ambassador if
it would be possible to hold the meeting during the first half of June.
His letter, nevertheless, concluded on a more hopeful note. "If, however,
I cannot be present at the Summit in Lagos, Mr.Abdou Diouf, my Prime Minister,
will replace me accordingly." -
Despite Senghor's evident reservations about the Community and
the problem of agreeing a suitable date for the proposed Summit, we
thought his reply to be quite positive, on balance, considering some of
the statements on ECOWAS attributed to him in the recent past. He had,
after all, taken the trouble to propose alternative dates and had given the
assurance that Senegal would be represented in Lagos, either by himself or by
the Prime Minister. The latter was known to be more conciliatory and less
difficult than Senghor and was likely therefore to raise fewer objections.
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But my relief was shortlived for, in a subsequent letter dated
March 10, 1975, written within a week of the first, President Senghor
had chosen to adopt a very different and more aggressive tone.
I have since learnt from several African Heads of
State that the meeting to which you are inviting
us, at the end of May, was meant not for continuing
the discussion on the CEDEAO /i.e., ECOWAS/, but for
the signature of the draft Treaty.
If that be the case, I could not associate myself
with it. In fact we have expressed, several times and
very frankly, our objections to this plan. Whereas
none of these objections has yet been removed.
It is because I have a great esteem and friendship
for Your Excellency - and I have often had occasion to
say it to some African Heads of State - that I cannot
leave You in any doubt as to Senegal's stand, which has
always been constant in the matter.
At first I was discouraged but, recalling the more positive aspects
of his earlier letter, I hoped, instead, for a more favourable response to
my next communication which was a formal invitation in April 1975 to attend
the ECOWAS Summit on May 26-28. This was delivered to Senghor, personally,
by the Nigerian Commissioner for Information, Mr.Edwin Clark, whose brother,
J.P.Clark, was himself a poet and writer. This apparently enabled the
Commissioner to establish a good rapport with the President as their
discussion ranged over a variety of cultural matters, including the
Festival of Arts and Culture, shortly to be held in Nigeria. Mr.Clark later
reported to me that the impact of the conversation on Senghor was quite
visible and the reply we later received was certainly most satisfactory.
On April 8 / was able to advise the other Heads of State that
the preference of the majority was for the later date, May 26-28,1975, and
cordially invited them to Lagos "for the purpose of considering and signing
63/
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the draft Treaty"	 64/, a copy of which was attached to the letter. -
To expedite proceedings at the Summit, I also proposed a preparatory meeting
of Ministers in Lagos on May 23-24. The letter was conveyed to the
various recipients by two members oftheTederal Executive Council,
Mr. E.K.Clark and Colonel Dan Suleiman (Commissioner. for Special Duties),
each of wham covered half the countries of the region. It achieved the
desired objective as all had replied within a fortnight and the responses
once again, were positive, confirming the widespread, almost universal
support throughout West Africa for our regional initiative.
President Tolbert's reply was couched in quite flattering language:
Liberia has always subscribed to and fostered the
view that the fruits of political independence can
best be enjoyed through economic cooperation on a
multi-national basis. Hence, as for me, my dear
Friend and Brother, I can assure you that I will
be at your side in Lagos as we consider and sign
the aforesaid Treaty, thereby witnessing the birth
of an organisation which we believe will contribute
immensely to the economic emancipation of our sub-region
and our Continent.
Accordingly, we are deeply gratified by the assiduous
and painstaking efforts undertaken by you, my dear Friend
and Brother, and our Brother Pre$1dent Gnassingbe
Eyadema of Togo, for the initiatives you have both
undertaken to advance economic cooperation in our sub-
region and to reactivate the concept of West African
cooperation. We heartily congratulate both of you and
are very appreciative of all your endeavours to ensure
the fullest participation of our Brother Heads of State
and of our sub-region in the forthcoming Lagos Summit ...
We reaffirm, once more ... cooperation and the great cause
of peace, unity, solidarity and progress in our sub-region
and Continent.
Following this letter of April 18 from Africa's oldest independent
state, we received another dated April 23 from the most recent state,
Guinea-Bissau. President Luiz Cabral seemed overwhelmed, perhaps because
65/
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the special envoy, who personally deliitered my letter was the first
representative of Nigeria, and perhaps the first official representative
of a major and important African country, to visit the country which had
only recently been liberated.
It was also with special pride that we were able to
welcome your special envoy at the head of the first
Nigerian delegation which is visiting our country
after its total liberation from colonial domination,
and we made it a point to reaffirm all the fraternal
esteem and admiration of our people and of our country's
freedom fighters for the great brotherly Nigerian people
and for Your Excellency ... who has placed himself in 66/the forefront of fighters for Unity in Africa.
The Deliberations of the CEA° Leaders
Meanwhile we awaited with interest the outcome of the CEA()
Summit, which met in Niamey on April 7-8, 1975 - the first to be held
since the inception of the organisation in April 1973. The CEA() had
continued to experience internal problems, partly the result of Diori's
overthrow in April 1974 by Lieutenant Colonel S.Kountche, which left an
unfortunate vacuum at the top.
The brief but bitter border war between Upper Volta and Mali at
the end of 1974 created even more serious difficulties which the CEAO
states were themselves unable to resolve without external intervention,
by Presidents Eyadema (then Chairman of the Entente), Tour and Boumedienne,
with the assistance of the Secretary-General of the OAU.6 -7/ Once again
a crisis had demonstrated the essential inter-dependence of the region as
a whole. Moreover, because of the war, Malian officials of the CEAO serving
in Ouagadougou, capital of Upper Volta, and headquarters of the sub-regional
organisation, had to be withdrawn, further disrupting the work of the
organisation.
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The April 1975 Summit of the CEAO, from a confidential report,
took a dim view of this action against its officials and, in the final
communique, General Lamizana of Upper Volta was apparently reminded of
"the imperious necessity to respect the diplomatic immunities that protect
officials of the co."EA 	 6E1/ This seems to have appeased President Traoz4
of Mali, who had otherwise threatened to disrupt the proceedings and
apparently refused to speak to Lamizana throughout the conference. For
Lamizana, however, it amounted to a severe rebuff, particularly as he was
not allowed to consult his ministers and experts before the communique was
published.
The conference did, on the other hand, afford a kind of indirect
recognition of Kountch‘'s leadership of Niger, despite the affinity of
many of the Francophone leaders with the former Niger president. And
there were some achievements, albeit of form rather than of substance,
including a decision on the date of application of the regional cooperation
tax and agreement on the size of the Communal Development Fund for the year
1976.
Our concern, however, was not with the internal organisation of
the CEAO and its private deliberations but rather with the approaching
Summit in Lagos, to which all Francophone leaders in the region had been
invited. There was still some uncertainty about Senghor's attitude to
ECOWAS and his likely tactics at the Lagos conference, although it was
increasingly improbable that he himself would attend and personally sanction
the formation of the new 	 We were convinced, however, that the great
majority of Francophone leaders would in any case participate in the Summit
and sign the ECOWAS Treaty. But there would certainly be an attempt at
Niamey to harmonise their views and concert their tactics before the Lagos
meeting.
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Already the Secretariat of the CEA() had prepared a report entitled "A
Critical Examination of the Draft Treaty of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS)", for consideration by the Council of Ministers of the
6791CEAO states prior to the Niamey Summit. - 	 That document was largely critical
of the proposed ECOWAS Treaty, comparing it unfavourably in many respects - and
in our view unfairly - with the Treaty of the CEAO. It did concede that
the principles and objectives of the two organisations, as set out in their
respective Treaties, were very similar. But it went on to insist at some
length that "this resemblance does not extend to the means of implementing them."
Much of the report, then, was taken up with complaints about the
"silence" of our draft Treaty concerning the regulations and procedures by
which we hoped to be able to realise our objectives, giving "the impression
that the document rather resembles a series of declarations of intent."
However, the authors had ignored the fact that our Treaty, establishing the
West African economic grouping, would be supplemented by a series of
Protocols which, because of lack of time and innumerable other difficulties,
aggravated by our insistence on the fullest possible consultation with all
fifteen countries involved, would not be finalised before the Treaty itself
was signed in May.
Our procedure therefore differed markedly from that used by the
Francophone countries in adopting the CEA() Treaty in April 1973. The -final
signature of that document had been repeatedly postponed following a
protracted debate over the details of its implementation - a debate which
had also revealed the full extent of the divisions within the relatively
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small Francophone-community. We had opted instead to circulate in
advance the various working papers that might later serve as a basis
of discussion before the Protocols were finally approved.
It had been our original intention to submit both the Treaty
and the accompanying Protocols for the approval of the Heads of State at
the inaugural Summit. But, as the latter were not yet in their final
form, and as most states in the region seemed anxious to proceed to the
creation of the new community in the shortest possible time, we preferred
to concentrate on getting approval for the Treaty itself in Lagos, with the
details of its implementation to be settled later.
Ours, in any case, was a much larger and more complex undertaking
than the CEAO. Even if there had been sufficient time available, there
was a strong case for deferring consideration of the detailed procedures
that would govern ECOWAS until agreement was reached on the principles
and objectives of the organisation, its membership and composition, and
its formal structures and constitution. We would then also be in a
position to benefit from the experience and recommendations of the various
bodies that would administer ECOWAS and from the advice of those who would
be responsible for implementing its decisions.
Other criticisms in the CEA° report concerned the provisions
made in the ECOWAS Treaty for the poorer states of the region, which were
apparently considered inadequate, the level of integration that we were
likely to achieve, which was held to be insufficient, and a presumed bias
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in favour of political cooperation and expanded trade rather than
economic integration in the full sense of the term. With an eye to the
poorer and landlocked states, the report claimed that in ECOWAS
The political and commercial aspects appear to be
preponderant while the development aspect, which
remains the prerogative of any formula of integration
and of development is relegated to second place, not to
say neglected. The advantages to be had by the States
and notably the least favoured ones, do not clearly
appear in this Draft Treaty and very often they are only
sketched in.
Further provisions of our Treaty that might have
benefited the poorer states were dismissed in much the
same summary fashion. Thus the references to freedom of
movement and residence within the proposed community, which
were similar to those already in the CEA() Treaty, were said
to give "the impression that the political aspect prevails
in the organisation"; while the prospect, under Article 18,
of "quantitative restrictions on goods produced in the
Community", again raised the question whether "the aim
sought is economic unity or a political federation."
Proposals for the development and harmonisation of
industries, under Chapter V, were dismissed as "a pure
declaration of intention for no means, no mechanism has been
envisaged that can oblige member states to put such arrangements
into practice." The quite unjustified conclusion of the
authors was that "one could believe that the member states are
not animated by the desire for cooperation and especially for
economic integration."....
The report noted the absence from the Treaty, itself,of any
specific community structures charged with promoting the exploitation
of natural resources, although here the principle of cooperation was
"clearly expressed". Once again, the ECOWAS Treaty was said to compare
unfavourably with the more detailed provisions of the CEAO document. As
for the harmonisation of economic and fiscal policies, the report commented
on the similarity between the Compensation and Development Fund set out in
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our Treaty and the CEAO's own Communal Development Fund, both drawing
on the experience of other, similar bodies. But our draft Treaty was once
more criticised for lack of detail regarding the scale of contributions
by member states and the operation and management of the Fund. "Who will
be the organiser and where will the fund be deposited?'
The report also predicted difficulties for ECOWAS with regard
to the future harmonisation of monetary policy within the community:
Which of course is the ultimate phase of an
integration and economic cooperation formula,
but it is also the stumbling block because a
monetary policy remains, at all times, one of
the fundamental attributes of national sovereignty
which the States will hardly part with.
It concluded that "the means of reaching this goal as defined by this
Treaty is far from being operational and lacks conviction." There was no
reference, however, to the fact that CEAO members had, under the terms
of the Franc Zone and the West African Monetary Union, long since abdicated
effective control of their own monetary policy. We, for our part, were
attempting to restore fiscal and monetary powers to the West African states
themselves acting through the new community institutions.
The report also wanted more powers for the new supra-national
institutions so that they could provide "directives and /Impart] some
kind of impulsion to the grouping"; although with a certain lack of consistency,
the authors had already complained - and rightly- of the problems involved
70/
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in attempting to persuade governments to delegate any of their responsibility
for determining policy. Some scepticism was expressed about the procedures
set out in our Treaty for achieving the elimination of tariff barriers
and a common external tariff for the region as a whole within the stipulated
period of fifteen years.
There were reservations in the report about the "rules of origin"
that would govern products to be exchanged within the Community, while it
was claimed that there were no specific procedures for dealing with "the
eventual imbalance" that must result from such exchanges. Finally the
report noted that there was provision in the Treaty for member states to
receive compensation for "loss of rights" or revenues as a result of
community decisions, but complained that there was no indication of the
basis on which such compensation would be calculated, or the interval
that would elapse before it was paid.
The conclusion of the report, prepared for the CEA° Secretariat
by an ad hoc committee of 'experts', was that:
"The ECOWAS Treaty, short of some details, comes
close to that of the UDEAO (The Customs Union of
West African States), i.e. a stage which the present
members of the CEA() had wanted to surpass in order
to launch themselves into an era of harmonised
economic development giving the less favoured
states all the opportunity to lift themselves to a
more advanced level. There is also the fact that
several contradictions exist in the text and one
wonders whether this is due to translation: or if,
rather, the Treaty is meant to be ambiguous. Finally,
it must be emphasised that the main concern does not
appear to be economic promotion of member states but71/
%—more justly, a political and customs association.
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Despite these conclusions and the very positive impression which the
report conveyed about the level of economic integration already achieved
within the CEAO, the Francophone states themselves appeared to believe that
ECOWAS had something to offer now and even greater potential in the future.
Senghor's Objections Overcome 
Our first real indication of the attitude of the Francophone leaders,
in conference in Niamey, came when I was advised that the above-mentioned
report, which was originally to have been presented to the CEA° Council of
Ministers for transmission to the Heads of State, had been withdrawn following
the objections of the Togolese observer, who also seems to have had support
from Dahomey, likewise represented by an observer, and from Niger. And at the
Summit, itself, it was interesting to note that other Francophone leaders,
notably President Seyni Kountchg
 of Niger - in keeping with that country's
previousl well-known stand - impressed upon the Senegalese leader the necessity
for joining ECOWAS, en bloc, while persisting with the CEAO.
Senghor, who was elected Chairman of the CEAO at Niamey, attempted
yet again to convince his Francophone colleagues to stay away from the Lagos
Summit. Rather surprisingly, he remarked that Senegal would have been advised
not to have been represented at the Monrovia meeting of West African Ministers,
in January, when their delegate had uncritically endorsed each and every
decision taken by his colleagues. Even more astonishing was the Sengalese
President's claim that it was only after his arrival in Niamey
 that he had
discovered that the real purpose of the Lagos conference was the Ceremonial
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signing of the draft ECOWAS Treaty, and that there would therefore be
little scope for further discussion about the nature and composition of
the proposed community. He therefore proposed to be absent from the
proceedings.
Senghor's opposition seemed now to be based partly on practical
economic grounds - the inconvertibility of currencies between CEAO members
and other countries in the region - and partly on political ones : the
ECOWAS would be an instrument for the domination of the smaller countries
by the larger ones, notably Nigeria. He revealed that he had approached
President Mobutu of Zaire about the possible inclusion of that large
African state in an expanded Atlantic community, but Mobutu had declined
to join a West African grouping for fear his country would be swallowed
72/
up by Nigeria. -
Although he wasnow Chairman of the CEAO, Senghor was increasingly
isolated within that organisation on the issue of joining ECOWAS. The
final communique emanating from Niamey at the conclusion of the Francophone
conference, was a clear and fairly unequivocal expression of support not
only for the CEA° but also for a West African regional grouping.
.... the Heads of State, conscious of the progress made
by the CEAO, reaffirmed their faith in its future, their
determination to make it an efficient instrument of
balanced development of the sub-region, of solidarity
and shared happiness. Also the Conference drew up
measures whose application will place the Organisation in
its operational phase....
... the Heads of State solemnly proclaim their desire to
achieve, with all Heads of State of the region, a
vast Community of West Africa based on effective
solidarity among the peoples and on a harmonised and
evenly distributed development. 73/
By the end of the CEAO Summit, therefore, Senghor had apparently
been prevailed upon to modify his views so far as to agree to attend the
forthcoming Lagos Summit, either in person or by means of a representative,
and was authorised to approach Eyadema and myself, indirectly, to ask for
the meeting to be postponed until June when he would be in a position to attend.
In reply to my earlier invitation of April 8, to attend the Lagos
Summit of ECOWAS on May 26-28, Senghor, in his new capacity as Chairman of
the CEAO, despatched the following reply dated April 21.
Mr. President and Dear Brother,
I received Your letter of 8th April 1975 .which
Your personal representative delivered to me.
In my capacity as current Chairman of the West
African Economic Community ItEA07, I am informing
You that we have all decided to respond to Your
invitation to assemble in Lagos during the second
half of the month of May. By a telegramme to the
other five Heads of State of the CEAO dated today,
I am apprising them of the dates of the Ministerial
Conference and the Summit Conference.
However, I must emphasise the following : If we
agree on the principle of an Economic Community of
West Africa which would include English-speaking,
French-speaking, Portuguese-speaking and Spanish-speaking
elements, we think that the legal texts on which it will
be based,should be discussed at length, for as You know,
it is a complex problem.
It is therefore not certain that we can sign in
May 1975, the Draft Treaty which You submitted to us.
Besides, as I had mentioned in one of my previous
letters, I will be in the Americas in the second half of
the month of May ... It means that I shall not be able to
participate in the conference of Heads of State which is
being held in Lagos from 26th to 28th May. However, this
will not be a great disadvantage, since I will be represented
by Mr. Abdou Diouf, my Prime Minister, who is more competent 74/
than I in economic matters.
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Democrat that he is, President Senghor had in the end to
accede to the deeply felt and vocal wishes of his other colleagues in the
CEAO. The reservations that he now expressed in this most recent letter
were largely procedural, namely the inclusion of Portuguese and Spanish
among the official languages of the proposed community which would entail
substantial paper work and translation and would occasion considerable further
delay. Portuguese-speaking Guinea-Bissau only became independent after the
Lisbon coup of April 25, 1974, while the apparent reference to Spanish-speaking
Fernando-Po related to Senghor's concept of an Atlantic Community of African
States, rather than our own more modest but more clearly delineated West
African regional grouping.
The substance of Senghor's letter reflected the earlier decision
of the CEA° leaders to attend our Summit in Lagos; in place of the more
sweeping objections that he had previously raised, the Senegalese President
seemed now to be asking whether we could delay the Lagos meeting so that
he could attend in person - failing which he would send Mr.Diouf. It was
impossible, however, for us to postpone the meeting at this late stage, when
practically every other leader in the region had indicated support for the
proposed date. We had to consider the inevitable disruption that would
result. And there was the risk of a possible crisis should Senghor attend
and persist with his opposition to the scheme, pursuing diversionary tactics,
such as his incorporation of Zaire and other Central African states within
the scope of a West African Economic Community. Besides, it was quite clear
from the Niamey meeting of the CEA° in April that on this issue Senghor was
isolated among the Francophone leaders, not always able to rely even on the
•support of his most recent comrade-in-arms, Houphouat-Boigny.
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Any misgivings I may have had about Senghor's request for a Summit
in June rather than May were removed by comments made after the Niamey meeting -
in his new capacity of Chairman of the CEAO. Outlining his future proposals
for the CEA() he had then indicated that:
sled he would ensure that all the structures of
the secretariat are in place, and that the Council
of Ministers would meet more often so as to prepare their
meeting with other African states, not only of the sub-
region but of the region as a whole, since our brothers
in Nigeria and Togo have proposed that we participate
in a larger community. But at the moment, the Wimistems
of Finance and of Economic Affairs should meet in Dakar
to harmonise their points of view for the Lagos Conference.
As the delegates of the West African countries had already gone to Lome
in December 1973, Accra in March 1974, and Monrovia in January 1975, for the
express purpose of harmonising their views, it was difficult to see what
positive contribution could be made by the proposed Dakar meeting. Despite
Senghor's latest assurances, therefore, I could see little advantage in
delaying our long-awaited Summit, particularly as, on this subject, the
Senegalese Prime Minister was reported to be less intractable than his leader.
I was due to attend the Commonwealth Conference in Kingston, Jamaica,
from April 29 until May 6,1975, which would be followed by a number of
state and official visits to various Caribbean countries. Fortunately,
my aircraft was due to refuel at Dakar, en route for Jamaica, and I was
therefore able to see President Senghor on April 28 to discuss his latest
letter and the issues raised therein. From our discussions, which were cordial,
it was soon evident that our viewpoints were not all that dissimilar. Recognising
75/
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the importance of the issues to be discussed at Lagos, Senghor wanted a
full and open debate, while we, for our part, had consistently favoured
a thorough exchange of views as the only means of reaching a viable consensus.
Senghor intimated that he would come to Lagos if the conference could be
delayed but that otherwise his country would be represented by the Prime
Minister. I expressed regret that Senghor might not be able to attend the
Summit in person, but outlined the difficulties involved in trying to postpone
the meeting, and expressed considerable satisfaction that Senegal would
nevertheless be represented.
The matter of the Summit and its timing was now almost settled.
In Jamaica I was able to meet the leaders of three other prospective
ECOWAS members, Ghana, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. We were agreed that
ECOWAS must in the event succeed and took the opportunity to review developments
in the region and to prepare our strategy for the Lagos Summit. Meanwhile,
before leaving Nigeria, I had issued instructions concerning the detailed
arrangements to be made for the forthcoming meetings. And, on May 6, while
abroad, I was thus able to approve, sign and despatch individual letters to
all the countries in West Africa, thanking their leaders for the cordial
reception they had accorded my envoys and the warm hospitality that had been
extended to them. I was also able to confirm the dates of the Summit meeting
when the proposed Treaty for ECOWAS would be considered and signed.
The Summit, itself, was scheduled for May 26-28,1975, to be
preceded by the Ministerial Meeting on May 23-24. With the letter I enclosed
a provisional programme, stressing that the final arrangements would have to
be considered and approved by the Heads of State themselves, meeting on May 26.
77/
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76/I also asked for details of their time of arrival and entourage. -
For Presidents Houphoutit-Boigny and Senghor, who still found the dates of the
meeting inconvenient and who wanted a postponement until June, I dictated
a special letter regretting that it was not possible to change times that had
been accepted by a majority of the leaders. This letter was then entrusted
to the same envoy as before who was given additional verbal instructions.
The relevant paragraphs read as follows:
In response to Your Excellency's wish, my Government
has examined the possibility of postponing the meeting
till early June, but we have discovered that arrangements
have reached such an advanced stage that the dates of the
meeting cannot now
	 changed without causing inconvenience
to our Brother Heads of State who have expressed their
agreement to the dates proposed.
I would also like to inform you that since the visit
of my Envoy to your country, I have heard from His
Excellency President Leopold Sedar Senghcr of Senegal,
with whom I have in fact been in touch. President Senghor
has indicated that his prior commitments, which he cannot
now conveniently set aside, would render it difficult for him
to attend the meeting before the 28th of May, 1975. I have
been assured, however, that if President Senghor is unable to
attend personally, he would be represented by the Prime Minister
of Senegal and other members of his Government.
I was also able to assure the President of Upper Volta, General
Lamizana, that Senegal would participate at the Summit in Lagos and at the
preparatory meetings of Ministers and officials.
It is my fervent hope that if further developments in
your programme of engagements favour it, it will be
possible for Your Excellency to attend the meeting of
Heads of State personally, and to send representatives
to the preparatory meetings of Ministers.
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In the case of President Senghor, I added expressions of my regret that
he would not be with us in Lagos.
.. at this important meeting of the Heads of State
of our sub—region. We will very much miss your wide
experience and wisdom in our deliberations in our
consideration of these most important proposals for our
region of Africa. While, however, regretting the fact
that Your Excellency will not be able to attend this
meeting personally, at the time proposed, we are much
gratified to learn that you will probably be represented
at the meeting by your distinguished Prime Minister and
other members of your Government. We will welcome him
to the meeting as your personal representative and as
Prime Minister of Senegal.
After these letters were despatched I continued with my state
and official visits to Caribbean states, namely Barbados, the Bahamas and
Guyana, before returning home via Anguilla and Monrovia, Liberia. By the
time I reached Nigeria on May 16, most countries had replied in the
affirmative to our invitation to the ECOWAS Summit. President Tolbert of
Liberia, whose brother, the Finance Minister, Stephen Tolbert, had been killed
in an air crash. as recently as May 11, was, most surprisingly but fortunately,
able to confirm that he would breach the period of mourning customary in his
country to be with us.
I had decided in keeping with our African tradition,
to remain on the mat for forty days. But taking
everything into consideration and especially in
pursuance of our commitment to serve, and, if necessary,
even die for the cause of Africa, I have reached a decision
to attend the Summit Meeting so as to be by your side
during that historic occasion.
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Such was the strong sense of commitment to the ECOWAS ideal among the
leaders and governments of the region.
There was an equally enthusiastic reply from neighbouring Guinea which,
like Liberia, had a long and active tradition of support for regional and
African cooperation. The fact that Guinea, unlike Liberia, favoured 'socialist'
economic policies showed the ability of ECOWAS to reconcile divergent political
traditions and to subordinate ideological considerations to the well-being
of the region and Africa as a whole.
The Republic of Guinea which, right from birth, has
always worked for the formation of a Regional Grouping
and an African Common Market, both of them resolutely
anti-imperialist and anti-neocolonialist and seeking
to realise the indispensable dignity and happiness of our
Peoples...
Our own Federal Executive Council met in the week following
my return to Nigeria and approved the memorandum submitted by the
Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction, requesting authority
to make the necessary administrative arrangements for the Summit and Ministerial
meetings, and to expend such moneys as might be required. Most important,
the Council
(1) Noted that the Four-Nation Committee appointed by
the Second Ministerial Meeting in Monrovia to finalise
the Treaty on the Economic Community of West African States
for its presentation to the Conference of Heads of State had
completed its work.
(2) Noted that fourteen Heads of State in the West African
sub-region had been invited to a meeting of Heads of State
and Government holding in Lagos on the 26th to the 29th
of May, 1975 ...
(6) Approved the Treaty of the Economic Community of
West African States and mandated the Head of the Federal
Military Government to sign it at the meeting mentioned in
(2) above.
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(7) Authorised the Attorney-General of the
Federation to prepare the Instrument of Ratification
for signature of the Head of the Federal Military
Government without further reference to Council.
Before the Treaty could be ratified, however, it had first to be
approved, which was the purpose of the Ministerial and Summit meetings soon
to convene in Lagos. Those meetings will themselves be the subject of the
next chapter and will be followed by accounts of the establishment of
ECOWAS; its institutions, their siting and delegation of the personnel
who would be responsible for their smooth operation; and preparation of
the various protocols, whose successful implementation would largely
determine the ability of ECOWAS to achieve its main objectives.
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CHAPTER 10
SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF THE ECOWAS TREATY 
THE LAGOS SUMMIT
It is my aim in this chapter to provide an account of the
Ministerial and Summit meetings that took place in Lagos during May 1975,
whose outcome was the signing of the Draft Treaty of the proposed Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). While much of the preparatory
work had already been completed, before the Summit, either by the Niqeria-Toqo
joint working party, or by the various meetings of ministers and experts,
or as a result of innumerable talks and discussions with and among the
various West African leaders, the Lagos meetings themselves were no mere
formality.
The Senegalese attitude had still to be clarified and we were
by no means sure of the approach some other Francophone states would adopt.
Although there seemed every likelihood that the Community would shortly
become a reality, much had still to be decided, including the protocols,
the terms of reference of the community institutions and their personnel.
It seemed to us best, however, to try to differentiate between these issues
and the main business of the conference, which was the creation of ECOWAS : the
signing of the Treaty and its early ratification, shortly afterwards, by the
required number of states. But we had yet to convince all of our colleagues
of the wisdom of this strategy.
On this matter at least the recommendations of the Ministers,
following their short meeting in Lagos, were not far from our own point of
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view. Nevertheless, previous gatherings of African leaders had more than
once declined to accept the advice of their Ministers. The proceedings
of the Summit were to that extent unpredictable and therefore extremely
important. The speeches themselves provided a useful indication of the
preoccupations of individual leaders and gave some idea of the wide range
of views and sometimes conflicting priorities that would have to be
reconciled if the future of the community was to be assured. Meanwhile
much valuable work in this direction was accomplished at the innumerable
private meetings and informal deliberations that always accompany such
conferences in Africa and elsewhere.
In our conclusion to the chapter we have tried, therefore, to
review the more important developments in Lagos from May 23 until May 28,1975,
and to focus on their likely significance for ECOWAS.
Third Meeting of West African Ministers 
Ministers of the fifteen West African States had arrived in
Lagos by Thursday,May 22 and met the next day at the Nigerian Institute
of International Affairs, in order to prepare the Agenda for the Summit
Meeting of Heads of State. Meeting under the current Chairman, Hon.Mr.Franklin
Neal, Minister of Planning and Economy in the Liberian Government, Ministers
proceeded to the election of the new Bureau that would be responsible for the
1/
subsequent conduct of the conference. -
The Nigerian Commissioner for Economic Development and
Reconstruction, Dr. Adebayo Adedeji, was unanimously elected the new
Chairman with the Upper Volta Minister of Finance, Colonel Tiemoko Marc
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Garango as Vice-Chairman. Dr. Adedeji would prove an astute Chairman in
the sometimes difficult discussions that followed while his constant colleague
in the preparation and planning of the proposed West African economic grouping,
Mr. Edem Kodjo, the Togolese Minister of Finance and Economy, was rightly
elected Rapporteur.
The real business of the conference then began with an opening
address by the new Chairman. After welcoming his colleagues to Lagos,
Dr Adedeji proceeded to review the history and development of the proposed
Economic Community of West African States, pointing out that on the
direction of the Heads of State', Ministers and experts had been meeting
cver a period of almost three years in order to prepare a Draft Treaty for
consideration by their Heads of State. When approved and implemented it
would represent the realisation of their aspirations for a regional community
that would transcend language and other artificial barriers to inter-state
cooperation.
Afterwards the Ministers continued and completed their deliberations
on the Draft Treaty itself. Much of the preparatory work of harmonising
the French and English texts had already been undertaken and finished by
a special committee of experts set up at the previous Monrovia meeting,
with representatives from two French and two English speaking countries
Dahomey (Benin) and Togo on the one hand, Liberia and Nigeria on the other.
Several amendments to the draft were nevertheless proposed and finally
approved by the Ministers. For the most part they arose from criticisms
of the draft made earlier by the Secretariat of the CEAO, after a
comparison of the treaties of the two organisations.
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For reasons that I have explained, the Protocols that would
later be embodied in the Draft Treaty, were not yet ready for presentation
and discussion, let alone approval. That would require at least a further
six to twelve months. There was an attempt at the meeting of Ministers,
however, to defer approval of the Treaty until the Protocols themselves
had been completed, when both could be considered together. Nigeria and
Togo and the great majority of the countries represented were strongly
opposed to any such delay which could only imperil the future of the
enterprise, and our resistance proved successful in the end.
Some four amendments were carried, one effect of which was to
relegate some of the more complex and contentious provisions of the draft
to "the Protocols which shall be annexed and which shall form an integral
part of the Treaty". A fifth amendment which provoked a lively debate
until finally approved, provided in particular that:
This Treaty and the Protocols which shall be
annexed and which shall form an integral part
of the Treaty shall respectively enter into force
provisionally upon the signature of Heads of State
and Government and definitively upon ratification
by seven signatory states in accordance with the
constitutional procedures applicable for each signatory 2/
state.
Which did at least ensure that the Treaty could take independent effect,
in the temporary absence of the protocols and also pending ratification
by the required number of states. Other, less sympathetic amendments were
rejected and the meeting concluded by approving the provisional agenda
for the Summit and sUbmitting various recommendations for consideration by
the Heads of State.
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The Ministers determined that it should be left to the Summit
to decide which government would act as repository for the Instruments of
Accession, once these.had been signed by member states as provided
for in Article 62. That same government would also be responsible for
"the provisional implementation of the Treaty between its signing and the
first meeting of the Authority." -
While the Ministers could not themselves fix a time-table for
ratification, "they nevertheless urged Member States to ratify the Treaty
as soon as possible." The inaugural meeting of the Council of Ministers,
to be set up under Article 61 of the Treaty, would be held within two
months of the Treaty coming into force. It would make "the necessary
arrangements for the various protocols and also ... set up various institutions
in accordance with the Treaty." Countries which had not by then ratified
the Treaty would nevertheless be invited to attend the meeting. -
It was also agreed "that international organisations such as
Lthe7 Economic Commission for Africa should render assistance to the new
Community in preparing the Protocols and carrying out the other studies
incidental to its implementation." Finally, the Ministers advised the
Heads of State that:
... importance should be attached to the drawing
up of the protocols which should be given top
priority by the Executive Secretariat of the Community.
When those protocols are prepared and are submitted to
the Council of Ministers for consideration, those countries
in the region that have not yet ratified the Treaty should
be invited to participate at the meeting-at which the
protocols will be considered.
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The meeting of Ministers concluded with an expression of
their commitment to and optimism concerning the success of the proposed
regional community. Those present were aware that this would be
Dr. Adedeji's last official assignment before taking up his new appointment
as Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). They
therefore expressed the warmest appreciation "for the pioneering work
he had done in the evolution of the Community and urged him to continue
to show interest in the growth of the Community to full maturity."
Replying, Dr. Adedeji was able to reassure his colleagues of "the unflinching
interest of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria in the Community." -6/
Preliminary Meeting of Leaders 
It only remained for the first Summit of the West African
leaders to consider the recommendations of the Ministers and sign the
Treaty establishing ECOWAS. By Monday, May 26, 1975, all had arrived in
Lagos and to ensure they were agreed about the programme for the conference
and the way that it would approach its task I decided to hold a preliminary
and informal meeting of leaders, that same evening. I was still uncertain
of the attitude of some of the leaders and plenipotentiaries and, while
not wishing in any way to abridge the subsequent debate, I was anxious that the
Summit should proceed without interruption to its main business and was
therefore prepared to anticipate and, if possible resolve, some of the more
delicate questions that might arise.
3i"?
At our informal gathering I was most gratified to see no
less than eleven countries represented by the Head of State, one (Mali)
by a Vice-President, two (Guinea and Senegal) by Prime Ministers and one
/(Ghana) by a Commissioner of Economic Planning. 7- It was the first
time in my experience that such a gathering had assembled in West Africa
and the list of those attending is eloquent testimony of the extent of
support for ECOWAS.
After a brief welcome, the programme of activities and the
provisional agenda were discussed and had little difficulty reaching
agreement on both, with only very minor alterations. As host and chairman
it was to be my privilege to make the opening speech of the Summit, with
Presidents Eyadema of Togo, and Tolbert of Liberia responding. It was also
agreed that, at the end of our formal deliberations, I should make the
closing remarks, while one French and one English speaking Head of State
would again respond. In the event, Presidents Houphoudt-Boigny of the
Ivory Coast and Dr.Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone were duly nominated for
the task. Mr. Luiz Cabral, as Chairman of the Council of State of
Guinea-Bissau, the newest state in our region, was invited to reply to my
own short address that would be given at the banquet in honour of the visiting
8/delegations. -
With these details settled, we then turned briefly to discuss
the Senegalese stand on "the geographical definition of West Africa".
They wanted the community to encompass additional African states, further
to the East and Southwards along the Atlantic, including the Central African
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countries and Zaire. The issue was a potentially divisive one and, in
my own view, did not merit the attention it might otherwise receive.
Having recently met the leaders of Chad, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, I
was able to assure the West African Heads of State that, while wishing us
every success, they had no wish whatever to be part of our proposed
community. As for Zaire, it was clear from that government's many public
pronouncements that it was trying to create a separate economic community
within Central Africa, perhaps linking up with East Africa, but with Zaire
as the focal point.
I was convinced, moreover, that only an issue of fundamental
principle could be allowed to delay the launching of ECOWAS. What was
in debate was not ECOWAS itself, or its present composition, but the
limits of its future membership. If the Senegalese merely wanted the
door left open for other members to join then that was quite in keeping
with out own long-term objective of an African Common Market. It was
probable that the success of ECOWAS would one day attract other applicants
for membership, just as Britain, Ireland and Denmark had recently entered
the EEC. It was therefore agreed that the final communique should contain
an explicit provision whereby other African countries might be admitted
/to ECOWAS. 9-
After the vexed question of the protocols, which had yet to
be drafted and whose consideration had therefore to be deferred to a later
date, and the equally problematic issue of the membership of ECOWAS, which
had been resolved in our favour, partly as a result of the negative attitude
of the Central and Equatorial African leaders themselves - there remained
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the delicate matter of the community's institutions, their location
within West Africa, and the nomination and appointment of their officials.
While ready to listen to the views and representations of each
and every government of the region, it was our contention that the first
priority of this, necessarily short Summit, should be the creation of ECOWAS
and the signing of the draft Treaty. The future structures of the Community
and their staffing, however, important and relevant, mere matters that
could more appropriately be considered at a second Summit, which could have
more time at its disposal as well as the advice and recommendations of the
Council of Ministers. The leaders could then review and approve the
institutions and their personnel together with the protocols that would
define and regulate their future operation.
Hence the inclusion of a second Summit as an item on the provisional
agenda which the leaders were now asked to approve, since we would have, at
some point in the conference, to consider both the date and place of the
next meeting. This procedure was approved without difficulty, as was the
suggestion that Nigeria should be the country to receive the instruments
10/
of ratification of the Treaty establishing ECOWAS. -
Throughout the informal meeting, which lasted only an hour and
a half, there was an exceptional degree of cooperation and understanding on
the part of all the leaders and plenipotentiaries, and agreement was quickly
reached on all the matters discussed. Closing the preliminary session I
called on those present to display the same fraternal spirit at our meeting
the following day so that we might successfully complete our deliberations and
on schedule.
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The Summit Opens 
On Tuesday, May 27,1975, the Summit was officially opened at
the Federal Palace Hotel, Lagos, with myself in the Chair. It considered
and adopted the report of the Second Ministerial Meeting in Monrovia,
Liberia, as amended by the Third Meeting of Ministers assembled in Lagos
on May 23-26. The provisional agenda, already discussed the previous
evening, was likewise approved.
In my opening speech, I took the opportunity, on behalf of Nigeria,
to welcome all the participants and visitors to this historic conference
and hoped that their deliberations would set West Africa firmly on the road
to the fulfilment of the common aspirations of all countries in the region
11/
for greater and more effective cooperation. - Such efforts at cooperation
would contribute not only to cohesion and prosperity in the region but
also to a more progressive and equally prosperous African continent. I
pointed out that, despite all the obstacles encountared,theSummit was the
culmination of persistent efforts by leaders of all countries in West Africa,
past and present, to form a larger economic grouping.
The Governments of this Vegion7 have met, sometimes
in smaller or larger numbers, sometimes with representatives
from all countries in the area. They have met in various
capitals sometimes at the level of Heads of State, sometimes
at the level of Ministers or experts. The most significant
fact is that in spite of what appeared to be discouraging
and even insurmountable obstacles, we have moved along the
hard and difficult road to our gathering here today.
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Nor were we alone in our action which was "in-conformity
with the trends which govern the relations of closely connected countries
in various regions and various parts of the world." Even the most developed
and industrialised nations were themselves forging closer bonds of practical
cooperation through larger economic units. The recent Lome Convention
with the EEC was an example of the "mutually advantageous terms" that
could be obtained "by a united group of nations from diverse parts of the
earth, comprising African, Pacific and Caribbean countries."
The need for economic cooperation in Africa was the more
urgent as we had sixteen of the twenty-five countries classified by the
United Nations as the least developed in the world. Only economic cooperation
would hasten the development of our respective countries and of Africa
as a whole. Whatever the initial difficulties, "we must be united in our
determination to succeed."
The potential benefits to be derived from economic cooperation
were a matter of common knowledge.
We cannot give a boost to inter-African trade,
which is at present infinitesimal in global terms,
unless we create bigger markets to allow viable and
optimum utilization and allocation of our resources.
There was also the problem of ensuring that goods produced locally in our
own countries were given preference over foreign goods "produced by the most
modern cost-saving equipment and machineries." An economic community would
not only accelerate intra-African trade but would also create more job
opportunities among all our peoples. "It will be a base on which to build a
prosperous and vigorous export trade beyond our own regional frontiers."
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No country today, whether developed or developing, could
escape from the reality of economic inter-dependence. Hence "the universal
trend towards some form of regional economic cooperation and United Nations'
support and encouragement for that worthy objective." But we must also be
pragmatic and flexible in our approach; pursue objectives "capable of
early realisation", and adopt "an open-door policy" that would enable all
countries in the region to become members. Arrangements that had proved
admirable in the sophisticated economies of the industrialised world were
not necessarily those best suited to our own peculiar circumstances.
Our economic community would be a living organism "evolving in
its own unique way and growing over the years."
Pragmatism is, indeed, a word enshrined in the treaty.
By providing a flexible and working instrument able to
accommodate all our differences, our doubts, and our
reservations, we believe that the treaty has attempted
to come to terms with the realities of our Zegiot7.
The treaty, for example, took account of the attempts currently
being made within the region "to establish tariff preferential zones
or economic unions for the mutual benefit of all the participating countries."
The draft treaty takes account of these developments
and guarantees their organisational growth, provided
such growth does not impede the success of this
momentous and exciting adventure on which we are now
embarked.
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I concluded by appealing for "cooperation and understanding"
among member states to assist in the realisation of the community's
objectives and hoped that ECOWAS would be "a step towards greater economic
integration and cooperation in areas neighbouring to West Africa, and in
the continent as a whole."
Indeed, this should be our goal, although prudence
and practical realities dictate that the movement
towards this ideal must be gradual in order to achieve
success.
General Eyadema responded by pointing out that:_
...shortly after our independences and while everybody
was still under the spell of the euphoria of recovered
freedom, it became clearly evident that the survival of
our new nations, their affirmation in the international
field, their capability to be organised into viable and
reliable groupings would partly depend on their ability
to take up quickly their major challenge : to win the
12/battle against economic underdevelopment.
Whatever "the differences in approach, even in conception which appeared
in the process of economic integration in our region ... actually the goal aimed
at was everywhere the same." It was to create a vast community of interests
which would transcend the obsolete colonial legacy and cut across geographical
and language barriers in order to generate material and moral advantages
and ensure a better future in West Africa.
He called on member states to cooperate "in a harmonious
development of the economies of our countries" in a region where "smaller
states can co-exist within a coherent grouping with bigger states, without
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sacrificing anything of their legitimate interests." He advocated
tolerance and broad-mindednessintheconmmunity where no one would be
able to convince the other by trying to impose his own ways but only as a
result of a loyal and fraternal dialogue."
Signing the treaty was not an end in itself but "a starting point"
towards the construction of "a real and active Community which associates
the legitimate concerns of a liberalised trade with the priority development
of the member states." The treaty itself should not be regarded as
perfect. The protocols had yet to be drafted, which meant that "a big
task still lies ahead and our Ministers and experts must tackle it."
Although incomplete in that sense, the treaty did, however, provide a
more than adequate basis for future cooperation within the region, permitting
liberalisation of trade; free movement of persons, goods and capital;
harmonisation of industrial development and agricultural policy; and
cooperation in monetary and financial fields, in the area of communications
and in social and cultural matters.
The Treaty also envisaged a Fund for cooperation, compensation
and development. With such wide and generous provisions General Eyadema
hoped that ECOWAS would be able to organise "the growth and harmonious
development" of all the countries of the region which were not equally
endowed and were at different stages of development.
We must therefore see to it that the high ideal
which we are trying to translate into fact, should
not result in an ill-fated juxtaposition, because
commonplace, of producer countries on the one hand and
of countries doomed to consume imported goods, be they
community goods, on the other hand. That would of course be a
great mistake.
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ECOwAS would be "an area of concerted development or it will
be nothing at all." Hence everyone must be seen to benefit from the new
arrangements : including the landlocked countries, those stricken by
drought, and those not so favoured as others in the distribution of natural
resources, but "rich in human, spiritual and moral potential." However,
"the determining factor" in turning ECOWAS into a living reality would be
"the political will of West African leaders" and it must be shown through
the early ratification of the treaty by the various governments and the
completion of the protocols.
A pre-occupation with social and economic development and a
clear preference for pragmatic and tangible solutions were perhaps
the most notable features of the previous speeches - just as they were
central to the one that followed, by President William Tolbert. Despite
the recent and tragic loss of his brother in an air accident, he had
nevertheless felt compelled to come to Lagos and to attend the Summit in
person. And his geSture of solidarity was very much appreciated by all those
present. He began by commending Eyadema and myself for our contribution
"towards rekindling the flickering flame of economic cooperation among all
the States of our Liegion7." 121
The new community must, he insisted, be acceptable to all
states in the region and must therefore take
Full account of the interests of the least developed
and smaller states ao a7 to ensure that they will be
adequately protected and 5;1117 not suffer any disadvantage
as a result of their membership of the community.
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His idea of a "realistic and meaningful cooperation" was one based on
...the reciprocal benefits of trade, the
closest possible collaboration of our institutions
of development, and the beneficial exploitation of
our economic resources and potential.
And it was his conviction that such an approach was "essential" to the
•success of the community. Moreover, while there were "significant benefits"
to be derived "from any economic organisation within our aegioxj7 which
cuts across linguistic and cultural barriers as well as national frontiers",
he felt that such an organisation should be designed
... to admit the existence of smaller groupings, as,
for example, the Organisation of Senegal River States,
the Niger Commission and the Mano River Union or the
Ghana/Togo Organisation, which complement our actions
on the broader level.
The pragmatic approach of the Liberian leader did not, however,
preclude the "fervent hope" that the decisions taken at the Summit
... will serve as an expression of our solid political
will to blaze a broad trail of vibrant and meaningful
economic cooperation and development not only for the
benefit of our 5egiori7 but also for the continent of
Africa and for our one world.
Nevertheless, while the objectives of the treaty covered a wide range of
subjects and areas, the Liberian Government felt that:
... during its initial years, the Community should
concentrate on a short list of priorities to occasion
tangible results. The choice of these priorities
should be governed by the peculiarities of the economies
of the countries in our Liegion7 and the realities of our
time.
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To achieve their common objectives the Community should
accord the utmost priority
... to complementary developments in the areas
of infrastructure, human resource, agriculture,
transportation, communication and industry,
and to "the removal of existing constraints imposed in these areas by
the high cost of energy, and the paucity of trained personnel for the
speedy promotion of intra-West African cooperation."
Tolbert concluded with an appeal for unity so that we might
hasten our economic development and secure our political sovereignty.
The alternative was to "remain divided and continue being exploited."
We had all been alerted to the urgent need for concerted action by the
global recession and
... the problems of spiralling prices, the
international monetary crisis, inadequate and
exorbitant development financing, inequitable
terms of trade, the energy crisis, and the
challenges to create a new economic order.
Report of the Ministers Approved 
With the formal speeches over the business of the Summit
continued, this time in closed session. The first item on the agenda
was the report of the recent Third Ministerial Meeting in Lagos, which
was introduced by the Chairman of that body, Dr. Adedeji. Consideration
of the report soon gave rise to renewed debate over the protocols which
had yet to be drafted but which, when approved, would form an integral
part of the Treaty. Article 62 of the Treaty, as amended by the Meeting
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of Ministers, would permit the Treaty to be approved, signed and
ratified and to enter into force in the absence of protocols which would
then be considered later and would be subject to separate ratification.
President Lamizana of Upper Volta wanted some clarification
of the procedures whereby the Treaty and the protcols were to be
ratified. He wanted it made plain that it was the Treaty and not the
protocols that they were being asked to sign in Lagos, and that the status
of the Treaty would remain provisional until such time as the protocols
were also ratified, by seven signatory states. To this end he suggested
re-drafting Article 62 to provide that:
This Treaty shall enter into force provisionally
upon signature by Heads of State and Government.
This Treaty and the protocols which shall be annexed
and which shall form an integral part of the Treaty
shall respectively enter into force upon ratification
by at least seven signatory states in accordance with
the constitutional procedure applicable for each 14/
signatory state.
Supporting this proposal two Plenipotentiaries further maintained that the
protocols should be an integral part of the Treaty since, without them,
the institutions of the Community could scarcely operate, let alone achieve
their stated objectives.
With the permission of the Chairman, Dr.Adedeji then explained
that the intention of Article 62, as amended by the Third Ministerial
Meeting, was two-fold:
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15/
(1) to provide for the entry into force of the
Treaty provisionally after it had been signed by
the Heads of State and Government and definitively
after it had been ratified by seven Member-States; and
(2) to provide for the way in which the protocols
which would be prepared would come into force. The
protocols too would enter into force provisionally
upon signature and definitively after they had been
ratified by seven Member-States.
He understood the amendment proposed by General Lamizana to mean that the
Treaty would not enter into force definitively until the protcols had been
prepared, approved, signed and ratified.
A Plenipotentiary, who had himself been present at the earlier
Meeting of Ministers, then attempted to explain to the assembled leaders the
reasons behind this recommendation concerning Article 62. Originally it had
been expected that both the Treaty and the protocols to be attached to it would
be ready for consideration by Ministers and Heads of State when they met in
Lagos. Unfortunately, because of insufficient time and practical difficulties,
only the Treaty was available in its final form and it would take another
six to twelve months to complete the texts of the various protocols. It
also became clear to the Ministers, in the course of their deliberations,
that some of the protocols could not be finalised.until after the community
16/
came into being. -
The Ministers had, therefore, recommended that the procedures
originally envisaged in Article 62 be changed so as to enable the Treaty to
be signed at this, the first Summit, and ratified shortly afterwards - despite
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the continuing absence of the protocols. They were well aware, however,
of the importance of the protocols and had therefore included a further
recommendation to the effect that the protocols be drawn up as soon
as possible and be ratified separately according to the procedures laid
down for ratification of the Treaty itself.
Although individual leaders expressed some concern that the
protocols were not yet available and could not therefore be considered
alongside the Treaty, the great majority of participants in the Summit
were prepared to accept the recommendations of the Ministers - and to
vote the amendment to Article 62, as outlined by Dr. Adedeji, in preference
to the later amendment proposed by President Lamtizana. By so doing the
leaders wished to express their continuing confidence in their Ministers and
also their determination to proceed without delay, to the signing of the
17/
ECOWAS Treaty. -
President Bouphouft-Boigny himself intervened at this delicate
stage, to urge acceptance of the Ministers' recommendations on the grounds
that all were more or less agreed on the problem and that it was important
and necessary that the Treaty should be signed at this Summit Conference.
Once that was accomplished, and after the Treaty was ratified, the
Provisional Secretariat could then prepare the protocols to be approved
and later included in the Annexe to the document. Only when the Treaty
and the various protocols giving effect to it had been drafted, approved
and ratified, would the survival of the Community be assured.12/
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There was a further minor amendment proposed by President
Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone and readily accepted, which provided
for ratification of the Treaty, not by "seven signatory states" but by
"at least seven signatory states". The Ministers' Report was then
adopted in full and the draft Treaty, as amended, was endorsed. The
Summit was agreed that Nigeria should serve as the depository country for
the instruments of ratification and would also be responsible, on an
ad hoc basis, and in association with Togo, for the conduct of the
Community's business — pending the establishment of a permanent secretariat. 19,
The Summit then unanimously approved both the French and English
texts of the draft communique and our formal discussions ended on Tuesday
May 27. There remained only the last session, scheduled for the next morning,
following a reception at Dodan Barracks for the visiting Heads of State
and their delegations.
Business of Summit Completed 
On Wednesday morning, May 28, all the Heads of State and
Plenipotentiaries gathered once again in the Federal Palace Hotel to sign
both the French and English texts of the Treaty, thereby establishing
ECOWAS. Copies of the Treaty, in both languages, were later deposited
with the OAU, the United Nations and, of course, the provisional secretariat
of our own new Community.
In my closing remarks I described the signing of the Treaty
"as an important milestone" in the struggle for economic emancipation in
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West Africa, although I was also concerned, as was General Eyadema earlier
in the conference l to point out that "the mere signature of this Treaty"
would not "by itself solve our many and difficult economic problems for all
time." 22( Indeed,
...despite the long and difficult negotiations which
have been carried out by our Ministers and officials
over the past three years, one can still say that
the more difficult phase of sub-regional cooperation
in West Africa still lies in the future.
I was referring of course to the ratification of the Treaty,
the establishment of the various organs of the new Community, the drafting
and incorporation of the protocols provided for in the Treaty, and the
implementation of the work programmes of work to be established in each
area of cooperation. And there would always be opposition from "those
who do not wish Africa well." In this regard, however, I was confident
that we would all
... continue to make a concerted effort to
overcome any rear-guard action that may be
mounted by internal and external forces hostile
to the economic resurrection of our beloved Continent.
It was my hope that ECOWAS, and those responsible for its future,
would draw the relevant lessons from other regional economic organisations
such as the East African Community
 (EAC), the Maghreb in North Africa,
and the Central African Customs Union (UDEAC). But, "by their very nature the
benefits of economic cooperation take some time to materialise" and I
counselled patience, confidence in one another and the recognition "at all
times that our economic survival lies in our unity of purpose and action."
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Not every country would benefit to the same extent from every
project or programme of the Community, whilst the contributions that
member states would make to the economic and cultural progress of the
region would vary in degree as well as in kind. The creation of the
Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development was meant to ensure "that
countries which have lost in one way or the other are equitably compensated."
President Houphouet-Boigny, whose presence at the Summit was
unexpected but was much appreciated, was most complimentary in his remarks
21/both about the Conference itself and about Nigeria, the host nation. -
He spoke of the Summit as "a symbol of courage",
Symbol of a new Africa, enterprising, imaginative,
sensible and anxious, under very favourable conditions,
to grapple with the problems posed by her rapidly
developing economy and changes in social structure;
symbol of community of families with common interest
and will, fully aware, in these days of uncertainty and
selfishness, of the need to evolve broad-based, realistic
and organised forms of grouping to promote solidarity.
He expressed satisfaction with the role Nigeria had played in
independent Africa and cited, in particular, her contribution to the
success of the Lome Convention, ratified by the EEC and the ACP countries
in February 1975.
While her stance has been very impressive, it is worth
mentioning that in the area of world regional politics
and groupings Nigeria's policy has been very constant
and commendable.
Population, financial resources and mineral wealth -
all these put together increase your country's chances
of becoming one of the new giant countries of the
world...
In view of these facts, Mr. Chairman, your government
could have been tempted to remain aloof or at least to be
ill-disposed to the idea of regional cooperation both in
Africa and with Europe...
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Instead, through the Lome Convention, the Nigerian
Government had contributed immensely to the formulation
and execution of the most recent plans aimed at
international and inter-African cooperation.
While, back home in West Africa, Nigeria had once more demonstrated
its "great desire for cooperation in Africa".
... by teaming up with your distinguished counterpart
of Togo, our friend and brother President Eyadema
and inviting us to establish jointly the Economic
Community of West African States, the largest regional
economic unit in our continent.
He maintained that, by signing the Treaty, all the countries
of the region had demonstrated, beyond words, their ability to transcend
linguistic - fiscal and cultural barriers - to make history and to
participate in the movement for a new economic order. By this action they had
ended "the era of bellicose nationalism and verbal warfare" and had "ushered
in a new era of regional groupings, fruitful with clairvoyance, highlighting
the desire of Africa to liberate herself from economic yokes." He therefore
thanked me
... for the opportunity afforded us today by this
Treaty to translate into realities one of the most
remarkable stages in the construction of this West
Africa that is dear to our hearts.
The Ivory Coast President emphasised the urgent need "to elaborate,
sign and ratify" the protocols, which were vital to the survival of
this young organisation, and he called for a determined show of political will
to make our new venture a success.
We are equally conscious of the fact that this multi-
national organisation will turn out to be what our
political will makes of it; for any substructures of
structures, however sound, will serve no useful purpose
if they lack that extra force generated by the common
will and equal interest.
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He cautioned against unrealistic expectations and a desire for
quick results and warned that "ECOWAS only becomes a reality when our hopes
for a better world have been realised." He then drew our attention to the
failure of the recent Paris Conference on Petroleum and Raw Materials, which,
he said, came as no surprise to him and was indicative of the selfishness
of certain big powers who were concerned only to preserve their numerous
and excessive advantages - "sources of discontent, hatred and trouble" -
rather than "engage in dialogue on the formulation of a new international
economic order based on justice." The lesson was clear. We should rely
only on ourselves and not continue to depend on "selfish gestures" by the
rich countries, whether disguised as pity or as charity. We should aim too,
at "getting to the root causes of our miseries which are of a commercial,
economic and fiscal nature."
From what he had seen at the Summit Conference, Houphouft-Boigny
concluded that the countries of the region were determined in future to
count only on themselves and to work towards more profitable forms of
economic cooperation based on a large internal market and the prospect of
increased industrialisation throughout the region.
The final response to my closing address was by President
Dr. Siaka Stevens, who described the conference as "one of the best" he
had attended and went on to compare the circumstances surrounding the
creation of ECOWAS with the biblical tale of the fishermen who, having
fished all day and far from home, had caught nothing, and returned to
harbour disappointed; there, however, they were advised once again to drop
their nets and this time succeeded in gathering in a large catch, where
22/they had least expected to find it. -
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True, we cannot live in isolation, true, we
have to keep in touch with the outside world
and we must expect assistance now and again
in the international field but it is my view
that, in the last analysis, it is only by making
full use of the opportunities around us that we
can reach the scale of development which our people
need.
He further advised that, within the region, efforts should
be concentrated on achieving real economic emancipation and transforming
the prevailing social and economic structures for the benefit of their
people.
I do not think that most of us can get away from
the fact that on the attainment of independence,
we went on a honeymoon spree of joy and gladness
that the Colonial tyrants had at long last been
forced to give us our liberty. Little did we
realise then that economic independence is the stuff
of which real political independence is made.
Having the colonial ties that had linked their countries in the
pre-independence period, they were now "forced to think differently and,
as a result, we have tried to get together by means of regional Z;nd
sub-regionalrcooperation." It was his considered view that such bodies
as-the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Senegal River Union, and the Mano
River Union had provided the launching-pad for ECOWAS, and would continue
to play a valuable role within the region. Meanwhile it was up to
them to make their new union a success since that would attract still more
African states. The "super-powers" themselves were "nothing but a grouping
together of peoples of different backgrounds and origins" and he advised
member states to learn from their example by coming together and cooperating
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for the attainment of their common goals. In conclusion he pointed to
the need for an energetic secretariat to give the new Community the necessary
sense of purpose and direction, to "keep us in constant touch with one another",
and to provide members "with the necessary information at the right time."
I had then only to thank all those participating in the Summit
and to assure them of our continued cooperation and partnership in the
economic endeavours of the region. I reminded the other leaders that the
private sectors of our economies also had 'vital and vigorous roles to play
in our integration efforts", and appealed to them to try to involve their
23/Chambers of Commerce and similar bodies in the process of integration. -
Such organisations could
... become a more potent force in enlarging
the boundaries of effective administrative
and commercial cooperation in West Africa so
that men, goods and services can move much
more freely across our frontiers.
I also urged functionaries of the member countries to redouble their efforts
and overcome any remaining obstacles in the speedy implementation of the
Treaty. Finally I thanked the officials of the Secretariat for their
diligence and the Press for their excellent coverage and the publicity they
had given the Summit Conference.
At the end of the conference the customary communique was issued
on our behalf, by Dr. Adedeji, who was also authorised to give the accompanying
press conference. The communique itself provided a convenient, if brief
summary of the main conclusions of the Summit.
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The Heads of State and Government and the Plenipotentiaries
affirmed, as their basic,aim, the promotion of cooperation
and development in all fields of economic activity. In
particular, they emphasised the need for cooperation in
the field of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy,
agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and
financial matters and in social and cultural matters. They
were convinced that such a cooperation is essential for
the purpose of raising the standard of living of their peoples,
of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering
closer relations among their countries, and of contributing
to the progress and development of the African continent. They
also affirmed their determination to make the Community a
pragmatic,dynamic and effective institution which would take
into account the realities prevailing in member-states.
The Heads of State and Government and Plenipotentiaries
recognised the existence of inter-Government organisation
and economic groupings within the region. They also expressed
satisfaction at the signing of the Treaty which marks the birth
of a new era of solidarity in Africa and which is a decisive
step forward in the achievement of a wider integration on the
African Continent. They affirmed their determination to do
all in their power to achieve this goal.
The Heads of State and Government and Plenipotentiaries
expressed the wish for the early ratification of the Treaty
so that the aims and objectives of the Community could be
realised without delay. They recognised the need to accelerate
the preparation of the Protocols of implementation of the
present Treaty and entrusted the Governments of Nigeria and Togo
with the responsibility of taking all necessary measures towards
that end. 24/
Informal Discussions
While the communique marked the end of the formal proceedings
it was also the case that before, between and even after the completion
of the regular sessions there was a good deal of informal discussion,
including meetings between myself and other Heads of State and Plenipoten-
tiaries, whenever it seemed necessary or desirable, either at their
request or on my own initiative. Our conversations ranged over a wide
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variety of topics, from the affirmation of our common faith in the proposed
economic community and its successful establishment, to requests for
bi-lateral assistance, or the sale of Nigerian crude oil to be used in
a number of West African refineries. President Daddah, of Mauritania,
even made representations on behalf of President Siad Barre, of Somalia,
for my intervention in the Somali-Ethiopian border dispute - at a time
when I was chairman of the OAU Conciliation Committee that was examining the
issue.
From the start of the Summit my main preoccupation was with the
attitude of some of the Francophone states since I was familiar with the
views of the English-speaking countries, many of whose leaders I had recently
encountered either at the Commonwealth Conference, in Kingston, Jamaica, or
on the return voyage to Nigeria. In any case they had consistently
supported the idea of a West African economic community and were unlikely
to draw back now that its realisation was so near. The Ivory Coast and
Senegal, however, were states that had previously given us some cause for
anxiety, but, the unexpected and very welcome presence of President HouphoUdt-
Boigny, in Lagos, was enough to reassure us that the Ivory Coast at least
was determined to participate in the new economic community from its
inception, no doubt perceiving the advantages that would thereby accrue
to the region as a whole, including its Francophone constituents.
Houphouft-Boigny's appearance at the Summit - his presence at
such large and comprehensive gatherings was unusual - was itself a sincere
and striking tribute to the strength of the ECOWAS ideal lwhile also
suggesting that the prospect of economic cooperation within the region
was no longer a distant dream but was about to become a reality. I was
particularly impressed by Houphouft-Boigny's unequivocal support for ECOWAS
throughout the proceedings and like other participants in the Summit, I was
moved by his very touching speech towards the end of our deliberations.
In our private talks he was likewise eloquent about the potential of ECOWAS
which, when launched, would constitute the biggest common market in Africa,
25/having the greatest concentration of human and natural resources. -
But their development and exploitation, which he saw as an
urgent priority for the new community, would depend on maintaining
a climate of peace and stability throughout the region. As in his speech
to the conference, he applauded our proposed regional grouping as the
best if not the only way of tackling the challenge that the more advanced
industrial countries posed to West Africa's development. The successful
conclusion of the recent Lome Agreements was a first step in that direction.
It was interesting, too, to have Houphoudt-Boigny's views
about the problems peculiar to economic groupings which, he maintained,
were more difficult to forge than political unions if only because some
countries would inevitably expect to benefit greatly from the community,
while others, not necessarily the same, would have to contribute dis-
proportionately to its upkeep. On the vital issue of financing the community's
activitie,
	 he therefore proposed that contributions should be scaled
according to the wealth of each country, with the richer states providing
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more — and with special provision for financial and technical assistance
to the poorest. This would help engender a greater sense of identity
and cohesion within the community.
Mere subsidies, however, were inadequate; training schemes
to help provide skilled and educated personnel were more useful as they
could make a substantial and more lasting contribution to the development of
even the poorest economies. With appropriate technology and more intensive
exploitation of their resources, countries now considered poor might soon
become sufficiently prosperous to be able to make their own independent
contribution to the relief of others, less fortunate. Libya, for example,
was now among the richest countries where, before, it had long been regarded
as one of the poorest and most backward.
Finally, President Houphouft—Boigny assured me that his country's
interest in ECOWAS stemmed from the conviction that such groupings were
the best way to overcame Africa's present economic difficulties. While the
Ivory Coast would therefore participate actively in the affairs of the new
community, his government would advance no claim either to the secretariat,
or to any of the other posts that would soon have to be filled.
President Senghor's absence from the Summit was, for reasons I have
explained, not at all unexpected but we were happy to be able to welcome his
Prime Minister, Abdou Diouf, to Lagos. His presence was a reminder that,
whatever our recent differences, our two countries remained steadfast in
their commitment to the West African ideal. I also had some sympathy with
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Diouf's predicament, given the unenviable assignment conferred on him by
his leader. Soon after his arrival in Lagos it must have become evident
that there was very little, if any, support for Senghor's view of a
grouping of African states extending along the Atlantic to Zaire.
It was therefore to the credit of the Senegalese Prime Minister
that, having first taken appropriate soundings, he pursued an increasingly
conciliatory policy as the conference advanced. In this respect President
Ould Daddah, of Mauritania, recounted to me how Senghor had apparently
instructed Diouf not to sign the ECOWAS Treaty if the new community did not
adopt his own more comprehensive view of its future membership and territorial
extent. 26/—
 When approached by Diouf, Daddah had advised him that no less
than fourteen of the fifteen countries present at the Summit would sign the
ECOWAS Treaty, irrespective of the Senegalese attitude.
He had warned that not to sign would simply confirm others in the
view of Senegalese policy as isolationist rather than integrationist. In any
case, he reminded Diouf, President Mobutu of Zaire had himself rejected
Senghor's proposed Community of Atlantic African States. Daddah could
rightly, therefore, claim some credit for the eventual compromise whereby
the Community would remain open to other, unspecified African countries.
It was thus that we secured the signature of the Treaty by all present and,
even more valuable, the future participation of Senegal in ECOWAS.
President Daddah left me in no doubt about his own enthusiasm
concerning the Summit itself and his optimism about the prospects of our
new community. He noted the striking change of attitude on the part of the
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President of the Ivory Coast, and maintained, very generously, that it
was our own patience and understanding that had made this evolution possible.
He confirmed that the heated debates among the CEA() states, during their
Niamey Summit, had arisen in response to a claim by some that Nigeria would
dwarf all others in the proposed regional grouping. Such fears had now
been allayed, however, and all members of the smaller Francophone community
recognised that to have remained outside the much larger economic grouping
would have been a serious error.
I expressed my sincere gratitude to President Daddah for his
part in helping us secure the attendance of the CEA° countries at the Lagos
Summit, pointing out that his own example in promptly accepting our
invitation doubtless influenced the thinking of the other Francophone
leaders. He, in turn, informed me that he looked forward to the early
and successful completion of the protocols so that the community might
quickly become operational.
One of the more gratifying aspects of the Lagos meetings,
which incidentally held out considerable promise for the future of our
enterprise and for the region as a whole was not only the presence, but also
the active cooperation of representatives of several neighbouring states,
whose relations in the past had often been marked by tensions and hostility.
The participation of the Prime Minister of Guinea, alongside the Prime
Minister of Senegal and the President of the Ivory Coast, was itself an
auspicious beginning to our joint venture and an additional cause for
satisfaction.
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President Toure was unable to attend in person, apparently
because of an agricultural campaign he was conducting back home, but the
Prime Minister, Dr. Lansana Beavogui, recalled the earlier cooperation
between Nigeria and Guinea in the context of the earlier and unsuccessful
/
West African Regional Group. 27- Circumstances, he insisted, were now
much more favourable to our enterprise. But there was still need for
vigilance as there were always some who were prepared, and even anxious,
to undermine the existence of any really independent community. There was
a hint of former differences, however, as he noted, with some astonishment,
that the sponsors of such a narrow and restrictive organisation as the CEA()
were now among those calling for the extension of ECOWAS to Central Africa.
Guinea, for her part, wished to play a full and active part in
the operations of our proposed community and was therefore, like other
states, interested in our views about the siting of the secretariat and the
choice of the various officials. As in similar discussions with other
leaders, I pointed out that,from our point of view the important thing
at present was to get the Treaty signed and the community established.
With regard to the institutions, themselves, the balance of English and French-
speaking states would seem to suggest that, if the Secretariat were to
be sited in an Anglophone state, then the Secretary-General should perhaps
be drawn from a Francophone state. Ideally, each country would nominate
and be represented by at least one senior member of the ECOWAS staff and
there was no reason why there should not be sufficient senior posts to
cover all fifteen member states. Obviously, it was not for us, acting
alone, to take such decisions but a broad and representative distribution
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of posts would be consistent with our determination that each and every
state should be able to participate fully in the work of the organisation
and have a real sense of belonging.
A further cause for satisfaction was the presence at the Lagos
Summit of the President of Upper Volta and the Vice-President of neighbouring
Mali, whose states had so recently been at war with one another. Reasons
of health had prevented President Traore from attending in person, but the
representatives of both states, by now reconciled, were on speaking terms
for the duration of the conference - which had not been the case at the
earlier conference of the CEA() in Niamey. The Malian Vice-President even
called on General Lamizana in his suite where I was informed by both parties
28/he was courteously received. -
Nigeria had not intervened in the dispute because other states,
including Togo and Guinea, were already mediating. But we did appeal to
both governments to cooperate fully with the mediators to see that
the border dispute was quickly resolved in the interest of peace and
development within the region. Without such peace and stability African
governments could not ensure the welfare of their people. Nigeria, for
example, had taken measures to relieve the suffering of those in the drought-
stricken Sahel states, but such assistance was greatly hampered by an
absence of cooperation between the governments of the states most directly
affected.
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The relevance of ECOWAS to the immediate needs of the region
and of the states that comprised it became abundantly clear in the
course of a conversation with the President of the new state of Guinea-Bissau,
/
so recently liberated from the repressive rule of the Portuguese. 29-
There was widespread disorganisation within the country following a protracted,
costly and vicious colonial war, the withdrawal of Portuguese investment and
the removal of everything of value. As a consequence Guinea-Bissau, like
Guinea before it, had to build up a state apparatus from scratch.
Problems of such imposing magnitude were further aggravated by
a major shortfall in food supplies, lack of seeds and implements, a large
Liberation Army that could not yet be demobilised for lack of alternative
occupations for the soldiers, and a big influx of refugees returning home
from neighbouring countries. If, however, the state managed to survive the
first two years of independence I was assured that it would then be able to
stand firmly on its own feet.
President Luiz Cabral was understandably anxious that, once the
ECOWAS Treaty was signed, the protocols should be prepared quickly so that
the economic community might become effective. Where his people had
cooperated to wrest their independence from the Portuguese, they were now
ready to join hands with others in any cooperative endeavour in West Africa -
hence their total support for ECOWAS.
Of our more immediate neighbours, the Dahomean President, Mathieu
Kerekou, indicated to us that, while his own contribution to the success
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of the conference had necessarily been modest, Dahomey had attended to
lend its whole support to the undertaking and to prove that it was not
one of those countries that were constantly afraid of being swallowed up
30/by Nigeria. - While not himself a racist, Kerekou believed that it was
better to be subordinate to an African country than to be subservient to
foreigners. He also hoped that Eyadema and myself would be able to persuade
any who were still hesitant to play a full part in the affairs of our
community.
Conclusion
Our meeting with President Eyadema, following the Summit,
was marked by considerable relief that the various obstacles to ECOWAS
had at last been successfully surmounted - to such an extent that those who
might have come to Lagos to try to delay implementation of the Treaty and
to embarrass its sponsors were convinced long before the end that their
suspicions were unfounded and that the new community would indeed accommodate
all their aspirations and help them realise at least some of their
31/
expectations. - Eyadema recalled how, at the Ministerial meeting, the
Togolese delegation had successfully opposed additional amendments that would
have considerably delayed implementation of the Treaty.
But this was no time for self-satisfaction and we expressed the
hope that our two countries might continue to cooperate to ensure that
the draft proposals were presented and approved in the shortest possible
time. Provided the ECONAS Ministers and officials continued to work with
19/4
the same speed and efficiency as before the Summit, we were confident
that the protocols would be ready for consideration towards the end of
the year, when many Heads of State were again expected in Nigeria for the
Festival of Black and African Arts.
Others, like President Lamizana, saw it as an outstanding success
and added:
If our Lagos Conference was the Symbol of Expression
of true solidarity among the people of the region, then
it is undoubtedly an important victory for our Continent
in its search for Economic independence andlconstitutes
a significant step towards unity.
Messages were received from far and wide, from within as well
as outside the region, from Presidents and private individuals who were
sincerely delighted with our success and achievements in this respect.
There followed a spate of activity as the various countries got
down to the business of ratifying the Treaty. Liberia was the first to
ratify. In a Cable dated 30 May 1975, President Tolbert told me that
he had on his return to Monrovia set in motion the constitutional process
of ratifying the Treaty.3 -3/ On the 30th may the Liberian Senate gave its
advice and consent and ratification of the document could then proceed.
Tolbert ratified the documentamdthe Instrument of Ratification was
sent to us immediately by Special Mission, in accordance with Article 65
of the Treaty. 34/
 - Nigeria followed on 2nd of June, with Guinea, Ghana and
The Gambia, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Sierra Leone, Togo and
Niger acting in quick succession. The ECOWAS Treaty came definitively into
force within three weeks of signing on 20th June, 1975.
32/
Country Ratification Deposition of Instrument
. Liberia
. Nigeria
. Guinea
. Ghana
. Gambia
. Ivory Coast
. Upper Volta
. Dahomey
9. Sierra Leone
10.Togo
,11 .Niger
30th May 1975
2nd June 1975
5th June 1975
6th June 1975
6th June 1975
12th June 1975
20th June 1975
24th June 1975
26th June 1975
27th June 1975
2nd July 1975
4 June 1975
3 June 1975
17 June 1975
Ei'-July 1975
21-July 1975
17 July 1975
7 July 1975
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By 22nd July the only countries still outstanding were
Mauritania, Guinea—Bissau, Senegal and Mali. Of these, only Senegal
could still be regarded as in any way doubtful. As for Mauritania and
Guinea—Bissau, the problem was doubtless one of communication.
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Among the many letters and cables of congratulation that
I received, following the conclusion of our Summit, there was one from
President Nyerere welcoming the Treaty "as a positive step towards
African Unity", and as "a further demonstration of the declared desire
of the people of Africa for closer cooperation and integration in accordance
with the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity." 32/ It would have
been difficult, however, to improve on the sentiments expressed by the
President of Rwanda, Major-General H. Juvenal, who so aptly summarised
the whole spirit of the ECOWAS movement. He greeted the new Community as:
It is only by uniting our efforts just as you are
now doing that African countries will succeed in
setting afoot an organisation capable of meeting
the challenge of the enemies of this continent.
We are optimistic that, in this perspective, the
OAU, while drawing its strength and vitality from
our different sub-regional organisations, will,
in the years to come, become stronger and, thus,
attain more realistically and effectively its most
immediate objectives, namely, the liberty, solidarity 36/
and fraternity of all African peoples.
397
REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES
1. Report of the third Ministerial Meeting on the Creation of the
Economic Community of West African States held in Lagos on 23 May,1975.
2. Ibid., para.5(e).
3. Ibid., para.7(a)
4. Ibid., para.7(c)
5. Ibid., para.7(e).
6. Ibid., para.8.
7. Minutes, Preliminary Meeting of West African Heads of State and
Government, 26 May 1975.
11. Opening Address, 27 May 1975, as contained in West Africa Finds a New 
Future. (Speech by Heads of State during the ECOWAS Summit Meeting in Lagos,
27-28 May 1975, pp.3-8.
12. Response by His Excellency, General Gnassingbe Eyadema, President of the
Republic of Togo, in West Africa Finds a New Future, pp.9-13.
13. Response by Dr. William R. Tolbert, Jr., President of the Republic
of Liberia, in West Africa Finds a New Future, pp.14-17.
14. Report of the First Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government
to consider and sign the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of
West African States, Lagos, Nigeria, 27-28 May 1975, p.8, para.20.
15. Ibid, p.9, para.22.
16. Ibid., p.10, para.24.
17. Ibid., p.10, para.25.
18. Ibid., pp.10-11, para.26.
19. Ibid., p.11, para.27. (Sierra Leone Amendment); p.11, para.29,
(Ministers' Report, as amended, is adopted); p.11, para.30 (Nigeria
to serve as the depository country.)
20. Closing Remarks, 28 May 1975, in West Africa Finds a New Future, pp.18-20.
398
REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES cont.
21. Response by His Excellency Felix Houphougt-Boigny, President of the
Republic of the Ivory Coast, in West Africa Finds a New Future, pp.21-24.
22. Response by His Excellency, Dr. Siaka Stevens, President of the
Republic of Sierra Leone, in West Africa Finds a New Future, pp.25-27.
23. Speech at the State Banquet given in honour of the Delegates to the
First Summit Conference of the ECOWAS countries, 28 May 1975, in
West Africa Finds a New' Future, pp.30-31.
24. Official Communique, Conference of Heads of State and Government of the
ECOWAS, 28 May 1975.
25. Minutes of discussions held with His Excellency, President Houphougt-Boigny
of the Ivory Coast, on 26 May 1975.
26. Minutes of discussions held with His Excellency, President MoukhtOr
Ould Daddah, of Mauritania, on 28 May 1975.
27. Minutes of discussions held with the Prime Minister of Guinea
(Dr. Lansana Beavogui) on 27 May 1975.
28. Minutes of discussions held with Major Baba Diarra, Vice President
of Mali, on 28 May 1975.
29. Minutes of discussions held with His Excellency, Mr. Luiz Cabral,
President of the Council of State of Guinea-Bissau, on 28 May 1975.
/ e
30. Minutes of discussions held with His Excellency Mathieu Kerekou,
President of the Republic of Dahomey (Benin), on 27 May 1975.
31. Minutes of discussions with His Excellency General Gnessingbe Eyadema,
President of the Republic of Togo, on 28 May 1975.
32. Cable to Head of Federal Military Government of Nigeria, from His
Excellency General A.Sangoule Lamizana, President of the Republic of
Upper Volta, 31 May 1975.
33. Cable to Head of Federal Military Government, from His Excellency
W.R.Tolbert, jr., President of the Republic of Liberia, 30 May 1975.
34. Correspondence to Head of Federal Military Government, from His
Excellency, W.R.Toibert, jr., President of the Republic of Liberia, 31
May 1975.
35. Cable to Head of Federal Military Government of Nigeria, from
His Excellency Julius Nyerere, President of the Republic of Tanzania,
31 May 1975.
36. Cable to Head of Military Government of Nigeria, from His Excellency
Major-General Habyarimana Juvenal, President of the Republic of Rwanda,
28 May 1975.
PART IV
399
CHAPTER 11
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ECOWAS INSTITUTIONS
With the ECOWAS Treaty now in force, it only remained for Nigeria
and Togo, as co-sponsors of the Community, to draft the relevant protocols
and submit them for consideration by the Council of Ministers and the
assembled Heads of State and Government. They could then be ratified, using
the same procedures as were employed for the Treaty, when they would be
incorporated into the Treaty itself. Meanwhile the Community could proceed
with the establishment of its institutions which would not only provide
a measure of permanence and continuity, but would also furnish the administrative
means whereby the terms of the Treaty could be executed.
But in a region as large and complex as ours, political and economic
cooperation can never be taken for granted, even in the most promising
circumstances. ECOWAS would soon encounter a succession of problems, both
procedural and structural, which, coinciding as they did with other political
changes within the region, would inevitably delay implementation of the Treaty
just as they would seriously impede the operations of the Community and its
institutions.
It is not unusual for a community of this size and complexity to
encounter difficulties in its formative years. It is always a testing time
both for the political leadership of the region and for the (often inexperienced)
officials of the new community. What matters in such cases is that member
states should manifest the political will to resolve whatever differences may
arise and show their determination to subordinate individual interests to the
well-being and prosperity of the region as a whole. The leaders, too, must
be capable of generating the kind of solutions that are required if the
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community is to be preserved intact with its sense of purpose and
direction unimpa“ed.
In the various 'crises' that would punctuate the development of
ECOWAS, in the latter part of the 'seventies, the survival of the community
itself was never seriously in doubt. There were occasional recriminations
among member states, but no defections, and ECOWAS managed, throughout, to
retain its substantial advantage over its sub-regional competitors. The
consensus that was finally realised at . the Lagos Summit, after long and
careful preparation, survived and has continued down to the present, notwith-
standing the many changes that have intervened both inside and outside the
community.
Before resuming our account of ECOWAS and its evolution after May
1975, it is first necessary to examine the Treaty and describe its main
provisions, particularly as they relate to the institutions of the Community
and to the protocols that would soon regulate its activities.
The Treaty 
With the ratification of the ECOWAS Treaty, all member states
undertook to respect the aims and objectives of the community as defined in
Article 2 (1).
It shall be the aim of the Community to promote
cooperation and development in all fields of
economic activity particularly in the fields of
industry, transport, telecommunications, energy,
agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary
and financial questions and in social and cultural
matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living
of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic
stability, of fostering closer relations among its
members and of contributing to the progress and development
of the African continent. 1/
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To this end the Treaty proposed the creation, "by stages",
of a common market among its member states. Article 2(2) therefore
provides for:
(a) the elimination as between the member states of customs duties and other
charges of equivalent effect in respect of the importation and
exportation of goods;
(b) the abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade
among the member states;
(c) the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial
policy towards third countries;
(d) the abolition as between member states of the obstacles to the free
movement of persons, services and capital;
(e) the harmonisation of the agricultural policies and the promotion of
common projects in the member states notably in the fields of
marketing, research and agro-allied industrial enterprises;
(f) the implementation of schemes for the joint development of transport,
communication, energy and other infrastructural facilities as well as
the evolution of a common policy in these fields;
(g) the harmonisation of the economic and industrial policies of the member
states and the elimination of disparities in the level of development
of member states;
(11) the harmonisation, required for the proper functioning of the Community,
of the monetary policies of the member states;
(i) the establishment of a Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and
Development; and
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(j) such other activities calculated to further aims of the Community
as the member states may from time to time undertake in common. -
These were ambitious goals, particularly for African states
with little previous experience of economic cooperation in such areas and
exhibiting a formidable array of economic problems and administrative
deficiencies. But it was the very scale and nature of the problems that made
collective action at this level so very necessary if the states of the region
were ever to experience anything approximating development. Nor were the
measures proposed in any way utopian or unrealistic. The ECOWAS Treaty
offers what has been described as "a practical programme, carefully tailored
to the needs and the susceptibilities of the fiteen West African
founding states." -3/
The immediate objectives were simple and strictly economic.
Member states would gradually eliminate customs and similar duties on trade
among themselves and would remove all other restrictions on such trade.
They would eventually establish a common tariff and a uniform commercial
policy towards the rest of the world. As well as securing free movement of
persons there was also provision for the free movement of capital and services.
We also envisaged joint development of a wide range of economic facilities and
increased cooperation in research and training. And underlining our approach
to economic cooperation was the idea that member states, in their relations with
one another, would be guided by a friendly 'division of labour' rather than
by an exaggerated emphasis on . 'econorilic nationalism'.
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In the longer term, cooperation among the West African states was
not to be confined to the economic sphere but would also encompass social and
cultural affairs. Thus the Preamble to the Treaty includes recognition of
the signatories of the "the over-riding need to accelerate, foster and
encourage the economic and social development of their states in order to
improve the living standards of their peoples"; it calls for "a fair and equitabl
distribution of the benefits of cooperation among Member States" and reaffirms
"as the ultimate objective of their efforts,
	
accelerated and sustained
economic development of their states and the creation of a homogeneous society
leading to the unity of the countries of West Africa, by the elimination of
all types of obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and persons." -
From this it should be clear that ECOWAS was intended eventually to be much
more than a free trade zone, a customs union, a common market, or even an
economic union.
If in the formativestage, the political potential of the community
was not emphasised, it was nevertheless there. There was no question, for the
present, of any member state being asked to sacrifice a substantial part
of its sovereignty but there was the opportunity for all citizens of each
member state to enlarge their political as well as their economic horizon by
becoming "community citizens" - for whom all obstacles to free movement and
residence within the Community would gradually be removed. Some claim to have
seen in this the germ of "a political union which in the distant future could
become the United States of West Africa." -
By the same token the provision in Article 11 for a Community
Tribunal to adjudicate disputes among member states arising from the
application of the Treaty has been viewed as "an embryo Court of Appeal"
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for the region as a whole, - although it is for the Heads of State
and Government, themselves, to appoint the members of the Tribunal.
The conclusion, afterwards of a Non-Aggression Protocol and discussion
of a possible Defence Pact are further indications of the scope for future
Community action in this direction.
Such varied goals cannot all be realised at once or even within
a relatively short period of time. In June 1975,Dr. Adebayo Adedeji said
that he expected ECOWAS to be operational within five years. Some observers,
lacking his experience and his grasp of the administrative scale and
complexity of the undertaking thought this estimate unnecessarily pessimistic.
Others, like President Senghor, maintained that fifteen years was the minimum
7/time needed to complete the harmonisation of the region's economic policy. -
He, however, left his audience in no doubt about his immediate preference
for the more restricted Francophone grouping, the CEAO, whose objectives
were similar to those of ECOWAS but which was building on an older colonial
tradition of economic and administrative cooperation.
From the ECOWAS Treaty, itself, it is evident that much thought
was expended on the time-table whereby conflicting and discordant policies
will one day be harmonised and the obstacles to economic integration reduced
and finally removed. Thus member states have some fifteen years in which to
phase in a customs union with a common external tariff. But many other less
sweeping measures will take effect long before that. Once the Treaty has
been in force for two years member states are no longer permitted to impose
new import duties or increase existing ones. Thereafter they are committed
to reducing them, while;
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8/
The Authority may at any time, on the recommendation
of the Council of Ministers, decide that any import
duties shall be reduced more rapidly or eliminated
earlier than is recommended by the Trade, Customs,
Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission.
Within two years member states must also begin the removal of internal
taxes designed to protect domestic industry and they have only one additional
year in which to complete the process. They have eight years to eliminate
"progressively" all revenue duties designed to protect domestic goods.
Once the Treaty was ratified member states were committed to
a number of important adjustments whose implementation would in the last
analysis depend on the degree of mutual understanding and cooperation that
they had achieved. Thus each member state:
Shall grant full and unrestricted freedom of transit
through its territory of goods proceeding to or from a
third country indirectly through that territory to or from
other Member States; and such transit shall not be subject
to any discrimination, quantitative restrictions, duties or
other charges levied on transit.
The signatories also undertook to abolish all obstacles to the freedom of
movement and residence within the community of the citizens of member states,
while member states:
Shall by agreements with each other exempt Community
citizens from holding visitors visas and residence
permits and allow them to work and undertake commercial
10/and industrial activities within their territories.
Both of these provisions were the subject of considerable controversy
within the Community during the first years of its operation.
9/
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Institution5 of the Communitz
Chapter crt of the Treaty sets out the main institutions of the
Community. The principal governing body is the Authority, comprising the
Heads of State and Government which "shall be responsible for, and have the
general direction and control of the performance of the executive functions of
the Community for the progressive development of the Community and the achievement
of its aims." 11/ Decisions of the Authority, "shall be binding on all
institutions of the Community." It meets at least once a year with a rotating
chairmanship and is itself responsible for determining its procedure, including
the manner of taking decisions.
The Council of Ministers reviews the operation and development
of the Community so as to ensure compliance with the Treaty, and is charged
with making recommendations to the Authority on matters of policy aimed at its
12/
"efficient and harmonious functioning." - The Council may also give
directions to all subordinate institutions of the Community and exercise such
other powers and perform such other duties as may be assigned it by the
Authority. It consists of two representatives from each member state and
meets at least twice a year, including the meeting prior to the annual Summit.
Like the Authority the Council is responsible for determining its own procedure.
Article 8 entrusts the day to day conduct of the Community to an
Executive Secretary, to be appointed by the Authority for an initial period
of four years which can not then be extended beyond a second term. He, in turn,
is assisted by two Deputy Executive Secretaries, appointed by the Council of
Ministers, and by a Financial Controller and such other officers as the Council
may determine. The duties assigned the Executive Secretary are to service and
assist the institutions of the Community in the performance of their taeks
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to keep the functioning of the Community under continuous examination and,
where appropriate, make any necessary representations to the Council of
Ministers; to report to all meetings of the Council of Ministers and the
Authority on the activities of the Community; and to undertake such further
duties, "relating to the aims of the Community", as may be assigned him by
the Council of Ministers and "make such proposals thereto as may assist in the
13/
efficient and harmonious functioning and development of the Community." -
The appointment of the Executive Secretary and the choice of the
Community Headquarters were decisions that, according to Article 61 (1),
were to be taken by the Authority at its first meeting following ratification
of the Treaty. Such sensitive issues were best resolved by the Heads of State
meeting together as soon as possible after the Treaty became effective.
The Authority would also decide which African languages, as well as English and
French, would receive official status within the Community. Moreover,
recruitment to the Secretariat would follow the guidelines contained in the
UN Charter to the effect that:
In appointing officers to offices in the Executive
Secretariat due regard shall be had, subject to the
paramount importance of securing the highest standards
of efficiency and technical competence, to the desirability
of maintaining an equitable distribution of appointments 14/to such posts among citizens of the Member States.
Meanwhile the staff of the Secretariat would have the status of international
civil servants and would "owe their loyalty entirely to the Community".
408
The Treaty also provides in Article 9 for the creation of
four technical and specialised commissions, with one representative
from each member state, to submit reports and recommendations through the
Executive Secretary to the Council of Ministers on matters pertaining
to their area of competence. They would be responsible for drawing up and
advising on programmes covering the following sectors of policy : Trade,
Customs, Immigration, Monetary Matters and the Settlement of Paymentsi Industry
Agriculture and Natural Resources) Transport, Telecommunications and Energyi
15/
and Social and Cultural Affairs. - Article 38 provides for a Committee of
West African Central Banks, "for the purpose of overseeing the system
of payments within the Community"; it comprises the Governors of the
Central Banks of the member states and its recommendations are directed to the
16/Council of Ministers. - A Capital Issues Committee is also designated
in Article 39 "for the purpose of ensuring the free flow of capital between
17/the Member States consistent with the objectives of this Treaty." -
One important community institution, of especial significance in
a grouping concerned primarily with promoting development within the region, was
the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development, whose role is briefly
described in chapter XI of the Treaty. Financed largely by the contributions
of member states, supplemented by income from community enterprises and receipts
and subsidies from other sources, the Fund is intended to finance projects
in member states; provide compensation to states that suffer losses either as
a result of the location of Community enterprises or as a consequence of the
liberalisation of trade within the region; to guarantee foreign investment
within the Community in respect of certain approved enterprises; and to
"promote development projects in the less developed Member States of the
Community." 112/
In such a vital and sensitive area as the Fund, concerned
as it is with achieving an equitable distribution of the costs and benefits
of integration, the Treaty (Article 51 (3)) stipulates that its "operation,
organisation, management, status" will be the subject of a protocol to be
19/
attached to the Treaty at a later date. - Under the terms of this subsequent
protocol the Fund was to be administered by a Managing Director, assisted
by a Deputy and by six Directors, each responsible for a particular aspect
of the Fund's work. Policy would be the responsibility of the Board of
Directors, representing the member states and consisting of either the
relevant Ministers or of deputies chosen by reason of their "wide experience
on economic, financial and banking activities", and appointed on a "permanent"
basis so as to provide both expertise and continuity.
It can be seen that every effort was made to secure the operations
of the Fund and its Managing Director from undue pressure from any quarter,
and to provide some measure of autonomy. This was later to be a source of
considerable confusion and a cause of no small embarrassment in so far as
the Treaty itself was ambiguous about the precise relationship between the
two principal Executive Officers of the Community : the Managing Director
of the Fund and the Executive Secretary. The Fund, while it is subject to
the decisions of the Authority, and, in some respects, to the Council of
Ministers, is only answerable to its own Board of Directors and thus enjoys
a considerable degree of discretion.
At the time of his appointment the Managing Director was, however,
enjoined to work in close cooperation and harmony with the Executive Secretary
and with the other officials of the Community. And Article 8 (9) of the
Treaty provides that the Executive Secretary "shall be responsible for the
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/day to day administration of the community and all its institutions," 20-
although no mention was made of the Fund, I recall it was our definite
intention to make the Executive Secretary the spokesman of the Community.
Clearly much would depend on the personalities, the style, competence
and experience of the chief executive officers, but it was the
Executive Secretary who was entrusted with the care of the ECOWAS
institutions and, to some extent, with the reputation of the Community.
Preparation of the ECOWAS Protocols : July 19/5 -NoveMber 1976 
The major outstanding business of the Community, after May 1975,
was the completion and approval of the protocols which alone would make
possible the early implementation of the Treaty, but which threatened,
meanwhile to provoke considerable debate among the member states. The
protocols would determine the nature and size of contributions by member
states to the Community budget; the definition of products held to originate
within the region and therefore benefiting from the provisions of the
Treaty regarding liberalisation of trade; the provision to be made for the
re-exportation within the Community of goods originating outside it; the
levels of compensation to be provided by the Community and the precise
circumstances under which payment might be made; and the , detailed
arrangements whereby the Fund would be administered. The contentious
nature of these issues pointed to the need for separate and more detailed
consideration after the Treaty itself was ratified. While the issues
411
themselves were controversial, however,much of the ground, particularly
in the matter of "rules of origin", had already been covered during the
negotiation of the Lomg
 Agreement with the EEC.
Which is why we were confident that agreement on the draft
protocols could be quickly reached by delegations from Nigeria and Togo;
and that the resulting texts would be ready in time to be submitted
to the Ministers and Heads of State,who were expected to reassemble in
Lagos towards the end of 1975 for the Festival of Black and African Arts.
Once initial agreement on the main political issues was reached in Lagos,
in May, the remaining questions, however difficult, could be quickly and
amicably resolved.
To us, ECOWAS was no utopia conceived by politicians anxious
to distract attention away from their domestic or international problems;
nor was it a mere academic exercise designed simply to enliven the
discussions of well-disposed economic theorists. Once the protocols were
formulated, approved and incorporated in the Treaty ECOWAS would at last
be in a position to implement what has been described as its:
Detailed programmes for the introduction of direct
commercial competition into the region, the re-
orientation of trade preferences towards the
West African region and away from other suppliers,
and the radical restructuring of the taxation
system upon which so many of the smaller states
depend. 21/
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Political Change in Nigeria : July 1975 
Shortly after the successful Lagos Summit, with its endorsement
of ECOWAS and the signing of the Treaty, there was a change of government
in Nigeria, on July 29, 1975. In other circumstances that might have had
very serious consequences for a fledgling community like ours. Fortunately,
I had always taken great pains to insist that ECOWAS should not come to
be seen as the property of any one state or individual and that the leaders,
irrespective of their services to the community, participated in its
deliberations as the accredited representatives of their several states.
My colleagues had not to look far for a relevant precedent.
Despite the removal of one of the region's more outstanding political
figures, Hamani Diori, in April 1974, the incipient community had so far
recovered, by January 1975, for its Ministers to be able to assemble in
Monrovia for their second and most crucial meeting to date — the last
before Lagos. In time, other leaders would resign or be replaced, including
Generals Acheampong and Lamizana, and Presidents Tolbert and Senghor.
Each, in his own way, made a contribution to the evolution of the Community
along with many other distinguished Africans, both before and since.
For myself, r had no wish in July 1975 to disturb the peace
and security of my country or to detract in any way from the unity,
reconstruction and development that had been the object of all our end6avours.
While I wished my successors well in the many and difficult tasks that would
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confront them now, I had at the same time done everything possible to
ensure that our regional community should survive and flourish
irrespective of any changes in its personnel.
There were problems, of course, as a change of government in
Nigeria inevitably meant a period of reflection and uncertainty when the
new administration re-examined both the priorities and the commitments
of its predecessor, while other governments in the region sought assurances
that existing obligations would, at the least, be respected. From the
viewpoint of ECOWAS, however, it was on balance better that the change
should come after the creation of the Community and before it became
fully operational. Any disruption in the life of the Community was
-thereby minimised, while the new administration in Nigeria retained
considerable discretion in such vital areas as the staffing, the institutions
and the detailed operations of the Community. In that sense it may have
been a good time to change gear and try to reach the same destination by
a different route or, more accurately, by employing a different kind of
approach.
The events covered in this and the remaining chapters relate mainly
to the military governments of General Murtala Mohammed and, after February
1976, General Olusegun Obasanjo. During these years I was no longer an active
participant in government and policy-making, but remained a keen if not
altogether dispassionate observer of African and international affairs.
I now had the privilege and the opportunity to be able to reflect on our
problems without the relentless pressures of office. But my work and
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efforts were always directed with a view to serving my country in my
new capacity and to the best of my ability. To this end I have tried
to prolong my association with ECOwAS and, by offering here an account
of its formation and development, I hope to encourage others to carry
the work further so that the Community may soon fulfil the expectations
that were held in many different quarters at the time of its inception.
While our own administration had secured the ratification of
the Treaty, we had also looked forward to continuing to work closely
with the Togolese Government to ensure that the protocols were drafted in
good time for consideration by the West African leaders attending the
Festival of Black and African Arts and Culture due to be held in Lagos
towards the end of 1975. There was a risk that any delay might weaken
the consensus achieved at the Lagos meeting, that the sense of momentum
would be lost and that the leaders, having once dispersed to their national
capitals, would resume their former competition.
Already there had been a slight hiatus in our preparations as a
result of the departure of the Nigerian Commissioner for Economic Development,
Dr. Adedeji who had left Lagos to take up his new post as Executive Secretary
of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Such an important cabinet post,
with so many and such varied responsibilities, would attract many eligible
candidates and a decision could not be taken lightly. I did not see, however,
why there should not be preliminary meetings between Nigerian and Togolese
officials on the subject of the BCOWAS protocols. Their studies and
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proposals could then be considered, at a later stage, by a joint
conference of the relevant Ministers. This was the essence of a memorandum
22/
approved by the Federal Executive Council on July 24. -
The delegation was due to leave for Lomg on July 28 when it was
delayed by a Togolese request for a postponement until Dr. Adedeji's
successor had been appointed. Their view was that Ministers from both
sides should first agree the guide-lines for the protocols and issue the
directives which their officials could then execute. It seemed to be a
question of approach, reflecting the different political traditions of
the two countries, rather than any more fundamental conflict over policy
or even a disagreement as to timing.
It is possible, too, that the Togolese were unhappy with the
decision of the Lagos Summit - to the effect that Nigeria should "continue
to give attention to ECOWAS matters on an ad hoc basis pending the setting
up of a permanent secretariat in due course and that Togo should be associated
with Nigeria in this matter." Thus Adedeji's departure may have been seen
by the Togolese as an opportunity to reverse their subordinate status.
Meanwhile, Ghana, which was entrusted with no special role at the Lagos
conference, had arranged to hold discussions in Lomg at a Ministerial level
on July 30 - also on the subject of the ECOWAS protocols. As relations
between Ghana and Togo were very cordial at this time we could not exclude
the possibility of an accommodation between the two that would restrict our
own political options where the Community was concerned.
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Whatever its cause, the delay in completing the protocols was
the more unnecessary and irritating, in our view, since most of the
issues involved had already been discussed and at considerable length -
during the negotiations between the EEC and the ACP countries. Moreover,
since the Third Ministerial Meeting, in Lagos, officials, ministers and
leaders were all well aware of the protocols that would be required before
ECOWAS could be activated. It was largely a matter of agreeing the details
and harmonizing the different tasks.
With the change of government in Nigeria some further delays were
inevitable as the new administration familiarised itself with the complex and
detailed business of government. It is by no means unusual for an incoming
team to have initial misgivings and doubts about some of the programmes begun
by its predecessor. There is always the temptation to make an immediate
and complete break with previous policies in order to discredit the previous
administration and legitimise the change. Certainly the impression of at least
one West African leader, visiting Lagos in the early days of the new government,
was that those then in charge were in no hurry to press on with the
construction of ECOWAS. Relations with Togo, in particular, may have suffered
because of my long-standing friendship and collaboration with General Eyadema.
Fortunately for our region and for Africa, those doubts and mis-
understandings were soon largely dissipated by the visit of General E yadema to
Lagos. Meanwhile other African leaders had also brought home to the Nigerian
government the lesson-thatwe had tried for so long to communicate to others : which
was that every African and West AErican country had a stake in the future
of ECOWAS and a corresponding commitment to its success. Already, our
neighbours, as well as other African countries, and much of the Third World
had grasped the full significance of ECOWAS : and they would not allow it to be
the victim of changing political fortunes in any one West African state.
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In the case of ECOWAS it was difficult, however, for my
successors to take up matters exactly where we had left them. In a highly
differentiated region such as West Africa, the continuing and close
cooperation between Nigeria and Togo, based as it was on mutual confidence and
respect, as well as a measure of economic advantage, had been a vital factor
in the creation of the Community. It helped bridge the former divide between
the Francophone and English-speaking states, and served to reassure the
smaller states that cooperation with Nigeria was not only feasible, but was also
desirable. The Nigerian-Togo 'axis' was no less important after the Lagos
Summit, than before, particularly as the focus switched to potentially more
divisive issues, such as implementation of the ECOWAS objectives and the
appointment of those who would largely be responsible for its administration.
Aware of the importance to ECOWAS of close cooperation and continuing
harmony between Nigeria and Togo, I did everything possible after July 29 to
try to ensure that the change of government in Nigeria did not damage relations
between the two countries, even declining an offer to take up temporary
residence in Togo pending my eventual return to Nigeria. Despite this it may
have been difficult, at first, for the new administration in Nigeria to
distinguish clearly between my friendship with Eyadema and the essential
purpose of our collaboration, which was the wider cause of African and West
African economic cooperation. Once this was recognised in Lagos, however, the
construction of ECOWAS could proceed.
Location and Staffing of ECOWAS Institutions 
Before ECOWAS could become fully operational-it was necessary
not only to complete the protocols but also to establish the Community's
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future institutions and to agree the choice of an Executive Secretary
and the location of the Secretariat which would also serve as the ECOWAS
Headquarters. It is not unusual in such circumstances for the euphoria
that accompanies the successful launching of an organisation to be replaced
by a more competitive and even aggressive spirit, as states vie with one
another to secure some institution that will enhance their influence in the
Community, or boost the prestige of their government and its capital. The same
rivalry is apparent in the nomination and choice of the officials who will
administer the Community's affairs.Such a large and important organisation
as ECOWAS was by no means immune from such competition, although considerations
of geography and communications did restrict the range of possible sites for
the Headquarters while many states had such difficulty finding qualified
candidates for their own administration that they were understandably reluctant
to second any of them to ECOWAS.
Several states, including Ghana, Togo and Liberia, were already
known to be strong candidates either to accommodate the secretariat or to
provide its Chief Executive. Long before July 29,1 had been approached by
various leaders anxious to know of Nigeria's own position in this regard.
It had been my considered view that, until the Treaty was finally ratified,
all such speculation was necessarily premature, although the Community itself
should perhaps begin to review the talent available within the region and to
prepare a list of suitable sites for the Headquarters.
Nigeria, .obviously had a very strong claim, if she chose to assert
it, to one of the principal posts in ECOWAS, or to accommodate
any one of the Community's major institutions. However, opinion in the
administration was somewhat divided as the Federal Military Government
prepared to make public its position. One view was that, as Nigeria would
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contribute the greater part of the Community budget and would also bear
a high percentage of the administrative cost, it was only appropriate
that Lagos should provide the headquarters of the secretariat which would
inevitably increase our influence with the Community and with the other
member states. The alternative, which was the nomination of a Nigerian as
Executive Secretary, would enable us to influence events directly for only
a limited period of time, as that official would serve for an initial period of
four years with the prospect of only one further term. Once established, the
headquarters were unlikely to be removed.
A second view was that Nigeria should aim at securing the office
of Executive Secretary, if only because the first incumbent of that post
would be well placed to set the pace for the Community's activities and to map
out its course of action both in the present and for the future. While a third
position was more concerned with Nigeria's image in the region and held that it
would be to our long-term advantage to abstain from contesting either the
secretaryship or the secretariat. Our influence within the region was
already such that we had no cause to concern ourselves with patronage that would
add little if anything to our influence, would not materially advance our
interests, and might adversely affect our good image, particularly among our
partners. If distributed among some of the smaller states in the region,
however, it would considerably enhance their international status, would
undoubtedly secure their commitment to ECOWAS, and would further allay the old
fears of Nigerian domination.
Before leaving office I had discussed these various positions with
my Commissioner of External Affairs, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, and we had agreed to the
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establishment of an inter-Ministerial Committee to examine and report
on the matter. I nevertheless indicated to those concerned that, on
balance, I would prefer to have the headquarters of the Secretariat sited
in Nigeria, where we could the more effectively observe the community's
future development and progress. I was convinced that, if we offered to
provide the land and also to build the secretariat, at our own expense,
the other possible contenders would probably withdraw in our favour. As
for the post of Executive Secretary, every effort must be made to attract a
suitable candidate irrespective of nationality. Here nationality was
not very important as the post would rotate every eight years, and all
countries in the region would therefore have the opportunity to provide
administrative leadership for the Community as a whole.
Liberia was the first country to ratify the ECOWAS Treaty, on
May 30, and was also the first to lay formal claim to the Headquarters of
the new Community, in a letter of August 12 to the new Nigerian Head of
State, Brigadier (later General) Murtala Mohammed. It was doubtless that
letter which then prompted Nigeria, Togo and other states to register their
counter-claims and which inaugurated the scramble for the Headquarters.
What ensued was a battle of wits on the part of the claimant states, combining
diplomatic finesse with an impressive display of political strength and
various attempts at coalition-building. The situation was not, however,
always conducive to the kind of cooperation needed if the momentum behind
ECOWAS was to be sustained.
President Toibert i s message to the Nigerian leader was brief and
to the point:
4A
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Pursuant to Liberia's total and steadfast commitment
to the realisation of the goals and objectives of ECOWAS,
it is with modesty that I am pleased to inform you that
the Government and people of Liberia are prepared to
offer Monrovia as the Headquarters of the Community. In
this connection, the Government of Liberia is prepared to
place at the disposal of ECOWAS adequate office accommodation
for the location of the Headquarters.
He then listed the specific advantages of Monrovia and Liberia
which would qualify them to accommodate the headquarters of the new
Community.
Liberia is centrally located between the eastern and
western halves of West Africa. We have under construction
adequate conference facilities which are scheduled to be
completed in February 1977 with villas for Heads of State.
Even though there exists in Monrovia adequate hotel accommodation
for delegates and conference officials, we are constructing
additional facilities.
And, "besides being one of the less expensive countries in West
Africa, Liberia has sufficient housing facilities and local supporting staff .
is in adequate supply." Tolbert despatched his letter by special envoy,
"as an indication of the great importance which I attach to this offer to have
the ECOWAS Headquarters located in Liberia, and in my effort to solicit your kind,
brotherly support..."
Brigadier Mohammed was wisely non-committal at this stage, preferring
to postpone any more definite reply until he had first consulted members of his
government. Hitherto the new Nigerian administration had exhibited little
enthusiasm for a Community that was so closely associated with my own government.
On receipt of Tolbert's letter on August 27, however, the Ministry of External
Affairs summoned their ambassadors and high commissioners from the ECOWAS
countries for discussion and a full and complete examination.
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Fortunately, the envoys had been closely associated with the creation
of ECOWAS and were well aware of the effort and energy that had already
been expended in the cause of West African economic cooperation - just
as they were familiar with the case for the Community. It was their advice
to the Commissioner and, through him, to the government, that finally convinced
the new administration of the relevance and importance of Nigeria's ECOWAS
commitments.
It remained only to formulate an appropriate response to the
Liberian initiative. And to this end Mohammed solicited the opinion of
the Commissioner for External Affairs, Colonel J.N.Garba, and that of his
department, and the government also had the benefit of advice from Dr.Adedeji.
The conclusion of the Ministry was that Nigeria had a choice between "securing
the post of the first Executive Secretary of ECOWAS" and "having Lagos as the
Headquarters of the Community". Their recommendation, accepted by the government,
was "that the balance of advantage clearly lies in having the headquarters of
the ECOwAS located in Nigeria." 21/
The Nigerian case rested mainly on her estimated share of the
Community budget, which was one-third of the total. This would be partly
off-set by the considerable impact she would make and the continuing influence
she would acquire once the headquarters was esstablished in Lagos. It was on
the basis of this advice, then, that Mohammed decided to launch a diplomatic
campaign throughout the region in support of Nigeria's claim to house the
Community Secretariat.
He authorised and signed letters to all the Heads of State and
Government in ECOwAS, expounding the Nigerian argument and giving great
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emphasis to the offer to provide land, buildings and other facilities
for the Secretariat and its staff, without charge to the other governments.
Special letters were despatched to the other claimant states, Liberia,
Togo and Ghana.
In his official reply, on October 17, to the earlier letter from
President Tolbert, Mohammed was careful
To re—assure Your Excellency of Nigeria's continuing
interest and total commitment to the ECOWAS and of our
preparedness to do everything possible to ensure that
our Community takes off to a good start as early as
possible in the interest of the social and economic
advancement of our peoples in the West African sub—region.
And on the main issue at point,he continued to the effect that:
After careful consideration of the matters pertaining
to the ECOWAS and having taken stock of possible demands
that would be made on Nigeria to make the ECOWAS a successful
instrument for cooperation among West African States, my
Government has come to the conclusion that the best role
Nigeria can play is to have the Headquarters sited in Nigeria,
where the Secretariat will be assured of a good home and of
the goodwill of the Government and people of Nigeria. I
therefore wish to apprise Your Excellency of Nigeria's wish
to provide host facilities for the Headquarters of the
Community and to solicit Your Excellency's support for Nigeria
when the matter comes up for decision.
Nigeria was not only willing to provide all necessary facilities
for the Headquarters, but they would be made available free of charge,
including offices and accommodation, while sufficient land was promised
for the present and future development of the Community. Pending the
construction of the permanent secretariat, a -suitable building would be
25/
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provided to house the headquarters of the Community. There would be
additional residential accommodation for the Executive Secretary and the
other staff of the Secretariat and such amenities as would "enable them
to perform their duties efficiently and in a congenial atmosphere."
On the delicate matter of Liberia's own prior claim to host
the secretariat,
My Government appreciates your kind gesture in proposing
the historic city of Monrovia as the site for the
Headquarters of the ECOWAS as well as the excellent
reasons aduced in Your Excellency's letter in support of
Monrovia's claim. I have no doubts whatsoever in my mind
as to the merits of your esteemed country's claim for the
Headquarters. Apart from the constructive role that
Liberia has always played in the advancement of African
interests, she has played key roles in the movement for
cooperation in West Africa including the current effort to
rekindle the flickering flame of economic cooperation in the
West African sub-region that has culminated in the signing
of the Treaty establishing the ECOWAS.
But considerations of the long-term interests of our
peoples, rather than any selfish motives, has made my Government
came to the conclusion that the best role Nigeria can play is to
provide host facilities for the Headquarters of the ECOWAS.
I pray that Your Excellency will be so kind as to support
Nigeria's candidature for the Headquarters.
Letters r to much the same effect,were also despatched to the other
main contenders for the ECOWAS headquarters, Togo and Ghana, while they and
other West African governments were invited to support Nigeria's own
unassailable claims, based as they were on the magnanimous offer to bear the
full cost of the headquarters and all ancillary services. As evidence
of the importance the government attached to the issue, the letters were
delivered to the other fourteen states by two special delegations headed
by the Commissioners for Economic Development and Health respectively.
Beginning on October 23, the operation was to be completed by November 7.
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In discussing his proposed tour with reporters, the Commissioner
for Health, Colonel Dan Suleiman, announced that he was going "to allay
fears that the recent change of government in Nigeria would harm ECOWAS.
He would reiterate Nigeria's total support for the grouping, in whose
establishment General Gowan was a prime mover, with President Eyadema of
26/
Togo."
	 -
Shortly before the delegations departed on their mission, a
cable was received from the Liberian President acknowledging Mohammed's
earlier, non-commital reply, but in terms that left no doubt about Toibert's
conviction that Monrovia should have the headquarters. This was no doubt
reinforced by the recollection of his country's previous services to the cause
of ECOWAS, not least his generous offer to host the Third Ministerial Meeting,
in January 1975, when it had seemed as though our initiative might collapse
for lack of a suitable conference site.
Having noted Mohammed's statement of his "continuous interest in
the success of ECOWAS and the attainment of its objectives", Tolbert reminded
him of Liberia's claim to have the headquarters;
I am confident that your Government and people will
always as in the past decide in the best interest 6f
our sub-region which has such a promising future through
cooperation and understanding among all its members.
You may rest assured, my dear brother, that Liberia
will continue to spare no effort to make ECOWAS a reality and
contribute to its ultimate success as it is indeed a
meaningful instrument for the upliftment, progress and
development of our respective peoples and for the promotion27/
of peace in our own world.
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The reply from Brigadier Mohammed was probably as tactful
as circumstances would permit. Having acknowledged the contents of the
Liberian cable, the Nigerian Head of State took
The opportunity to inform Your Excellency of my
desire to send a special envoy on 25th instant
to discuss with Your Excellency not only the siting
of the headquarters of our community but the whole
range of possibilities for transforming our young
community into a dynamic instrument for cooperation
and development and for ensuring continued growth 28/
and stability in West Africa.
But, as we have seen, Liberia was not the only other state in
the region interested in playing host to the ECOWAS secretariat. Togo had •
consistently harboured the ambition to have the headquarters in Lam,
perhaps to strength its new-found role as a centre for international and
regional economic organisations. The Lome Convention, between the EEC and
the ACP countries, had been signed there at the beginning of 1975, and the city
also housed the West African Development Bank (BOAD), which sought to
promote economic development and integration within the region among
Francophone countries. As co-sponsor of ECOWAS, with Nigeria, Togo had
hoped that we might concede to Lome the honour of having the Community
headquarters, and to that end was prepared to exploit Nigerian sensitivity
to the accusation that she was exercising undue influence within the region.
It would have been clear to the Nigerian authorities that Togo could not
easily be persuaded to reconsider her chance to house the Community
headquarters, particularly in view of her special role in the creation of
ECOWAS, and her possible Francophone allies.
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The issue of the secretariat and its location should have been
discussed and settled at the proposed ECOWAS Summit, scheduled for Lagos
in November/December 1975, after the leaders had first disposed of the various
protocols. That meeting could not now take place, however, because of the
change of government in Nigeria. While all these matters had still to be
formally considered at the time of the change, in July, the position of the new
administration was in no way different from our own. Given my personal
friendship with Eyadema - which also extended to the other West African
leaders - the issue could doubtless have been settled quickly and amicably
and without damaging the basis of trust and mutual confidence on which the
Community had been built and would always rest. However, that was no longer
feasible after the events of July.
My own shiort and unofficial visit to Togo, after July 29, where I went
in a personal capacity to convey my appreciation to General Eyadema for his many
past and present kindnesses, may have been misunderstood or misinterpreted
in Lagos. As I have indicated, we always considered our close association with
Togo to be an important aspect of cooperation within the region as a whole.
However, there are indications from newspaper reports, that relations between
Nigeria and Togo became somewhat distant following July 1975 - as indicated
by the fact that the visit of a Togolese delegation to Nigeria in the latter
part of September 1975, to discuss ECOWAS and other matters, had to be postponed
until October 9. However, when the Togolese team arrived in Lagos, led by
the Foreign Minister, Ayi Hunlede, relations had evidently improved to the extent
that discussions could at last begin on the protocols, while both sides took
the opportunity to review an earlier argument-Whereby "Nigeria is to exchange
29/her crude oil for Togo phosphates." -
In his letter to General Eyadema, on October 17,1975, the
Nigerian Head of State could refer to the cordial reception accorded Nigerian
envoys in Lome, earlier in the month, as
A manifestation of the continued brotherly relations
existing between our two countries. I wish to re-assure
Your Excellency that, notwithstanding any happenings in our
two countries, Nigeria will continue to extend her right hand
of fellowship to her sister country, Togo, in all our
endeavours to pool our resources with a review to promoting
development and improving the living standards of our people.
Mohammed then recalled the decision of the Lagos Summit to entrust
the preparations of the protocols to their two countries.
My Government has taken the necessary initiative in
consultation with your Government to embark on
preparatory work on these protocols; but because of
developments of which Your Excellency is aware, it has
not been possible for the Ministers of our two countries
responsible for economic cooperation to meet with a view
to necessary action being taken to prepare the protocols.
However, now that things have stabilised, it is my fervent
hope that our two Ministers responsible for ECOWAS matters
will soon meet to carry out this urgent assignment to which
we, the Heads of State in West Africa, attach the utmost
significance. By so doing it will be possible for the
inaugural meeting of the Council of Ministers to be held
in order to carry out the various duties enumerated under
Article 61 of the Treaty.
It was perhaps unfortunate, but no doubt unavoidable, that the
same letter, inviting the Togolese government to resume joint consultations
on the protocols, served also to advise General Eyadema of our strong
interest in acquiring the Headquarters of the Communit y for Lagos, although
Togo herself had a direct interest in securing the secretariat for Lome.
Togolese ambitions in this matter were brusquely 	 dismissed in terms less
sympathetic, in the view of some observers,than those contained in a similar
message sent at the same time to President Tolbert.
30/
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The Envoys have informed me of Your Excellency's
interest in having the Headquarters of the ECOWAS
sited in Togo. I have no doubt in my mind as to
the merits of your esteemed country to have the
Headquarters since your country is a progressive one
and has all the potentials for economic development.
I also appreciate the valuable role your country played
in conjunction with Nigeria to have the ECOWAS established.
But considerations of the long-term interests of all our
peoples ...
It would certainly be hard to exaggerate the value and importance
of the Togolese contribution, in a region where Francophone states outnumbered
their English-speaking counterparts, and where there was a long tradition
of suspicion between the two, fostered by colonial rulers.
A new meeting of the Nigerian and Togolese delegations was
again arranged for February 1976, in Togo, but had once more to be cancelled
after the attempted coup de'etat and the assassination of the Nigerian Head
of State on February 13. There was yet another unavoidable delay as the former
Chief of Staff (Supreme Headquarters), Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo,
assumed his new duties as Head of State. This seems, nevertheless, to have
been the occasion for a rapprochement between the two former allies (Togo and
Nigeria) who were able to resume their previous close collaboration - to the
benefit of ECOWAS and the region as a whole, to say nothing of their
respective peoples.
In a letter of March 17, President Eyadema took the initiative
in communicating his views to the new Nigerian administration, taking the
opportunity to warn them that disillusionment with the progress of ECOWAS
could only serve to strengthen the smaller, sub-regional organisations which
had hitherto been on the defensive since the formation of the wider Community.
The numerous tasks which devolved upon You when
you assumed the leadership of the affairs of the great
sister Country of Nigeria, could have prompted me to
delay once again the despatch of this message. Please
excuse me.
I wish to refer to our Economic Community of West
African States which was established in Lagos, on the 28th
of May 1975, after much negotiation the traces of which
have still not disappeared. Nigeria and Togo, who are the
originators of this economic union, had been entrusted with
preparing and submitting to Member-States the Protocols
annexed to the Treaty creating the Community and, according
to the time-table drawn up, the meeting of Heads of State for
the effective take-off of the ECOWAS should be held in the
month of May this year.
But, unforeseen circumstances have hitherto delayed the
various preparatory meetings of the Summit of the Heads of
State at both expert and Ministerial levels.
During this time, some Member-States who for special
reasons have been pushed to create a community we did not
approve of - because it is contrary to African Unity - are
working to strengthen their group, with every risk of
dangerously jeopardising the chances of success of the
laboriously realised economic union.
I have, in fact, just received from His Excellency
President Senghor of Senegal, current Chairman of the
Economic Community of West Africa (CHAO) an invitation to
attend a forthcoming summit of that organisation.
Faced with such a situation, which calls our own
community into question, I am asking for your vigilance,
to quickly speed up the work, and facilitate the adoption
of the draft-Protocols prepared by my Government and
submitted to Your Government, for possible remarks.
The imperialists, who are not in favour of the economic
union of all the States of our Sub-region, are working day
and night to divide us and our slowness must not be allowed
to favour their criminal game.
I therefore count on You so that the meeting of the
Heads of State may be held next May as scheduled, which
means that the meetings of the experts and Ministers should
be held, at the latest, in April. 31/
The Nigerian reply was prompt and affirmative, as revealed
by General Obasanjo's letter of April 5:
I have studied your latest correspondence on the
important assignment given to our two countries
regarding the preparation of Protocols to the ECOWAS
Treaty. Before the abortive coup of February 13,1976, my
officials were preparing to travel to Lome to hold
consultations with their counterparts on the basis of the
two draft protocols prepared by both sides. It was of course
impossible at that time for the meeting to take place because
of the difficulties in my country.
However, I am happy to inform your Excellency that
officials of my Government are now in Lome to discuss the
two draft protocols and agree on a joint draft which could
be considered shortly at a Ministerial Council meeting.
The continuing controversy over the location of the ECOWAS
Headquarters, and the staffing of its principal offices, had the immediate
effect of impeding cooperation between Nigeria and Togo who had together
been entrusted, at the Lagos meetings, with the elaboration of the protocols.
By delaying the preparation of the protocols the Community, itself, was
compelled to mark time, increasing the im patience of the member-states and
particularly those who had greatest need of the new Community. But, where the
wider grouping had already shown that it was able to survive political change
in the largest of its member-states, it was now able to demonstrate
sufficient sense of unity and purpose successfully to overcome the internal
rivalries that appeared for a time to threaten it.
The Approaching Summit 
With the growing likelihood of a Summit conference some time
in 1976, when the question of the protocols and the location of the secretariat
and other institutions would be resolved, there was the additional problem of
32/
432
a suitable venue for meetings of the Ministers and Heads of State. A
formal request by the Togolese to the Federal Military Government to be
allowed to host the forthcoming Summit seems to have upset the Nigerian
authorities who recommended, instead, that contenders for the Community
headquarters should not be eligible to host the conference. The brief dispute
involved differences between the relevant Nigerian ministries as well as a
potentially more serious dispute between Nigeria and Togo.
Fortunately, the distance between the two sides was at no time so
great as to be unbridgeable. Partial agreement was soon reached at a joint
meeting in Loma, at the end of May 1976, when Nigeria announced that she would
continue to work for the success of ECOWAS,It recognised the "joint pioneer
status" of the two countries in the preparation and elaboration of ECOWAS,
and stressed the "special responsibility" of Nigeria and Togo to continue
33/
to collaborate so that ECOWAS might become operational in the near future. -
Both delegations were agreed that officials and experts of the ECOWAS countries
would meet in the Ivory Coast, from May 31 until June 6, 1976, to prepare the
final draft of the protocols. Meanwhile Nigeria - and Togo would together
invite Ghana to host the subsequent Council of Ministers, while the venue
for the Summit would be left in abeyance until the Heads of State of the
region had themselves been consulted jointly by Nigeria and Togo.
As the Sit approachedcanvassing continued throughout the region
for the privilege of providing the headquarters of the Community, Nigeria's
remaining competitors were Liberia and Togo, although Togo had by now
emerged as the principal rival, with a possible advantage should the matter
come to a vote. Increasingly, therefore, the government in Lagos began
to look for a compromise that would not only secure Nigeria's position in the
contest for the headquarters, but would also recognise Togo's role and
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contribution to the Community. To this end yet another delegation was sent
to Lome to try to resolve the stalemate. Its terms of reference were
sufficiently broad to enable Lagos and Lam to coordinate a mutually
satisfactory agreement.
In other circumstances a wide-ranging exchange of views of this kind
would have seemed an obvious step and one that would doubtless have been taken
earlier but, perhaps, for the inexperience of the new Nigerian administration
which came to office in July 1975 and the domestic crisis that had confronted
it as recently as February 1976. In their commendable zeal to secure the
headquarters for Nigeria, at whatever cost, the administration may have
neglected other Community institutions whose potential influence was arguably
greater than that of the secretariat. It was now recognised in Lagos that
there was more to the Community than the location of the headquarters and
the appointment of the Executive Secretary. There was, for example, the
Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development, established under Article 50
of the Treaty, for the purpose of promoting development in the less advanced
states of the Community, and of ensuring some balance between the interests
of the more prosperous coastal states and the requirements of the poorer
land-locked countries.
The outcome of these many overtures between the Nigerian and
Togolese governments, in the course of 1976 was a special meeting in the
Autumn in Lame between General Eyadema and the Nigerian Chief of Staff
(Supreme Headquarters), Brigadier S.Yar'Adua, when a compromise solution was
reached which enabled both countries to agree on a wide range of appointments,
locations and other matters affecting ECOWAS. The impasse was finally
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resolved in a complex series of arrangements whereby Togo would have
the headquarters of the Fund, while Nigeria would provide the headquarters
of the Community and accommodation for the Secretariat.
Liberia, the other contestant, was invited to nominate the
Managing Director of the Fund, while the Ivory Coast would be asked to
supply the first Executive Secretary, even though President Houphoudt-Boigny
had not lobbied for the post. Other appointments were quickly agreed on and,
with this secret agreement between the two original sponsors of the Community,
it was then possible to remove all remaining obstacles to the effective
establishment of ECOWAS. A subsequent meeting of Togolese and Nigerian
officials, after three days of hard bargaining, agreed a formula for the protocols
concerning rules of origin, compensation for loss of revenue, and the basis
34/
of contributions to the Fund and the Community budget. -
The location of the Community institutions and the appointment
of their officials was not the only outstanding business confronting the
West African leaders. The institutions would obviously affect the shape of the
Community, while the officials would be expected to impress on the organisation
their own distinctive style and sense of purpose. But the Community could not
become operational without prior agreement on a certain number of protocols.
The five under consideration after the Lagos Summit all concerned
crucial areas of the Treaty and involved a definition of "rules of origin"
for those goods originating in member-states and permitted to circulate
freely within the Community; provision for the re-exportation within ECOWAS
of goods imported from third countries; the manner in which the Community
would assess the loss of revenue by member states arising from the
implementation of its programmes; the procedures that would govern the
A35
the operations of the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development;
and the schedule that would determine the contributions by member states to
the ECOWAS budget.
The protocols were the sole business of a meeting of experts
and officials in Abidjan, the Ivory Coast, held at the beginning of June 1976,
and their report was then considered at a Meeting of the Council of Ministers
of the Community, in Accra, Ghana, at the end of July. Opening proceedings,
General Acheampong advised the Ministers to devote more attention to promoting
'horizontal' trade among member-states, as this was the one means whereby they
could develop their self-reliance and make their countries more independent. He
reminded his audience that
By our signature and subsequent ratification of the
treaty, we have raised in our citizens the vision of
a vast homogeneous society linked together by a
complicated network of roads, connected by a direct,
efficient and rational system of telecommunications,
enriched by a steady flow of commerce and sustained
by common ventures in agriculture, industry, energy, 35/
mineral resources, and other fields of economic activity. -
But, he warned, "we cannot afford to blight this vision by delaying the
adoption of the necessary instruments for action."
After long discussion and lively debate, all but two of the five
protocols were recommended for adoption by the Heads of State. The other
two, concerning "rules of origin" for the products of member states, and
levels of compensation to be awarded states suffering as a result of Community
action, were referred to a subsequent meeting of Ministers, to be held
36/immediately before the conference of Heads of State and Government. -
4B6-
As at previous mettings, the Ministers were assisted by
representatives of the Economic Commission for Africa, although on this
occasion there were some objections that both the ECA advisers were from
English—speaking states, namely Ghana and Nigeria. Our own Ministry of
External Affairs was clearly anxious to have a more representative team
advising the next Council meeting, when the remaining protocols would be
considered. According to Dr. Adedeji, however, the problem was not one
of bias, but stemmed from the absence within the ECA of Francophone officials
with the requisite expertise.
The controversy was perhaps unfortunate but should not be allowed
to obscure the long and creditable record of the ECA in promoting West
African economic cooperation, particularly in the years that elapsed between
the meeting in Accra, in 1967, of ministers and plenipotentiaries to sign
the articles of association of the proposed West African Regional Group,
and the meeting in 1976 of Ministers, gathered in the same city, to consider
the protocols that would regulate the activities of ECOWAS. It was appropriate,
then, that Dr. Robert Gardiner, Dr. Adedeji's predecessor at the ECA, and now
Commissioner for Economic Planning in Ghana, should preside over the Accra
deliberations.
In Accra, Nigeria and Togo were mandated to discuss arrangements
for the proposed Ministerial and Summit meetings and to finalise all relevant
details in consultation with the other member states of the Community. Where
the dispute over the siting of the headquarters had delayed agreement on a
venue for the forthcoming Summit, the intervening negotiations between
Nigeria and Togo, and the resulting compromise proposals, now made it
possible for them to propose Lome as the location for both meetings.
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Nigeria had already despatched envoys to all countries in the
region to obtain their views about the date and venue of the meetings
and to solicit their support for the inclusion in the ECOWAS protocols
/
of a non-aggression pact. 37-
	 This last was seen as a contribution to the
peace and stability of the region and an attempt to secure the autonomous
development of the states comprising it. Events elsewhere in Africa at
this time, to say nothing of our own experience within the region, suggested
the wisdom of such an arrangement which had also recommended itself to some
of the Francophone states. The envoys were also able to inform the West
African leaders that Nigeria and Togo were agreed that the Summit should be
held before the- end of 1976, by which time they hoped to be in a position to
make joint proposals on such issues as the siting of the Community headquarters
and the appointment of a secretary-general.
It was, by all reports, a successful mission which prepared the
way for the later visit by a joint Nigeria-Togo team to all states in the
region with a formal invitation to attend an ECOWAS Summit on November 4-5,
in Lome, Togo, to be preceded by a Council of Ministers also meeting in Lome.
This second mission, from 22nd to 28th September was led by the Nigerian
Federal Commissioner for Special Duties, Mr. Ajose-Adeogun, accompanied by the
leader of the Togolese representatives, the Minister for Works and Mines,
38/the Hon.Ayite G.Mivedor. -
On October 13, the joint team was able to report to the Nigerian
and Togolese governments that its task had been completed as all member
countries had signified their agreement to attend the Summit and, in most
cases, to be represented at the highest level. The impression formed by the
leader of the joint delegation was one of considerable enthusiasm for ECOWAS
throughout the region and, not least, among the Francophone states,
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particularly those like Senegal and Mali whose earlier attitude had
39/been lukewarm or ambivalent. -
Even President Senghor, who had hitherto been noticeably reticent
about ECOWAS, had promised to be in Lome, in person, for the Summit and had taken
the opportunity to commend the role of Togo and Nigeria who 'had done a
marvellous job on ECOWAS." Senghor, it was said, "could hardly conceal
his pleasure about the mission of the delegation and in consequence threw
aside protocol and discussed freely in English." In conclusion he had stressed
that "he thought it more and more imperative for African nations to control
their own economies and sustain their political independence."
The more favourable attitude displayed by many of the Francophone
states may have reflected developments elsewhere in Africa, with evidence
of growing involvement by the big powers and their allies, and by the former
colonial rulers, but it was doubtless also a product of the wide-ranging and
important modus viVendi recently concluded between Nigeria and Togo, which
held out to the Community the prospect of operations using its institutions
and procedures. To capitalise on this new sense of harmony and cooperation
and to ensure that the crucial decisions to be taken at Lome had the widest
possible basis of support within the Community, the same envoys were again
despatched to those countries whose leaders either had not been available
during the earlier tour, or had been uncertain whether they could themselves
attend the Summit.
In the case of the Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone the mission now
received a definite commitment that the President would himself be present
in Lome for the Summit. And the leader of the mission, Ajose-Adeogun, was
again impressed by the more encouraging mood emanating from the Francophone
401leaders and, on this occasion, from the President of the Ivory Coast. -*
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Like Senghor, before him, Bouphouet-Boigny received the mission without other
officials or even Ministers being present. The Ivory Coast had clearly been
kept well informed of the progress made in the talks between Nigeria and Togo.
Where Eyadema was actively mediating at this time in the recent dispute between
the Ivory Coast and Gabon, arising from the latter's decision, in September 1976,
to quit OCAM and its threat to withdraw from Air Afrique, it is quite
possible that Eyadema had also solicited the support of Houphouft-Boigny in
obtaining the cooperation of other Francophone states, including Upper Volta,
Mali and Senegal, the latter which had expressed certain reservations about
ECOWAS at the previous Summit in Lagos.
It was perhaps fortunate that, on the most controversial issues
facing the Lom‘ Summit, the Ivory Coast seemed ready to support the
compromise reached between Togo and Nigeria. Where it had been feared that
some Francophone states, including Senegal, might object to the choice of
Lagos as the site of the Community headquarters, giving as grounds the high
cost of living, lack of accommodation, transportation problems and poor
communications. Houphougt-Boigny dismissed such reports as unfounded, asserting
categorically that he would go along with whatever Nigeria and the Togolese
government had agreed. He was also prepared, if asked, to try and find a
suitable candidate for Executive Secretary of the Community, although his-own
country was hard pressed to meet its own requirements for top administrators
41/
and specialists. -
Even the protocols, in their revised form seemed to him to present
no great difficulties, whether concerning "rules of origin", or the terms
of compensation to be offered the less industrialised states. Neither
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proposal was new and, in the case of the second, the Sahel states were already
being compensated, under existing customs arrangements, for any loss of revenue
on goods imported through the Ivory Coast. In an earlier report, Ajose-Adeogun
had described Houphoudt-Boigny "as an elder statesman, conscious of the
42/interest of his fast-growing industrialised country...." - The latter now took
the opportunity of his discussions with the leader of the visiting mission to
express his continuing interest in the supply of crude oil from Nigeria,
which could then be refined in the Ivory Coast.
When the Council of Ministers of ECOWAS assembled in Lams, on
October 29,1976, some seventeen months had elapsed since the last Lagos
Summit. -43/ The meeting was chaired by the Togolese Foreign Minister, Yao
Grunitzky, and the earlier cooperation between Nigeria and Togo continued
as every effort was made to confine Council discussions to the matter of the
two protocols that were still in dispute after the previous Accra meeting.
The Community institutions, their location and staffing, and the Nigerian
proposals for a non-aggression pact, were thus deferred for the consideration
of the Summit.
The Summit, itself, was opened by General Eyadema and was
attended by no less than eleven Heads of State, while the remaining countries
were represented by their plenipotentiaries. After months of patient work
by the Nigerian and Togolese ministers and officials, the five protocols,
as amended by the Council of Ministers at Accra or, more recently, Lom g, were
presented for final approval. Only one occasioned serious further debate : the
formula for contributions to the organisation's budget. Where the Ministers
had proposed that these should be based half on the country's Gross Domestic
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Product and half on per capita income, Nigeria, the richest and most
populous state in the region, had opposed this, proposing instead a levy
one-third of which would be based on GDP, while the remaining two-thirds
would be based on per capita income. The complicated formula finally adopted
by the Summit, despite some Nigerian opposition, was that the financial
budget would each year be assessed on the basis of a coefficient calculated
"as one-half of the ratio of the GDP of all member states plus one half of
the ratio of the per capita income of each member state to the total per capita
4income of each member state." 4/ (Table 6).
The remaining protocols, which produced less discussion on this
occasion, provided for the creation of a Fund for Cooperation, Development
and Compensation; for compensatory payments to reimburse those member states
that suffered a loss of income as customs tariffs within the Community were
progressively reduced over the ensuing fifteen years; there was provision,
too, for the re-export within the Community of goods imported from non-member
countries - which some had feared would favour European exporters with long-
established African connections - and there was agreement as to the criteria
to be applied to'which goods were to be defined as products originating in member
states.
It was agreed that the headquarters of the Community should be in
Lagos and although Senegal was reported to have opposed the choice, "neither
she nor any other state made a rival bid to be host to the headquarters",
45/perhaps because such hospitality "could prove expensive". - In any case
Nigeria would, under the formula for assessing contributions to the Community
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budget, be defraying something like a third of the cost of the organisation
and Nigeria was also in a position to meet unexpected payments and to
underwrite any temporary deficits. The Ivory Coast was asked to provide
the first Executive Secretary. Lom g would be the headquarters of the Community
Fund, whose future significance was only beginning to be realised. Liberia, which
was disappointed in its bid for the secretariat and was later a prospective
candidate for the headquarters of the Fund, was invited to supply the Managing
Director of the Fund. Ghana, meanwhile, with Nigerian support had seen its
candidate, Dr. Donkoh Fordwor, elected President of the African Development
Bank, in Kinshasa, in May 1976 - after an unsuccessful bid the previous
year in Dakar.
As West Africa commented after the Summit:
While the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS is to come
from the ivory Coast, the Managing Director of the
Fund will come from Liberia. So, with the exception
of Guinea-Bissau, which, one supposes, is little
concerned with such matters, all the strands which have come
together in ECOWAS are to have their place in the organisation.
It would be idle to suppose that at this stage such an
organisation could operate on any other basis. But it is
to be hoped that the enormous benefits which establishment
of this great area of free trade and free movement offers to
member states - for some of which it can be said to be 46/
essential - will soon transcend such considerations.
In his closing speech, General Obasanjo paid tribute to Lomg,
which had now witnessed the signing of the protocols.to be incorporated
in the Treaty,"in which we have recorded, in great detail, the principles
47/
for carrying out the objectives of our Organisation." - In congratulating
the ministers and officials on their work in preparing the protocols he remarked
that, "from personal experience ... the task of producing the Protocols has by
no means been easy." Later in his address he introduced a cautionary
noteinto the proceedings, similar to General Eyadema's warning at the
Lagos Summit : that the Treaty, itself, was only a beginning and that
the Community was only as strong as the political will supporting it.
It could be a fatal error to under-estimate the
immensity and the magnitude of the problems that
still lie ahead. The signing of the Treaty and the
Protocols is only the beginning of a long and difficult
journey to full economic integration of the sub-region,
and it must be acknowledged that the Treaty per se,
however perfect in form, cannot guarantee the achievement
of its objectives without the necessary political will
on the part of all concerned in its operation.
Obasanjo maintained further that the leaders had
A supreme duty, nonetheless, to succeed in the face
of all odds, and not deviate from the goal of
economic emancipation for our peoples.
Moreover, he had no doubt that, with unyielding determination, and given
the necessary political will, with the steadfast courage of statesmen,
ECOWAS shall overcome all obstacles that could arise both now and in the
future.
The "resounding success" achieved at Lome was a consequence of
"the statesman-like spirit of compromise," made possible by "the constructive
approach" of those involved in the Summit, working "in the truest spirit
of African solidarity."
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The ECOWAS Summit of Lame, as a result of this
general spirit of cooperation, goes down into the
records of the birth of our sub-regional Organisation
as a turning point in our efforts to get ECOWAS off the
ground. The happy outcome of our deliberations is
undoubtedly a great achievement for which we all deserve
to congratulate ourselves. Furthermore, it has quite
clearly confounded the enemies of Africa who have, as
usual, viewed with cynicism any possibility of achieving
a concrete and positive result at this Summit meeting.
Obasanjo pledged "priority attention" by Nigeria to "all matters
of economic, political, and social advancement" affecting "all our African
brothers". Although the Nigerian economy had recorded "some improvement" in
recent years, they were "very conscious of the fact that our domestic demands
on these resources are many and formidable". Nevertheless,
I need hardly emphasise ... our active commitment within
the limits of our resources, in the areas of bilateral and
multilateral economic cooperation with sister African states.
We are consequently irrevocably committed to the success
of ECOWAS for the benefit of all our peoples in the sub-
region.
The Nigerian authorities were well aware that
Our economic problems cannot be solved in isolation,
because our individual national economies are
characterised by common problems, indivisable by
nature, and requiring common solution through joint efforts.
Finally the Nigerian leader alluded to his country's proposal to
include among the protocols of the Community a non-aggression pact, which
suggestion had been well received although a decision had been postponed pending
more detailed consideration of its final form and content.
4 4,5
Your Excellencies, please permit me at this point
in time to reiterate the proposal so generously
supported by our brother, President Eyadema, in his
opening remarks, about the imperative need to refrain
from the use of force in settling our problems, which I
personally consider very important to our Community.
It seems to me, in this regard, that we have too often
permitted avoidable political differences to divert our
attention from the desired goal of economic development
and cooperation in our sub-region. I believe, therefore,
that we should spare no efforts under the auspices of the
Community, to stabilise peace and harmony in our sub-region,
and to re-affirm our adherence to the Charters of the United
Nations Organisation and the Organisation of African Unity
on peaceful co-existence among the nations of the world.
I refer, of course, to the proposal to insert a non-
aggression clause in the Treaty of ECOWAS. It is, in
our view, a proposal that is worthy of early consideration
by the High Authority of Heads of State and Government of the
ECOWAS, in the interest of lasting peace and security in
our sub-region as a solid basis for the economic and social
integration of our peoples and our lands.
It would be tantamount to self-deceit to hope for economic
and social cooperation and integration, in an atmosphere
of disharmony and hostilities in the sub-region.
By February 1977 the Liberian National Assembly had already
ratified the draft protocols agreed in Lome and, as it only required seven
member states to ratify before the protocols came into operation, the
foundations of ECOWAS could be said to have been well and truly laid.
On December 24, a letter to-General Obasanjo, from President Houphoudt-Boigny
advised of the nomination of Aboubakar Diaby Ouattara, presently Regional
Director of the International Bank for West Africa, Abidjan, as his country's
48/
choice for the post of Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. - On December 27
there was a cable from the President of Liberia nominating Dr. A.Romeo Horton
to serve as Managing Director of the ECOWAS Fund for Compensation, Development
49/
and Cooperation. - Dr. Horton was President and one of the founders of the
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Bank of Liberia; he was also President of the Bankers Association of Liberia,
had played an important role in the negotiations leading to the establishment
of the African Development Bank, was a former Secretary of Commerce,
Industry and Transportation, and, until this appointment, had acted as Dean
of the College of Business and Public Administration of the University of
Liberia. The two new executive officers both travelled to Lagos on the
same flight, to see General Obasanjo, before assuming their respective
positions.
It was interesting that both nominees had considerable experience
in the field of banking - the more valuable in view of the daunting economic
tasks confronting ECOWAS. In his letter Houphoudt-Boigny also proposed
to circulate the West African leaders with a note on the operation of the
Fonds d'Entraide of the Council of the Entente, indicating that theirlong
experience in administering this "fund for regional solidarity" could well
50/furnish useful guide-lines for the new Community Fund. -
On December 29 both nominees paid a courtesy visit on the Nigerian
Head of State and pledged themselves to do all in their power to achieve
the objectives of the Community. General Obasanjo emphasised Nigeria's
commitment to the success of ECOWAS and advised the new Secretary-General,
the central figure of the Community, of the basic priority to be given such
areas as communications, including roads and telecommunications, which were
essential to the emergence of an integrated system. Moreover, studies
of practical areas of cooperation should be initiated at the earliest
opportunity, while Nigeria would render what assistance she could provided it
51/
was within her capacity. -
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Perhaps perceiving possible difficulties in future, he emphasised
to both officers the need to look at the Community as a single and unique
body comprising the Secretariat and the Fund, which should function in an
atmosphere of exemplary harmony. In the absence of such a rapport the Community
might, he warned, be doomed to failure and he concluded with the admonition that
"this, therefore, requires direct and constant communication between the two
institutions." 52/ Both officers then renewed their assurances of commitment
to the new Community while Obasanjo asked them to assume their duties as soon
as possible and to try to visit other member states of the organisation
before their nominations were announced publicly.
The warnings by the Nigerian Head of State proved to be both
accurate and timely, but did not succeed in averting the 'crisis' that would
soon paralyze the Community's institutions and delay its effective operation
for a further three years. That 'crisis' is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 12
PROBLEMS OF OPERATING THE NEW ECOWAS INSTITUTIONS : 1977-79
Shortly after ECOWAS became fully operational, in 1977, with
the ratification of the protocols and the installation of the Executive
Secretary and the Managing Director of the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation
and Development, the Community was soon faced with a new set of problems
involving the Executive Secretariat and the Fund arising out of the relationship
between the two most senior officials. Such personal and institutional
rivalries are by no means unique to ECOWAS or confined to multinational
organisations, but they are likely to assume wider dimensions and a more
damaging character in the latter, where there is a premium on voluntary
cooperation.
The history of inter-governmental organisation;therefore offers
innumerable examples of conflicts involving officials and institutions and
the governments they are meant to serve, and arising from every conceivable
source. Having appointed the chief executive officers the member states
usually reserve the right to supervise their activities and to determine the
direction and content of Community policies. And yet the dividing line between
policy and administration, however important, is exceedingly difficult to draw
with any degree of certainty or precision. Nor can it be assumed that there
will always be close cooperation among the officials themselves, or the states
comprising the Community.
The situation is particularly delicate in organisations like the OAU
or ECOwAS, which rely for much of their effectiveness on preserving a broad
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consensus of views and conduct among the participating states. ECOWAS does,
of course, have the advantage of mobilising a restricted number of states -
sixteen after the accession of Cape Verde, in October 1977 - and of acting
within a limited area of competence. But even in ECOWAS, which is primarily an
economic community, political considerations are likely to be prominent,
particularly in the formative years and before governments and their
representatives and officials have settled into a more relaxed and confident
set of relationships.
The brief, but fairly intense rivalry over the location of the main
ECOWAS institutions was indicative of the continuing strength of national
sentiment among the governments of the region, and their understandable
preoccupation, still, with political sovereignty despite their voluntary
commitment to wide-ranging measures of economic integration. There is always the
risk that, in such circumstances, the community institutions will not have
sufficient autonomy to function effectively or, indeed, at all. Or else, that
certain community institutions will become so closely identified with particular
national interests as to assume an almost independent existence.
The administrators, themselves, who are expected to serve the
wider community, are vulnerable to the accusation that they are unduly
sensitive to the interests of the government that nominated them in the first
place - and to wham they are often beholden in various other ways. Conversely,
that government may itself become critical of the performance of a nominee
who has now, perforce, to respond to pressures from other quarters. The problem
for the community officials is therefore to avoid giving any impression of
divided loyalties as they work to develop their new institutions.
453
In the short time available they have to adapt their individual
style to the new situation, impress their personality on their colleagues
and on others with whom they have now to act, assert their authority over
their subordinates and establish, as quickly as possible, the basis of an
effective but suitable and positive working relationship with their new
employers, i.e., the member states of the organisation, but more particularly -
although not exclusively - with the government and administration of the host
country, where the headquarters of the institution are situated.
It is likely that a country with sufficient influence to attract
the headquarters of an inter-state organisation, will also have a strong
and abiding interest in the success of the community and in the way it
functions, extending perhaps beyond matters of administrative detail to
broader considerations of community policy. This may be even more marked in an
organisation of relatively few states, than in one of continental dimensions.
Then there are the complex problems of administering a multi-national
institution in such a way as to maintain a semblance of cohesion, discipline
and efficiency, despite the need for 'balanced' re presentation at all levels,
including the most senior, if only to maintain a semblance of parity among
the member-states - and despite their differing levels of organisational
competence and educational opportunity.
Other problems, again, stem from the organisational structure of
such communities and the delicate relationships within and between the various
community institutions. The highest administrative offices within a multi-
national community are likely to attract candidates with considerable experience
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in the politics and government, or the commerce and administration, of their
own countries, and enjoying the confidence of the national leadership. In
trying to impress their own personality and style on the community institutions
they are open to accusations of exceeding their competence or, even worse,
abusing their trust.
There is the frequent problem, too, of trying to coordinate
the activities of the various institutions co-habiting within the same
community, each of which is subject to different expectations and may therefore
be tempted, whether for reasons of survival or of budgetary advantage, to engage
in activities that can only be described as 'empire-building'.
The Heads of State and Government are themselves usually the
ultimate arbiter of most such quarrels in multi-national communities - pending
the establishment of a permanent tribunal with an agreed jurisdiction. But,
because of the demands and pressures of high office, they are by definition
unable to immerse themselves as completely as they might wish in the
day to day affairs of the community for any extended period of time.
They have, therefore, to devolve many of their functions and even
•
some of their responsibilities onto periodic meetings of ministers or other
subordinate officials who, in turn, may lack sufficient authority to resolve
disputes concerning administrative competencies, and whose efforts, however
well-meant, may simply aggravate the problem - if only hy delaying the
intervention of the government leaders themselves. Alternatively, there is
the risk, happily rare, that some of the ministers may themselves be more
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concerned to carve out independent spheres of action, removed from the
constant oversight of their superiors, than they are to assert the community's
authority over its institutions and their chief executives.
The preceding discussion is not to say that ECOWAS was necessarily
confronted by all - or even most - of these difficulties once its institutions
were activated in 1977. The central issue here was the relationship of the Fund
to the Secretariat and the responsibility of the Executive Secretary for the
administration of the Community as a whole. But it is in the nature of
administrative disputes that, given the opportunity, they will inevitably grow,
encompassing a wide range of subsidiary issues and assuming exaggerated
proportions as the chief protagonists feel compelled to seek out whatever
support is available. As a rule, the longer the dispute continues the more
numerous the groups and interests affected and the more difficult it becomes
to achieve a successful reconciliation.
This particular dispute was resolved, satisfactorily, after two
years and following repeated interventions by the Council of Ministers and
individual leaders and, finally, the arbitration of the Heads of State and
Government acting as the supreme Authority within the Community. Their
involvement was probably unavoidable, given the constitutional ambiguities
at the heart of the matter. But the constitutional issues, themselves, were
only relevant in so far as their interpretation was contested by officials
of contrasting personality, style and approach, seeking to establish a firm
administrative base and to impose their authority thereon, and at the same time
seeking and finding support within the Community that went far beyond their
country of origin.
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In concentrating on the central issue, in this chapter, I have
also tried to convey some impression of the extent of the dispute, its
ramifications and the many attempts to resolve it, so that the appropriate
lessons may, hopefully, be drawn. First, however, it is necessary to describe,
briefly, the institutions and then the parties to the dispute and the origins
of their controversy in so far as these can be ascertained.
ECOWAS Institutions
As the ECOWAS Treaty became fully operational on March 1,1977,
the Community now had constitutional status and its activities enjoyed legal
sanction. Its activities were conducted by the following institutions,
provided for in Article 4 of the Treaty, as amended subsequently, on May 28,
1981, by an additional protocol authorising the creation of a Defence Council
and Defence Commission:
(a) The Authority of Heads of State and Government;
(b) The Council of Ministers;
(c) The Defence Council;
(d) The Executive Secretariat;
(e) The Tribunal of the Community; and
(f) The following Technical and Specialised Commissions:-
(i)	 The Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and
Payments Commission;
The Industry, Agriculture, and Natural Resources
Commission;
(iii) The Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission;
(iv) The Social and Cultural Affairs Commission; and,
since May 1981,
(v) The Defence Commission. -
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As we have indicated, the Authority was the principal governing
institution of the Community, with responsibility for the general direction
and control of the executive organs. Meeting at least once a year, with a
rotating chairmanship, the decisions and directives of the Authority were
binding on all the institutions of the Community. The governments concerned
preferred this system to the pattern of supra-national organisation employed
elsewhere because it seemed more appropriate in our case, and because in any
case, decision-making in 'supra-national' bodies usually requires individual
states to approve the more important decisions taken on their behalf. As
the final authority in their own countries, the Heads can, if they wish,
commit those countries in advance to a particular line of action at their
Summit meetings - subject, of course, to endorsement in accordance with the
constitutional provisions in fairce in each state.
The Council of Ministers, meeting at least twice a year, with two
representatives from each state, was expected to act as the main link between
the Authority and the other institutions of the Community. The Ministers
would be in touch with their respective political heads and would be more
closely involved in the planning and discussion of Community affairs, working
to ensure the harmonious development of the Community and the recognition,
by others, of the interests of their own state. At any one time their
deliberations were likely to provide a consensus of the views to be found
among the various members of the Authority.
The Secretariat was intended to be the main administrative and
nerve centre of the Community and without it ECOWAS could not even begin
to function effectively. The Executive Secretary, who was the principal
executive officer of ECOWAS, was appointed by the Authority, itself, to serve
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an initial term of four years, which might be extended for a second term.
There was also provision for two Deputy Executive Secretaries, a Financial
Controller, and other officers who would later be appointed to the Secretariat
by the Council of Ministers. These officials, in the discharge of their duties,
owed allegiance to the Community alone.
If the Secretariat was to be responsible for the smooth functioning
of the Community's administrative machine, it was essential, firstly, that the
Executive Secretary should enjoy the confidence of the member states and,
second, that his responsibility for and his authority over the various
agencies comprising ECOWAS should be respected by his subordinates and upheld
by the Council of Ministers and by the supreme Authority, itself, And it
was the question of his authority over one of these agencies, the Fund for
Cooperation, Compensation and Development, that was at the centre of a bitter
and complicated dispute, from 1977 until 1979, which did much to paralyse
the activities of the Community and may even have seemed, at times, to threaten
its survival.
Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development 
Seen from the outset as a subordinate agency, albeit charged with
important functions and enjoying a limited autonomy, the Fund was not
included among the institutions of the Community, set out in Article 4 of the
Treaty and reproduced earlier in this chapter. Given the attention that it
received during 1977-79, however, it seems advisable at this point to provide
a more detailed account of the Fund. and its proposed area of operation.
Chapter XI of the Treaty (Articles 50-52) provided for its establishment, while
its detailed operations and structures were later set out in a protocol
2/signed at the Second ECOWAS Summit, in Lome, in November 1976.- TJnder
the terms of that protocol the purpose of the Fund was to:
(i) Provide compensation and other forms of assistance
to Member States which have suffered losses as a result
of the application of the provisions of the Treaty;
(ii) Provide compensation to Member States which have suffered
losses as a result of the location of Community enterprises;
(iii) Provide grants for financing national or Community research
development;
(iv) Grant loans for feasibility studies and development projects in
Member States;
Cy)
	 Guarantee foreign investments made in Member States in respect
of enterprises established in pursuance of the provisions of the
Treaty on the harmonisation of industrial policies;
(vi) Provide means to facilitate the sustained mobilisation of internal
and external financial resources for the Member States and the
Community; and
(vii) Promote development projects in the less developed Member States
(Article 2).
Articles 3 and 4 of the protocol set out details of the two
sources of finance available to the Fund and its Directors:
(1) The Ordinary Capital Resources of the Fund from:
(a) the Capital of the Fund from the contributions of Member
States assessed and calculated on a coefficient of one-half
of the ratio of Gross Domestic Product of a Member State to the
total Gross Domestic Product of all Member States plus one-half
of the ratio of the Per Capita—Income of all the Member
States - both GDP and PCI based on United Nations GDP and
Population figures;
(b) income from enterprises either wholly or partly owned by
the Community;
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(c) receipts from bilateral and multilateral sources as
well as other foreign sources;
(d) subsidies and contributions of all kinds and from all
sources;
(e) income derived from loans made from the above mentioned
resources or from guarantees given by the Fund;
(f) borrowing by the Fund; and
(g) any other source of income received by the Fund which does
not form part of its Special Facilities.
(2) Special Facilities from 
(a) funds contributed by Member States as may be determined
by the Council for provision of compensation and other
forms of assistance to Member States;
(b) funds accepted by the Fund in any Special Facility;
(c) funds repaid in respect of loans or guarantees financed
from any Special Facility 	 •
(d) income derived from operations of the Fund where Special
Facility funds are used 	 ;
(e) funds from such sources as the Fund may consider
approrpiate for the promotion of the purposes of the
Fund including compensation to Member States.
Contributions to the Fund by member states were to be made
"in specified convertible currency" and the unit of account was the Special
Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund, or other currency designated
by the Council (Article 6). If they felt it desirable, or necessary, the
Board of Directors of the Fund might propose an increase in the contributions
by member states as well as other methods of increasing the Fund's resources
(Article 7). However, those resources were to be used exclusively for the
purpose set out in Article 2 of the protocol. Article 10 prescribes the
methods of operation of the Fund, while Article 11 defines the limits of those
operations, and Article 13 requires the Fund to be guided mainly by sound
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banking principles. Other articles set out the terms and conditions
for direct loans and guarantees, the scale of commission and fees to be
charged, and procedures to be employed in case of default.
To provide for some degree of autonomy, in respect of its
technical operations, the Fund has its own Board of Directors, .consisting
of Ministers from each member state, or an alternate delegate nominated by
the state. This Board, which is very similar in composition to the Council
of Ministers, is invested with all the powers of the Fund and has the capacity
to make regulations as and when required. The Authority, itself, issues only
general policy directives to the Board (Article 25). The Directors meet
at least once a quarter at the Fund's headquarters, Lome, where the quorum is
two-thirds of the membership; meetings are usually convened by the Managing
Director, on the advice of the Chairman of the Board. The chairmanship rotates
on an annual basis; each director has a single vote and all issues are decided
by simple majority.
The chief executive officer of the Fund is the Managing Director,
appointed by the Council of Ministers for a period of four years. He may
attend meetings of the Board but has no vote, being mainly responsible for the
day to day administration of the Fund, in which task he is assisted by a
Deputy Managing Director of the Fund, appointed by the same procedures.
The Managing Director is the legal representative of the Fund (Article 28),
which has separate legal status, enjoys legal	 immunity, and has assets
that are exempt from all restrictions, regulations and controls, and are not
liable to any form of taxation.
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Member states are specifically requested to respect the
international character of the Fund and to refrain from any attempt
to influence its Managing Director or Staff in the discharge of their
duties. All employees are reminded that their sole loyalty is to the
Community and the Fund (Article 14), while they are expected to avoid any
involvement in the politics of member states for the duration of their
service with the Community. Conversely, empioyees are to be protected by
the Community from possible pressures emanating from individual member states.
Such injunctions, meant to uphold the international character
of the Fund and to ensure the integrity of its staff and operations, were
later used by the Managing Director in his own defence during the subsequent
dispute between himself and the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS.
Initial Concept of the Fund and its Role 
That dispute and its repercussions are the principle subjects
of this chapter. At the outset no one queries the division of functions
between the Secretariat and the Fund, or the wisdom of locating their
headquarters in different countries - however close to one another. It
had been assumed that the secretariat would be the leading institution
and that its incumbent would be the principal administrative officer,
responsible for coordinating the operations of the Community as a whole
and, as such, answerable to the Council of Ministers and, ultimately, the
Authority. The Fund was held to be an important institution, essential
to the smooth and successful operation of the Community, but with more
limited and specialised functions than the Secretariat. Without continuing
and harmonious cooperation between the two, in the pursuit of common
objectives, both long and short term, the Community could hope to achieve
very little.
The Fund was set up primarily to facilitate the creation of a
West African Customs Union, offering compensation to those states whose
revenues were diminished by progressive reductions in tariff levels. Its other
important, but subordinate functions were to guarantee foreign loans intended to
finance approved projects within the region and, in some instances, to provide
financial resources.What soon became apparent, however, was the fact that(
in a Community designed to create new economic opportunities in an otherwise
largely underdeveloped and ill-equipped region, the Fund would inevitably
assume particular significance, especially to the poorer members.
For those who were so inclined, it was easy to project the
agency not as a Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development, but
as one for Development, Compensation and Cooperation. Given a sufficiently
astute and determined Managing Director, and an incomplete and still largely
inchoate Secretariat, the opportunities for making the Fund and its activities
the focus of the entire Community were soon evident to all. Worse, the
concern of the founding fathers to insulate the Fund and its executive officers
from excessive interference, whether from inside or outside the Community,
did much to encourage a view of the Fund not as an agency with limited
autonomy and broad discretion, but as a totally independent institution
functioning only nominally within the wider Community.
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These problems, as we shall see, were inherent in the Treaty
itself and in the accompanying protocols, signed in November 1976.
Together they provided the basis for a continuing and bitter conflict that
delayed the development of the Community for almost two years, and even
threatened the broad but undefined consensus on which it rested.
In other circumstances, and with other officials, issues that
soon arose might have continued to remain dormant, although it is difficult
to see how friction could have been avoided indefinitely, even under the
most favourable conditions. Coming as the 'crisis' did, at the very outset
of the Community's operations, it was fortunately still possible for the
Authority and the Council of Ministers to take effective remedial action -
while other divisions within the Community were still latent and there was
less risk of cumulative tensions triggering an even more serious upheaval.
Had the problem arisen at a later stage, when lines of communication were
established and an administrative hierarchy was more securely entrenched in
both the Secretariat and the Fund, it is difficult to see how the dispute could
have been so readily contained.
Profiles of ECOWAS Officials
With the unavoidable delays at the end of 1975 and the protracted
negotiations during 1976, everyone associated with ECOWAS was anxious for a
quick take-off by the new institutions. In this regard there were valuable
contributions from all those involved, both states and individuals, but
particular mention must be made of the efforts of the Task Force, set up
in February 1977 and composed for the most part of officials and experts
from Togo and Nigeria, who provided technical assistance to the chief
executive officers of ECOWAS until other permanent staff were assigned
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and could assume their new duties. It was the Task Force which drew up
the necessary documentation and prepared the various organisation charts,
along with the job profiles of officials, operating rules, staff regulations
and conditions of service within the Community, as well as the financial
regulations and administrative procedures that would in future govern the
operation of its executive organs, i.e., the secretariat and the Fund, located
in Lagos and Lome.
The Executive Secretary and the Managing Director of the Fund
had each experienced some initial difficulty in adjusting to his new role and
in coming to terms with a relatively unfamiliar environment. Within three
months of taking up their appointments, concern was already being expressed
about the performance of the leading ECOWAS officials and there was criticism
of some of their first initiatives, notably by the host countries, Nigeria
and Togo. Together these two countries had been assigned responsibility
for the new institutions during the brief but difficult transitional period.
While the officials were understandably anxious to make their mark as quickly
as possible and to create favourable conditions for the operation of their
institutions, the host country was equally concerned that they should
respect the mandate given them under the Treaty and comply with the wishes
of those who had so recently created the Community.
The Executive Secretary, Dr. A.Ouattara, proved himself an
open, energetic and effective administrator - at least in the view of
many observers. Prepared to work, in the transitional phase, within the
guidelines provided by the Task Force, he was nevertheless anxious to consolidate
his position and to involve other states in the work of the Secretariat at
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the earliest opportunity. His critics warned that he was inclined to
attempt too much too quickly and with too little preparation. However,
it is on record that he soon recognised the over-riding need to organise
the work of the Secretariat and other institutions on a sound and efficient
basis, before proceeding to the more rewarding but long-term task of
furthering the development of the region as a whole.
His initial problem arose when on finding the Secretariat unable
to function effectively in the initial months and its operations crippled
by a temporary lack of funds, Dr. Ouattara solicited and immediately obtained
financial assistance from his country of origin, the Ivory Coast, until
such time as the host government, Nigeria, would authorise payment of the
full amount required from its own resources for the work of the Community
Secretariat. In my view the Executive Secretary was fully justified in
acting as he did, given the unfortunate delay on the part of the Nigerian
authorities in meeting their commitments. At the same time it was in the
interests of all that the host government should first be able to assure
itself that strict financial control and discipline was being exercised
within the Secretariat and that funds, when disbursed, would be used for the
purpose for which they were provided.
Nigeria, as the host country responsible for ensuring the smooth and
successful running of the Secretariat advised Dr. Ouattara to return the
temporary loan to the Ivory Coast, and immediately released the full amount
required for the operations of the Secretariat - until such time as the
contributions from member states became available. With this issue satisfactorily
resolved, the Executive Secretary was able,without further ado, to re-direct
his attention and his energies to the organisation of the Secretariat.
The fact that he was reputed to enjoy the confidence of the President
of the Ivory Coast was no great handicap in an organisation that depended
to such an extent on continuing good relations between French and English-
speaking countries and, in particular, on the rapprochement, after 1970, between
Nigeria and the Ivory Coast.
Himself bi-lingual, Dr. Ouattara was concerned to utilise existing
sub-regional bodies and organisations, wherever possible, to achieve the
objectives of the new regional Community - reflecting a view that was
widespread among the Francophone leaders and was also shared by such
Anglophone leaders as Presidents Tolbert and Siaka Stevens, involved as
they were in the Mano River Union. While the ECOWAS concept was a great
and pioneering one, Dr. Ouattara was ready to point out that "they were
not starting from scratch. They would use the services of existing
organisations of all kinds, rather than try to build up a huge selparate
bureaucracy to tackle all the tasks before them."
	
The Executive
Secretary was simply expounding the provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty when he
commented, further, that "all such bodies have our blessing". He was prepared,
too, to "sub-contract" ECOWAS work to other organisations already in the field
and having compatible or parallel goals - including the entire gamut of
United Nations agencies. -
Dr. Ouattara seems quickly to have earned the approval of his
Nigerian hosts by repudiating any idea that Nigeria could -.or had any
wish to - dominate ECOWAS.
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Obviously Nigeria provides the chairman if we meet
in Lagos. But our Ministerial and Heads of State
meetings will rotate among members according to
alphabetical order. And although Nigeria is obviously
the biggest contributor, according to our formula there
is no 'weighting'. She has only the same representation
as any other country at our meetings.
His approach was pragmatic while his requests for assistance were by no
means regarded as excessive. "There is so much for us to do. But we
do not have to invent the bicycle. That was done long ago and our job is
to use the machine." He accepted the Treaty as providing the "guidelines"
for ECOWAS and maintained that "within this he can fit all that ECOWAS might
try to do."
In the case of the Fund and its Managing Director, Dr. Romeo
Horton, the problems were more serious and much less easily resolved since,
as we have pointed out, there was some ambiguity in the provisions of the
Treaty and the Protocols regarding the precise relationship between the Fund
and the Secretariat. The issue was, however, compounded by the contrasting
personalities heading the two agencies.
Dr. Horton has been described as "aggressive, but gracious In his
manners, gregarious but correct in his human relations" and one who "mixed
a disarming informality with firmness." 	 A pan-Africanist, devoted like
his first political leader, President Tubman, to the creation of a free
trade area in the West African region, he had a long experience in African bankin
and had been among those Who helped promote the African Development Bank in
1964. "Known for his great diplomatic and negotiating skills", and as
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leader of Tubman's "special diplomatic task force", Dr.Horton quickly became
"a well known figure in many African capitals and to many African Heads of
State in the '60s", assisting Tubman in his efforts to bring together the
Casablanca and Monrovia groupings in order to facilitate the creation of the
OAU in 1963. -
Nor only was Dr.Horton apparently well connected in government
as well as business circles in Liberia, and a close associate of Presidents
Tubman and Tolbert, but he was clearly also an experienced political operator :.-
but one evidently more at home in Liberian and American-style politics, and
less familiar with the West European patterns of government and administration
prevalent in other West African countries. A gifted "survivor" and "a man
of great debating skills", he was apparently able to utilise his many and
existing talents to strengthen his position as Managing Director of the ECOWAS
Fund but seems to have been somewhat less successful in adapting his free-
wheeling style to meet the political and administrative requirements of a
complex, multinational economic community.
With an entrepreneurial rather than a bureaucratic approach,
Dr.Horton may well have preferred to set his own goals, take his own
decisions, create his own support base, and make separate international
arrangements for the funding of his projects. According to a West Africa 
correspondent : "For him nothing is impossible". Again, "he has no patience
with theories, arguing that all known empires or great institutions were built
by men of action capable of making great decisions." Set in his ways, he
was characterised by a "strong will", and "tough and dogged character" and
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a "fierce nationalism". - Discounting possible bias and even some
exaggeration in this journalistic portrait, it is nevertheless easy to
see why the Managing Director of the Fund might be reluctant to assume a
subordinate position in the administrative hierarchy of ECOWAS, convinced
as he was of the constitutional merits of his case.
Origins of the Dispute 
Problems began shortly after Dr. Horton arrived in Lome to start
work, with an initial staff of three officials from Liberia. It was
reported that one of them was later dispatched to Lagos to act as liaison
officer between the Fund and the Secretariat. Dr. Ouattara's reaction was
naturally unfavourable:
It is alleged that this officer was not well
received as Dr. Ouattara felt that Dr.Horton
should have been in Lagos personally at least
in the initial stages to work directly with the
Executive Secretary. The officer was subtequently
called to Lome. Thus the first seed of discontent
was laid between the two men.
Whatever the trust of this, there is no doubt that effective liaison
between the Secretariat and the Fund was, from the outset, "virtually nil".
Following on this incident a further "difference" seems to have
arisen between the two Community officials over the related question of who
was to have responsibility for the administration of the Community as a whole.
Dr. Horton felt, perhaps with some justification, that if the Treaty was
7/
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interpreted literally then the Fund was in fact independent of the Secretariat
and a separate and completely distinct legal entity for which he alone was
responsible to the Authority and, in some matters, to the Council of Ministers.
That then became the dominant issue and would defy all subsequent attempts
at mediation and conciliation until Dr.Horton's withdrawal and replacement in
1979, at the prompting of the Authority itself.
Dr.Horton's early difficulties were not confined, however, to his
relations with the Executive Secretary, crucial though these were to the well-
being of the Community. There were also problems between the Managing
Director and the authorities in Lome% concerning a number of Dr.Horton's
early initiatives, including his policy on the staffing of the Fund which, it was
claimed was, uhrepresentative of the Community as a whole. There were
allegations, moreover, that the Managing Director would take advice from no
quarter and would not be held accountable even to his own Board of Directors,
whose Chairman was the Togolese Minister, Mr.Yao Grunitzky. Yet another source
of complaints was Dr.Horton's choice of technical advisers from outside
West Africa, mainly from the United States and Britain, without having first,
it was said, exhausted the talent available within the region.
The issue of the Fund and its Managing Director quickly became a
cause cSilbre, and the major obstacle to the continuing and harmonious
development of the Community. Various steps would be taken at different
times, by people within different institutions, before the matter was finally
settled some two years later, in May 1979, at a Summit meeting in Dakar.
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First Intervention by the Council of Ministers : July 1977 
As the dispute involved a conflict about the interpretation of
the Treaty and the relevant protocol 'it appeared, from an early stage,
that some authoritative intervention was urgently required before the
activities of one or other, or both of the Community's principal officials
prompted a damaging crisis within the organisation. Moreover, in such a
delicate constitutional matter, it was likely that the Authority would
itself have, at some time, to issue a directive pronouncing once and for all
on the points at issue. Until then the Nigerian government was understandably
reluctant to allow itself to be embroiled in a dispute that did not yet
concern it directly and which might well sour its previous good relations
with the Liberian government, which had nominated Dr.Horton to his present
post. Liberia, even if willing, would be hard pressed to replace Dr.Horton
at short notice, and, in any case, the Managing Director had as yet done nothing
that he could not defend on the basis of the legal instrument establishing
ECOWAS.
Alive to its special responsibilities, however, the Nigerian
Government sought by other means to persuade Dr.Horton to cooperate both
with the Secretariat in Lagos and with the host government in Lome, while
General Obasanjo recognised the urgent need to remove the underlying cause
of the friction which was the ambiguity concerning the constitutional
position of the Fund in relation to the Secretariat. However, this could
only be done by the Heads of State, themselves, acting perhaps on the
recommendation of the Council of Ministers. Any other independent initiative
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by Nigeria and Togo would only serve to antagonise the other states
while giving the misleading impression that Nigeria and Togo had some kind of
monopoly of Community wisdom.
Early in July 1977 the Nigerian Government, after joint consultation
with Togo, wrote to all Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS apprising
them of the progress so far in setting up the various institutions of the
Community and of the proposed programme of action to speed up realisation
of the OWAS objectives. - It was encouraging to see that the Secretariat
had, by then, successfully organised a meeting of two of the four Technical
and Specialised Commissions - the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and
Payments Commission, and the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission.
The outcome of their deliberations would form the basis of their programme
of action to deal with the Community's problems in these areas. It was a
good and positive beginning.
Regarding the Fund, General Obasanjo was able to report that the
headquarters were now also satisfactorily established in Lome' and that the
first meeting of the Board of Directors was scheduled to take place later
that month - and did in fact begin on July 25. But the purpose of the letter
was to obtain the assent of the member states for the convening of the
first meeting of the Council of Ministers since the signing of the protocols
at the end of the previous year. It was proposed that the Council should meet
in Lagos, from July 18-22, to consider a range of issues relating to the
effective functioning of the Community, such as the staffing of the Secretariat,
the headquarters agreement, the budget for 1977-78, the initial capitalisation
of the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development, and the contributions
of member states to both the budget and the Community Fund.
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The response to the letter was positive and the meeting was
duly held in Lagos during that month. On the relations between the
Secretariat and the Fund, the Council of Ministers noted a number of
ambiguities in the Treaty and protocols establishing ECOWAS, especially in
respect of the powers of the Executive Secretary and the role of the
Managing Director of the Fund. As a result of these ambiguities the two
chief executives had thus far viewed their roles and functions very differently -
a state of affairs that could, if unchecked, prove fatal to the Community.
It was Articles 8 (9) of the Treaty and Articles 28 (7) and (8)
of the protocols that had given rise to the confusion and the subsequent
controversy. While Article 8 (9) of the Treaty says that the Executive
Secretary "shall be responsible for the day to day administration of the
Community and all its institutions", it does not specifically mention the
Fund as one such institution over which the Executive Secretary can exercise
supervisory jurisdiction. As if to reinforce the ambiguity, Articles 28 (7)
and (8) of the protocols made the Managing Director of the Fund its "Legal
Representative", and its "Chief Executive", empowered him to "conduct the
current business of the Fund under the direction of the Board of Directors",
and held him "responsible for the organisation, appointment and dismissal
of the officers and staff in accordance with regulations made by the Board
of Directors".
Certainly it had not been the intention of the founding fathers
to create two separate and autonomous institutions within the framework
of BCOwAS. My recollection i s that we saw the Executive Secretary at the -
apex of the administrative hierarchy. With the exception of the Authority,
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the Council of Ministers and the Tribunal of the Community, we saw all other
bodies and institutions as subordinate to the Executive Secretary, who was
himself appointed by the Authority and was entrusted with the smooth running
of all parts of the Community. The Fund was definitely designed as an agency
which, because of the specialised nature of its work and the expertise
required, enjoyed considerable discretion in its technical operations, but
which had at the same time to respect the position of the Executive Secretary
as the essential link between all the administrative echelons of the
Community, on the one hand, and the Council of Ministers and the Authority
on the other.
We could not have envisaged and would never have permitted a
situation in which the Fund and its officers were allayed to pursue objectives
that were not identical with those of the Community as a whole, or were in a
position to authorise undertakings that had not first been referred by the
Secretariat to representatives of member states for their collective consideratior
and approval. It was our view that Community appointees must act together
in a spirit of mutual understanding, good will and cooperation, particularly
at the higher levels where the executives would have to draw up a well
coordinated programme of work for the Community as a whole, with the approval
of the Council and the Authority. The fact that membership of the Board
of Directors of the Fund was almost identical with that of the Council of
Ministers should have been sufficient guarantee of consistency of policy
between the two bodies, and should have ensured continuing adherence by all
concerned to the objectives set by the Authority.
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In preparation for the meeting of the Council of Ministers there
was doubtless much discussiDn among ministers and their leaders in an
attempt to prepare a set of recommendations that would help resolve the
dispute. Considering Dr.Horton's general attitude so far, some countries,
including Togo, had initially wanted his recall and replacement by someone
more sympathetic to the conceptions that had inspired the Community. Nigeria
had counselled patience, hoping by less formal and drastic means to prevail
on the Managing Director to accept the need for frequent consultation with
the Executive Secretary and to adopt administrative procedures more consonant witl
modern international practice.
It is probable, too, that the issue was the subject of talks at the
OAU Summit in Libreville, in 1977, particularly among the West African
countries directly concerned. Indeed, relations between the Togolese authorities
and the Managing Director of the Fund did show a marked improvement after
Libreville. Meanwhile, by a combination of persuasion and diplomacy the
Nigerian Government evidently hoped to achieve a better working relationship
between Fund and Secretariat. It recognised, at the same time, that a
long term solution would involve action by the Council and the Authority to
remove the anomalies in the Treaty and protocols, without which the dispute
could not have assumed its present importance.
The intention clearly was to try and keep Dr.Horton and Dr.Ouattara
at their respective posts, while promoting improved relations between them
and working towards a mutually acceptable solution that would nevertheless
confirm the responsibility of the Executive Secretary for all aspects of
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administration within ECOWAS. Various expedients were therefore considered,
whereby a lasting improvement might be achieved. One possibility was that
Nigeria might nominate the Deputy Managing Director of the Fund, in that
way acquiring some say in its operations. However, apart from possible
objections by other interested countries, perhaps anxious for a wider
distribution of posts, it was almost certain that the Francophone states
would contest a decision to entrust the activities of the Fund to two
English-speaking officials. In any case, it was for the Managing Director,
himself, to define the responsibilities of his Deputy after his appointment.
There was no guarantee, therefore, that he would be able to influence the
Fund's operations to an appreciable extent.
The Office of Financial Controller, whose powers were nowhere clearly
defined, either in the Treaty or the protocols, seemed to offer better
prospects of a satisfactory solution. By inviting the Council of Ministers
to invest him with real powers of control and by locating him, not in the
Fund headquarters in Lome., but with the Secretariat at Lagos, it was hoped
that a more effective and continuing liaison might yet be established between
the two. It was for the Council then to consider and perhaps recommend
the definition of a clear chain of command, establishing once and for
all the responsibility of the Executive Secretary for administration throughout
the Community, and at the same time to invite the Authority to invest the new
Financial Controller, yet to be appointed, with powers of audit extending to
both the Secretariat and the Fund.
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The Council of Ministers, meeting in Lagos in July 1977, whose
chairman was the Nigerian Commissioner for Economic Development, Professor
0.Adewoye, was anxious to lay down clear lines of operation for the main
executive institutions of the Community. To that end the Council made the
following recommendations to the Authority:
(i)	 ECOWAS is one corporate body subsuming all its
institutions, including the Fund;
(ii)	 Administratively, ECOWAS has a hierarchical
organisation with the Executive Secretary at its head;
(iii)	 The Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development
is a financial institution only in the context of the
objectives set for ECOWAS, the financial operational
instrument for translating into reality the aims and
objectives set out in Article 2 of the Treaty;
(iv)
	 While the Managing Director enjoys considerable
autonomy in the day to day administration of the
Fund in accordance with Articles 28 (8) of the
Protocols to the Treaty, the Executive Secretary
has a coordinating role to play in relation to the
Fund and the Community as a whole;
(v1	 It follows from (ii), (iii), (iv) above that there
should be constant consultations between the Managing
Director of the Fund and the Executive Secretary in
matters of policy. In a spirit of mutual respect it
is expected that the Executive Secretary and the
Managing Director of the Fund would discuss with each
other major issues affecting the Fund and ECOWAS as
a whole.
Having tried to establish that principle, the Council proceeded
to recommend interim measures to try to ensure closer liaison between the
two. Henceforth, it proposed:
(vi)	 The meetings of the Board of Directors of the Fund
should always precede those of the Council of
Ministers, since the latter, judging from a general
reading of the Treaty and its Protocols is the greater
authority of the two;
9/
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These arrangements will ensure good working
relations not only between the Board of
Directors and the Council but also between
the Executive Secretary and the Managing
Director of the Fund. No meeting of the
Board of Directors should be held without
consultation with the Executive Secretary
regarding the agenda and the time for the meeting;
To ensure effective liaison between the Executive(vii)
Secretary and the Managing Director of the Fund,
the Financial Controller at the Secretariat should
serve as an internal auditor not only for the
Secretariat but also for the Fund. While the
internal auditing unit at the Fund Headquarters
is administratively under the control of the
Managing Director, it is operationally responsible
to the Financial Controller af the Secretariat;
There should be regular meetings, say, once every
two months, or quarterly, alternating between Lagos
and Lome, to review activities both at the
Secretariat and at the Fund Headquarters and to
formulate working policies. Each review meeting-
should comprise:
The Executive Secretary	 - Chairman
The Managing Director of the Fund - Vice-Chairman
The Deputy Director of the Fund - Member
The Financial Controller	 - Member
The Two Deputy Executive
Secretaries	 - Members
Despite these eminently sensible and practical suggestions, the
Council of Ministers was nevertheless well aware that:
Proper relations between the two officers
cannot be maintained solely by rules and
regulations. There is always room for mutual
respect, mutual confidence and those simple
norms of good human relations which cannot
really be codified.
These recommendations were later tabled before the meeting of
the Authority, in Lagos, in April 1978, when they were approved and
subsequently implemented. Meanwhile, on the subject of the appointment
and functions of ECOWAS officials, which was a matter for the Council, itself,
10/
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there was an attempt to broaden the basis of representation in the Community
institutions and to ensure the appointment to the new posts of suitably
qualified candidates. The role and functions of the Financial Controller
were set out in detail while the chief executives were enjoined to involve
their deputies fully in the formulation of policy. The decisions were
important for the future development of the Community and also had a direct
bearing on the dispute between the Secretariat and the Fund. They were that:
(i) The post of the two Deputy Executive Secretaries
of ECOWAS, the Deputy Director of the Fund and
the Financial Controller of the Community be
filled in terms of Member States designated by the
Ministerial Council;
(ii) Such designated Member States should supply to the
Ministerial Council the Curriculum Vitae of their
most highly qualified and experienced nationals
for such posts.
(iii) Where a designated Member State is unable to comply
with the requirements of any such posts, that Member
State should forthwith indicate the fact to the
Chairman of the Ministerial Council;
(iv) The two Deputy Executive Secretaries of ECOWAS should
function as the chief advisers of the Executive
Secretary and should be totally involved together
with him in the formulation of all policy matters
affecting the Community. In addition, they may
be specifically assigned to such other duties as the
Executive Secretary may determine.
(v) The Deputy Director of the Fund should likewise function
as the chief adviser of the Managing Director in the
formulation of all policy matters affecting the Fund.
In addition he may be specifically assigned such other
duties as the Managing Director may determine;
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(v)	 The Deputy Director of the Fund should
likewise function as the chief adviser of the
Managing Director in the formulation of all
policy matters affecting the Fund. In addition he
may be specifically assigned such other duties as
the Managing Director may determine;
(vii	 The Financial Controller shall be responsible to
effect all financial and budgetary control over the
Secretariat, the Fund and all other subordinate
institutions of the Community;
(viii	 The Financial Controller is empowered to prescribe
all necessary rules and regulations to facilitate
the efficient discharge of his duties, such rules and
regulations to be previously approved by the Ministerial
Council;
(viii) The Financial Controller shall regularly submit reports of
his work direct to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council,
copy the Executive Secretary, the Managing Director of
the Fund and the head of any subordinate institutions
that may be affected thereby. He shall be in attendance
at meetings of the Council of Ministers and the
Board of Directors of the Fund.
(ix) To ensure effective liaison between the Executive
Secretary and the Managing Director of the Fund,
the Financial Controller at the Secretariat should
serve as an internal auditor not only for the Secretariat
but also for the Fund. While the internal auditing unit
at the Fund Headquarters is administratively under the
control of the Managing Director, it is operationally
responsible to the Financial Controller at the Secretariat;
(xi
	
The Council of Ministers at its second sessions
decided that the above posts be filled in the first
instance by nationals of the following Member States:
Posts
Deputy Executive Secretary I 	 - Republic of Guinea
Deputy Executive Secretary II	 - Ghana
Deputy Director of the Fund	 - Benin
Financial Controller 	 - Nigeria
(xi)	 The Council of Ministers further considers that it is
desirable that the posts of Directors or other heads
of divisions of the Secretariat, the Fund or other
subordinate institutions of the Community should be
filled as the case may be by the Executive Secretary,
the Managing Director of the Fund or the head of the
relevant subordinate institution, bearing in mind
equitable geographical distribution of such posts and
also bearing in mind the professional, academic and
administrative competence and experience. 11/
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These decisions did not require the approval of the Authority
and could therefore be implemented at once in accordance with Article 6 (2)
and (3) of the Treaty. In the light of earlier experience and problems,
they were designed to ensure that the administrative personnel of the
Community were recruited in such a way as to make the institutions
representative of the Community as a whole, and at the same time to guarantee
a level of competence compatible with a reasonable degree of administrative
efficiency.
The same meeting of the Council approved an interim budget for
the operations of the Community (July-December 1977), agreed on the capitalisation
of the Fund for its first year, approved the manpower requirements for the
Community and the conditions of service and superannuation of its employees,
and invited the Executive Secretary to make recommendations to its next
meeting, later in the year, concerning the establishment of a Data Bank
and a Bilingual School of Management and Public Administration. It also
called on the Executive Secretary to produce and submit in November draft
proposals for a non-aggression pact, and for a protocol facilitating the
free movement of persons within the Community. And the following were
designated priority areas for immediate study with a view to future action:
(i) A study in the structure of Customs Tariffs and
Trade Flows with a view to implementing the Customs
Union, developing trade and assessing revenue
implications of tariffs reduction;
(ii) A study into the problems of Transport and
Telecommunications particularly the Panaftel
programme as it affects the area of the Community,
the aim being the establishment of efficient transport
and telecommunications networks in ECOWAS;
(iii) A General Economic Survey of Member States of the
Community to assess current economic condition of
the sub-region as an entity, and provide a sound
information base on which to build the Community's
perspective plan. 12/
483
Second Intervention by the Council of Ministers : November 1977 
Shortly after the Council of Ministers in Lagos, much the
same personnel attended the first meeting of the Board of Directors
of the Fund in Lome', from 25-27 July 1977. It was at this meeting
that the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development became operational.
After reminding those present of the purpose of the Community, General
Eyadema emphasised the theme of development and the central role that the
Community and, within the Community, the Fund could play in promoting
that development. ECOWAS "must be a real zone of development within which
13/
the development of each of our states can take place." - That was the main
task confronting the Fund.
If the Community we have set up is not to mean
for some states a loss of income so that there
is a need to ensure for each fair compensation,
we must also pay heed to the statement made by one
of our colleagues that, to achieve true integration
of our development, we must transcend the notions 14/
of compensation for loss of revenue.
Compensation then was to be subordinate to the over-riding
imperative of development, while the ECOWAS institutions and particularly
the Fund "constitute the ideal framework for a harmonious development
provided that they are not deflected from their objective." But cooperation
was essential to the achievement of that goal. "Let us remain strong and
15/
united, for it is only in this way that Africa will overcome."
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The mood of euphoria accompanying the launching of the Fund
continued as Togo's Minister of Finance, Mr. Yao Grunitzky, maintained
that the Fund
Is an instrument for cooperation and compensation and
will be the driving force in the development of the
community. At a time when the world economic order
is crumbling and the ways and means employed to seek
solutions are making no headway - for example, the
North-South Dialogue has not justified the hopes
placed in it - a community like ours should be able
to make its weight felt on the world economic order.
But it was the Managing Director of the Fund, Dr.A.Romeo Horton, who
delivered one of the most stirring and best received speeches.
I come before you at this moment, filled with a
sense of history as together we stand at the threshold
of launching what is today, despite the attendant problems, 17/
the largest and most viable economic unit in West Africa.
Recalling his long-standing commitment to West African economic union,
Dr.Horton emphasised the economic potential of the region and, by implication,
the exalted role of the Fund within the Community. "We must replace poverty
with prosperity, and under-development with technological and social
advancement." 18/-
It was this speech that the Nigerian Commissioner for Economic
Development and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Professor 0.Ademoye,
alludedto when he described Dr.Horton as "the ECOWAS missionary", a remark
made in good faith_ but 	 which_ he may later have had some cause to regret.
Shortly after the completion of proceedings in Lam, Dr.Horton took the initiative
in disclosing a number of possible enterprises in which the Fund might soon
be interested, ranging from the coordination of airline services within the
region, to the setting up of an ECOWAS iron and steel industry - a project
16/
with which Liberia had long been associated - and, finally, an "integrated
19/fishing industry", with its own processing plants in member states. -
This last proposal was likely to prove attractive to the many coastal states
of the region. But, however, commendable these projects, they seem to have
had but little bearing on the priority areas designated by the earlier
Council of Ministers.
The Board of Directors was able, nevertheless, to agree on July 25,1977,
as the date on which the Fund would commence operations, with its Capital
fixed at 500,000,000 SDR (Special Drawing Rights), of which 100,000,000 SDR
must come from the contributions of member states - and with the understanding
2o/that 50,000,000 SDR must be deposited in the course of the first year. -
At the conclusion of the meeting the Togolese Government was in a position to
submit an encouraging report on the progress made in Lome% And considering
that Togo had expressed some reservations about the performance of the Managing
Director, it was gratifying to be able to note in that report that "a marked
improvement has been recorded at the level of the Managing Director of the
Fund". As "co-sponsors", it is "our duty to ensure the introduction and
consolidation of good relations of collaboration and cooperation between
the officials and the organs of the ECOWAS" - the decisions of the recent
Board of Directors and the conclusions of the previous Council of Ministers
"enables me to look at the future of these institutions of our Community
21/
with confidence." -
Optimistic though this report was, there was still no visible
or appreciable improvement in the mutual cooperation between the Executive
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Secretary and the Managing Director of the Fund. From all accounts the
blame must rest squarely with the Managing Director, who did not conceal his
opposition to the idea that the role of the Fund should be subordinate to
that of the Secretariat. Prior to the Council of Ministers meeting in
November, growing concern was expressed within the Community, by Nigeria and
others, about the recruitment and staffing policies of the Fund and, more
important, the continued refusal of the Managing Director to accept
instructions from any source within the Community other than his Board of
Directors.
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers envisaged the creation
of a single appointments and promotions board responsible for vetting
applicants for posts in the Fund as well as the Secretariat and, pending
consideration of this matter at the forthcoming Council of Ministers, had
suggested that both bodies should stay action on existing applications until
a decision was taken. 22/-
 This was acceptable to the Executive Secretary,
who disUosed that apart from members inherited from the special Task Force,
and the officials appointed by the last Council of Ministers, "as far as I
23/
am concerned, no permanent appointment has yet been made at the Secretariat." -
Dr.Horton, on the other hand, indicated that he was "left no choice but to
continue to manage the affairs of the Fund in keeping with the Treaty and
Protocols and in strict compliance with directives of the Board." Which,
"of course, includes appointment of personnel and collection of contributions
from Member States to the ordinary Capital of the Fund." 21/
The Chairman of the Council of Ministers was concerned,
that "the Fund is still being regarded, not as structurally a part of
4e7.
ECOWAS, but as an autonomous institution with its own hierarchy of
authorities separate and apart from that of the Council of Ministers."
He further observed "gradually, but surely, I can see the Board of Directors
for the Fund being regarded as the co-equal of the Council of Ministers,
which is supposed to be the highest policy-making organ of ECOWAS below
the Authority." 2Y This view seemed to be substantiated in view of the
fact that despite their almost identical membership,some of the Ministers
serving on the Board of Directors were inclined to take a more relaxed and
tolerant attitude to practices that they had already condemned as members
of the Council of Ministers. While trying to secure the administrative
authority of the Executive Secretary over the Managing Director ,the chairman
saw the need for some clarification of the relationship between the Council
and the Board, differentiating more clearly between the specialist functions
of the latter and the broad political responsibility of the former.
The Nigerian Head of State seemed ready to support the idea of
a Joint App6intments and Promotions Board, but rightly warned about the
problems of securing uniformity of standards across so many countries with
such varied administrative grades and procedures and systems of education.
In some cases, experience and integrity might well count for more than formal
26/
educational attainment. - As for the question of further reforms, in an
international organisation such as ECOWAS, more might be achieved by assuming
a 'low profile' and persuing patient diplomacy than by mounting a major
offensive across a wide political front. As a correspondent in West Africa 
27/pointed out : "This is not an organisation in which anything can be hurried." -
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This was the strategy followed by Professor Adewoye at
the two-day Council of Ministers in Lagos in November 1977. The Council
followed a four-day meeting of experts, largely concerned, like the Council,
with organisational matters, "of which the major one, no doubt, is the
relationship of the ECOWAS Fund ... with its headquarters in Lomg , and the
28/Secretariat, with its headquarters in Lagos." - This preocupation with
internal matters and the fact that this was the second Council meeting in
Lagos within six months may account for the presence of a number of relatively
junior ministers, while Guinea Bissau, for whom international representation
is always a problem, was not represented at all.
In his opening speech Dr.Adewoye made little reference to the
internal problems of the organisation directing the attention of his
audience rather to the heritage of colonialism and the risks of neo-colonialism.
The only sure way of "breaking the shackles of poverty and neo-colonialism"
was to foster industrialisation on a regional basis.
If ECOWAS is so crucial to our development, what
are our duties as Ministers in terms of nurturing
the organisation? The first is to let us continue
employing our statesmanlike approach to all matters
relating to it. Whatever are the issues being
discussed, whether they concern administration or
policy, please let us always remember that it is
the interest of our Community that should predominate.
The interest of ECOWAS should transcend partisan or
personal considerations. This is the time to lay a
solid foundation for the Community : tomorrow may be
too late. 29/
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Because of the difficulties experienced in appointments
and in othAr matters, the Council subsequently agreed, after long
discussion, to set up an Investigation Committee, under the Gambian
Minister Alhaji M.C.Cham, with representatives of Mali, Benin (Dahomey)
and Sierra Leone, and their technical advisers. The Committee was
instructed to look into and report on all relevant matters affecting the
relationship between the Fund and the ECOWAS Secretariat. The report
of that committee would be presented to the Council of Ministers, meeting
in Lagos, in April 1978, prior to the next ECOWAS Summit. 30-/
Third Ministerial Intervention and Summit : April 1978 
At a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Fund, in January
1978, Dr. Horton, who had been commended at the inaugural meeting in July,
was now sharply criticised by Directors for presenting a report
that seems to have fallen Short of their expectations. They complained
that the underlying tone of the report gave the impression that there were
two organisations, not one in the Community, the Secretariat and the
Fund, and this despite their earlier admonition - and that of the Council
of Ministers - regarding the need for mutual respect and cooperation
between the two institutions. 311
This was also criticism of the unorthodox procedures adopted
for appointment to and promotion within the Fund and the Director's very
personal style of management. It was argued, too, that he had presented
an unrealistic development programme,which was not coordinated or
harmonised with that of the Secretariat, while the Directors also had
reason to question the criteria for including such apparently diverse
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projects as fisheries, cement industries, phosphate mining and processing.
Furthermore, at a time when the operations of the Fund were
just commencing and when only three of the sixteen member states had
paid any part of their contribution to the Fund, the Managing Director
was proposing a budget substantially larger than the previous one - an
increase of over three hundred per cent. - and involving a considerable
expansion in staff numbers. Again, there was a need to separate capital
and recurrent expenditure and to diversify the pattern of the Fund's
investments.
A resolution was adopted calling the attention of the Managing
Director to these criticisms and to the Board's instructions thereon.
He was also required to refrain from making permanent, non-statutory senior
appointments to the Board until the candidates could be screened by the
proposed Board of Appointments and Promotions. Such senior appointments
as had been made Should be deemed temporary.
The managing Director was not, however, without some support
on the Board at this stage as can be seen from the published resolution,
at the end of the Board's proceedings, where the report of the chief
executive was said to have been noted "with satisfaction", while the
Board had also expressed "its appreciation for the high qualities of
the said report." 3a/ Which would also explain why, rather than take
further, action itself, the Board preferred to await the result of the
Chain Committee of Investigation, set up at the last meeting of the
Council of Ministers.
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There was no question of Dr. Horton's persuasive talents, sharp
political instincts or his capacity for survival. It was the case, however,
that ECOWAS, like any large, multinational community, contained an
assortment of views and priorities and was therefore vulnerable to any
activity that might favour one or other section of the Community. Success
required the full cooperation of all concerned in achieving our goal, which
was the development of the region and, eventually, of the Continent as a
whole. The Community could not afforathe luxury of bureaucratic
rivalries, still less the prospect that any one agency, e.g., the Fund,
might try to usurp the future of the organisation as a whole.
In such a community there is always the fear that any official,
with responsibility for funds, appointments and in some cases projects,
may deploy them to secure his base or to enlarge his prospective audience -
playing on the need of most states for additional investment to create both
wealth and employment. The poorest states, in particular', will inevitably
be attracted towards those institutions and agencies, and those personalities,
that promise early and effective remedial action to help overcome their
many, otherwise intractable problems. Which is why it took no small
courage on the part of the relevant Nigerian officials to defend our original
conception of the Community against those who might seek to distort it to
serve their own immediate ends.
As the largest single contributor to the Community budget and to
the Fund, Nigeria enjoyed a considerable influence, although voting within
the Fund and on its governing Board was in no way weighted to reflect the size
of members' contributions. But Nigeria's position was also a delicate one,
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as her leaders would not wish to invite the criticism that they were
using financial muscle to impose their views and policies on the Community
as a whole - and especially to the detriment of the smaller, poorer and,
for the most part, Francophone states. Individuals, however, could not
be prevented from voicing their dissatisfaction with certain aspects of
Community policy or administration.
Thus the first published criticism of the activities of the
Managing Director of the Fund had already appeared in an article, in
September 1977, in the Nigerian Herald, which was a newspaper quite
33/
independent of the central government and circulating in Kwara State. -
Shortly after the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Fund, in January
1978, there appeared a strident defence of Dr.Horton, In the Liberian Age, 
which was known to be close to the ruling party in Monrovia. A feature
article alleged that Nigeria had been responsible for most of the criticism
directed at Dr.Horton during the recent meeting of the Board, and implying
34/
that Nigeria was exercising undue influence in the affairs of the Fund. -
This was almost certainly not the case, but the issue was a sensitive
one, calling for the exercise of diplomatic skills and a watchful eye on
the part of the West African leaders - if retaliation and mutual recrimination
were not to become the order of the day throughout the region.
It would already have been clear to the governments involved
that, whereas the functions of the Community were mainly economic, a degree
of political cooperation was at all times indispensable to its smooth and
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successful operation. Indeed, the political dimensions of the dispute -
increasingly in evidence throughout 1978 - illustrated yet again the
need for the closest cooperation within as well as between governments.
Particularly in Nigeria, where the administrative machinery was so large and
complex, there was the ever-present need to coordinate the activities of the
Ministry of Economic Development, which had primary responsibility for
ECOWAS, with those of the Ministry of External Affairs, responsible for the
country's relations with all West African states and with the rest of the
world.
And as the controversy continued within ECOWAS, there does seem
to have been a move by foreign ministries in several other West African
countries, to become more directly involved in ECOWAS affairs - on the
grounds that the Community, at least in its formative phase, would inevitably
be concerned rather more with politics and diplomacy than with economics.
Fortunately, such incursions, where they threatened previous arrangements,
were firmly resisted, although the need for improved communication, between
governments and between ministries, was widely recognised, as, of course,
was the political nature of the commitment to ECOWAS, depending as the
orgallisation did, on the continuing good will of all sixteen member states.
Conscious of its duties and responsibilities towards ECOWAS,
Nigeria therefore assumed the leadership of those who wanted to ensure
respect for the spirit as well as the letter of the Treaty and Protocols,
and of the Community who approved the decisions of the previous Council of
Ministers as they concerned the administration. The Council, which met again
in Lagos from April 10-18, 1978, to make recommendations to the Third Summit
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of Heads of State and Government, was primarily concerned with trade
liberalisation measures, the accompanying proposal to secure freedom of
movement and residence within the Community, and a draft protocol
containing provisions for a non-aggression pact.
The Ministers did, however, also consider the Report of the four-
nation Investigation Committee appointed to look into the administrative
and structural problems of the Secretariat and the Fund - the Chain Report.
Their findings of that Committee were then accepted by the Council. The
report indicated, among other things that:
The qualification and experience of the majority of the
staff at the Fund leaves much to be desired, and the gaps
between qualifications, experience and placement at the
Fund is too glaring to warrant further comment.
It recommended immediate steps to stop all further recruitment to the Fund,
while the existing professional staff should be given the requisite notice
so that new appointments could be made through independent channels. The
chief executives of the Fund and the Secretariat would lose their right
to hire and fire which would become the responsibility of a separate
Appointments and Promotions Board.
As for the operations of the Fund, the Chain Committee confirmed
that "the existing situation is unsatisfactory" and recommended that the
accounts of the Fund be audited by an independent source, since the accounting
35/
system was held to be deficient in many respects and travelling expenses
36/
were thought to be high. - The Committee was thus strongly critical,
both of Dr.Horton's recruitment policies and of the absence of orderly
financial records of the Fund's activities. Dr.Horton later contended,
by way of reply, that the Chem Committee had not fully appreciated the
difficulties confronting the Fund in the early days of its operations,
while he insisted that there had also been a minority report, with an
37/
altogether different viewpoint. -
The eleven point recommendations of the Council, as later
amended, were accepted by the Authority at the ensuing Summit meeting in
Lagos, on April 21-22. Most notably, the Authority recognised
	 :ECOwAS
as "a single and indivisible entity with some measure of autonomy to the
Fund as a constituent institution of the Community, particularly in banking
and financial matters." 3Y As if to underline the primacy of the Secretariat,
the Authority proceeded to ratify the appointment of Dr. Abubakar Diaby
Ouattara as Executive Secretary. Dr. Horton's appointment was never ratified,
either by the Council or by the Authority. At the same time the Authority
accepted the need for an External Auditor to complement the activities of
the Financial Controller and Sierra Leone were invited to nominate a
competent firm for that purpose.
The fact that the Summit was attended by some twelve Heads of
State as well as by four senior cabinet ministers - representing Niger, Mali,
Ghana and Guinea - was evidence that the administrative problems of the
Community had not so far affected the resolve of the member states to make
496
39/
the grouping a success. - The new Chairman of the Authority, General
Obasanjo, made no attempt to minimise the difficulties ECOWAS must face
in the future in realising its objectives, but insisted none the less that
members should not allow themselves to be discouraged. The difficulties
must be overcome.
I can see a great future for a well developed ECOWAS
which should be in a position to contribute its
quota in the international efforts aimed at the
re-ordering of the international economic system.
As the future augurs well for our community we should
start early to coordinate efforts in order to pave
the way for ECOWAS to take its proper place in the
international economic community.
General Eyadema, in his valedictory address, as the retiring Chairman,
spoke in much the same vein, expressing the view that, "as one of the
founding fathers of ECOWAS I am hanpy that the Community, like a new baby
41/born yesterday, can now walk." -
In addition to its recommendations to the Authority, the Council
of Ministers had also agreed that, because of the difficulties experienced,
current staff employed by the Community should be laid off, pending the
appointment of a permanent staff recruited by uniform and approved method.
This was within the competence of the Council and meant that, after the
statutory period for notice of termination of employment;
ECOWAS ceased functioning as an effective entity.
The only people left on permanent employment were
Dr. Ouattara, Dr. Horton, their deputies and the
minor secretariat staff. All professional staff
had to go. At the Fund, only the accountant and
personnel officer were left on a temporary basis.
40/
42/
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This was a slight exaggeration since both chief executives were
allowed to retain at least a skeleton staff. In any case, former senior
staff had the right to apply for any of the posts about to be advertised
and would then be considered along with the other applicants. The task
of recruiting a new professional staff was entrusted to a committee
comprising the Executive Secretary (as Chairman), assisted by the Managing
Director of the Fund, and other members nominated by the Council. This
committee would interview candidates short-listed by their respective
governments, and would then present a final list for the approval of the
next Council of Ministers, scheduled to meet in Dakar in November 1978.
Fourth Ministerial Intervention, November 1978 
This Special Recruitment Committee met and did, apparently,
43/present a slate of candidates for confirmation by the Council, in November. -
That slate was finally accepted after Ministers reached a consensus, which
was the only available means to provide the Community with the staff to
implement decisions on harmonisation of customs tariffs, mobility of labour,
and the sectors to receive priority in development.
No sooner was the compromise effected than it was overturned
by the action of the Liberian delegate who expressed strong reservations,
with the result that the problem was referred for final determination,
under Article 6 of the Treaty, to the Authority of Beads of State and
44/Government. - Subsequent efforts failed to persuade the Liberian Minister
to withdraw his opposition to the proposed new appointments within the Fund
and the Secretariat. The work of the Special Recruitment Committee had,
therefore, to be suspended, leaving the Community once more without
effective permanent staff.
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The problems within the Council were evidently not unrelated
to the controversy about appointments at the Board, both past and present,
and were mainly prompted by countries sympathetic to Dr.Horton and his
stand. Some of the smaller and less developed states were also emphatic
about the need for the Recruitment Committee to include geographical spread
among the principal criteria for appointment, in addition to 'competence'
and 'equitable distribution'. Apparently there were some complaints, too,
that Nigeria and Ghana were both over-represented on the existing staff of
the Community, while it was alleged that the Francophone states were being
discriminated against in the matter of appointments.
The leading Francophone states do not, however, seem to have
shared that view. In any case, despite the slight preponderance of
professional staff from the Anglophone countries, under the initial staffing
arrangements, it has also to be said that the English-speaking states had a
much larger total population, while the question of recruitment from the
Francophone states was complicated by the smaller number of applicants from
those countries, reflecting different levels of educational attainment as
well as the shortage of senior administrative staff within most Francophone
states, often leading to higher levels of remuneration there than was
possible in ECOWAS, itself.
Nevertheless, at some important levels of administration within
the Community, French-speaking officials actually outnumbered their English-
speaking colleagues, although the first consideration of all was with the
45/
advancement of the Community and the peoples that it served. - Among the
junior staff the situation was different again, as the host countries.
Nigeria and Togo, the one English and the other French-speaking, enjoyed
disproportionate representation - but for reasons that were obvious to
everyone, particularly in the early years of the Community, while awaiting
implementation of the protocols on mobility of labour and freedom of residence.
The failure of the Council to accept the recommendations of the
Recruitment Committee, or even to agree a procedure for future appointments,
was all the more regrettable as it was quite unnecessary. Respect for
competence and efficiency are not necessarily incompatible with considerations
of 'equitable' or 'balanced' representation, while countries where there
are opportunities for formal education cannot be denied a share in the
administration of the Community and can, in any case, contribute personnel
with much-needed practical experience, familiar with the economic problems and
needs of their own communities.
What is difficult, of course, is to apply such criteria in
assessing and selecting candidates, but that is a matter for those entrused
with the task and should certainly not become the responsibility of the
Council of Ministers, itself - let alone the Authority. Disregarding that
principle, the Fourth Council of Ministers in Dakar found itself in an
impossible situation where no appointments to ECOWAS could be made. The
only solution was either to refer the matter upwards, to the Authority,
distorting the original division of functions, or else to return powers of
appointment and promotion to the chief executives, themselves - which ran
509.
counter to the decision of the Third Council that, in the interests of
efficiency, all staff should be recruited by a Central Appointments and
Promotions Board.
A large minority of Ministers seems nevertheless to have
favoured a proposal allowing the Executive Secretary and the Managing
Director a free hand to recruit their own staff. In the event the
Central Appointments and Promotions Board was requested to stress
"geographical balance" which at least had the merit of recognising the
need for the widest possible participation and representation in Community
46/
affairs. -
Another achievement of the Council meeting in Dakar, in NoveMber,
contributing to a more coherent and more efficient administration, was the
establishment of a Permanent Committee on Research and Studies, which would
in future process all projects and make appropriate recommendations to the
Council. Thus, neither the Secretariat nor the Fund would be permitted
to entertain any project thathad not first been sanctioned by the Council
of Ministers. The Council also laid down a specific order of priorities
to govern the future development of the Community.
The retiring Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Professor
(Dr.) AdeNove, evidently resisted the temptation to give an account of his
stewardship, preferring to remind his audience of the need to translate
"self-reliance" into more practical terms, if it was to have any real or
lasting effect. He spoke of their having laid "a solid foundation for the
gigantic superstructure that ECOWAS is destined to be. We have built
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those institutions capable of sustaining its steady growth." They could
not pretend to "have resolved all problems of structure within the
organisation", but with the kind of good will demonstrated in the past he
was confident that they could meet any challenges the future might bring.
And he spoke for all the ECOWAS governments in insisting that it was now
47/
time to turn from structural matters "to begin the actual work of development." -
Dakar Summit, May 1979 : the Authority Intervenes
Where the Ministers in Dakar had engineered a situation requiring
intervention by the Authority, the Chairman of the latter, General Obasanjo,
was understandably reluctant to summon a Summit for the purpose of arbitrating
in the appointment of clerks, secretaries and professional personnel. He
was advised, however, by the Executive Secretary that "the structural and
related problems which have plagued the smooth operation of ECOWAS are still
48/
confronting us", although "some progress had been made." - He did, therefore,
agree to discuss the question of relations between Fund and Secretariat with the
chief executives of both institutions. When this approach proved unsuccessful,
and reports indicated that the difficulties originated mainly with the
Managing Director of the Fund, the Nigerian Head of State had little option
but to communicate directly with the Liberian Government.
All the indications, however, were that Dr.Horton still enjoyed
the confidence of his government which was unwilling, therefore, to withdraw
and replace him. Nigeria now had the 'alternative' of leaving the
Community she had helped to found, or of remaining within the Community
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but at the same time increasing pressure for the adoption of more rational
administrative procedures. However, no responsible Nigerian leader ever
envisaged his country would leave ECOWAS, for which there was, in any case,
no adequate or effective substitute. The second strategy had the dual
merit of being consistent with the goal of regional union and of offering the
quickest and best way out of the administrative impasse. Nigeria could
simply withdraw its participation from the Fund, refusing to make further
payments until the problems of that body were discussed at the next meeting
of the Authority. A decision by the Authority concerning the management
of the Fund would then relieve the Liberian Government of the embarrassment of
having themselves to intervene to replace their original nominee.
That this stategy was, to some extent, effective, was apparent
from the Fourth Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Fund, in January
1979, when the Managing Director was advised to concentrate his efforts
on obtaining full payment by member states of their ,contributions. As
of November 30, 1978, only six states had paid their full contribution, while
three others had made no contribution at all. Nigeria had provided over
one-third of the Fund's capital to date, although a third of the Nigerian
49/
contribution was also outstanding. -
The Board was also more assertive on other matters. In the
matter of Community projects, the Board instructed the Managing Director to
make contact with the Executive Secretary; regarding the investment of
resources, he was invited to take account of the criteria of profitability,
liquidity, security and the quality of services likely to be rendered by
the selected establishments; he was also instructed not to renew the Fund's
contracts with the existing consultants and to be more cautious in future
50/in engaging foreign consultants for urgent assignments. -
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In the Spring of 1979 preparations began for the forthcoming
Summit and the preceding Council of Ministers, due to be held in Dakar-i-
in May. In his report to the Chairman of the Authority, Dr.Ouattara
advised that the Summit should deal with the urgent problem of providing
the Community with the necessary human and financial resources to enable
it to operate. In his view the survival of the Community and the continued
support of member states were dependent on a decision to re-shape the
51/
Community. - And on March 21, 1979, General Obasanjo issued invitations
to the other Heads of State to attend the Dakar Summit on 28-29 May.
Meanwhile the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, M.Ousmane
Seck of Senegal, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Fund,
M. Isidore Amoussou, from Benin (Dahomey) attempted a final series of
initiatives in an attempt to resolve the impasse over administrative
appointments. On April 8 they were notified that Liberia had withdrawn
its previous reservations concerning the proposed appointments, but Guinea
then wrote to the Executive Secretary confirming that it, too, now had
reservations. Further efforts to harmonise the positions of the Executive
Secretary and the Managing Director were likewise unsuccessful.
More conclusive were the separate reports of the Financial
Controller and of the External Auditor, particularly concerning the
activities of the Managing Director and the operations of the Fund. In
March 1979 the Financial Controller issued three separate reports, all
52/
strongly critical of the Managing Director and the operation of the Fund. -
The report of the External Auditor, in April 1979, was even more pointed
53/in its carefully considered recommendations. - Regarding the administration
of the Fund it noted the requirement, under Article 26 (1) of the Protocol
rnA.
that the Board of Directors should meet at least once a quarter or
more frequently if necessary, and observed that "the present practice is
for the Board of Directors to meet as infrequently as possible." (Paragraph 56
of the Report). Concerning appointments, "staff grading and annual increments -
should not be determined by the unilateral decision of the Managing Director."
(Paragraph 49). The accounts of the Fund, moreover, revealed "evidence
of wantonness in certain areas of expenditure. The criterion seems to be
not the ethics of the expenditure but the availability of budget." (Paragraph 45).
This report was even more penetrating in its comments on the
continuing absence of liaison between the Secretariat and the Fund. "The
absence of expeditious means of communications between the two Institutions
would appear to be one of the major sources of misunderstanding between the
Executive Secretariat and the Managing Director." (Paragraph 48). A radio
link was suggested as one possible remedy (Paragraph 33). The next paragraph
of the Report upheld the previous decision of the Authority.
The office of Executive Secretary must become a
Department on its own and the pivot of authority
in the Community. The Executive Secretary must be
seen to be unquestionably accepted as the Chief
Executive of the Community. Unless this concept
is firmly established now, there can be no reasonable
assurance of the success and the prosperity of the
Community as conceived. This has become glaringly
clear to us during the course of our audit at the
Secretariat in Lagos and the Fund in Lome. 54/
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Finally, the External Auditor warned of the deteriorating
administrative situation within the Community and its probable consequences
unless checked in the near future.
Although it is not for us as External Auditors to
get concerned with the politics of the Community
it is obvious to us that cracks are beginning to
appear in the administration as persons in key
positions are being accused of favouring staff of
their own nationality. Insignificant or 'normal' as
this may seem in our accepted way of life, we think
that we have a duty to draw the attention of the
Community to this situation which if unchecked at this
early stage could become the anathema of the administration
of the Community sooner or later.
Aware that opinion within the Community was hardening against
him, and that his continuing appointment was now in serious doubt, Dr.Horton
again attempted to influence leaders by his statements to the Fifth Board
of Directors, meeting in Dakar in April 1979. He concluded his opening
address with the comment : "We are now ready to move", and noted that
a large sum in arrears had been paid to the Fund in the second half of the
56/previous year. - Mention was also made of a speech given in Monrovia
at a state banquet by the new Head of State in Ghana, General F.Akuffo.
In February 1979 Akuffo had apparently stated that:
ECOWAS remains as the only organ capable of fostering
cooperation on a real sub-regional scale. ECOWAS has
our total support. We are happy to have an able son of
Liberia, Dr. A. Romeo Horton, as Managing Director of
the ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation and Development (sic.)
We are confident that under his direction the Fund will
make ECOWAS truly responsive to the economic needs of the
sub-region. 57/
55/
506,
Past differences with the Secretariat, Dr. Horton maintained,
had been resolved at the Lagos Summit in April 1978 and were now a
matter of history. The many troubles that had beset ECOWAS since 1976
had now been "successfully ended and the organisation was on course and
moving ahead." Lack of staff would cease to be a problem once the Authority
had met and given a final ruling on the matter. The meetings in Dakar
could therefore be expected "to record dramatic progress". Meanwhile the
Fund was "especially interested in projects of a multi-national nature, the
encouragement of economic integration being one of the Fund's primary
purposes. At present they were looking at telecommunications, transport
58/
and food production. -
At Dakar, in May 1979, the Council of Ministers reported to the
Authority on the unsatisfactory state of affairs within the institutions
of the Community - as confirmed by the submissions of the Financial
Controller and the External Auditor. The Council complained once again
of the absence of cooperation among the principal officials, and of the
resulting misunderstandings compounded frequently by acts of indiscipline
and a failure to assert authority. The Ministers then appealed to the
Authority, as the one body able to intervene and thereby provide a new
lease of life for the Community's operations. They called for the
installation of new officials at the top who would command the respect of
59/
all and would ensure the implementation of the Community's objectives. -
This last recommendation, that the Authority should remove
the Executive Secretary as well as the Managing Director, would hardly
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fail to offend Dr.Ouattara's supporters, particularly as all the available
evidence pointed to the Managing Director as the one senior official who
had failed repeatedly to comply with the letter as well as the spirit of
the Treaty and its accompanying Protocols. When the Heads of State and
Government assembled in Dakar, on May 28-29, it was reported, nevertheless,
that there was criticism - in their absence - of the two chief executives,
accompanied by suggestions that both should resign.
It is possible that the campaign against Dr. Ouattara was intended
to relieve the mounting pressure on the Liberian President for a unilateral
decision removing the Managing Director from his post. If both executive
officers were removed by the Authority's express decision, then President
Tolbert would be spared a painful and difficult decision. It is possible,
too, that Dr. Ouattara had become the target for supporters of Dr.Horton,
who were now reluctant to acknowledge his administrative shortcomings,
and viewed the Executive Secretary as a convenient scapeT-goat. Others,
again, may have been genuinely dissatisfied with some aspects of the
Secretary's administration, or simply wished to project a new, more positive
image of the Community, by replacing the existing officials with others who
had had no part in the previous quarrels.
One can nevertheless readily appreciate the motives that may
have led President Houphouft-Boigny to resist such pressures, bearing in
mind that he had never, at any time, solicited any office for his country in
the Community, while the Ivory Coast was, after Nigeria, the second largest
contributor to the ECOWAS budget and to Fund: This may help to account for
reports that the Ivory Coast would be compelled to withdraw from the Community
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should it demand the resignation of the Executive Secretary. As a result
the original proposal was dropped while criticism again focussed on the
person of the Managing Director until, in stateManlike fashion, President
60/
Tolbert agreed to withdraw him from the Fund. -
The Summit then proceeded to define, once and for all, the
precise relationship between the Secretariat and the other agencies of
the Community. In the words of the President of Mali, as reported in
West Africa:
We decided not only to remove the Managing Director
of the Fund from his post - because of the mistakes
he had made - but also to re-examine the structures
of Our organisation in order to make it more operational
and effective.	 61/
Once again the Summit confirmed that the Executive Secretary
was the head of the Community's administration with an operational unit
based in Lome for the proper management of the Fund's resources. To
ensure centralisation of authority and decision-making the Authority declared
that the Fund "is the financial instrument for the implementation of
62/Community policies". - 	 However, no formal statement was issued after
the meeting while Dr. Horton's withdrawal was not mentioned in the communique.
It would appear that, at this crucial point in the Community's
development, with the decision to freeze tariff and non-tariff barriers over
the next two years, pending their eventual elimination, the Heads of State
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were justifiably anxious to avoid any public display of disagreement
or ill-feeling. There was an obvious need for team-work if the Community
was to tackle its most ambitious task to date with any prospect of success.
Hence the decision by the Liberian Government the following year,
to replace Dr. Horton with a nominee, acceptable to the other leaders,
distinguished in his own right and prepared to respect the rules and
conventions within which the Fund had to operate. Mr. Robert Tubman, a
son of the former Liberian President, and a deputy Minister of Justice,
in the Liberian Government, was believed to combine academic talent, considerable
business experience and a practical knowledge of legal forms and administrative
procedures. On his appointment, in February,1980, he gave an interview
clearly setting out his own future position.
There apparently was a misconception surrounding
the instruments of the Fund. This has now been
cleared and I have studied the amended version.
I shall be running the Fund strictly on this basis.
That is to say, the Fund is the instrument for the
implementation of the Community's policies. Therefore, 63/
I shall be there to execute these as given to me.
There was an unexpected irony in the fact that, shortly afterwards,
the Liberian Government was replaced following a coup d'etat, while the
next Summit of ECOWAS, in June 1980, would see the temporary exclusion of the
new Liberian leader, Master-Sergeant Do t.q. His government, in turn, suspended
all obligations to ECOWAS "until its rights are restored" and pending
64/
recognition of the new regime in Monrovia by the other West African states. -
Meanwhile the problems of staffing that had threatened to cripple
the Community were apparently resolved following a decision of the Authority
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to proceed with the recruitment exercise largely on the basis of a
quota system. According to criteria, approved by the Authority in July
1979, all future appointments within the Community would have to take account
of the qualifications and experience of the applicants. Where there were
candidates with relevant and otherwise comparable qualifications and
experience, the distribution of professional posts should, as far as
65/
possible, reflect the composition of the Community as a whole. -
Of the sixty-five posts previously approved by the Council
of Ministers, fifty-two were retained by the Authority, and thirty-nine
66/
of these were promptly filled by the above means. - It was hoped that
the Community would before long be able to appoint to the remaining thirteen
posts. Where feasibility studies and the implementation of projects had
previously been hampered by the absence of permanent staff, this was no
longer a problem. ECOWAS was now set to make up for time lost during the
previous years. In the words of the Executive Secretary, "We are determined
to make 1980 a year of all round success." 61/
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CHAPTER 13
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ECOWAS PROTOCOLS, 1977-82 
The prolonged controversy over the ECOWAS institutions did
not prevent the Community from making progress with other matters,
notably the protocols providing eventually for free movement of Persons,
Residence and Establishment, for a non-aggression pact, and for a freeze
on tariff and non-tariff barriers, to begin in May 1979 and extend over
the next two years - prior to the progressive reduction of existing
tariff levels. But the ability of ECOWAS to function successfully and meet
its various objectives depended in the first place on the availability of
Community finance and, initially at least, this could come from only one
source : the contributions of those who had earlier created ECOWAS. In
many respects the funding of the Community was a more delicate and
difficult problem than the original political decision to set up the
organisation.
1. Financing the Community 
Paragraph 1 of Article 54 of the ECOWAS Treaty required that
the mode by which the contributions of member states shall be determined
and the currencies in which member states shall pay their contributions to
the Budget of ECOWAS shall be prescribed in a Protocol to be annexed to
the Treaty. It was in compliance with this directive that the said protocol
was prepared, considered and approved by the Council of Ministers in
November 1976, and later signed by the Heads of State and Government on
November 5, and subsequently ratified by member states. 11
It was obvious that the principal organs of the Community,
the Secretariat and the Fund, would endeavour to extract as much as
possible by way of contributions from member states. However, while
member states would wish to see the Community's operations adequately
financed, they would also try to cut the cost to themselves. From the
protracted discussions on this subject it was clear that most states
were of the view that the more prosperous ones, namely Nigeria, the Ivory
Coast, Ghana and Senegal, should shoulder most of the responsibility for
providing the necessary financial backing for the Community. In my
private discussions with most of my West African colleagues, just before
the signing of the Treaty, this view was widespread - with the inference
that Nigeria and, to some degree, the Ivory Coast, should shoulder the
greater part of the Community's financial burden.
President Houphouft-Boigny had also expressed that conviction
both in private and in public - as in the discussion of the proposed Treaty
on May 27, 1975, when he argued that "... the wealthier a state, the more
it would contribute". Also that "provision should be made for financial
and technical assistance to the poorer states ... to help them develop their
economies through the provision of experts ... and trained personnel." -
In our private discussions I had agreed with such suggestions, indicating
that "Nigeria would never be selfish and would contribute as much as
possible to see that poorer countries in the sub-region were adequately
catered for." -
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A number of states therefore demanded a formula that would
provide generously for the needs of the Community and its institutions,
with contributions coming disproportionately from the richer states.
This formula would be based on a coefficient of the GNP of member states.
If accepted, this would have meant that Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, in
particular, would be called on to bear the brunt of all contributions to
the Community and the capital budget of the Fund. It was hardly surprising,
therefore, that the countries most directly affected resisted the demand
and proposed an alternative formula based on a coefficient of Gross
Domestic Product - which would distribute the burden rather more equitably.
What was finally agreed to, and later approved by the Authority
of the Community, was the formula contained in Article 5.1 of the
Protocol relating to the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development,
and in Article 11.2 and 11.3 of the Protocol relating to the contributions
by member states to the Budget of the ECOWAS. The formula for assessing'
contributions to the Fund is identical with that for the Budget of the
Community and is defined as follows:
The Contribution of each Member State shall be
assessed on the basis of a coefficient which takes
into account the Gross Domestic Product and the
Per Capita Income of all member states. For this
purpose, the coefficient shall be calculated as
one-half of the ratio of the Gross Domestic Product of
each Member State to the total Gross Domestic Product
of all Member States plus one-half of the ratio of the
Per Capita Income of each Member State to the total
Per Capita Income of all Member States.
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It is expressed in the algebraic equation:
GDP of State C = 12 of GDP of all States
PC/ of State +
PCI of all States
Of,	 C=½ (11 + 12 (1;')
Where C = Coefficient that is to serve as a basis for all contributions;
a = GDP of the State;
x = GDP of the Combined States;
b = PCI of the State;
y = PCI of the Combined States.
ECOWAS Funds would therefore come from contributiohs to be
divided on the basis of members economic strength, assessed as a factor of
GNP and population. The inclusion of the Per Capita Income was a reminder
that Nigeria, despite its apparent prosperity, remained one of the poorer
states of the region because of its large population. At Lome, Nigeria had
proposed as an alternative, a coefficient to be based one-third on GDP and
two-thirds on PC/, although she later withdrew her opposition and supported
the formula finally adopted. - The statistics and other data used are to
be published by the United Nations and a further safeguard was the inclusion
in the Protocol of provision for a review every three years of the information
on which contributions are to be assessed. Depending on its current economic
performance a state might therefore expect to see its contributions rise or fall.
It is clear that the Fund would prefer /MF -approved convertible
currencies, but there is provision for contributions to be made in any
"acceptable" currency. This is to provide for countries, like Guinea, whose
own currency is not easily convertible in world markets.
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With this formula settled, members' contributions are as
indicated in the accompanying table (Table 6 ). Nigeria would contribute
the most (nearly 33%) of the total, followed by the Ivory Coast and Ghana
(with around 13% each), with Cape Verde, Guinea.Bissau, Guinea Conakry,
Niger, Upper Volta and the Gambia contributing under three per cent. each.
All other contributions i.e. Special Contributions, and those to the
Compensation Budget, would follow the same pattern.
Like other multinational organisations, ECOWAS was dependent
from the first not only on the good will but also on the contributions
of member states - to the budget of the Secretariat and to the budget and
paid-up capital of the Fund. While we considered the method of assessing
contributions to be on the whole a reasonable one, we were also aware of
the experience of other bodies, like the OAU, which had experienced great
difficult, at times, in collecting contributions when due. In a regional
organisation, whose purpose was to promote development among states
including many described as Least Developed States a shortfall in revenue
was probably to be expected. For our member states the problems of
under-development were compounded both by the drought, earlier in the
decade, and more particularly by the global economic crisis after 1973.
Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde were a special case in view
of their recent independence and the dislocation of their economy after
the successful but devastating war of liberation against the Portuguese.
In July 1977 the Council of Ministers therefore agreed that Guinea-Bissau
should only be asked to meet at least half of its contribution to the Fund,
was relieved of further contributions to the Community for the next two years.
Its contributions would be Shared among the other states.
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With the exception of Niger, the Sahel states seem to have had
difficulty meeting their financial targets although these had been deliberately
set low. As we have seen the more prosperous coastal states had expected
from the first to have to meet a substantial proportion of the Community's
costs, with Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and Ghana being asked to contribute
just under sixty per cent, of the income of the Fund and a similar proportion
of the budget of the Secretariat. Nigeria's share along was just under a
third of the total. In the event, because Ghana, Liberia and some of the
Sahel states were behind in their contributions to the Community Fund, Nigeria's
payments amounted to almost forty per cent, of the total subscribed by November
30, 1978. Nigeria and the Ivory Coast alone met sixty per cent, of the
capital requirements of the Fund in the first two years of its existence.
The same two-states subscribed forty-five per cent, of the budget of the
Secretariat in 1977 and forty-six per cent, the following year. (Table 6)
There was a noticeable decline in contributions between the
1977 and 1978 financial years which may have reflected growing financial
embarrassment on the part of member-states, or even some reduction in their
initial enthusiasm for the Community. The unfortunate delay before the
Community finally became operational no doubt disappointed many and may have
discouraged some. As at September 30, 1977, less than a quarter of all .
contributions to the Secretariat were outstanding, while a year later the
figure was nearly two-thirds. To some extent this may simply conceal the
fact that states are often behind with their contributions, so that moneys
contributed in one year may be used to meet arrears incurred earlier. (Tables 7 & 8
b2la
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TABLE 7
1977 BUDGETARY CON"	 JTION POSITION AS AT
30.9.-7
L'ETAT DEC CONTRIBUTIONS BUDGETAIRES A LA
DATE DU 30.9.77
Name off Country
1-lys
Ratio	 Contribution
Proportion
	 *f7	 UA
Payment
Paiement
Balance Due
Solde Du $
1.	 BENIN 2.9 104,194 89,900 - 104,194
2.	 GAPIBTA 2.5 90,081 77,500 90,081 -
3. GIMNA 12.5 450,407 387,500 450,407 -
4. GUINEA 2.8 100,891 86,800 100,891 -
5. GUINEA BISSAU 1.51 54,409 46,810 - 54,409
6. IJORY COAST 12.6 454,010 390,600 454,010 -
7. LIBERIA 6.5 234,212 201,500 234,212 -
8. MALI 1.9 68,462 58,900 - 68,462
9. MAURITANIA 3.5 126,114 108,500 112,445 13,669
10. NIGER 2.0 72,065 62,000 72,065 -
11. NIGERIA 31.9 1,149, 438 988,900 1,149,438 -
12. SENFML 5.3 190,972 164,300 - 190,972
13. SIERRA LEONE 4.3 154,940 133,300 - 154,940
14. TOGO 3.5 126,114 108,500 126,114
15. UPPER VOLTA 2.5 90,081 77,500 - 90,081
16. CAPE VERDE - - - -
17. SUSPEOS 3.79 136,563 117,490 136,563
3,602,933 3,100,000 2,789,663 813,290
5-21b
TT.BLE8
SFCREPARIAT	 1978 BUDGETARY COJTRIBUTION POSITION
AS AT 30.9.78
L'ETAT DES CONTRIBUTIONS BUDGETAIRES A LA
DATE DU 30.9.78
Name of Country
Pays
Proportion
	 Contribution
U.A.
oo
Payment
Paiement
Balance Due
So1de Du $
f
1. BMW 3.03 65,661 54,718
- 65,661
2. GA"I1IA 2.63 56,992 47,494 56,992 -
3. GUANA 13.03 282,364 235,304 - 282,364
4. GUINEA 2.93 63,494 52,912 - 63,494
5. GUINEA BISSAU 1.51 32,722 27,269 16,449 16,273
6. IVORY COAST 13.13 284,532 237,110 314,875
-
7. LIBERIA 6.77 146,708 122,576 - 146,708
8. MALI 1.92 41,607 34,673 - 41,607
9. MAURITANIA 3.64 78,879 65,733 - 78,879
10. NIGER 2.12 45,940 38,284 - 45,940
11. NIGERIA 33,13 717,939 598,283 848,517 -
12. SENEGAL 5.45 118,104 98,420 - 118,104
13. SIERRA LEONE 4.44 96,216 80,180
-
96,216
14. TOGO 3.64 78,879 65,733 169,543
15. UPPER VOLTA 2.63 56,992 47,494 - 56,992
16. CArE VERDE - - - - -
2,167,029 1,806,183 1,406,376 1,012,238
CREDITORS 10 BE CARRIFD FORWARD TO 1979
CREANCIERS REPORTES A 1979
NIGERIA $130,578
TOGO $ 90,664
IVORY COASP $ 30,343
GAMBIA $	 13,917
$265,502 
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Nevertheless, this could not by itself explain the fact that
on November 30, 1978, the Fund's Budget was under-subscribed by thirty-six
per cent., while the capital budget was under-subscribed by a similar figure.
(Table 6).
	 It seems probable that, as the quarrel between the Executive
Secretary and the Managing Director of the Fund continued, a number of states
either withheld part of their payments to both bodies, or subscribed to one
agency in preference to the other.
At one stage the financial position of the Secretariat was so
serious that Nigeria agreed a loan of a half million Naira ($750,000)
interest free. When this sum was finally exhausted the overall position
with respect to contributions had scarcely improved. In Part V of the
Executive Secretary's Report for 1980-81 attention was drawn to the increasingly
difficult economic situation of the countries in the region and the problem
this created for the Community's institutions.
At moments such as this, every nation-state seeks
to protect itself against any external factors that
do not bring relief but are rather capable of worsening
the domestic situation. There is also the tendency to
resort to ad hoc and short-term remedial measures and
to heavily discount any activities that hold the promise
of only long-term returns It is possible that there
would be moments when Member States would waver and be .
tempted to meet domestic pressing problems rather than
devote the same resources or even attention to Community
needs. If we should fall into that temptation, we shall
only be prolonging the difficult period of transition
from a set of fragmented, individualistic and isolated
under-developed economies into a unified, strong and
viable economy.
More welcome news was the announcement in May,1982,
-that the new regime of
Ft.Lt.J.J.Rawlings in Ghana, despite its many economic problems, had decided
to pay all its backlog of contributions to the Community, including its full
6/
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share of the Fund's initial capital call - and to make payment in a
convertible currency, namely CFA francs. - This was interpreted as
an act of faith both in the Ghanaian economy and in the ECOWAS idea, and
recalled Ghana's long and often close association with the cause of African
unity.
Countries will subscribe the more readily to organisations that
provide tangible benefits and useful services. This was why the founding
fathers preferred to concentrate on a narrow range of objectives, which could
be completed with available resources and within a fairly short period of time.
After the intervening difficulties, this seems to have been the view taken by
the Authority at the end of the 'seventies and it is to be hoped that it
will lead to a rejuvenation of the Community and its institutions and that
the problem of contributions, although it will not quickly be solved, will
not prevent the Community from successfully pursuing its initial goals.
In this regard it was encouraging to note that "since matters
came to a head at the Dakar Summit in 1979, Fund-Secretariat relations have
vastly improved, and that institutional relations are now functional." 2/
Not only did the Fund receive authorisation from the Fifth Summit, in Cotonou,
in May 1982, to start work on its new headquarters, but it was now in a
position to finance its first project, a $25 m. communications network, that
will be welcome throughout the region. -
2. Trade Liberalisation 
Trade liberalisation was a major Objective of the ECOWAS
Community, with provision eventually for a customs union, a common external
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tariff and a free trade area comprising all member states. At the
inception of ECOWAS levels of intra-Community trade were fairly uniformly
low, although higher among the Francophone states who were also members
of the CEAO. (Tables 2.8' 3) • It was hoped, however, to be able to boost
trade within the Community, not only by dismantling the barriers that
had long helped to promote a widespread and illicit cross-border traffic - to
the detriment of national revenues - but also by active measures of trade
promotion and by a well planned programme of industrial location, designed
to foster the exchange of goods, materials and labour among and between
member states.
It has always been the view of the Nigerian government that
the Community should go beyond mere liberalisation of trade and create the
conditions in member states that would favour greater integration. General
Obasanjo was clearly of a similar mind in December 1978:
After all, how much trade could be liberalised
at present since inter-state trade within ECOWAS
was still minimal? Industries and projects should
be created that would spill over national boundaries
by seeking out raw materials, labour and markets
from within the Community.
Certainly the effective implementation of trade liberalisation was expected
to give a valuable stimulus to investment, as well as encouraging
cooperation in productive ventures and generally assisting in the formulation
of other measures to expand production.
At no time, however, did we in ECOWAS underestimate the many,
seemingly intractable problems that would be involved at almost every
stage of the scheme. While other regional communities have proposed
10/
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similar measures, implementation has usually been a slow and often
painful process, and the results have often been disappointing. 1/ -/
Only in the Central American Common Market were tariffs in the zone
completely abolished. The result was an encouraging increase in trade,
but the experiment was shortlived as customs duties were replaced by
the unilateral imposition of fiscal incentives, culminating in the
withdrawal of Honduras.
Where the East African Community had a common tariff, member
countries had different policies regarding duty drawbacks on machinery
and equipment. The Central African Customs Union (YDEAC) boasts a common
tariff, but additional taxes may be imposed by individual member states,
while differential tax rates also introduce a protective element into
intra-zone trade. Within the Francophone West African Community (CEA0),
trade in agricultural commodities was free of internal duties but tariffs
on manufactured goods remained the subject of detailed negotiation.
The elimination of tariffs within ECOWAS would undoubtedly
pose serious problems for those states, the majority, who depended on
duties as an important source of revenue. According to UN figures, in
1973 the Gambia derived 35% of total government revenue from customs
duties; in Benin the proportion was 55%, while it was scarcely lower in
Upper Volta (45%), and constituted 30.9% of revenue in Sierra Leone and
19.4% in the Ivory Coast. (Table 9).
*The poor economic state of
the country does not allow
or encourage imports into
the country by both Ghana itself
& exporting countries. Ivory
Coast allows capital goods
importation at a low duty to
encourage industrialisation.
Monrovia is a Free port and
imports to Liberia are
generally low.
The reason for this is - Cl)
Duty free importation, esp.of
capital goods to encourage
industrialisation and business
(2) Excessive smuggling of
goods from their over 2,000
mile borders. Nigeria had a lop
rate of import duties on
capital goods to encourage
industrialisation. She also
cut down on heavy goods &
encouraged local production.
Togo's Port, Lome, is a Free
port, import duties are low
and this encouraged the great
use of the port from various
West African countries.
Country Year- Import Duties
as'%'of Revenu6s
1.	 Dahomey (Benin)
	 (cc) 1971 55.0%
2,	 The Gambia (cc) 1973 35.0%
3.	 Ghana	 (cc) 1973 10.4% *
4.	 Ivory Coast (cc) 1973 19.4%
5.	 Liberia (cc) 1973 18.9%
6.	 Mauritania (cc) 1973 26.7%
7.	 Niger (ULC) 1973 10.5% **
8.	 Nigeria (cc) 1973 18.3%
**9.	 Senegal	 (cc) 1968 43.4%
10. Sierra Leone (cc) 1973 30.9%
11. Togo	 (cc) 1973 19.9% ***
12. Upper Volta 1973 45.0%
13. Guinea
	 (C)	 (cc)
14. Guinea	 (B)	 (cc) 4. Not Available
15, Mali CLUCI ***
16. Cape Verde (cc)
Remarks
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TABLE 9
IMPORT 'DUTIES'ASTROPORTION OF 'REVENUE FOR 'ECOWAS
-COUNTRIES 
(Selected Years)
"Source:	 African Statistical Year Book, Part 2, West Africa
(New York : UN, 1975). Amended by the Author.
NB.	 LLC = Land Locked Countries.
CC = Coastal Countries.
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There was also the problem of harmonising and adapting the
customs regulations and nomenclature in use in the various states.
These were the legacy of three separate colonial administrations, with
very different languages, standards of statistical compilation, and very
different trading philosophies. Standardising nomenclature would itself
fully occupy officials of the Community for some time before trade
liberalisation could even begin. Meanwhile the remaining disparities had
all to be reviewed, discussed and, where necessary, harmonised.
Finally, ten of the sixteen ECOWAS states were also members of
other sub-regional groupings, including the CEAO, Mano River Union (MRU),
and the Cape Verde/Guinea Bissau free trade area established as recently
as 1976. Their objectives also included the elimination of tariffs on
trade and provided in some cases for preferential treatment for goods
originating in other member states. The Mano River Union presented few
problems as integration had not yet advanced very far, while the member
states were closely identified with the regional grouping and with its
broader concerns.
The CEAO, however, had made tangible progress while ECOWAS
was itself becoming operational. Both envisaged the creation of a customs
union - after twelve years in the case of the CEAO, fifteen with ECOWAS -
but only ECOWAS aimed at the establishment of a free trade area within the
customs union. By 1982 the CEA() might have been able to achieve a 65 per
cent.tariff reduction but, unlike ECOWAS, it does not have a zero target.
Only unprocessed, raw produce would pass freely between CEA() states, all other_.
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goods being subject to a Regional Cooperation TaxTTCR), which might
vary between states and was designed to supplement their revenues and
compensate for generally lower levels of customs duty. Within ECOWAS,
compensation was to be a matter for the Fund and would be regulated by
protocol. Both communities, then, had provision for separate trade
liberalisation programmes, with the risk of overlap and possible conflict.
Chapter II/ of the ECOWAS Treaty set out in some detail, the
future trade liberalisation programme. The relevant "legal framework" as
it emerged from successive Summit meetings in April 1978 (Lagos), May 1979
(Dakar), and May 1980 (Lome), envisaged a transitional period of eight
years, from May 1981 until May 1989, for the realisation of a free trade
area, and the elimination of all tariff barriers between member states,
with the gradual establishment in the same period of a Common Customs Tariff
in respect of goods imported from outside the Community. Under Article 14
of the Treaty they were recrodired to align their internal tariffs with the
Common Customs Tariff over a five year period, May 1988-May 1993. 121
 -
But with immediate effect from May 28, 1981, the following were to be
completely removed : tariffs on all unprocessed goods, on traditional
handicrafts, and on industrial products from Community enterprises. Tariffs
on priority industrial products imported into the four more advanced, and
the twelve less advanced states, were to be shared out over four and six years
respectively, also with effect from May 28, 1981. Tariffs on all other
industrial products imported into the four more advanced and the twelve less
13/advanced states would be eliminated over six and eight years respectively. -
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It was hoped that the elimination of these and other obstacles to
trade within the region - supplemented by other more positive measures of
trade promotion, would greatly enhance the chances - and increase the volume -
of intra-Community trade. The Trade Liberalisation Programme was described
as "undoubtedly the most important activity of the ECOWAS." To stimulate
economic development, however, the removal of trade barriers would have to
be "accompanied by the introduction of trade promotion and development
measures." Here, unfortunately,
the sub-region trade though limited in volume faces
a number of obstacles including lack of market intelligence,
poor transport infrastructures, inconvertible currencies,
differences in grading and standards, inefficiency of
domestic market organisations, and preferential agreements
with foreign overseas countries.
It was obVious that the implementation of the trade liberalisation
scheme would mean the loss of customs and other revenue for member states.
Unless there was some provision for compensation, they would be unable to
balance their budgets and meet their various commitments, domestic and external.
Article 25 of the Treaty authorised the Council of Ministers to:
determine the compensations to be paid to a Member
State which has suffered loss of import duties as a
result of the application of this chapter.
The Council was also instructed to keep under constant review the industrial
conditions within the region, with a view to locating disparities in the
levels of industrial development of the Member States. The Council may
then direct the appropriate Commission to recommend measures to remedy such
disparities (Article 32). Whatever compensation was finally agreed would
be forthcoming from the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development
(Article 50). Article 52 authorised the Fund to:
provide compensation and other forms of assistance
to Member States which have suffered losses arising out
of the application of the provisions of this Treaty on the
liberalisation of trade within the Community.
14/
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The detailed measures concerning compensation were set out in a
separate Protocol that was finally agreed by all Member States in November
1976. It provided that compensation would be forthcoming only in the case
of a loss of revenue incurred as a result of tariff reductions on imported
industrial goods originating within the Community. The right to compensation
would lapse five years after the loss was incurred. The amount of revenue
lost would be calculated on the basis of the difference between the actual
revenue collected using the preferential ECOWAS rates in any given year,
and the revenue that would otherwise have been collected had the consolidated
15/
rates, applicable at May 28, 1979, been imposed instead. -
Payments would be from a special Compensation Budget, equivalent,
in any financial year, to the estimated compensation claims for that year.
Contributions to and payments from the Budget by member states would be on
the basis of a formula derived from their share of intra-Community trade as
it related to individual products. Advance payments might be made up to an
amount estimated at one-quarter of the total due to the member state for a
given year. Finally, contributions to and payments out of the Compensation
Budget would be made in convertible currency.
Apart from the provisions for compensation, the most vexed
issues related, as before, to the definition of "rules of origin" that
would identify the products to benefit from the new dispensations, and
the definition of "community enterprise", which raised the question of
16/
ownership and indigenous participation. - Other problems were largely
administrative, but together these had helped delay implementation of
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the trade liberalisation programme as a whole. An attempt was made,
by means of a questionnaire, to assess the likely effect of trade liberalisation
on those states that belonged to both the CEA° and to ECOWAS. Only one
of the six states involved seems to have replied to the Secretariat although
the information solicited was seen as indispensable to the successful
implementation of the programme.
Member countries also failed to respond to repeated requests
by the Secretariat for information concerning customs nomenclature and
statistical standards. The printing and distribution of the new forms and
procedures was due to be completed by July 1980, but countries had yet to
17/submit details of their tariff schedules as late as November 1980. -
The Common Statistical Standards and Harmonised Customs Documents for the
Community as a whole were nevertheless printed and circulated at the beginning
of January 1981 so that trade liberalisation could commence on schedule in May
of that year. The Executive Secretary's Report suggests, however, that on this
issue member states did not share the same sense of urgency as the Community
officials.
A mission was sent out to the Member States to
assess the application of these documents which
constitute an essential element in the implementation
of the trade liberalisation programme.
It is regrettable to note that none of the reports
received on the status of implementation by Member States
of these Community policies and measures was encouraging.
It appears that none of the documents enumerated above,
which had to be introduced into use as a prerequisite for
a smooth application of the trade liberalisation programme,
18/has been effectively implemented by any Member State.
The trade liberalisation programme was the main issue at the
May 1082 Summit, in Cotonou (Benin), as a result of a request from the
CEA() and from the much smaller Mano River Union for the suspension of
Article 20 of the Treaty, which provides for most-favoured nation treatment
within the Community. The sub-regional groupings had previously submitted
requests for "derogation" as early as July 1980 and these had been discussed
by Officials and by Heads of Institutions of the ECOWAS and the two smaller
communities. 19/-
In the absence of sufficiently detailed evidence in support of
the requests, the matter was referred to a special derogation committee
constituted at ministerial level. Its report, adopted by the Council of
Ministers in Freetown, in November 1981, recommended the review of the
different liberalisation schemes and compensation mechanisms proposed by
the three bodies, and their simultaneous application for an interim period -
during which studies would be undertaken concerning the harmonisation of
internal taxation among member states and the establishment of a Common
External Tariff. The special committee also recommended the "consolidation
of current rates and list of products that constitute the CEA0 and MRU trade
preferential system" and the application of ECOWAS customs and statistical
20/documents. -
These recommendations had then to be considered by the Authority
meeting in Cotonou in May 1982. Its decision was likely to be a critical one
for the future of the Community. According to one experienced observer:
Article 20, with its implications of equality of
treatment within ECOWAS has thus become the test-case
clause of the Treaty, which could make or mar the
application of the whole programme of trade liberalisation,
without which moves towards harmonisation of tariffs and 21/
eventual customs union are going to lack convinction.
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After some discussion, "during which the CEAO/ECOWAS problem was, according
to conference sources, clearly exposed", the Authority chose to postpone
the issue - "but not for long, as it were, because of the central nature
of the trade issue in ECOWAS." The ministerial committee on derogation would
be convened once more to re-examine the matter and make proposals for the
next Council of Ministers meeting in Cotonou in November 1982. 2-2/
It was not surprisingthat:such an important matter as trade
liberalisation among so many countries of such varied background should
continue to create difficulties for ECOWAS. Dr. Ouattara's opinion of the
Cotonou decision was nevertheless hopeful, since the Heads of State had
shown a "political willingness to deal with the matter now and not to let
23/
it drag on unnecessarily." - The Report of the Executive Secretary for
1980-81 also drew attention to the complexity of the programme, recalling
that it had taken the much smaller CEA° some two years before its own
common customs and statistical nomenclature had come into effect; the
Mano'River Union had taken more than two years and the EEC some two and
24/a half years to agree their harmonised nomenclature. -
It was clear from the Secretary's report that the liberalisation
programme, officially approved at Lome in May 1980, "is trembling on the
brink of becoming operational." A beginning had been made. Already, tariffs
on all unprocessed goods and traditional handicrafts should have been abolished.
However, "it is with respect to industrial goods that a number of
difficulties encountered have caused a delay in the implementation..."
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Nevertheless, the list of priority industrial goods, which were to be
liberalised faster than other industrial goods, had been adopted by ECOWAS
ministers in November 1981, although not without reservations from three
of the CEA() members. Existing non-tariff barriers had also been defined
25/
and classified in preparation for their eventual removal. -
Moreover, in the course of the year a protocol on the definition
of "community enterprises" was finally drafted, for approval by the Cotonou
Summit. It was reported that the ministers of Ghana, Mauritania, Niger
and Nigeria had expressed reservations about some aspects of the protocol,
26/
while Upper Volta was critical of the protocol as a whole. - When the
Authority failed, however, to endorse the protocol at the Summit in May 1982,
this was attributed to "technical rather than political reasons." 22/
Nevertheless, the effect was again to delay implementation of the provisions
for free circulation of community enterprise products, originally scheduled
for May 1981.
Although Cotonou produced no spectacular decisions and the
trade liberalisation programme suffered a temporary postponement, the
presence of some twelve Heads of State, along with two Prime Ministers
(Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau) and two Ministers (Mali and the Gambia) was
a tribute to the success of the Summit and to the enthusiasm that ECOWAS
28/
continues to evoke among member states. - If there were obstacles to
the programme they were not insurmountable; if some delay was inevitable,
it need not be a protracted one.
Any problems in the relationship between the CEA° and ECOWAS
did not adversely affect Nigeria's own relations with the Ivory Coast, whose
534
President intervened at Cotonou to persuade the conference that "the
Community be responsible for financing the construction of the headquarters
29/
of the institutions." - - thereby relieving Nigeria of its earlier
commitment to financing the construction of the Secretariat buildings.
The decision was timely given the economic and financial difficulties
confronting Nigeria at the time. It had the merit of involving all
sixteen countries in the construction of their new regional headquarters,
but might also be interpreted as reneging on their earlier promise to provide
the headquarters at their own expense. West Africa summed up the situation
within ECOWAS following the Cotonou Summit.
There are many remarkable aspects to the
ECOWAS experiment. It now has a comprehensive
set of programmes and increasingly operational
institutions. But people could still ask, with
justification, has it done anything? Does it not
still exist much more on paper than in reality?
Welding 16 disparate countries together is no
easy task, and the road is still a long one, but
there were many in Cotonou who felt that the time
for action was at last arriving, and that ECOWAS,
for its own good, could not remain much longer in
the words of our correspondent, "trembling on the
brink."
Free Movement of Persons and Rights of Residence and Establishment 
The idea of unrestricted movement throughout West Africa is
not a new one. There was considerable mobility of populations before
colonial rule while, under the colonial regime, there was, as Professor
C.M.B.Brann has pointed out, free movement of professional elites within
31/the territories administered by each power. - Nigeria, always a major
30/
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employer of external manpower, if only by reason of its size and
population, attracted many lawyers, teachers and civil servants from
Sierra Leone and Ghana. Likewise, Dahomeans furnished a disproportionate
number of cadres who had helped administer the French West African Federation
(A0F). Foulah pastoralists crossed the frontiers of the three colonial
powers, as did Hausa and other traders, while Ghanaian fishermen settled
on the Bights of Bonny and Benin.
Such patterns of migration attested to the economic unity of
the region and to the artifieiality of the colonial enclaves wherein trade,
labour and communications were reorganised according to the wishes of the
metropole and its agents. Nevertheless, colonial administration did at
least have the virtue of permitting exchange and mobility within frontiers
more extensive than those of the future West African states.
As independence approached, the new and overriding concern
of the African leaders with nationalism and self-government resulted
"in the mass expulsion and partial expropriation of non-indigenous (i.e.
32/foreign) African groups from both Anglophone and Francophone states." -
After independence, however, because of a growing awareness of the vulnerability
of the small national economies, and with the breakdown of the former
colonial and linguistic blocs,
new alignments could be made across these
borders, on a regional basis, of which ECOWAS
is the first good example, after the first
ineffectual moves of pan-African ideologists.
What we then have with the ratification of the
Protocol /on free movement of labour, residence
and capital/ is a return to free mobility,
this time however, across the politico-linguistic
borders. 33/
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Even more than the promotion of trade, the mobility of labour
and the other factors of production was central to ECOWAS and exemplified what
the Community was about. The free movement of persons within the region was
both a repudiation of colonial frontiers in so far as they impeded the
economic development of the new states, and an affirmation of the spirit
of cooperation and mutual assistance. It was not only a symbol of the
ECOWAS idea, but was also the main ECOwAS initiative that sought to involve
and to benefit the ordinary man and woman in the Community.
It cannot be denied, however, that movement of labour and
population across frontiers does pose serious political, social and
economic problems, even for more developed countries. Given the under-
development of West Africa there was a natural tendency for the unemployed
and underemployed to migrate to the more prosperous states and areas.
While free mobility within a grouping ensures a more efficient use of
resources, it can also provoke the hostility of those forced to accommodate
large numbers of nationals from other states. There is the risk of
discrimination in employment opportunities, while, in times of economic
adversity, there is the temptation to safeguard the interests of one's
citizens at home - perhaps at the expense of those living and working abroad.
The question of immigration has, indeed, been a sensitive and
recurring political issue in the region, both before and after independence.
The expulsion of foreign nationals from Abidjan, the Ivory Coast, in 1958
created considerable
	 in the states most directly affected, namely
Togo, Dahomey (now Benin) and, to some extent, Niger. The expulsion of
53/..
aliens from Ghana, in 1969-70, however legal, nevertheless adversely
affected nationals of several neighbouring states, including Upper Volta,
together with a half million Nigerians who had been living and working
in Ghana. These were the most notable cases, but Dahomeans have also
been expelled from Niger and later from Upper Volta; Voltaics, as we have
seen, have been expelled from Ghana; Ghanaians have been removed from
Sierra Leone, while more recently Sierra Leone has taken measures forcibly
to repatriate members of the Foulah community who have crossed over in large
numbers from Guinea.
In every case the result was a marked deterioration in bilateral
relations within the region, considerable individual suffering and hardship,
a setback to regional cooperation, and very often, damage to the economies
of all the states involved. It is clear that every country in the region
is vulnerable to unilateral action seeking to discriminate against foreign
nationals, and that more often than not such actions are taken under strong
popular pressure and as a result of economic recession. The issue, then,
is one that requires the most careful monitoring et all times by responsible
officials and by all the governments of the region.
It was our intention in creating ECOWAS that free movement of
labour, like trade liberalisation, would proceed gradually being accompanied
by other measures to secure promotion of trade, the replacement of
competitive by complementary economies, an increase in industrial specialisation
and agricultural differentiation, and a programme of industrial location
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specially designed to prevent excessive movement across frontiers. Our
first concern was to give security to those already living and working
abroad in the interests of stabilising production and increasing economic
growth. The relaxation of controls could also channel skills and labour
to countries where they were in short supply and provide at least temporary
relief for those states without adequate employment opportunities.
Articles 2 and 27 of the Treaty called on member states to
take positive measures to eliminate "by stages" all obstacles to the
free movement of persons, services and capital within the region, while
recognising the new status of nationals of all member states as "community
citizens". The provisions relating to services and capital were subsequently
dealt with in separate protocols. The intention, however, was clear.
As Dr. S.K.B.Asante, of Legon University, Ghana, has rightly pointed out:
Undoubtedly, the mutual economic benefit
which the member states of ECOWAS could draw
from the free movement of labiaux across their
international boundaries would be immense.
While the Nigerian scholar, Dr.O.Chukwurah, has indicated that free movement
of persons is a vital way of ensuring the rational use of the Community's
human resources - which involves equating labour supply with demand
without thereby seriously endangering standards of living and levels
35/of employment or, indeed, national security in the member countries. -
34/
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The letter of the Treaty could only be implemented, however,
by means of a protocol and there were more immediate problems before such
a protocol could be drafted and agreed. First there was the definition
of a "community citizen", and the problem of ascertaining who would be
eligible for that status. Article 27(l)of the Treaty simply states that:
Citizens of Member States shall be
regarded as Community citizens and
accordingly Member States undertake to
abolish all obstacles to their freedom
of movement and residence within the Community.
Article 27.2 requires member states, by agreement with one another,
to exempt community citizens from holding visitors' visas and
residence permits. and to allow them to work and undertake commercial and
industrial activities within their territories.
Citizenship can, however, be defined by birth, descent or
naturalisation, while some states are more stringent than others in their
requirements for naturalisation. Some concern was therefore voiced that
alien minorities, denied naturalisation in one country, might acquire
citizenship elsewhere in the region and return as "community citizens"
with full rights of entry and residence, and qualified to undertake (or
resume) business activities. The Nigerian delegation had at first wanted
to restrict community citizenship to "any citizen of a member country
37/
that is of direct African descent." - The matter was reserved for
further discussion and was not finally settled until the Summit in May 1981.
Meanwhile an additional qualification was introduced in Article 4 of the
relevant protocol to the effect that:
36/
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notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 above,
Member States shall reserve the right to refuse
admission into their territory of any Community
citizen who comes within the category of inadmissible
immigrants under its laws.
There was no problem getting nationals of member states
to accept Community citizenship, the real problem rather was to get
them to accept a possible influx of nationals of other member states,
who might then compete in the labour market for scarce jobs. Such
a situation did in fact arise in the Ivory Coast, in 1965, when
President Houphougt-Boigny attempted to introduce the principle of "dual
citizenship", so as to strengthen the Entente and secure his own country's
economy - dependent as it was on immigrant labour from Upper Volta. Under
the terms of the proposal non-Ivorian workers would receive Ivory Coast
citizenship while retaining their own nationality. The proposal was,
however, bitterly contested by Ivorians, especially white collar workers,
who saw it as a threat to their employment prospects at home without the
compensating advantage of being able to take up similar employment elsewhere
in the Entente. In the face of opposition from within the ruling party
(PDCI), the President had no alternative but to withdraw his suggestion.
The protocol on free movement of persons was at last drafted,
approved and signed on May 29,1979. The Treaty had envisaged the gradual
implementation of the protocol by means of a series of bilateral
arrangements on the part of member states, "in the hope that this gradual
approach would eventually lead to a multilateral arrangement." After
long deliberation, however, the Authority opted instead for "the
39/
multilateral approach ab initio" - The protocol nevertheless
recognised the wisdom of a gradual approach to such a sensitive question.
In the words of the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS : "Anyone who reads the
protocol will see that it was very cautiously planned, proposing a stage-by-
n 40/stage programme. -
The first stage, which took effect immediately, upon ratification,
provided for the right of entry without visa for a period not exceeding
ninety days. 41/
- Upon application, however, a Community citizen could be
granted an extension of his time of stay. Valid travel documents and the
necessary health certificates would continue to be required. This measure
would remain in force for a period of five years, during which trial period
the Council of Ministers loould consider implementation of the second and
third stages, conferring respectively the right of residence and, finally,
the right of establishment.
Ratification proved a difficult and protracted exercise.
President Shagari of Nigeria raised the question of implementation at the
ECOWAS Summit in Lome, in May 1980.
There seems to have been too slow progress
in the ratification of some of our decisions.
I would like to refer to the protocol on free
movement of persons. Since this protocol was signed a
year ago, only six out of 16 have ratified the instrument.
Nigeria has, of course, signed the instrument of
ratification and has long started to implement the
letter and spirit... 42/
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It was July 1980 before the required number of states had deposited
the articles of ratification, namely Nigeria, Togo, Liberia, Senegal,
43/Guinea, Niger, the Gambia and Ghana. - It is probable that the
concern with national security and possible political problems was
responsible for the delay, rather than the administrative difficulties
cited by the other states. Only one additional state had ratified the
protocol by the end of the year.
Moreover, the Executive Secretary also had cause to complain
of the "unsatisfactory manner in which the protocol is being implemented".
Now ratified by nine states,it
is being implemented by an even fewer number
of Member States. It is strongly felt that by now
the Protocol shouldhave been ratified and the first
phase fully implemented throughout the sub-region.
A check on those Member States actually implementing
the Protocol, in relation to the measures to be
instituted to effect the proper application of the
Protocol, revealed that nowhere have the provisions 44/
of the Protocol been fully observed."
Since these provisions included machinery for monitoring the results
of implementation, which formed part of the control system originally
envisaged by the Community, it was difficult to ensure the successful
application of the protocol. And
it should be recalled that it is upon the
results of the monitoring and assessment of the
operation of the first phase - abolition of visa -
that the subsequent phases ... can be introduced. 45/
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Implementation of free movement of persons was perhaps easier
in the case of Nigeria, if only because the country had long since entered
into a series of bilateral arrangements with all its neighbours, and also
with Togo, the Ivory Coast, Guinea and Morocco, exempting their nationals
from having to satisfy the customary visa requirements for entry to Nigeria.
Suspended during the civil war, these agreements were reactivated on
June 4, 1971, in a spirit of "African brotherhood".
It was possible, then, for General Obasanjo to welcome the
protocol, agreed in Dakar, in 1979, as "a great step forward". 4E/
Almost immediately, however, there were complaints that visas were still
required by immigration officials for entry to Nigeria. Although the
Nigerian government had ordered immediate implementation of the protocol
the story circulated of a Nigerian official at Murtala Muhammed airport
who, confronted by a visitor from Sierra Leone without a visa but evidently
aware of his Community status, was said to have replied : "ECOWAS for your
47/President and my President. ECOWAS not here." -
As Dr. Ouattara commented : "the protocol itself is not a
problem. The question is how it is being implemented.".
In fact, we made sure that there were specific
directives for member countries to follow so that
that protocol, which is the first important measure
to affect ECOWAS citizens, should not produce unexpected
problems. But time is needed. We anticipated that there
would be some uneasiness at the beginning about the
free movement of people, but that is not the fault of the
protocol. The member countries have to find their feet
in this new situation. It is the first real decision
they have had to implement. It is the first that effects
the ordinary citizen. There will be many more. 48/
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Implementation of this and other measures was still evidently
a serious problem and one considered by the ECOWAS Summit at Cotonou,
in May 1982. On the recommendation of the Council of Ministers it was
proposed and apparently agreed to set up a committee of five, comprising
Nigeria, Senegal, Benin, Togo and Sierra Leone, "to take stock of the
Community after seven years."
This has been called for by the Executive
Secretary in his report, and will produce a
report, particularly on the difficult question
of the imperfect implementation of Community
decisions, for the next meeting of ministers 49/in November.
Nigeria, itself, was in the forefront of those pressing for
ECOWAS to start making "real advances". President Shagari had himself
insisted:
I believe that nokenough is being done at
national level to demonstrate our commitment
to the cause of the Community. Despite our
goodwill and declared intentions, several of
our protocols and decisions are not being
ratified as fast as reasonably expected.
Even those ratified are hardly implemented
to the spirit and letter.
Opinion in West Africa was not therefore prepared for the
Nigeria decision, early in 1983, to expel upwards of one million illegal
51/immigrants, mostly Ghanaians. — They had outstayed the permissible
period of ninety days and in most cases had taken up employment without the
50/
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necessary papers. Various sections of Nigerian opinion had been
agitating for some time for a change in the ECOWAS protocol, effectively
restricting the rate of immigration. The downturn in the economy in the
late 'seventies and again in the 'eighties created depressed conditions
in Nigeria itself, still attuned to the relative prosperity of the years
after 1973.
To the fear of unemployment and competition from cheap,
immigrant labour, was added the growing problem of law and order,
particularly in the large cities and towns, which was seen by many as yet
another consequence of population movement into the country. More serious
was the threat to national security underlined by the Kano disturbances
at the end of 1980 and the riots in Maiduquriin October 1982.
To some extent the blame was misplaced. The influx of labour
into Nigeria was primarily a response to the oil boom and would doubtless
have taken place - albeit on a smaller scale - irrespective of the ECOWAS
decision. The cheap labour complained of by unions such as the Gongola
branch of the National Union of Construction and Civil Engineering Workers
URKX:Elln
 came, by the Union's own admission, from Chad and the Cameroon
52/
as well as from Niger. - Only the last was a member of ECOWAS. The
foreigners identified as being active in the Kano and Maiduguri troubles
were likewise mostly from Cameroon and Chad, neither of them members of
ECOWAS. The real problem is the artificial and therefore 'porous'
nature of West African frontiers - which can only be resolved by the
joint action of all interested governments.
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Moreover, large numbers of Nigerian nationals were also
resident and working in other West African states where economic conditions
were in no way better than in Nigeria. It was unfortunate, too that
the Ghanaian regime,in defiance of the ECOWAS Treaty, had closed its
frontiers with its neighbours in September 1982, preventing Ghanaians
expelled from Nigeria from returning quickly and with the minimum of
inconvenience to their own country. Although the border post with Togo
was eventually opened, Ghana has yet to re-open all her frontiers.
There had been other incidents in West Africa, prior to the
Nigerian decision, and after the conclusion of the ECOWAS Treaty.
The Benin-Togo frontier had been closed by the government in Cotonou late
in 1975 and was not re-opened until March 1977, despite protestations
53/by the Togolese and Ghanaian governments and the intervention of Nigeria. -
In December 1982 Sierra Leone had expelled members of the Foulah community,
originally from Guinea, while a subsequent incident between the Sierra
Leone government and the new regime in Liberia had led to the closure
of the frontier and the deployment of some 2,000 Liberian troops along the
border. And both states were members not only of ECOWAS but also of
the Mario River Union. Nevertheless the Mano River Union called for an
emergency session of ECOWAS to discuss the problems arising from the
54/Nigeria action in 1983. -
However justified in legal terms it was perhaps unfortunate
that the Nigerian government was compelled, in the end, to act unilaterally
to try to resolve a problem that is common to most of the West African
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states and certainly to the more prosperous of them. Greater
cooperation on the part of all the governments concerned would certainly
have reduced the problem to more manageable proportions. Meanwhile, it
should be the function of ECOWAS to ensure that such problems do not
arise in future.
The member states - or a majority of them - would seem to have
failed in their duty to create the administrative machinery required to
monitor the flow of labour in defence of ECOWAS. It has also to be said,
however, that it was only in 1972, sixteen years after the creation of
the EEC, that the West European states themselves recognised the need for
a regional policy, designed to eliminate excessive labour movement within
the Community. They sought to achieve this by financing additional jobs
in the more depressed regions. Economic recession is always likely to
exacerbate national tensions, but it is at such times that cooperation
among governments is most needed.
Non-Aggression Pact 
The issue of regional security has often been linked with
that of regional cooperation. The very presence of a common external
threat may inspire political leaders to work towards a common external
tariff - as in post-war Western Europe. However, a political and
economic community seldom entails the simultaneous creation of a defence
community. The success of the EEC after 1956 was in no way impeded by the
failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954-5. In any case,
the external threat may be economic rather than military - or both as in the
case of the Andean Pact, created in the shadow of Brazil and Argentina.
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Military motivations were perhaps more in evidence in the Association
of South East Asian States (ASEAN), whose role and importance increased
with the American withdrawal from Vietnam. The Central American Common
Market, on the other hand, foundered after the so-called 'football'
war, involving two of its principal member states.
In most of black Africa, before the 'seventies, defence
agreements with the former colonial powers were more frequent in the
case of France and her former African territories. The Anglo-Nigerian
Defence Treaty had lapsed after 1961, while the last British intervention
in East Africa was in 1964. By the 'seventies, even the Franco-African
defence commitments had either lapsed or were the subject of revision
as African states sought to assert their sovereignty in this vital area.
In West Africa, the French retained small garrisons in Senegal and the
Ivory Coast, and continued to offer military aid and assistance to other
states in the region, including Niger, Togo and Benin and, most notably,
Mauritania, following the outbreak of fighting in the former Spanish
Sahara.
But French military policy under Giscard d'Estaing was even
more selective than under his Gaullist predecessors, and the main thrust
was eastwards, towards Central Africa and Zaire, threatened first from
the South, with the two 'invasions' of Shaba province in 1977 and 1978,
and then from the North, following the collapse of the French-backed
administration in Chad. The complete withdrawal of French forces from
Mauritania threatened to expose West Africa to the escalating conflict
in the former Spanish enclave, while the temporary withdrawal of French
54.4
forces from Chad, in the late 'seventies, occasioned even greater
alarm among the adjacent Francophone and non-Francophone states.
In any case France had always retained considerable discretion
in the matter of implementing the defence agreements, which explains her
preference for bi-lateral rather than multi-lateral pacts. It was no
surprise, therefore, that the defence pact organised by members of the
Zion Africain et Maleat (MAMD) was ineffective, certainly where issues
of internal security were involved. At the time of the first military
intervention in black Africa, which coincided with the assassination of
President Olympio of Togo, in January 1963, no African leader, however
alarmed, thought to appeal to that particular grouping. When OCAM was
constituted later in the 'sixties, there was again discussion about a
common defence pact but by then differences among member states were so
pronounced and their ideologies sometimes so distinct that mutual defence,
like the other political aspects of OCAM, was seldom if ever invoked.
In West Africa, at a sub-regional level, members of the Entente
were all bound by a mutual defence agreement, as well as having bilateral
agreements with France. These were designed, originally, to contain any
possible threat from Nkrumah's Ghana and were frequently referred to
following his overthrow, in February 1966, when it seemed that Guinea
might attempt forcibly to restore him to power. However, the real
security of the Entente members derived from their bilateral treaties with
France - soon confirmed by Jacques Foccart's visit to the sub-region at
the height of the 1966 'crisis'.
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In an attempt to reduce the dependence of the African states
on outside powers, and to lessen the scope for unwanted external
intervention, the OAU Charter echoed that of the United Nations in
calling on its signatories "to refrain, in their international relations,
from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or
independence of any State." More specifically, the OAU document requires
member states to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
each state "and its inalienable right to an independent existence." But
these commitments have not always been scrupulously observed.
Inter-state and border problems have been widespread in
Africa and are usually politically motivated and, for the most part,
restricted to an exchange of verbal recriminations; on occasion, however,
they have resulted in the deployment ot r use of force, usually when the
political tensions are heightened either by economic disparities or
ideological disputes. While the OAU does provide for common defence
arrangements to ensure members against such aggression, the difficulty of
obtaining the agreement of so many states with such varied interests has
in practice precluded the creation of any effective machinery. A more
practical means of providing collective security would seem to be the provisions
of the OAU Charter for regional defence agreements - reducing African
dependence on outside powers and at the same time increasing the chances of
effective cooperation in many other areas of policy.
There was renewed interest in the question of collective
security in Africa in the aftermath of Angolan independence in November 1975,
when civil war and external involvement seemed for a time to revive the
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ideological divisions of the early 'sixties, with the accompanying threat
to peace, security and cooperation. Events in southern, central and
north-eastern Africa, later in the 'seventies, showed a considerable and
not altogether welcome revival of interest by the super-powers and others
in the affairs of our continent. Meanwhile, the conflict between Uganda
and Tanzania, was a reminder of continuing border tensions and the damage
they could inflict - although the East African Community was by then defunct.
The renewed war between Somalis and Ethiopia, in 1977-78, aroused the fear
of other African leaders - particularly when it seemed, for a time, that
Africas frontiers might be redrawn by the use of force rather than by
negotiation. Perhaps of more immediate relevance to West Africa was the
growing conflict on the northern perimeters of ECOWAS, involving Mauritania
in the dispute over the former Spanish Sahara, and involving Nigeria and
Niger as the conflict in Chad escalated to new and alarming proportions.
Since the drafting of the ECOWAS Treaty and its final approval,
in 1975, the prospects for continuing peace within the region seemed
increasingly threatened. There had been problems in the 'sixties which
had contributed, among other things, to the failure of a number of earlier
attempts at regional integration, notably the West African Regional Group
in 1967-8, overtaken as it was by growing tensions among the Francophone
states, as well as by the conflict in Nigeria itself. However, when the
ECOWAS Treaty was under consideration, in the 'seventies, the political
situation in the region improved to such an extent that we had no cause
to consider the inclusion of a non-aggression clause, either in the Treaty
itself, or in one of the accompanying Protocols. The short border conflict
between Mali and Upper Volta in December 1974 was too recent and scarcely
seemed to require a major revision of the Treaty, particularly as other
ECOWAS members, such as Togo and Guinea, were able to mediate with considerable
success.
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The conflicts in Shaba province of Zaire, in 1977 and again
in 1978, following the conclusion of the civil war in Angola, and involving
military intervention by France, Belgium and, indirectly, America, and
the introduction of a 'Pan-African Defence Force' into the province, raised
the spectre of similar eruptions elsewhere in Africa and led to demands,
particularly from President Senghor of Senegal, for a Force Africaine Commune,
based perhaps in the Ivory Coast and having the benefit of French logistical
55/
support. -
The issue dominated the Fourth and Fifth Franco-African
Summits in Dakar, in April 1977, and again in Paris in May 1978. The build-up
of Cuban troops and Soviet arms, and growing East-West confrontation in
Africa and neighbouring regions, failed to produce agreement on Senghor's
proposal - probably to the relief of the French President - but did result
in a communique, in 1977, condemning "foreign intervention in the affairs
of the continent, from whichever direction it should come" and stressing the
over-riding concern of all African states, irrespective of their political
56/
outlook, with peace and development. -"
	 had joined.
Senghor in 1977 in calling for "an end to all aggression, direct and indirect,
and of all attempts to create subversion in the continent", while Giscard
d'Estaing condemned aggression promising French assistance for any country
57/that should find itself so threatened. -
However, a number of states had already expressed reservations
about the idea of a joint French-African force. Guinea Bissau, for
example, had no wish to renew military ties with any European power having
just removed the Portuguese. The President of Mali suggested that a non-
aggression pact, signed by the six member states of the Francophone West
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African Community (CHAO), would be preferable to a Franco-African
58/
'Holy Alliance'. - The matter was then referred to the CEA° Summit
later that year. The CEA() Summit in May-June voted for a non-aggression
pact - as President Traore of Mali replaced his former opponent,
President Lamizana as Chairman of the Francophone Community. In his
closing address, however, President Senghor returned once more to the
earlier theme of collective security.
In today's bleeding Africa, where a war
which dares not speak its name continues in the
north-west and a fire is starting in the east, the
main need of all states, the imperative pre-condition 59/for their development, is security.
Meanwhile, the issue was no longer confined to French-speaking
states as was shown by the presence of increasing numbers of Portuguese
and English-speaking states at the Franco-African Summits. In May 1977,
before the CHAO itself adopted the principle of a non-aggression pact,
Houphoudt-Boigny, in the course of a six-day visit to neighbouring Liberia,
had concluded an agreement between the two states committing them to
the conclusion of a non-aggression pact "in line with their policy
never to allow their respective territories to be used as a military training
base against any other state." 60_,'
	 Presidents voiced their strong
apposition to the use of terror, violence and force to settle inter-state
disputes; they also re-affirmed their belief in ECOWAS, expressing
satisfaction at its steady progress. In 1979 Liberia and Guinea agreed
to draw up a non-aggression and defence pact between their two countries
61/after a two-day visit by President Sekou Toure. -
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With the spectacular reconciliation between President Mobutu
of Zaire and President Neto of Angola, in August 1978, and with Shaba
province once more calm, the earlier enthusiasm for collective security
seems to have waned for a time, even among the more 'moderate' Francophone
states. President Bongo, of Gabon, for example, told the Franco-African
Summit in Kigali, Ruanda, in May 1979, that collective security was a
matter for the OAU rather than for a conference of predominantly French
speaking states. Whereas Senghor continued to press the case for collective
security on the part of the African states, if only to guarantee their
economic development, most delegates were reported to favour President
62/Bongo's proposal for regional defence pacts. - In his view and that of
the delegates, any multilateral force would have to be organised under
the aegis of the OAU and which would present considerable problems.
Meanwhile the question of a non-aggression pact had been
discussed in the context of ECOWAS as early as the Lomfift Summit in November
1976. President Eyadema of Togo strongly favoured such an initiative, as
did the Nigerian Government, and both countries had worked together
preparing a draft protocol for submission to the Summit. General Eyadema
devoted much of his opening address in Lome to the subject, while
General Obasanjo's concluding remarks returned to the same theme.
Your Excellencies, please permit me at this
point in time to reiterate the proposal so
generously supported by our brother, President
Eyadema, in his opening remarks, about the
imperative need to refrain from the use of force
in settling our problems, which I personally
consider very important to our Community. It
seems to me, in this regard, that we have too
often permitted avoidable political differences to
divert our attention from the desired goal of economic
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development and cooperation in our sub-region.
I believe, therefore, that we should spare no
efforts under the auspices of the Community,
to stabilise peace and harmony in our sub-region,
and to re-affirm our adherence to the Charters
of the United Nations Organisation and the
Organisation of African Unity on peaceful
co-existence among the nations of the world.
I refer, of course, to the proposal to insert
a non-aggression clause in the Treaty of ECOWAS.
It is, in our view, a proposal that is worthy of
early consideration by the High Authority of Heads
of State and Government of the ECOWAS, in the
interest of lasting peace and security in our
sub-region as a solid basis for the economic and
social integration of our peoples and our lands.
It would be tantamount to self-deceit to hope
for economic and social cooperation and integration,
in an atmosphere of disharmony and hostilities in
the sub-region.
Referring to the basic aims of the Community-as stated
in Article 2 of the Treaty, and recognising the necessity for
"peaceful and friendly relations among the Member States ... as a
means of promoting cooperation and development in all fields of
economic activity within the Community", the proposed Protocol comprised
only a single paragraph:
All Member States of the Community shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of a Member State and to this
end shall settle all their international disputes by 64/peaceful means.
63/
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A resolution favourable to the proposal was carried on
November 5,although the final terms of the protocol could not be
agreed at this Summit because of pressure of other business. By June
1977 the six member states of the CEA() had concluded their own non-aggression
pact, and Eyadema again raised the matter with the Nigerian Government,
querying the delay in amending the ECOWAS Treaty in the same direction.
Both governments a4reed that, notwithstanding the independent action of
the CEA() states, the matter should be vigorously pursued within ECOWAS to
enable another draft to be tabled before the next meeting of the Council
65/
of Ministers in July 1977. -
In the event the draft was submitted to the Council of
Ministers meeting prior to the Lagos Summit, in April 1978. Benin (Dahomey)
produced a more comprehensive text which was then combined with the main
draft to produce the definitive version of the protocol finally approved
by the Authority on April 22.6§Aar1ier reservations expressed by Niger
and Sierra Leone, about the competence of the Council to discuss such a
matter were withdrawn after appeals from other leaders present. There
was apparently a general consensus that any arrangement that contributed
to peace and stability was not only desirable but was also a pre-requisite
67/for the rapid economic development of the region. -
The new, expanded version of the protocol set out in much
greater detail the obligations of member states towards one another.
Not only should they refrain, as before, from "the threat or use of
aggression", or employing other means inconsistent with the UN and OAU
Charters "against the territorial integrity ot political independence of
other Member States", but, in addition:
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2. Each Member State shall refrain from
committing, encouraging or condoning acts of
subversion, hostility or aggression against
the territorial integrity or political
independence of the other Member States.
3. Each Member State shall undertake to
prevent Foreigners resident on its territory
from committing the acts referred to in Article 2
above against the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of other Member States.
4. Each Member State shall undertake to prevent
non-resident Foreigners from using its territory
as a base for committing the acts referred to in
Article 2 above.
Member States were pledged "to resort to all peaceful means
in the settlement of disputes arising among themselves", while "any
dispute which cannot be settled peacefully among Member States shall be
referred to a Committee of the Authority." The protocol provided further
that, in the event that the committee, to be set up by the Authority,
failed to achieve a settlement, "the dispute shall finally go to the
69/Authority." - The protocol was signed and subsequently ratified,
becoming an integral part of the ECOWAS Treaty.
Mutual Aid and Assistance for Defence
During 1978 there was considerable discussion within ECOWAS
of ways by which the intentions of the protocol might be more effectively
realised in practice. Troops from Senegal and Togo and medical personnel
from the Ivory Coast were, meanwhile, involved in the 'Pan-African Defence
Force' operating within Shaba province of Zaire, although the force was
due to be withdrawn in September 1978. It was not surprising, therefore,
that the BCOWAS conference in Dakar, Senegal, in May 1979 should have
before it separate proposals for an ECOwAS Defence Pact submitted by Senegal
and Togo, for the information of the Council of Ministers and the consideration
70/
of the Authority. -
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Recalling the Non-Aggression Pact signed by member states
in April 1978, the Authority declared itself "convinced that peace,
security and territorial integrity are the basic conditions for political
stability, economic and social progress of ECOWAS Member States" - and
convinced, too, "of the necessity to supplement the said Non-Aggression
Pact with a Mutual Defence Agreement." 71/ Having taken note of the
different draft proposals submitted by Senegal and Togo, the Authority
instructed the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Executive
Secretary to convene a meeting of Chiefs of Staff of the various
national armies, together with the ministers responsible for Defence,
Foreign Affairs, Finance and Economic Planning/Development, to consider
these drafts and submit their own recommendations for a Defence Pact to
72/the next ECOWAS Summit. -
The delay in approving a Defence Agreement seemed to reflect
concern about the nature, scope and effectiveness of the proposed measures
and an awareness of the many practical problems involved in constituting
a combined Defence Force. In no circumstances could the force be deployed
against an internal opposition without clear evidence of external military
involvement by another state or states.
But domestic unrest was easily the most frequent cause of
political instability within the region, and was a major pre-occupation
in some states. Other countries, affected by border conflicts in the
past, were reluctant, perhaps, to entrust their defence to a regional
force including former
	 critics and/or opponents. Others again, like
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Mauritania, who felt threatened by forces operating on or beyond the
perimeters of the region, looked for some assurance that their partners
in the Community would identify with their cause.
Within the region there were states, too, who feared that
the proposed joint force might be deployed in support of French
or Western, rather than West African interests. Outside the region
the French, themselves, had not previously shown themselves sympathetic
to the idea of multilateral defence agreements, even when proposed by
such loyal allies as Senegal. Finally, the logistical problems and
the difficulties in recruiting, training, arming, housing, clothing and
financing a permanent standing force made it more likely that individual
countries would be asked to designate special units for possible Community
service. Even then a considerable amount of planning was involved and
provision had to be made for the appointment of a Force Commander. How
much discretion he enjoyed in the deployment of troops and in the planning
of exercises, and his relationship both to the Authority and to the
4overnment requesting intervention, was another issue for ECOWAS to resolve.
The Nigerian view about such a force was that it should be
primarily for defence against external aggression and that it was
premature at this stage to think in terms of a single, integrated
regional army. Coordination would be secured through a Community
headquarters which could then call on various states to provide an
agreed number of troops. There might also be a peace-keeping element
within the region with provision for mediation and arbitration before
there was any recourse to military intervention. The principal need was
to avoid recourse to non-ECOWAS forces in cases of external threat to
member states.
560
The proposed Defence Pact was again considered at the
Lome Summit of ECOWAS, in May 1980, with leaders being asked to choose
between the different proposals from Senegal and Togo, President Eyadema
opened the Summit with a strong recommendation that it should approve
a common defence organisation.
We must at all costs maintain peace and
stability •.. This is why the pact of non-
aggression ... must acquire greater significance.
Collective acceptance of a common defence pact will
free us from the permanent obsession of war and
aggression. It is when each member state of
ECOWAS knows that it need not fear its neighbour,
which is ready to fly to its aid in the event of
any aggression, that we can serenely occupy ourselves
with the multiple tasks imposed by our development.
He ended his speech with an appeal to
all areas of the continent where peace remains
precarious	 to hear the voice of consultation
and dialogue, for no problem can be solved by force
or the use of arms. That is why, in accordance with
their vocation of peace, cooperation and progress,
the Togolese people will participate in any initiative
meant tc-, safeguard peace in our region because we in
Togo are convinced that with peace and unity among
our people we can obtain the necessary force for this 73/
new war for our economic and social development.
Nigeria and Togo again strongly favoured such a pact since
ECOWAS must be "meticulously protected" from both internal and external
aggression. At the earlier Council of Ministers, however, the Mali
delegate had already maintained that the formation of a joint force
would be a step towards the "colonial reconquest" of Africa "and would
encourage splitting the continent into blocks dominated by outside powers."7 -4/
There were reported to be strong objections, too, from the former Portuguese
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territories, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, and from Benin. No final
agreement could therefore be reached, although a large majority does
seem to have accepted the immediate need for a common defence organisation
to safeguard the institutions of the Community. 	 An eight-nation
ministerial committee was therefore set up comprising Nigeria, Togo,
Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cape Verde and Niger,
to revive the question of the defence treaty and report back to the next
Summit'- which would also consider the question of command and the
75/
financing of the force.- The concluding remarks of the outgoing Chairman
of the Authority, President Senghor, pointed the way to a possible
resolution of the issue.
As we are all aware, there is no development
without security. It might be advisable and even
normal to leave out those countries which do not
want to join and let those wishing to do so
negotiate a defence pact.
It was the Freetown Summit, in May 1981, which finally
approved the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, In the
event only Mali, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau failed to initial
7 7/the protocol which was subsequently ratified. - By way of preamble the
protocol notes that member states are "conscious of the serious continuous
threats of aggression on the African continent in general and their own
countries in particular"; and conscious, too, "of the serious risks that
the presence of foreign military bases on the African continent may constitute
as support forces to external aggression." They were also aware of "the
fact that external defence of their states depends entirely on each
sovereign state, and that such a defence will be more effective with the
coordination and pooling together of the means of mutual assistance provided
by respective Member States within the framework of this Protocol."
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Chapter II provided that "mutual aid and assistance for
defence" would be available in the case of "any armed threat or
aggression directed against any Member State" which shall be deemed to
"constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community."
In the case of armed conflict between member states, mutual aid and
assistance for defence would only be available "if the settlement
procedure by peaceful means as indicated in Article 5 of the Non —
Aggression Protocol ... proves ineffective." Where there was internal
armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively
from outside" and "likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire
Community", then the Authority itself shall appreciate and decide on this
situation in full collaboration with the Authority of the Member State or
States concerned." In such difficult cases considerable discretion
therefore rested with the Authority of the Community.
The responsibility for implementing the mutual defence
proposals rested with the Authority which "shall decide on the expediency
of military action and entrust its execution to the Force Commander of
the Allied Forces of the Community (AAFC)." The Authority's decisions
on these matters "shall be immediately enforceable on Member States."
The better to meet its responsibilities in case of emergency the Authority
was authorised to "hold extraordinary sessions on defence matters where
circumstances so require."
Otherwise the Authority is to be assisted by a Defence Council,
comprising Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of the member states.
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In case of crisis the Council would be chaired by the current
Chairman of the Authority while there was provision for its membership
to be varied "according to the circumstances". Technical matters would
be entrusted to yet another body, the Defence Commission, to be established
by the Authority and to comprise a Chief of Staff from each member state.
In an emergency, the Defence Council would "examine the
situation", the strategy to be adopted and the means of intervention
to be used"; while, assisted by the Defence Commission, it would
supervise with the authority of the State
or States Concerned, all measures to be taken
by the Force Commander and ensure that all
necessary means for the intervention are made
available to him. The actions o*le Force
Commander shall be subject to competent political
authority of the Member State or States concerned.
The Executive Secretariat would be enlarged to provide for a
Deputy Executive Secretary (Military), to be appointed by the Defence
Council from among senior serving military officers for a period of four
years renewable only once. Under the authority of the Executive Secretary
he would be entrusted with the administration of the Authority's decisions,
would prepare and manage the military budget of the Secretariat, would
report to the Secretariat "on all matters relating to personnel and
equipment within his jurisdiction", and "shall update plans for the movement
of troops and logistics and initiate joint exercises as provided for
in paragraph 3 of Article 13 below."
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It was clear from Chapter V that the Allied Armed Forces
of the Community would consist of "earmarked units from the existing
National Armed Forces", placed at the Community's disposal by member
states "in case of any armed intervention". Its effectiveness would
be ensured by a provision that "the Member States may organise, from
time to time, as may be approved by the Authority, joint military
exercises among two or more earmarked Units of the AAFC."
The Force Commander would himself be appointed by the
Authority on the proposal of the Defence Council and would receive his
powers from the Authority. He and the Chief of Defence Staff of the
assisted country would together comprise the Joint Chief of Defence
Staff of the Allied Armed Forces and would "be responsible for the
implementation of armed intervention and assistance as decided by the
Authority." Given the innumerable and often serious problems previously
encountered by joint military action of this kind, Chapter V on the
"modalities of Intervention and Assistance" was perhaps unduly optimistic
about the prospects for overall coordination, integration of the forces,
and unity of command. But the concluding sentence in Article 14,
relating to the Armed Forces Commander, was more in the nature of an
aspiration : "He shall have at his disposal all necessary means of defence."
The remainder of Chapter V was concerned with the details by
which the Head of State of a country confronting an external armed
threat might communicate his request for assistance to the Authority.
Article 17 specified mediation by the Authority in case of conflict
between two member states. "If need be, the Authority shall decide only
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to interpose the AAFC between the troops engaged in the conflict."
Other than recourse to mediation there was no mention of any return by
troops to their original pre-conflict positions. Article 18 was rather more
explicit where the conflict was within the frontiers of a member state.
Mutual Defence Aid and Assistance would be provided only "in the case
where an internal conflict in a Member State of the Community is actively
maintained and sustained from outside..." (18.1). "Community forces shall
not intervene if the conflict remains purely internal." (18.2).
Under Chapter III "special provisions" of the protocol enabled
member states to subscribe to other conventions or agreements on defence
"provided such Conventions and Agreements are not in conflict with the
spirit of this Defence Assistance." Nevertheless member states were
instructed to "undertake to and the presence of foreign military bases within
their national territories as soon as the Community is in the position to
meet their requirements in matters relating to defence."
The adoption of the Mutual Defence Protocol on May 29,1981,
gave rise to various comments. One journal described its impact as
mainly "psychological", helping to create the right climate in which
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cooperation can flourish. - Lagos Radio was more positive in its
appraisal.
The significance of a defence protocol cannot
be overemphasised, particularly at a time when
almost every African country is becoming more and
more vulnerable to external aggression. It is a
fact that there cannot be any meaningful development
without peace and adequate security. In fact, both
are necessary conditions for the welfare and prosperity
of the citizens of any state, country or sub-region.
And to the extent that this is the case for member
countries of ECOWAS union such a defence pact will be
indispensable.
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Besides, the establishment of the ECOWAS joint
defence force can be seen as a point of departure
for the setting-up of a similar force on a
continental level. It is recalled that in the
early 1960s President Kwame Nkrumah's initiative
in the Casablanca group of African states for the
setting-up of an African High Command was somewhat
unpopular. Since then, many radical African countries
have not relented in their efforts for a continental
high command similar to those of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
But in spite of the fact that the Charter of the
OAU refers in its preamble to the need to establish
and maintain conditions of peace and security on the
continent, members only agreed in dubious terms to
coordinate and harmonise their general policies for
defence and security. In fact, the defence commission
set up has been ineffective because it has neither the
power nor the equipment with which to work.
There is no doubt that several factors have militated
against the formation of an African High Command. One
of these is undisputably the reluctance of most African
countries to give up a part of their sovereignty for a
continental cause. Ironically, there are compelling
reasons why African states ought to give their support
to the idea of a united defence system for the continent.
South Africa, for one, poses a constant threat to the
security of the states in southern Africa. It recently
fulfilled its promise to attack any neighbouring state
that provides sanctuary to black freedom fighters. For
instance, the Headquarters of the African National
Congress of South Africa was attacked in Maputo, Mozambique.
The racists have vowed to carry out similar raids anywhere
else when the occasion demands. Also there is the question
of foreign military intervention in African affairs.
Today, foreign troops are stationed in areas that should
be manned by an African defence force. What has happened
so far is that the difficulties in the way of the formation
of such a defence force have been played down. What should
be realised, however, is that the threat to the independence
and sovereignty of each African nation is beyond the means
of a single state to contain. The ECOWAS protocol on a
mutual defence force must therefore be seen as a first step
towards an attempt for a collective defence system for the
West African sub-region. Whether or not the move will 79/
appeal to the rest of Africa is a question of time.
My own view is that although the Defence Protocol might be
necessary, it represents a diversion of activity away from the main purpose
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of the Community, which is economic. It was our view that the
economic development of the region as a whole and the experience of close
and continuing cooperation, both economic and political, would together
help guarantee the security of West Africa and the states that comprise
it - and would do so more successfully and at less cost than the creation
of a top-heavy and administratively complex regional task force. Military
coordination for external defence and peace-keeping is, of course, a
necessary and perfectly valid exercise. But it is a burden that is, in
any case, likely to be born by a relatively small number of states and which
is perhaps more appropriately dealt witheat this stage, in the context of
80/
the OAU, rather than our own West African community. -
By way of contrast the Non-Aggression Pact is very much in the
main stream of African policy with the emphasis on political rather
than military sanctions, at least in the first instance. But it largely
re-states the existing provisions of the UN and OAU Charters. If we did
not include provision for mutual defence in the original ECOWAS Treaty
it was because there was, at the time, no serious threat to the security
of the region and because the risk of external intervention could best be
minimised by resolving our own internal differences peacefully and presenting a
united front to the outside world. If we cannot first achieve that the
81/
prospects for joint military action would not seem very promising. -
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it may be that proposals Mr an ECOWAS defence treaty which
have been floated in some quarters would prove more decisive than
useful at the moment. (There is, of course, already a protocol
of non-aggression.) Against whom are the ECOWAS states to be
defended? When does a revolution encouraged from over the border
become an invasion? Who is to decide these and other questions?
Who will command an ECOWAS force? There are real gains that must not
be unduel Yrisked.. :West Africa, 1 June 1981.
81. An earlier leader in West Africa, entitled 'ECOWAS and Non-Aggression'
recognised both the advantages and the potential problems raised by the
Non-Aggression Pact. The big development at the Summit Meeting in
Lagos of the Economic Community of West African States were the passing
of the protocol of non-aggression. Under this the 16 statee agree not
to attack each other and recognised as definitive the present borders
between them. The proposal to pass such a protocol has been in
existence since the beginning of ECOWAS: it is reported that the
Somali-Ethiopia, Tanzania-Uganda disputes and others, persuaded the
Heads of State and their deputies meeting in Lagos that it was in the
Community's interests to pass the protocol now.
It might be agreed by some that a non-aggression agreement is always
of doubtful value: if fighting breaks out between states, their pacts,
protocols and treaties are automatically put in abeyance. It would be
difficult to cite a case from history where a treaty of non-aggression
has actually prevented a military offensive. More common have been
times when non-aggression pants have been arguably used by countries
in order to prepare for an invasion - the Ribbentripp Pact between
the Nazis and the Russians is still fresh in many people's minds and
memories. There is no question of anything like that in West Africa
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today, of course, and the present protocol does have a value as a
statement of intent and a demonstration of the good will that exists
in the region. It is also a concealed criticism of the OAU. Why
shoilld such a declaration be needed if the OAU's procedures for preventing
and settling disputes were effective?
More important is the fact that this is the first political discussion
of ECOWAS. There were obviously strong political overtones in other proposals;
about the lowering of tariffs, for instance, or the eventual alignment of
currencies, or the freedom of movement of people between countries. But it
can be argued that they involve basically economic decisions: making war
can only be a political decision. The sovereignty of the individual nations
has been restricted in a new area. This is not necessarily a bad thing; the
whole idea of setting up ECOWAS involved the surrender of a degree of
sovereignty by the members, and this has been made clear from the start. But
unexceptionable in itself : few countries are themselves potential aggressors
and everyone is in favour of peace, particularly when their vital interests
are not threatened. But it is also the first step on a path that will require
most careful and skilful t1eadi419" West Africa, 1 May 1978 (ed.)
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CONCLUSION
The signing of the ECOWAS Treaty in May 1975 and its subsequent
ratification must be seen as the outcome of long, arduous and continuing
diplomatic efforts to establish a viable and functional economic community
politically acceptable to all the West African states. It brings into focus
the various social, political and economic problems that all developing
countries have had to confront in their attempt to secure economic development
and growth. The ECOWAS experiment in 'economic integration' gives us an
opportunity to study in depth - thanks to the source materials now available -
the different elements involved in such a cooperative exercise, the obstacles
and constraints encountered, and the ways in which at least some of these
have been overcome or are on the way to a solution.
A pertinent question regarding the West African countries, or any
other group of developing countries for that matter, is why they have chOsen
to make such an experiment and why they persist in that endeavour despite the
inevitable setbacks and the high failure rate among comparable communities?
What they hoped to achieve by it? Why it took so long to materialise? and why
ECOWAS finally emerged when it did? These are among the questions I have
attempted to answer in the course of the thesis. As I have been mainly
concerned with the formation of ECOWAS and the establishment of its key
institutions and agencies, the emphasis throughout has been on political
rather than economic factors, although the performance of ECOWAS will be
judged more by economic than by political criteria.
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Long before 1945, state and later national boundaries were
perceived as an obstacle to the development of trade and to economic growth.
However, the undoubted success of the European Economic Community (EEC) has
been the point of departure for groupings of a predominantly regional and
economic nature. This has been the case notably in the Third World, where
the concern with independence and development has been thwarted by the
existence of colonial boundaries and inherited patterns of trade and 'dependency'
that have seldom been conducive to independence or to development. Political
independence, far from resolving the problem or alleviating the constraints,
economic and political, has served to generate new pressures and impose
additional constraints on the governments concerned.
Sometimes the problems encountered by Third World governments
were of their own making. More often, however, they were the product of
external forces and events beyond their control or influence. The only
way to change the situation to their advantage was to cooperate among
themselves, particularly in their dealings with the advanced nations.
Policies of economic nationalism pursued after independence underlined the
inadequacy of existing markets and the chronic shortage of investment.
Scarce resources were wasted as identical industries were created in neighbouring
countries excluding the possibility of economies of scale or the benefits of
specialisation.
Increasingly the answer appeared to be cooperation among the new
states, at the regional level where it was most practical and most likely to
be effective. For the West African states in particular, economic development
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and growth and the achievement of a measure of self-reliance were out of
reach for most of the countries on account of their extremely low economic
base, the absence of resources, lack of industry, deficiency of rainfall,
• and weak infra-structure. The leaders saw no reason why the benefits of
economic integration should be confined to the European and industrial
economies : why their states should not also cooperate to promote their
economic and social development.
Where the customary 'static' benefits to be derived from
regional integration maybe restricted to predominantly industrial economies,
there are other more 'dynamic' effects associated with such communities. Here
it is a question not of securing small additional increments to existing growth
and welfare levels, but rather of generating development in otherwise under-
developed countries. The emphasis is much less on removing . barriers to present
trade and encouraging greater specialisation, and much more on the re-orientation
of trade away from customary products and traditional (mainly colonial) markets.
In this way it is hoped to provide greater incentives for local manufacturing
to encourage product diversification, r, attract external investment and
stimulate joint exploitation of energy and mineral resources. (Table 10).
Of the West African states Nigeria is one of the fortunate few
that might be able to develop alone, by expanding the domestic market, by
policies of agricultural and self-sufficiencr, by export diversification and
by an aggressive marketing policy at home and, more particularly, abroad.
Even then it is difficult to see how Nigeria alone could circumvent the
tariff and other barriers ,
 that were being erected within the region and elsewhere
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TABLE 10
PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS OF SELECTED WEST AFRICAN
COUNTRIES
DAHOMEY (BENIN)	 Palm products, cotton, fish.
IVORY COAST
	
Coffee, cocoa, timber, bananas
THE GAMBIA	 Groundnuts.
GHANA
	
Gold, diamonds, timber, aluminium, cocoa.
MALI	 Rice, cotton, groundnuts, livestock, fish.
MAURITANIA	 Iron ore, copper, gum, gum arabic, fish.
NIGER	 Groundnuts, livestock, uranium.
NIGERIA	 Crude petroleum, tin, ground nuts, palm
products, rubber, cocoa, cotton, timber.
SENEGAL	 Groundnuts, phosphate, fish, manufactures.
SIERRA LEONE
	
Diamonds, iron ore, bauxite, palm kernels,
coffee, cocoa, ginger, kolanuts.
TOGO
	
Phosphate, cocoa, coffee.
UPPER VOLTA	 Livestock, cotton, groundnuts.
Source:	 Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review,
10, 1 (June 1972).
J.P.Renninger, Multinational Cooperation for Develo pment in 
West Africa.
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in the world. And it is doubtful whether the Nigerian market is itself
sufficiently large and prosperous to sustain an important and eventually
competitive manufacturing base. Despite its large and rapidly growing
population, its oil and agriculture, Nigeria has more in common, nevertheless,
with its smaller neighbours than with either the advanced industrial nations
or the wealthy and small oil states of the Middle East. Because of its
population and its under-development Nigeria remains vulnerable to price
fluctuations for its major export commodity and to sudden climatic
variations where food production is concerned.
Regional economic integration did seem to provide a more reliable
and rational basis for ordering our economic priorities and a more effective mean:
of promoting economic and social development throughout the region. Such
cooperation would also encourage 'collective self-reliance' on the part of
the member states of the community andmnuld hopefully, permit the kind of
structural changes that could not easily be undertaken within existing colonial
and linguistic frontiers. Without industrialisation a strategy of agricultural
diversification offered little immediate nrospect of economic improvement for
most states in the region, especially those of the Sahel, whose populations
were as familiar with drought as with visiting aid personnel and often
conflicting advice.
Among the first generation of West African leaders, after
independence, long-term economic considerations were too often subordinated
to short-term political imperatives. The result was a number of groupings,
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regional and continental, beginning with the Ghana -Guinea Union and
later the Union of African States, where the economic objectives were
clearly subordinate to ideological ones. For President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana,
regional or sub-regional organisation was at best a ste p towards and, at worst,
an obstacle to continental unity under a single African government. By
political integration he hoped to circumvent the long process of consultation
necessary if there was to be consensus among individual governments on the
goals and methods of economic development.
But there were no short-cuts to economic cooperation, as was clear
from the failure of the Union of African States and the earlier collapse
of the Mali Federation, integrating Mali and Senegal, which was to have
provided the political nucleus for a regional community of the Francophone
states. Other West African leaders saw such moves as a threat to their new-
won sovereignty and independence. Nigeria quickly stated its preference for
a gradual anproach to political unity, through inter-governmental
cooperation at a regional level with the emphasis on developing economic
and functional linkages. On the whole, groupings that were less politically
and ideologically oriented and more economic and functional in character, such
as the Council of the Entente, proved more successful in retaining the
support of their members. And it was this pattern that would later be
followed in the 'seventies- by both the Francophone West African Economic
Community (CEA()) and our own ECOWAS. Cooperation and consensus would be
the basis of all future efforts at integration within the region.
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It was nevertheless to be admitted that subsequent attempts
at economic integration in West Africa, in the 'sixties and early 'seventies
fared little better on account of the contingent nature of the strategies
adopted and the extent to which such schemes continued to reflect more
immediate political considerations rather than long —term social and economic
preoccupations. In that period, however, there did emerge another generation
of West African leaders, often but not always from a military background, and
concerned above all with the mounting economic problems of their states and
the failure of existing policies and programmes to resolve them. Political
instability threatened to become endemic unless governments were able to
coordinate their economic policies and cooperate to develop
 their economies.
It was not that they were any less concerned with national interests and
independence rather that they saw no prospect of achieving either without
some sacrifice of sovereignty.
•
They were influenced and greatly assisted by the advice of
specialist teams from the various United Nations' agencies and, in particular, th
Economic Commission for Africa DrAJ, whose influence grew as its leading
personnel came to be drawn from the African states themselves and could
therefore communicate more readil y
 with African governments and respond to
African needs. The many reports, conferences and papers emanating from the ECA
and various other international agencies, all drew attention to the advantages
of industrialisation which could best be achieved through regional
cooperation, economic diversification and the creation of larger and more reliabl
markets. Here the advantages of the region over smaller and larger units were
quickly appreciated while the boundaries of the proposed African regions aroused
little controversy at the time, although there was discussion about West
Africa's eastern border.
,582
Just as important were the examples of the EEC itself, as a
successful functioning regional entity, and the various regional experiments
in South and Central America, the West Indies and South-East Asia, although
these included many failures alongside a very few successes. Closer to home
there was the example of the East African Community, whose final collapse
in 1975-77 unhappily coincided with the establishment of ECOWAS. But the
EAC was essentially a colonial creation that had survived independence, but
only in a modified form, whereas ECOWAS was conceived as a reaction against
colonial frontiers and inherited economic structures. Small communities
like the EAC are also muchmore vulnerable to sudden changes at the top,
where our own larger grouping has repeatedly shown its Ability to accommodate
such changes without precipitating a crisis within the organisation itself.
We also had, in West Africa, the experience of the Common
Services, which operated among the English-speaking states until Ghana's
independence in 1957, and which, to some extent, we had later to reconstruct
with considerable difficulty in our pursuit of cooperation across existing
borders. The Francophone states had their own continuing history of regional
integration, both administrative and economic, including, before independence,
the West African Federation CP.OF), and later such organisations as the UAM,
UAMCE and OCAM which, although continental in scope, were largely West
African in leadership and inspiration. There were also such economic
associations-as the Franc zone, grouping countries in several regions, the
Customs Unions (tIDEA0 in West Africa and the more successful UDEAC), as well
as regional banking, monetary and commercial arrangements. The Francophone
groupings served mainly, however, to integrate their African members with
the metropole rather than to enhance the prospects for inter-African
cooperation, which was surely the first objective of a West African regional
economic community.
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The main obstacles to regional integration in West Africa I have
defined first as the appearance in the early 'sixties of political and
ideological differences within the region, so that the more specific
economic objectives were soon overtaken by ambitious political schemes
seeking to encompass the continent as a whole. And as the ideological divisions
began to recede even before the creation of the Organisation of African Unity
in 1963, while economic preoccupations came to the forefront, there were the
problems posed by colonial dependency and the cultural, economic and political
legacy of the three West European states that had been involved in the area
up to independence. Excluding the Portuguese territory of guinea-Bissau,
still fighting for its independence, there were the states associated with
the Commonwealth and the system of economic preference, and there were the
Francophone states, the majority, who with the exception of Guinea (and the
part-exception of Mali) were bound to France by various cooperation agreements.
West Africa was the one region of the continent where colonial
boundaries, linguistic, cultural and monetary, were the major obstacles
to economic cooperation and eventual integration. In East Africa the three
states involved in the EAC were all former British colonies, just as the
states of the Maghreb were Francophone and Arabic speaking. The Central
and Equatorial African groupings were exclusively Francophone in character,
formerly ruled by France and Belgium, while the southern African states
were predominantly British - with the important exceptions of Angola and
Mozambique after 1975 - but drawn together, nevertheless, by the proximity
of white-ruled South Africa. The linguistic division in West Africa was
accentuated after independence by the aggressive policies of Ghana towards
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its Francophone neighbours, while the Nigerian leaders worked hard to
convince the Francophone states that their size and economic potential
did not constitute i threat to the other, smaller states of the region.
The main themes of Nigerian foreign policy in this period were respect for
existing states within their present frontiers, on the one hand, and the
promotion of trade and economic cooperation on the other.
Unfortunately, Nigerian unity was itself threatened for a
time and the civil war, 1967-1970, can be seen as vet another obstacle
to West African unity, coinciding as it did with the abortive attempts
to construct a Regional Group, undertaken on the initiative of Senegal
and some of her immediate neighbours. The civil war restricted the extent
of our own contribution to that worthy enterprise, although our support for
it was in no way diminished and continued until the end. The civil war
also added to the existing divisions among the Francophone states, since our
immediate neighbours supported the cause of Nigeria while the Ivory Coast and
France, itself, came to support the rebellion. Rather than the civil war it
was the rivalries among the Francophone states, particularly between Senegal
and the Ivory Coast, contending for political leadership and economic primacy
within the region, that brought about the failure of the Regional Group.
Meanwhile, there was the continuing antagonism between the two leading,
conservative Francophone states, and Guinea (Conakry), with its radical
government. This had threatened to erupt into open confrontation at the
time of Nkrumah's overthrow, in February 1966, and it would again become
a very serious issue following the abortive invasion of Guinea in November 1970.
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I have argued that the 'seventies were more favourable to
regional integration, with the successful resolution of the civil war
in Nigeria, accompanied by a policy of reconciliation towards all those
who had opposed us, at home and abroad. Fear of Nigeria, that had largely
dictated the hostile attitude of some Francophone states during the civil
war, began at last to recede - the more so as our immediate neighbours began
to derive considerable benefit from the oil-boom in Nigeria without having
to sacrifice anything of their independence. Our relations with France also
began to improve with the end of the war and the retirement of President de
Gaulle. At the same time the French presence in West Africa became less
prominent, while the Francophone states demanded the re-negotiation of their
cooperation agreements. The entry of Great Britain into the Common Market
led to demands among the Francophone African states for improved economic
relations with their Anglophone partners in the region - to complement
the new rapprochement within the EEC. Finally, in the early 'seventies, the
Ivory Coast and Senegal at last made common cause in the interests of regional
integration, even if the community they proposed was much narrower than the one
that we in Nigeria envisaged and, being confined to the Francophone states,
was interpreted by some as an attempt to contain Nigeria's growing influence.
The global economic crisis, following the 1973 Middle East war,
served to remind West African leaders of their economic vulnerability when
confronted with a situation over which they, as individual states, had little
influence and less control. The metropoles, moreover, seemed more concerned
with their economic rivalry and survival than with the predicament of their
African associates. Coinciding as it did with a prolonged drought in the
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Sahel region, and the big jump in oil prices, the economic conjuncture was
particularly discouraging for most West African states and their leaders.
These difficulties and Nigeria's material assistance acted as a catalyst
to overcome any remaining doubts or suspicions. Regional integration was
not, however, simply a response by governments to external economic crisis.
The movement towards integration was already strong in the late 'sixties and
in the meantime most of the obstacles had been or were in the process of being
removed. All countries within the region had expressed the wish to be
associated within an economic community that would bridge the linguistic
divide.
After 1970 Nigeria came to identify much more completely with
Africa and with the region of which it is an integral part. The first
tangible evidence of that was the celebration in Lagos of the tenth
anniversarrof our independence, when Heads of State and plenipotentiaries
assembled from all over Africa, and whefttthe question of West African economic
integration was once again discussed. More tangible evidence of the renewed
interest in a regional grouping was the decision by Nigeria and Togo, in 1972,
to form the nucleus of a proposed economic community. That partnership , which
has endured to the present, contributed greatly to the improvement of
relations throughout the region. The cooperation of the two countries has been
of inestimable benefit to the community as a whole and it was appropriate,
therefore, that they should have been chosen, in 1976, to house the key
institutions of the Community, the Secretariat and the Fund for Cooperation,
Compensation and Development.
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Meanwhile, Nigeria which enjoyed greatly expanded revenue as
a result of increased oil production and higher prices, was able to use
its new advantageous position for the lasting benefit of all the states
of the region. But the policy of reconciliation and the drive for economic
cooperation were based in the main on national as well as African integration.
Nigeria had survived the civil war, thanks in good part to the loyal support
of her Francophone neighbours. To continue as one nation, Nigeria had not
only to develop
 its own resources and ensure their equitable redistribution
within the country, but had also to win the confidence and trust of the other
states of the region. Then, as now, increased trade and economic cooperation
within West Africa seemed to offer the best prospects for peaceful co-existence
and the most reliable basis for a profitable collaboration.
The first product of that new collaboration was the widely-
•
acclaimed agreement of association concluded at Lome, Togo, at the beginning
of 1975, between the EEC and the African-Caribbean-Pacific states. And in
May of that same year the Summit of West African Heads of State and
Plenipotentiaries, meeting in Lagos, agreed to the establishment of ECOWAS.
Since then even those states who were formerly apprehensive about Nigeria's
intentions towards her partners in the region, have since come to appreciate
the value of Nigeria's support for the community. The growing friendship
and closer economic ties between Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, particularly
after 1973, has served the cause of ECOWAS well. The trade agreement between
the two states, signed in March 1982, provides for most-favoured nation
status in respect of many items originating in either state. It will
continue in the first instance for three years. -
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Even Senegal which, under President Senghor, was first a strong
advocate of regional integration in the 'sixties, and then, in the 'seventies,
the leading critic of certain aspects of our community, has, since 1978,
associated itself more closely with ECOWAS. In October 1983 Senghor's successor
as President, Abdou Diouf, concluded an interview with what he described as
"a profession, of faith".
I am convinced that, whatever the quality of the
administration of our states, taken individually,
whatever the capacity of our rulers, we will not
get very far in the context of our own little states.
I am a fierce partisan of the economic integration of
our continent and even of its eventual political
integration. I would be very happy if one day we had
a West Africa integrated first economically, then
politically,because that would permit millions and millions
of Africans to possess a great state instrument allowing
the creation of a great deal of good in Africa. But in the
framework of our mini-states we will make mini-progress.
We will not take the giant steps needed by our countries
to ensure their progress. I am a fierce partisan of
integration at all levels, and hope that all heads of
state have the same faith in this integration, and that
we will realise it as soon as possible.
It was never intended that such a large and heterogeneous
community as ECOWAS, having taken so long to emerge in the first place,
would then develop
 so quickly as to accomplish miracles of economic
integration and development. Those responsible for drafting and approving
the ECOWAS Treaty and the subsequent Protocols have, therefore, provided for
a realistic time-table according to which implementation of the objectives
can be accomplished step by step and within a predetermined time-scale. The
sooner the process is completed the better for all the countries concerned.
But we have seen that there are no short cuts to development and there is
no adequate or satisfactory substitute for cooperation and consensus among
all the states involved.
2/
The ECOWAS Treaty invites the Council of Ministers to "take
steps to reduce gradually the Community's economic dependence on the outside
world and strengthen economic relations among themselves." ECOWAS and
similar bodies have been criticised by some writers who maintain that
regional economic integration serves only to increase rather than reduce
dependency on external sources of investment, trade and technology. -
That was certainly not the view of the American government which was hostile
to the Andean Pact and its provisions to control foreign investment, and it
would not explain France's prolonged opposition to the association of French
and English-speaking states within a single West African grouping.
Other writers, like W.A.Axline and J.P.Renninger, maintain
that regional cooperation in the Third World can be used to combat
dependency and to stimulate development that is based instead, on 'collective
self-reliance'. But that depends, in their view, on whether such communities
are able to evolve rapidly towards 'higher' forms of integration (e.g. customs
union, common market). For it is only then that substantial benefits can
be derived by member states, that centralised planning machinery can be
established to secure the equitable distribution of those benefits, and that
policies can be sufficiently coordinated so as to offset external and other
unfavourable pressures. Failing whidh regional communities of under-developed
countries are likely to succumb to outside forces (dependency), internal
tensions (backwash) or, most likely, to a combination of the two.
However, the ECOWAS Treaty does, as Renninger recognises, provide
for various forms of association among member states including a free trade
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area, customs union and common market, depending on the circumstances
and the disposition of the member states and their governments. While the
greatest benefits may well be derived from more advanced forms of integration,
members can look forward to important and tangible benefits at each and every
state of the integration process. ECOWAS also has elaborate compensation
procedures to assist the less developed states which are also likely to be
those most heavily dependent on customs duties as a source of government
income. In the absence of such provisions they would, of course, stand to lose
heavily from the abolition or even the reduction of tariffs.
With the establishment of the Fund there is also provision for
the creation of approved industries in states otherwise unable to attract .
sufficient capital investment. The risks of 'backwash' are thereby considerably
reduced. And to try to ensure greater equity of treatment, the countries
of the region have now been classified into three groups according to the
level of their industrial development, the importance of customs revenue
as a proportion of their national budget, and the special problems that
result from relative inaccessibility and poor communications, particularly
in the case of our land-locked and island members of the community.
ECOWAS does certainly aim to reduce external de pendency and,
to that end, encourages inter-state cooperation within the region and
between ECOWAS and other comparable groupings. Renninger contends,
however, that "although ECOWAS can undoubtedly contribute to the collective
self-reliance of the West African sub-region, it will not, b y
 itself, be
4/
able to achieve collective self-reliance." - The reason is that there is
:01
no "institution or body in ECOWAS ... empowered to negotiate with outside
forces on behalf of ECOWAS." - However, while closer cooperation among
member states is likely to enhance their bargaining power - political unity -
in whatever sense - in international negotiations, must be seen as a long-term
goal. Nigerian governments have always maintained that complete integration,
while eminently-desirable as an ultimate objective, could only he reached
as a result of long consultation and eminently desirable as following the
emergence of a broad consensus among all the member states. As Renninger
correctly perceives the first years are crucial ones for ECOWAS. "In this initial
period progress can only be incremental." -
The basis of the 'integration with more haste' argument is as
much political as economic and may even seem to cast doubt on the usefulness
or viability of regional groupings in a Third World context. For, if it is
true that "at the outset a higher level of integration is necessary in
developing countries than is the case‘ with industrialised countries", then the
outlook for communites such as ECOWAS was not promising since "Much advanced
forms of integration presuppose an abrogation of sovereignty that, for political
reasons, few leaders of developing countries are willing to contemplate." 2/
But, as Renninger himself insists, there is now a few factor to be considered,
namely the growing significance of the international situation for all
countries, but especially for those in search of development.
In the past, few political leaders in the developing
world were willing to give up even an insignificant
amount of their freedom of action. But today the
international environment is leading to changed
perceptions as political leaders come to the
realisation that only through cooperation can their
countries hope to achieve their developmental goals. 8/
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And that is what I have tried to demonstrate in the case of
ECOWAS. The negotiations and successful conclusion of the Lome Convention
in 1975 was evidence of the way in which developing countries, from
different parts of the world, and with different interests to protect, could
nevertheless collaborate, effectively, in the pursuit of common goals without
necessarily establishing elaborate integrative mechanisms. In that respect
the various ECOWAS institutions, although very much dependent on a consensus
among the member states, are a considerable advance on the ad hoc agencies
that conducted the Lome negotiations.
Like most other large and complex organisations, ECOWAS has
had its growing pains. The instability of particular governments and
leaders is always a problem in any African community and there have now been
several changes of administration in the community's biggest state, Nigeria.
But ECOWAS, thanks partly to the multiplicity of member states, partly to the
experience gained in all the long formative phase of the community, has
managed to overcome all such difficulties successfully. Temporary
misunderstandings between Nigeria and Togo, during 1975-76, would seem
to have delayed agreement on the proposed ECOWAS institutions, their staffing
and location. But once again a good working relationship was quickly re-
established during 1976.
The subsequent quarrel involving the chief executives of the new
community institutions, the Secretariat and the Fund, arose from the
ambiguity to be found in the Treaty concerning their respective role and
functions. At issue was the question of responsibility for the administration
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of the community reflecting the inevitable tensions between countries of
different size, resources and background and some degree of identification
between governments and their nominees in the community institutions. By
the end of the 'seventies, however, a good working relationship had been
restored between the principal ECOWAS officials, while the authority of the
Executive Secretary was confirmed by the Summit so as to ensure that there
would be no similar disputes in the future.
With the implementation of the protocols concerning liberalisation
of trade, free movement of persons, the non-aggression agreement and the
defence pact, ECOWAS was well and truly established and began to develop
close working relationships with other international organisations. Where
some have stressed the difficulty of getting agreement on measures involving
the sacrifice of sovereignty, compared with the greater ease with which
governments will consent to functional integration involving on-going economic
relationships, ECOWAS seems to have moved much more quickly on several highly
sensitive political issues than on the economic front. This is less
surprising in the West African context, however, where leaders have long
been accustomed to cooperating on political issues, in the context of the OAU
and other bodies, but where economic cooperation presents numerous
administrative as well as political problems.
Indeed, West African leaders probably meet more frequently in
various councils and communicate more regularly than their counterparts in
Western Europe. While this should generate a sense of trust and facilitate
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the development of mutual understanding, particularly among leaders
of similar background, age and outlook, it does tend also to obviate
the need for more frequent contacts at a senior administrative level.
There may well be a tendency, too, notably in the first years, to delegate
less responsibility to the new Community officials than is the case within
the now well-established EEC. This is most obvious in the case of
decisions on complex technical and economic matters, where the ground-rules
of the community are still being formulated. Thus the most protracted
and difficult debates within ECOWAS have been concerned with the classification
of community goods, definition of their place of origin and the degree of
foreign input permitted, the adoption of a common customs nomenclature,
detailed arrangements for compensation for revenue lost, and.a time-table
for eliminating barriers to inter-state trade on specified items.
By way of contrast, freedom of movement of persons between and
among member states was approved and implemented with remarkable speed given
the political and social problems that it presents, particularly, in the
absence of common legislation or agreement regarding social security, minimum
wages,job classification and region-wide data indicating where there is a
shortage of skills within the community and where there is already a surplus
of labour. There is also the problem of securing common immigration
regulations and making provision for the repatriation of earnings. The
decision was initially popular throughout the region, establishing as it did
the concept of an ECOWAS citizen. Nigeria, which was to be the main focus
for immigration, given its relative pros perity
 at the time, hastened to
comply with ECOWAS directives. Then, with the economic setback in January
1983, there was the regrettable incident when large numbers of Ghanaian and other
illegal immigrants from the Region and other parts of Africa, were deported
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from the country. ECOWAS governments have, however, shown considerable
maturity in refusing to condemn the Nigerian action, perhaps because in
many cases they had experienced similar problems themselves.'
The adoption of the non-aggression agreement and the defence
pact were a response largely to events outside the region : the confrontation
in the Horn of Africa and, nearer home, the Western Sahara issue and
the new Libyan interest in the Sahel states of the region. The principle or
non-aggression was already embodied in the Charter of the OAU and would seem
to be a pre-requisite for any stable community. Those res ponsible for the
creation of ECOWAS had envisaged the possibility of measures for the common
defence of the region, but within the context of the OAU and only after
economic integration and other forms of regional cooperation were much
more advanced. In the event it is difficult to see how the defence provisions
can be effectively implemented in the case of a military crisis - where
prompt action is clearly required. The problems of creating a multi-national
force are large, even in the case of NATO and the West European industrial
powers. On a more positive note the ECOWAS Summit in May 1983 was responsible
for a major and successful foreign policy initiative. This was the collective
decision by all ECOWAS leaders to attend the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa,
thereby ending the crisis within the OAU arising from the failure of the
earlier Summit due to have been held in Tripoli. -
But it is in the economic sphere that the success of ECOwAS
will be decided. The problems here are numerous and substantial and
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derive mainly from the very different colonial backgrounds of the
Francophone and other states, together with the different levels of
growth achieved since inde pendence, and the structural disparities between
coastal and inland states. The existence of so many and such different
monetary arrangements is yet another complication for states wishing to
undertake trade liberalisation and for an organisation one of whose
objectives is integration and a form of economic union. Besides arrangements
for a West African Clearing House consisting of the various central banks
within the region, studies are now being undertaken whose aim is the
creation of an ECOWAS Monetary Zone. There can be no doubt about the wisdom
of ensuring ready convertibility, at agreed rates, between the currencies
circulating within the region. Meanwhile the community continues along the
path to greater trade liberalisation despite these and other obstacles. As
was pointed out in May 1983, following the ECOWAS Summit in Conakry, Guinea:
... the acceptance of a single trade liberalisation
scheme by ECOWAS leaders here is in keeping with the
Lagos Plan of Action, which envisages the setting up
of an African common market by the year 2000.
To this end the Francophone sub-regional grouping, the CEAO,
has now been invited by ECOWAS to merge its aims and aspirations with
those of the larger community so as to avoid wasteful duplication of
efforts and facilitate the creation of a regional customs union. The
acceptance of this resolution, at Conakry in 1983, should end the dispute
between the majority and those member states that wish to take advantage
cf the 'derogation' arrangements in the Treaty, permitting members in certain
10/
597
circumstances to postpone com pliance with ECOWAS decisions. Indeed,
writers such as R./.0nwuka and J.P.Renninger had seen 'derogation' and
the presence within the region of two important groupings, ECOWAS and the
CEAO, with overlapping but not entirely consistent aims, as a source of
11/possible future difficulty for the larger community. - Certainly the
CEAO has the 'advantage' of a small number of states With a common
currency, similar administration and a shared colonial background. It
should be much easier for such a grouping to advance more quickly towards
its objectives.
It is a linguistic community - in government,
at least; it is territorially contiguous; its
member states bear the same powerful imprint of
their French colonial nastr they have close ties
with France today and most important of all they
are all linked to the franc zone.
However, tie benefits to be derived from cooperation within
such a restricted community, with a small population and limited resources,
are not to be compared with those that can be achieved in the context
of a West African regional community of states. Certainly the CEA() Summit in
November 1980 showed to what extent the Francophone states were affected adversel
by the earlier rise in oil prices and the simultaneous and sharp drop in
commodity and uranium prices. Not only have development projects been
cancelled, but the incoming chairman of the community, President Senghor,
called for immediate consultations on regional projects between CEAO and
ECOWAS, with talks between their respective secretariats to see how their
respective resources could best be pooled.
12/
One hopes that people have paid heed to President
Senghor's sincere call for more cooperation between
CEA() and ECOWAS. Whereas comments of a similar type
have been made in the past they have usually been too
impregnated with the diplomatic niceties that relations
between such organisations demand. In this case,
however, there is a marked difference. President Senghor's
was a plea for the whole of West Africa. It was also a
plea to Nigeria, which is the cornerstone of ECOWAS.
If dependence on foreign assistance has to be reduced,
as the CEA() leaders have said, then integration is an 131
essential first step.
	 -1
President Houphouft-Boigny has also s poken out to the effect
that once ECOWAS takes off, its size and potential were such that the CEA()
would eventually be absorbed into the new body. And that is my own
conviction. It also seems to be the view of Senghor's successor as president
of Senegal, Abdou Diouf. Asked if ECOWAS was being held. back by the CEAO
and whether the two organisations should merge, he replied:
It is in everybody's interest that if ECOWAS reaches
its cruising speed, the CEAO should normally melt
into the structures of ECOWAS - no problem, it will become
a sub-grouping of ECOWAS, or a specialised institution
of ECOWAS, or it could disappear completely. We are
convinced that the future is with ECOWAS; if ECOWAS reaches
its cruising speed, and overcomes its present difficulties.
What. we do not want, we members of CEAO, is to be asked
to eliminate something that works well, that produces
brilliant results - CEAO, while ECOWAS has not reached
cruising speed. It is a false argument to say CEA() is
a brake on the progress of ECOWAS. The real reasons are
elsewhere, not in the existence of CEAO.
There is also the question of the smaller sub-regional organisations,
largely a legacy from the 'sixties which nevertheless persist and in some
cases are continuing to carry out functions for which ECOWAS is better-suited.
14/
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They may distract attention from ECOWAS and even compete for scarce
resources and investment, but they do not threaten our community in
any way. At the ECOWAS Summit in 1983 President nacari of Nigeria
was nevertheless justified in expressing "serious concern" at
...the proliferation of inter-governmental
organisations in our sub-region with very similar
aims and objectives. There seems to me to be an
urgent need to streamline the existing institutions in
the interest of our economies and eliminate institutional
overlaps or conflicts of objectives which only hamper our
march towards the achievements of our desired development
goals.
It was the view of the ECOWAS founders that other organisations in the
region should in future confine themselves to specialised functions
and that, as President Shagari suggested,
... those that are not so geared should be wound up
in the interest of solidarity and optimal utilisation
of limited resources to fewer organisations that we can
more adequately support to pursue our objectives.
Also at the 1983 Summit of ECOWAS the Liberian Head of State
spoke of "the concern of possible conflict which the Mano River Union ...
causes for ECOWAS." But, in defence of such groupings, he continued
"We must realise that a small group
 of countries can promote economic
cooperation and integration more rapidl y than a larger group ." Moreover,
"countries that are more or less at the same level of development when
grouped together, will find it easier to agree on specific projects which
16/
15/
17/
would be impossible if there were wide differences between these countries." -
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While it may be more convenient, however, to organise
cooperation among neighbouring states, it is precisely at that level
that friction can be most marked and its effects can be most serious.
Thus in 1983, the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone was close after
a dispute involving the two founding-members of the Mano River Union, when two
18/thousand four hundred Liberian troops were sent to police the common frontier. -
ECOWAS not only offers the best means of attracting the necessary capital
for much-needed investment, and the most equitable means of distributing
that investment among the member states, it is also the most appropriate
forum for the discussion of economic issues that affect the development of the
entire region.
The problems of the smaller bodies were well illustrated at
the June 1983 conference of the e.ight-nation Niger River Basin Authority (NBA).
"The meeting was brief and lacked general enthusiasm. This was an indication
of a growing disillusionment among the leaders about too many tiny organisations
in the West African sub-region whose only achievement is to meet annually
 in
cosy surroundings and make the same marathon speeches." 12/
 Otherwise the
final communiaue was reported to contain nothing that was in any way specific,
despite the Presence of four Heads of State.-
The most serious threat to ECOWAS is not 'derogation' or rivalry
between the larger organisation and such bodies as the CEAO - still less the
20/Mano River Union or the Senegal and Gambia River Organisations. -
Rather it is the possibility, fortunately remote, that Nigeria's commitment
to ECOWAS might weaken, given economic difficulties at home and a sense of
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disappointment that ECOWAS has still to reach its potential. As
President Shagari warned at the 1983 ECOwAS Summit:
... times are hard ... and we cannot afford to
be extravagant ... The sizeable sums of money
spent annually to maintain the community's
institutions including the secretariat, as well
as the time, sums and energy spent /in meetings
and deliberations/ cannot be justified if we allow
ECOWAS to degenerate into a talking shop where very
little concrete action is realised.
The time would seem to be appropriate for a re-affirmation
by all member states of their total commitment to ECOWAS, its ideals
and objectives. There is a pressing need for the governments involved
to revive the enthusiasm and sense of purpose that were so much in
evidence at the first Lagos Summit in 1975. And it is tangible results
that are required now, if only to show in a practical way that cooperation
works, that successful cooperation begins at home and among West African
states, and that multilateral cooperation is preferable to any number of
bilateral arrangements. The Lome Agreement was sufficient evidence of what
can be accomplished and the benefits to be derived from closer cooperation
in the economic sphere.
ECOWAS was born out of the aspirations of governments and
peoples in the region for a better way of life and an improvement in their
material circumstances and social welfare, and it is by these criteria
that the performance of ECOWAS will continue to be judged. The best
incentive of further and closer cooperation is the commencement and
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completion of specific projects of benefit to the region as a whole.
There is, of course, much more to ECOWAS than this, as I have tried to
show. But in order to accomplish the more exalted and ambitious goals
the community must first win and retain the confidence of each and every
member state and earn the trust of the West African peoples.
What the governments of Nigeria,and Togo, together, were able
to achieve in 1972 may, hopefully, serve as an inspiration and an encouragement
to the present leaders of the region who have once again to confront an
unfavourable interntional economic situation not of their' making. In
these circumstances governments have no alternative but to cooperate and
there now exists an institutional framework for such cooperation within
West Africa. Having persevered for so long and against such odds with the
creation and establishment of ECOWAS, it is essential that all concerned
continue to work for the success of the community, the development of
the region and the unity of Africa.
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THE CnUNTRIEs OF WEST AFRICA
Area
(sq.kl.)
1
Population
1975
Density
(per sq.
kl.)
Date of
Independence
Former Colonial
Power
BENIN 112,622 3,112,000 28 August 1 1960 France
CAPE VERDE 4,033 294,000 73 July 5,1973 Portugal
THE GAMBIA 11,295 524,000 46 Feb.18, 1963 United Kingdom
GHANA 238,537 9,866,000 41 March 6,1957 United Kingdom
GUINEA 245,957 4,416,000 18 October 2,1958 France
GUINEA-BISSAU 36,129 525,000 15 Sept.10,1974 Portugal
2
IVORY COAST 322,463 6,673,000 21 August 7,1960 France
LIBERIA 111,369 1,708,000 15 July 26,1857 France
MALI 1,240,000 5,697,000 5 Sept.22,1960 France
MAURITANIA 1,030,700 1,318,000 1 Nov.	 28,1960 France
NIGER 1,267,000 4,600,000 4 August 3,1960 France
NIGERIA 923,768 62,925,000 68 October 1,1960 United Kingdom
2
SENEGAL 196,192 5,085,000 26 August 20,1960 France
2
SIERRA LEONE 71,740 2,729,000 38 April 27, 1961 United Kingdom
TOr;0 56,000 2,222,000 40 April 27, 1960 France
UPPER VOLTA 274,200 6,032,000 22 August 5,1960 France
Source: (1) Demographic vearbook,1975 (United Nations Publication, Sales
No. E/F.76.XIII.1.1977), Table 3. These figures are mid-year
estimates.
(2) These figures are from the United Nations "Population and
Vital Statistics Report," Statistical Papers Series A,
Volume 'XXVII, No.4, 1976.
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Name of Project	 Countries Covered Executing
Aaency 
WMO
WMO
WMO
WHO
4.
TABLE A
UN /NVOLVEMENT IN THE WEST AFRICAN SUB-REGION 
SOME RELEVANT UNDP INTERCOUNTRY PROJECTS IN WEST AFRICA, 1972-1976 
Guinea, Mali, NigerFlood Control and Warning
System on the River Niger Basin
(Phase 2)
Hydrological Forecasting System
for the Middle and Lower Basins
of the Niger River
Program for the Strengthening
of Agromtteorological and
Hydrological Services of the
Sahelian Countries : Training
Center for Agrometeorology and
Applied Ayrology.
Onchocerciasis Control Program
in the Volta River Basin Area:
Applied Research (Epidemiology
and Chemotherapy) and Training
Onchocerciasis Control in the
Volta River Basin.
Apnlied Research on Trypano-
somiasis Epidemiology and
Control.
Reaional Center for Postal
Training, Abidjan
Benin, Cameroun, Mali,
Niger, Upper Volta
Chad, The Gambia, Mali
Mauritania, Niger,
Senegal, Upper Volta
Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast
Mali, Niger, Togo, Upper
Volta
Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast, 	 WHO
Mali, Niger, Togo, Upper
Volta.
Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria,
	
WHO
Upper Volta.
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, UPU
Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta,
Togo
Documentation Center for the
Nicer Basin.
Telecommunications Network
Adviser (W.Africa)
Multinational School for Medium-
level Telecommunications
Personnel, Rufisaue
Telecommunications Link between
The Gambia and Senegal
Hydroagricultural Survey of the
Senegal River Basin (OMVS)
Cameroun, Chad, Benin,
Guinea, Ivory Coast,Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, Upper Volta.
West African Subregion
Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal,
Upper Volta
The Gambia, Senegal •
Mali, Mauritania, Senegal
UNESCO
ITU
ITU
ITU
FAO
Water Resources in the Lake
Chad Basin (LCBC)
Agricultural Research and
its Application in the
Senegal River Basin (OMVS)
Documentation Center for
OMVS
Livestock Development in
Assale-Servewel (LCBC)
Four Agricultural Centers
in the Lake Chad Basin
Development of the Fisheries
in Lake Chad
Research on Desert Locust
(OCLALAV)
Control of Grain-eating
Birds (Phase 2)
5.
TABLE 1	 cont.
Name of Project	 Countries Covered	 Executing
Agency
FAOCameroun, Chad, Niger, Nigeria,
Mali, Mauritania, Senegal.
Mali, Mauritania, Senegal.
Cameroun, Chad, Niger, Nigeria
Cameroun, Chad, Niger, Nigeria
Cameroun, Chad, Nicer, Nigeria
Benin, Cameroun, Chad, Ivory
Coast, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Somalia, Upper Volta.
Benin, Cameroun, Chad, Ivory
Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia,
Upper Volta.
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
Agricultural Development in 	 Mali, Mauritania, Senegal 	 FAO
the Senegal River Basin
(Phase 2) (OMVS)
Hydraulic Development of
Pastoral Areas (LCBC)
Creation of Four Forestry
Centers Around Lake Chad
(LCBC)
Cameroun, Chad, Nigeria, Niger
Cameroun, Chad, Nigeria, Niger
FAO
FAO
Implementation of Water	 Cameroun, Chad, Nigeria, Niger	 FAO
Drilling Program in the
Lake Chad Basin (LCBC)
Applied Research on Tsetse
Control in Dry Savanna
Zones.
Study of the Mano River
Basin : Land Resources
Survey
 (Liberian Portion)
Ivory Coast, Niaer, Nigeria,
Upper Volta
Liberia, Sierra Leone
FAO
FAO
6.
MPLE 4	 cont.
Name of Project
	 Countries Covered	 Executing
Agency
West Africa Rice Development Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, 	 FAO
Association (Phases 1 and 2)
	 Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo,
Upper Volta.
ECA/UNCTAD'West African Clearing House
Agreement
Benin, Cameroun, Ghana,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper
Volta.
Updating of Prefeasibility 	 Benin, Togo.
	 UNDP
Studies of the Mono River
Indicative Development Plan
	 Benin, Cameroun, Chad,
	 ECA
for Niger River.	 Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, Upper Volta.
Niamey UNDAT	 Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast,
	 ECA
Niger, Nigeria, Togo,
Upper Volta •
Assistance to Banque	 Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast,
	 ECA
ouest-Africaine de	 Niger, Nigeria, Togo,
develoopement
	 Upper Volta.
Source:
	
John P. Renninger, Multinational Coo peration for Development 
in West Africa.
Compiled from "UNDP Regional Programme for Africa 1972-1976",
The Projects listed in this table are illustrative rather
than exhaustive.
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TABLE 7
SECRETARIAT	 1977 BUDGETARY CONTRIBUTION POSITION AS AT 
30.9.77 
L'ETAT DES CONTRIBUTIONS BUDGETAIRES A LA
DATE DU 30.9.77
Name of Country
Pays
Ratio	 Contribution
Proportion	 UA
Payment	 Balance Due
Paiement
	 Solde Du $
. BENIN 2.9 104,194 89,900 - 104,194
. GAMBIA 2.5 90,081 77,500 90,081 -
. GHANA 12.5 450,407 387,500 450,407 -
. GUINEA 2.8 100,891 86,800 100,891
5. GUINEA BISSAU 1.51 54,409 46,810 - 54,409
6. IVORY COAST 12.6 454,010 390,600 454,010 -
7. LIBERIA 6.5 234,212 201,500 234,212 -
8. MALI 1.9 68,462 58,900 - 68,462
9. MAURITANIA 3.5 126,114 108,500 112,445 13,669
10. NIGER 2.0 72,065 62,000 72,065 -
11. NIGERIA 31.9 1,149,438 988,900 1,149,438 -
12. SENEGAL 5.3 190,972 164,300 - 190,972
13. SIERRA LEONE 4.3 154,940 133,300 - 154,940
14. TOGO 3.5 126,114 108,500 126,114 -
15. UPPER VOLTA 2.5 90,081 77,500 - 90,081
16. CAPE VERDE - - - -
17. SUSPENSE 3.79 136,563 117,490 - 136,563
3,602,933 3,100,000 2,789,663 813,290
10.
TEBLE 8 
SECRETARIAT	 1978 BUDGETARY CONTRIBUTION POSITION
AS AT 30.9.78 
L'ETAT DES CONTRIBUTIONS BUDGETAIRES A LA
DATE DU 30.9.78
Name of Country Proportion
	 Contribution	 Payment Balance Due
Pays U.A. Paiement Solde Du $
1.	 BENIN 3.03 65,661 54,718 - 65,661
2.	 GAMBIA 2.63 56,992 47,494 56,992 -
3.	 GHANA 13.03 282,364 235,304 - 282,364
4.	 GUINEA 2.93 63,494 52,912 - 63,494
5.	 GUINEA BISSAU 1.51 32,722 27,269 16,449 16,273
6.	 IVORY COAST 13.13 284,532 237,110 314,875 -
7.	 LIBERIA 6.77 146,708 122,576 - 146,708
8.	 MALI 1.92 41,607 34,673 - 41,607
9.	 MAURITANIA 3.64 78,879 65,733 - 78,879
10. NIGER 2.12 45,940 38,284 - 45,940
11. NIGERIA 33,13 717,939 598,283 848,517 -
12. SENEGAL 5.45 118,104 98,420 - 118,104
13. SIERRA LEONE 4.44 96,216 80,180 - 96,216
14. TOGO 3.64 78,879 65,733 169,543
15. UPPER VOLTA 2.63 56,992 47,494 - 56,992
16. CAPE VERDE - - - - -
2,167,029 1,806,183 1,406,376 1,012,238
CREDITORS TO BE CARRIED FORWARD TO 1979
CREANCIERS REPORTES A 1979
NIGERIA $130,578
TOGO $ 90,664
IVORY COAST $ 30,343
GAMBIA $ 13,917
$265,502 
Country Year Import Duties Remarks
*The poor economic state of
the country does not allow
or encourage imports into
the country by both Ghana itsel
& exporting countries. Ivory
Coast allows capital goods
importation at a low duty to
encourage industrialisation.
Monrovia is a Free port and
imports to Liberia are
generally low.
** The reason for this is - Cl)
Duty free importation, esp.of
capital goods to encourage
industrialisation and business
(2) Excessive smuggling of
goods from their over 2,000
mile borders. Nigeria had a low
rate of import duties on
capital goods to encourage
industrialisation. She also
cut down on heavy goods &
encouraged local production.
it
TABLE 9
IMPORT'DUTIES'AS'PROPORI/ON OF 'REVENUE FOR ECOWAS
• COUNTRIES
(Selected Years)
...
ag ' sh'Of Revenues' ' ....
1. Dahomey (Benin) (cc) 1971	 55.0%
2. The Gambia (cc)
	
1973	 35.0%
3. Ghana (cc)	 1973	 10.4% *
4. Ivory Coast CcO	 1973	 19.4%
5. Liberia (cc)	 1973	 18.9%
6. Mauritania (cc)
	
1973	 26.7%
7. Niger (LLC)	 1973	 10.5% **
8. Nigeria (cc)	 1973	 18.3%
9. Senegal (cc)	 1968	 43.4%
10. Sierra Leone (cc/
	
1973	 30.9%
11. Togo (cc)	 1973	 19.9% ***
12. Upper Volta	 1973	 45.0%
13. Guinea (C) (cc)
14. Guinea (B) (cc)	 Not Available
15. Mali CLLCI
	
*** Togo's Port, Lome, is a Free
port, import duties are low
16. Cape Verde (cc) 	 and this encouraged the great
use of the port from various
-West African countries.
— Source:
	 African Statistical Year Book, Part 2, West Africa
(New York : UN, 1975). Amended by the Author.
NB.	 LLc = Land Locked Countries.
CC = Coastal Countries.
TABLE 10
PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS OF SELECTED WEST AFRICAN
COUNTRIES
DAHOMEY (BENIN)
	
Palm products, cotton, fish.
IVORY COAST	 Coffee, cocoa, timber, bananas
THE GAMBIA	 Groundnuts.
GHANA
	
Gold, diamonds, timber, aluminium, cocoa.
MALI	 Rice, cotton, groundnuts, livestock, fish.
MAURITANIA	 Iron ore, copper, gum, gum arabic, fish.
NIGER	 Groundnuts, livestock, uranium.
NIGERIA	 Crude petroleum, tin, ground nuts, palm
products, rubber, cocoa, cotton, timber.
SENEGAL	 Groundnuts, phosphate, fish, manufactures.
SIERRA LEONE
	
Diamonds, iron ore, bauxite, palm kernels,
coffee, cocoa, ginger, kolanuts.
TOGO
	 Phosphate, cocoa, coffee.
UPPER VOLTA	 Livestock, cotton, groundnuts.
Source:	 Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review,
10, 1 (June 1972).
J.P.Renninger, Multinational Cooperation for Development in 
West Africa.
12.
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ANNEX 1 
TREATY OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)
PREAMBLE
The President of the Republic, Head of State, Head of the Revolutionary
Military Government, and President of the National Council of the Revolution
of Dahomey.
The President of the Republic of Gambia.
The Head of State and Chairman cif the National Redemption Council of the
Republic of Ghana.
The Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary
Armed Forces, President of the Republic of Guinea.
The President of the Republic of Guinea Bissau
The President of the Republic of Ivory Coast.
The President of the Republic of Liberia.
The Chairman of the Military Committee of National Liberation, President of
the Republic of Mali.
The President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.
The Head of State and President of the Supreme Military Council of the
Republic of Niger.
The Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
The President of the Republic of Senegal.
The President of the Republic of Sierra Leone.
The President of the Togolese Republic.
The President of the Republic of Upper Volta.
CONSCIOUS of the overriding need to accelerate, foster and encourage the economic
and social development of their states in order to improve the living standards
of their peoples,
CONVINCED that the promotion of harmonious economic development of their states
calls for effective economic co-operation largely through a determined and
concerted policy of self-reliance.
RECOGNISING that progress towards sub-regional economic integration requires an
assessment of the economic potential and interests of each state;
14.
ACCEPTING the need for a fair and equitable distribution of the benefits of
co-operation among Member States;
NOTING that forms of bilateral and multilateral economic co-operation existing
in the sub-region give hope for wider co-operation;
RECALLING the Declaration of African Co-o peration, Development and Economic
Independence adopted by the Tenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government
of the Organisation of African Unity;
BEARING IN MIND that . efforts at sub-regional co-operation should not conflict
with or hamper similar efforts being made to foster wide co-o peration in Africa;
AFFIRMING as the ultimate objective of their efforts accelerated and sustained
economic development of their states and the creation of a homogeneous society,
leading to the unity of the countries of West Africa, by the elimination of
all types of obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital and persons;
DECIDE for the purpose of the foregoing to create an Economic Community of West
African States, and AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
'CHAPTER 1 
PRINCIPLES 
ARTICLE 1 
Establishment arid M mbtrship of the Community 
1. By this Treaty the HIGH:CONTRACTING PARTIES established among themselves
an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS1, hereinafter referred to
as "the Community".
2. The members of the Community, hereinafter referred to as "the Member States",
shall be the States that ratify this Treat y and such other West African States
as may accede to it.
'ARTICLE 2
Aims of the Community 
1. It shall be the aim of the Community to promote co-operation and development
in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry,
transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce,
monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose
of raising the standard of living of its Peoples, of increasing and maintaining
economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of
contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.
2. For the purposes set out in the preceding paragraph and as hereinafter
provided for in this Treaty, the Community shall b y stages ensure:
Cal the elimination as between the Member States of customs
duties and other charges of equivalent effect in respect
of the importation and exportation of goods;
15.
Cb1 the abolition of quantitative and administrative
restrictions on trade among the Member States;
Cc). the establishment of a common customs tariff and a
common commercial policy towards third countries;
(dI the abolition as between the Member States of the
obstacles to the free movement of persons, services
and capital;
(el the harmonisation of the agricultural policies and the
promotion of common projects in the Member States notably
in the fields of marketing, research and agro-industrial
enterprises;
CO the implementation of schemes for the joint development
of transport, communication, energy and other infrastructural
facilities as well as the evolution of a common policy in
these fields;
(g) the harmonisation of the economic and industrial policies of
the Member States and the elimination of disparities in the
level of development of Member States;
(hi the harmonisation, required for the proper functioning of
the Community, of the monetary policies of the Member States;
(II the establishment of a Fund for Co-operation, Compensation
and Development, and
' (-j1 such other activities calculated to further the aims of the
Community as the Member States may from time to time
undertake in common.
'ARTICLE '3
General Undertaking 
The Member States shall make every effort to plan and direct their
policies with a view to creating favourable conditions for the achievement
of the aims of the Community; in Particular, each Member State shall take
all steps to secure the enactment of such legislation as is necessary to give
effect to this Treaty.
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CHAPTER II
INSTITuaIONS OF*TIM'COMMUNITY
ARTICLE 4
Institutions 
1. The institutions of the Community shall be:
Ca/ the Authority of Heads of State and Government;
WI the Council of Ministers;
(c) the Executive Secretariat;
(d) the Tribunal of the Community; and
(el the following Technical and Specialised Commissions:
the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission;
the Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission;
- the Transnort, Telecommunications and Energy Commission;
- the Social and Cultural Affairs Commission;
and such. other Commissions or bodies as may be established by the Authority
of Heads of State and Government or are established or provided for by this
Treaty.
2. The institutions of the Community shall perform the functions and act
within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by or under this Treaty
and by Protocols thereto.
-ARTICLE 5
Authority of'Heads'of - State and Government 
Establishment; Composition and Functions 
1. There is hereby established the Authority of Heads of State and Government
of the Member States referred to in this Treaty as "the Authority" which shall be
the principal governing institution of the Community.
2. The Authority' shall be responsible for, and have the general direction and
control of the performance of the executive functions of the Community for the
progressive develonment of the Community and the achievement of its aims.
3. The decisions and directions of the Authority shall be binding on all
institutions of the Community.
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4. The Authority shall meet at least once a year. It shall determine its
own procedure including that for convening its meetings, for the conduct of
business thereat and at other times, and for the annual rotation of the
office of Chairman among the members of the Authority.
ARTICLE 6
Council of Ministers
Establishment, Composition and Functions 
1. There is hereby established a Council of Ministers which shall consist
of two representatives of each Member State.
2. It shall be the responsibility of the Council of Ministers;
(a) to keen under review the functioning and development of
the Community in accordance with this Treaty;
CbI to make recommendations to the Authority on matters of
policy aimed at the efficient and harmonious functioning and
development of the Community;
CcT to give directions to all subordinate institutions of the
Community; and
CdI to exercise such other powers conferred on it and perform
such other duties assigned to it by this Treaty.
3. The decisions and directions of the Council of Ministers shall be binding
on all subordinate institutions of the Community unless otherwise determined
by the Authority.
4. The Council of Ministers shall meet twice a year and one of such meetings
shall be held immediately preceding the annual meeting of the Authority.
Extraordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers may be convened as and when
necessary.
5. Subject to any directions that the Authority may give, the Council of
Ministers shall determine its own procedure including that for convening its
meetings, for the conduct of business thereat and at other times, and for the
annual rotation of the office of Chairman among the members of the Council of
Ministers.
6. Where an objection is recorded on behalf of a Member State to a proposal
submitted for the decision of the Council of Ministers, the proposal shall,
unless such objection is withdrawn, be referred to the Authority for its
decision.
ARTICLE 7
Decisions of the'Authority and the Council*of'Ministers 
The Authority shall determine the procedure for the dissemination
of its decisions and directions and those of the Council of Ministers and for
matters relating to their coming into effect.
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ARTICLE 8 
The Executive Secretariat 
1. There shall be established an Executive Secretariat of the Community.
2. The Executive Secretariat shall be headed by an Executive Secretary who
shall be appointed by the Authority to serve in such office for a term of
four (4)- years and be eligible for reappointment for another term of four (4)
years only.
3. The Executive Secretary shall only be removed from office by the Authority
upon the recommendation of the Council of Ministers.
4. The Executive Secretary shall be the principal executive officer of the
Community. He shall be assisted by two Deputy Executive Secretaries who shall
be appointed by the Council of Ministers.
6. The terms and conditions of service of the Executive Secretary and other
officers of the Executive Secretariat shall be governed by regulations that
may be made by the Council of Ministers.
7. In appointing officers to offices in the Executive Secretariat due regard
shall be had, subject to the paramount importance of securing the highest
standards of efficiency and technical competence, to the desirability of
maintaining an equitable distribution of ap pointments to such posts among
citizens of the Member States.
8. The Executive Secretary and officers of the Executive Secretariat, in the
discharge of their duties, owe their loyalt y entirely to the Community.
9. The Executive Secretary shall be responsible for the day to day administration
of the Community and all its institutions.
10. The Executive Secretary shall:
00 as appropriate, service and assist the institutions of the
Community in the performance of their functions;
Chi keep the functioning of the Community under continuous examination
and, where appropriate, report the results of its examination to
the Council of Ministers;
(cI submit a report of activities to all sessions of the Council of
Ministers and all meetings of the Authority; and
(dl undertake such work and studies and perform such services relating
to the aims of the Community as may be assigned to him by the
Council of Ministers and also make such proposals thereto as may
assist in the efficient and harmonious functioning and development
of the Community.
19.
ARTICLE 9
Technical and st,etiansed Commissions 
Establishment, Comnosition and Functions 
1. There shall be established the following Commissions:
Cal' the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission;
(b) the Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission;
CcI the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission; and
(dI the Social and Cultural Affairs Commission.
2, The Authority may from time to time establish other Commissions as it
deems necessary.
3. Each Commission shall consist of representatives designated one each by the
Member States. Such representatives may be assisted by advisers.
4. Each Commission shall:
Cal' submit from time to time reports and recommendations through
the Executive Secretary to the Council of Ministers either on
its own initiative or upon the request of the Council of Ministers
of the Executive Secretary; and
(b) have such other functions as are imposed on it under this Treaty.
.5. Subject to any directions which may be given by the Council of Ministers,
each Commission shall meet as often as necessary for the proper discharge of
its functions and shall determine its own procedure, including that for
convening its meetings and the conduct of business thereat and at other times.
ARTICLE 10 
External Auditor
1. There shall be an External Auditor of the Community who shall be appointed
and removed by the Authority on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers.
2. Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Council of
Ministers shall make regulations governing the terms and conditions of service and
powers of the External Auditor.
ARTICLE 11
Tribunal of the Community 
1. There shall be established a Tribunal of the Community which shall ensure the
observance of law and justice in the interpretation of the provisions of this
Treaty. Furthermore, it shall be charged with the responsibility of sealing
such disputes as may be referred to it in accordance with Article 56 of this
Treaty.
2. The composition, competence, statutes and other matters relating to the
tribunal shall be prescribed by the Authority.
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CHAPTER III 
CUsTONS AND.TRADE-MATTERS
ARTICLE 12
Liberalization of 'Trade
There shall be progressivel y established in the course of a
transitional period of fifteen (15T years from the definitive entry into force
of this Treaty, and as prescribed in this Chapter, a Customs Union among the
Member States. Within this Union, customs duties or other charges with
equivalent effect on imports shall be eliminated. Quota, quantitative or
like restrictions or prohibitions and administrative obstacles to trade among
the Member States shall also be removed. Furthermore, a common customs
tariff in respect of all goods imported into the Member States from third
countries shall be established and maintained.
ARTICLE 13
Customs Duties
1. Member States shall reduce and ultimately eliminate customs duties and
any other charges with equivalent effect except duties notified in accordance
with Article 17 and other charges which fall within that Article, imposed on
or in connection with the importation of goods which are eligible for
Community tariff treatment in accordance with Article 15 of this Treaty.
Any such duties or other charges are hereinafter referred to as "import duties".
2. Within a period of two (2) years from the definitive entry into force
of this Treaty, a Member State may not be required to reduce or eliminate
• import duties. During this two—year period, Member States shall not impose.
any new
	 and taxes or increase existing ones and shall transmit to the
Executive Secretariat all information on import duties for study by the
relevant institutions of the Community.
3. Upon the expiry of the period of two C21 years referred to in paragraph 2
of this Article and during the next succeeding eight (8) years, Member States
shall progressively reduce and ultimately eliminate import duties in accordance
with a schedule to be recommended to the Council of Ministers by the Trade,
Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission. Such a schedule shall
take into account, inter alia, the effects of the reduction and elimination
of import duties on the revenue of Member States and the need to avoid the
disruption of the income they derive from im port duties.
4. The Authority may at any time, on the recommendation of the Council of
Ministers, decide that any import duties shall be reduced more rapidly or
eliminated earlier than is recommended by the Trade, Customs, Immigration,
Monetary and Payments Commission. However, the Council of Ministers shall, not
later than one calendar year Preceding the date in which such reduction or
eliminations come into effect, examine whether such reductions or eliminations
shall apply to some or all goods and in res pect of some or all the Member
States and shall report the result of such examination for the decision of the
Authority.
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ARTICLE 14
Common Customs 'Tariff
1. The Member States agree to the gradual establishment of a common
customs tariff in respect of all goods imported into the Members States from
third countries.
2. At the end of the period of eight (8) years referred to in paragraph 3
of Article 13 of this Treaty and during the next succeeding five (5) years,
Member States shall gradually, in accordance with a schedule to be recommended
by the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission, abolish
existing differences in their external customs tariffs.
3. In the course of the same period, the above-mentioned Commission shall
ensure the establishment of a common customs nomenclature and customs
statistical nomenclature for all the Member States.
ARTICLE 15
Community Tariff Treatment 
1. For the purposes of this Treaty, goods shall be accepted as eligible
for Community tariff treatment if they have been consigned to the territory
of the imnorting Member State from the territory of another Member State
and originate in the Member States.
2. The definition of products originating from Member States shall be the
subject of a protocol to be annexed to this Treaty.
3. The Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission shall
from time to time examine whether the rules referred to in paragraph 2 of
this Article can be amended to make them sim pler and more liberal. In order
to ensure their smooth and equitable operation, the Council of Ministers.-may
from time to time amend them.
ARTICLE 16 
Deflection of Trade 
1. For the purposes of this Article, trade is said to be deflected if,
Cal imports of any particular product by a Member State from another
Member State increase,
(il	 as a result of the reduction or elimination of duties
and charges on that product, and
CUT because duties and charges levied by the exporting
Member States on imports of raw materialsused for
manufacture of the product in question are lower than the
corresponding duties and charges levied by the importing
Member State; and
Cb) this increase in imports causes or would cause serious injury to
production which is carried on in the territory of the importing
Member State.
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2. The Council of Ministers shall kee p under review the question of
deflection of trade and its causes. It shall take such decisions, as are
necessary, in order to deal with the causes of this deflection.
3. In case of deflection of trade to the detriment of a Member State
resulting from the abusive reduction or elimination of duties and charges
levied by another Member State, the Council of Ministers shall study the
question in order to arrive at a just solution.
ARTICLE '17
Revenue Duties'and'Internal'Taxation
1. Member States shall not apply directly or indirectly to imported goods
from any Member State fiscal charges in excess of those applied to like
domestic goods or otherwise impose such charges for the effective protection
of domestic goods.
2. Member States shall eliminate all effective internal taxes or other
internal charges that are made for the protection of domestic goods not later
than one Clr year after the period of two C2I years referred to in paragraph 2
of Article 13 of this Treaty. Where by virtue of obligations under an existing
contract entered into by a Member State and such a Member State is unable to
comply with the provisions of this Article, the Member State shall duly
notify the Council of Ministers of this fact and shall not extend or renew
such contract at its expiry.
3. Member States shall eliminate progressively all revenue duties designed
to protect domestic goods not later than the end of the' periodof eight (8)
years referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 13 of this Treaty.
4. Each Member State shall, not later than the end of the period of two (2)
years referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 13 of this Treaty, notif y the Council
of Ministers of any duty it wishes to apply under the provisions of paragraph 3
of the aforementioned Article.
ARTICLE 18
Quantitative Restriction'on'Community Goods 
1. Except as may be provided for or permitted by this Treaty, each of the
Member States undertakes to relax gradually and to remove ultimately in
accordance with a schedule to be recommended b y the Trade, Customs, Immigration,
Monetary and Payments Commission and not later than ten (10) years from the
definitive entry into force of this Treaty, all the then existing quota,
quantitative or like restrictions or prohibitions which apply to the import
into that State of goods originating in the other Member States and thereafter
refrain from imposing any further restrictions or prohibitions.
2. The Authority may at any time, on the recommendation of the Council of
Ministers, decide that any quota, quantitative or like restrictions or
prohibitions shall be relaxed more rapidly or removed earlier than is
recommended by the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments
Commission.
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3. A Member State may, after having given notice to the other Member
States of its intention to do so, introduce or continue or execute
restrictions or prohibitions affecting:
Cal the application of security laws and regulations;
Cbl the control of arms, ammunition and other war equipment
and military items;
CcI the protection of human, animal or plant health or life,
or the protection of public morality;
(dl the transfer of gold, silver and precious and semi-precious
stones; or
Ce) the protection of national treasures;
provided that a Member State shall not so exercise the right
to introduce or continue to execute the restrictions or
prohibitions conferred by this paragraph as to stultify
the free movement of goods envisaged in this Article.
ARTICLE 19
pumping 
1. Member States undertake to prohibit the practice of dumping goods within
the Community.
2. For the purposes of this Article, "dumping" means the transfer of goods
originating in a Member State to another Member State for sale:
Cal at a price lower than the comParable price charged for
similar goods in the Member States where such goods originate
(due allowance being made for the differences in the conditions
of sale Or in taxation or for any other factors affecting
the comparability of prices); and
abl under circumstances likely to prejudice the production of
similar goods in that Member State.
ARTICLE 20
Most Favoured Nation Treatment
1. Member States shall accord to one another in relation to trade between
them the most favoured nation treatment and in no case shall tariff
concessions granted to a third country under an agreement with a Member
State be more favourable than those applicable under this Treaty.
2. Copies of such agreements referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall
be transmitted by the Member States which are parties to them, to Executive
Secretariat of the Community.
3. Any agreement between a Member State and a third country under which
tariff concessions are granted, shall not derogate from the obligations
of that Member State under this Treaty.
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ARTICLE 21
Internal Legislation 
Member States shall refrain from enacting legislation which
directly or indirectly discriminates against the same or like products
of another Member State.
ARTICLE 22
Re-exportatidn of-Gcods'and Transit Facilities 
1. Where customs duty has been charged and collected on any goods imported
from a third country into a Member State such goods shall not be re-exported
into another Member State except as may be permitted under a Protocol to
this Treaty entered into by the Member States.
2. Where goods are re-exported under such a Protocol, the Member States
from whose territory such goods are re-exported shall refund to the Member
State into whose territory such goods are imported the customs duties
charged and collected on such goods. The duties so refunded shall not
exceed those applicable on such goods in the territory of the Member State
into Which such goods are imported.
3. Each Member State, in accordance with international regulations, shall
grant full and unrestricted freedom of transit through its territory of
goods proceeding to or from a third country indirectly through that territory
to or from other Member States; and such transit shall not be subject to any
discrimination, quantitative. restrictions, duties or other charges levied
on transit.
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3 of this Article,
Cal goods in transit shall be subject to the customs law; and
CbI goods in transit shall be liable to the charges usually made
for carriage and for any services which may be rendered, provided
such charges are not discriminatory.
5. Where goods are imported from a third country into one Member State,
each of the other Member States shall be free to restrict the transfer to
it of such goods whether by a system of licensing and controlling importers
or by other means.
6. The provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article shall apply to goods which,
under the provisions of Article 15 of this Treaty, fall to be-accepted as
originating in a Member State.
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ARTICLE 23
Customs Administration
Member States shall, upon the advice of the Trade, Customs,
Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission, take appropriate measures
to harmonise and standardise their customs regulations and procedures to
ensure the effective application of the provisions of this chapter and to
facilitate the movement of goods and services across their frontiers.
ARTICLE 24
-Drawback
1. Member States may, at or before the end of the period of eight (8) years
referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 13 of this Treaty, refuse to accept
as eligible for Community tariff treatment, goods in relation to which
drawback is claimed or made use of in connection with their exportation
from the Member States in the territory of which the goods have undergone
the last process of production.
2. For the purposes of this Article:
Gal "drawback" means any arrangement, including temporar y duty-free
admission, for the refund of all or part of the duties applicable
to imported raw materials, provided that the arrangement, expressly
or in effect, allows such refund or remission if goods are exported
but not"if they are retained for home use;
(b) "remission" includes exemption from duties for goods imported into
free ports, free zones or other places which have similar customs
privileges; and
(c) "duties" means customs duties and any other charges with equivalent
effect imposed on imported goods, except the non-protective element
in such duties or charges.
ARTICLE 25
Compensation s for'Loss of Revenue 
1. The Council of Ministers shall, on the report of the Executive Secretary
and recommendation by the appropriate Commission or Commissions, determine
the compensation to be paid to a Member State which has suffered loss of
import duties as a result of the application of this Chapter.
2. A protocol to be annexed to this Treaty shall state precisely the methods
of assessment of the loss of revenue suffered by Member States as a result
of the application of this chapter.
ARTICLE 26 
Safeguard Clause 
1. In the event of serious disturbances occurring in the economy of a Member
State following the application of the provisions of this chapter, the Member
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State concerned shall after informing the Executive Secretary and the
other Member States take the necessary safeguard measures pending the
approval of the Council of Ministers.
2. These measures shall remain in force for a maximum period of one year.
They maynot be extended beyond that period except with the ap proval of the
Council of Ministers.
3, The Council of Ministers shall examine the method of application of these
measures While they remain in force.
CHAPTER rv 
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT'AND'RESIDENCE
ARTICLE 27
Visa and Residence
1. Citizens of Member States shall be regarded as Community citizens and
accordingly Member States undertake to abolish all obstacles to their
freedom of movement and residence within the Community.
2. Member States shall by agreements with each other exempt Community
citizens from holding visitors' visas and residence permits and allow them
to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their
territories.
CHAPTER V 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND HARMONIZATION
ARTICLE 28 
General Principles 
For the purposes of this chapter, Member States shall achieve their
Industrial development and harmonization in the three stages as set out in
Articles 29, 30 and 31.
ARTICLE 29
Stage 1: Exchange of Information on major Industrial Projects 
Member States undertake to
Cal furnish one another with major feasibility studies and
reports on projects within their territories;
CbT furnish one another, on request, reports, on the performance
of prospective technical partners who have developed similar
projects in their territories)
CO furnish one another, on request, reports on foreign business
groups operating in their territories;
27.
611- furnish one another, on request, with re ports on
their experiences on industrial projects and to
exchange industrial research information and experts,
CeT commission, Where appropriate, joint studies for the
Identification of viable industrial projects for
development within the Community, and
(fT finance, where appropriate, joint research on the
transfer of technology and the development of new
products through the use of raw materialscommon in
some or all of the Member States and on specific
industrial problems.
ARTICLE 30
Stage II : Harmonization of Industrial Incentives and Industrial Development 
Plans
Member States undertake to:
CaY harmonize their industrial policies so as to ensure a
similarity of industrial climate and to avoid disruption
of their industrial activities resulting from dissimilar
policies in the fields of industrial incentives, company
. taxation and Africanisation= and
GbY co-operation with one another by exchanging their
industrial Plans so as to avoid unhealthy rivalry and
waste of resources.
ARTICLE 31 
Stage ITT : Personnel Exchange, Training and Joint Ventures 
Member States shall:
CaY exchange, as may be necessary, skilled, profession and
managerial personnel in the operation of projects within
the Community:,
MT provide places for training in their educational and
technical institutions for Community citizens: and
Ccr engage, where appropriate, in joint development of
projects including those which entail the execution
of complementary parts of such projects in different
Member States.
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ARTICLE 32
Remedial Measures
1. The Council of Ministers shall keep under constant review in the
implementation of the provisions of this Chapter, the dis parity in the
levels of industrial development of the Member States and may direct the
appropriate Comniission of the Community to recommend measures to remedy such
disParity.
2. In the implementation of the aims of the Community, the Council of
Ministers shall recommend measures designed to promote the industrial
development of Member States and shall take steps to reduce gradually the
Community's economic dependence on the outside world and strengthen economic
relations among themselves.
3. The Council of Ministers shall further recommend measures designed to
accelerate the industrial integration of the economies of the Member States.
CHAPTER VI
CO-OPERATION IN AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES
ARTICLE 33
Co-operation among member States 
Member States shall co-operate as set out in this Chapter in the
development of their natural resources particularly agriculture, forestry,
animal husbandry and fisheries.
ARTICLE 34
Stage I: Harmonization of Agricultural Policies 
1. Member States undertake to work towards the harmonization of their
internal and external agricultural policies in their relations with one
another=
2. Member States shall exchange regularly information on experiments and
results of research being carried out in their respective territories and
on existing rural development programmes= and
3. Member States shall formulate, as appropriate, joint programmes for
both basic and in-service training in existing institutions.
ARTICLE -35
'Stage IT : Evolution of a Common Agricultural Policy 
Member States undertake to take all measures necessary for the
creation of a common policy especially in the fields of research, training,
production, processing and marketing of the products of agriculture,
forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries. For this purpose, the Industry,
Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission shall, as soon as possible,
after its establishment meet to make recommendations to the Council of
Ministers for the harmonization and exploitation of natural resources of the
Member States.'
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CHAPTER VII
CO-OPERATION TN'MONETARY'AND FINANCTAL-MATTERS
ARTICLE 36
Co-operation in MotetarY'and Fiscal Matters 
1. It shall be the responsibility of the Trade, Customs, Immigration,
Monetary and Payments Commission, among other things to:
Cal" as soon as practicable, make recommendations on the
harmonisation of the economic and fiscal policies of the
Member States:
(br give its constant attention to the maintenance of a
balance of payments equilibrium in the Member States,
and
Cc) examine developments of the Trade, Customs, Immigration,
Monetary and Payments Commission under this Article shall be
made to the Council of Ministers.
ARTICLE 37
Settlement of Payments Between member States 
The Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission
shall make recommendations to the Council of Ministers on the establishment,
in the Short term, of bilateral systems for the settlement of accounts
between the Member States and, in the long term, of a multilateral system
for the settlement of such accounts.
ARTICLE 38
Committee of West African Central Banks 
1. For the purpose of overseeing the system of payments within the Community,
there is hereby established a Committee of West African Central Banks, which
shall consist of the Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States or
such other persons as may be designated by Member States. This Committee
shall,subject to this Treaty, determine its own procedures.
2. The Committee of West African Central Banks shall make recommendations
to the Council of Ministers from time to time on the operation of the clearing
system of payments and on other monetary issues of the Community.
ARTICLE 39
Movement of Capital and Capital Issues Committee 
1. For the purpose of ensuring the free flow of capital between the Member
States consistent with the objectives of this Treaty, there is hereby
established a Capital Issues Committee, which shall consist of representatives
designated one each by the Member States and shall, subject to this Treaty,
determine its own procedure.
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2. The Member States, in designating their representatives referred to in
Paragraph 1 of this Article, shall designate persons with financial, commercial,
banking or administrative experience or qualifications.
3. In the exercise of its functions under paragraph 1 of this Article, the
Capital Issues Committee shall:
Cal seek to achieve the mobility of capital within the
Community through the inter-locking of any capital
markets and stock exchanges:
(b) ensure that stocks and shares floated in the territory
of a Member State are quoted on the stock exchanges of the
other Member States.
(c1 ensure that nationals of a Member State are given the
opportunity of acquiring stocks, shares and other securities
or otherwise investing in enterprises in the territories of
other Member States:
(d) establish a machinery for the wide dissemination in the
Member States of stock exchange quotations of each Member
State:
CeY organise and arrange the quotation of prices, timing,
volume and conditions of issue of securities of new
enterprises in the Member States:
CY, ensure the unimpeded flow of capital within the Community
through the removal of controls on the transfer of capital
among the Member States in accordance with a time-table,
to be determined by the Council of Ministers: and
Q0 seek to harmonise the rates of interest on loans prevailing
in the member States so as to facilitate the investment of
capital from a Member State in profitable enterprises elsewhere
within the Community.
4. The capital envisaged in the provisions of this Article is that of
Member States or their citizens.
5. With regard to capital other than that referred to in paragraph 4 of this
Article, the Capital Issues Committee shall determine its movement within the
Community.
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CHAPihrt VII
INFRASTRUCTURAL LINKS IN ittt. FIELDS'OF'TRANSPORTAND'COMMUN/CATIONS
ARTICLE 40
Common Transport and'Communications'Policv 
Member States undertake to evolve gradually common transport
and communications policies through the improvement and expansion of their
existing transport and communications links and the establishment of new
ones as a means of furthering the physical cohesion of the Member States
and the promotion of greater movement of persons, goods and services within
the Community.
ARTICLE 41
Roads
The Transoort, Telecommunications and Energy Commission shall
formulate plans for a comprehensive network of all-weather roads within
the Community with a view to promoting social and unimpeded commercial
intercourse between the Member States through the im provement of existing
roads to, and the construction of new ones of international standards. In
the formulation of these plans, the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy
Commission shall give priority to a network of roads traversing the territories
of the Member States.
ARTICLE 42
Railways
The Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission shall for
the purpose of connecting the railways of the Member States formulate plans
for the improvement and reorganisation of such railways.
ARTICLE 43
Shipping and International Waterways 
1. The Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission shall formulate
plans for the harmonisation and rationalisation of policies on shipping and
international waterways of the Member States.
2. Member States undertake to do their utmost to form multinational shipping
Companies for both maritime and river navigation.
ARTICLE 44
Air Transport 
Member States shall use their best endeavour to bring about the
merger of their national airlines in order to promote efficiency and profitabilit
in the air transportation of passengers and goods within the Community by
aircraft owned by the Governments of the Member States and/or their citizens.
To this end, they shall co-ordinate the training of their nationals and
policies in air transport and standarize their eqdipment.
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ARTICLE 45
Telecommunications
1. Member States shall reorganise and improve, where necessary, their
national telecommunications network to meet standards required for
International traffic.
2. Member States undertake to establish a direct, modern, efficient and
rational system of telecommunications among themselves.
ARTICLE 4E
Pan-African TelecommunicatiOns Network 
The Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission shall
make urgent recommendations for the rapid realisation in the West African
Section of the Pan-African Telecommunications network and, in particular,
the establishment of links necessary for the economic and social development
of the Community. Member States shall co-ordinate their efforts in this
field and in the mobilisation of national and international financial
resources.
ARTICLE 47
Postal Services
1. The Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission shall study and
make recommendations to the Council of Ministers on proposals for speedier,
cheaper and more frequent postal services within the Community.
2. Member States undertake to:
(aT promote close collaboration among their postal administrations:r
Cbr harmonise routes of mails: and
(C) establish among themselves a system of postal remittances
and preferential tariffs which are more favourable than
those envisaged by the Universal Postal Union.
CHAPTER rx 
ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES
ARTICLE 48
Co-operation in Energy and Mineral Resources 
1. The Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission shall engage
in consultations on, and the co-ordination of the policies and activities
of the Member States in the field of energy and submit its recommendations
to the Council of Ministers.
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2. Member States undertake to:
(al co-operate, consult on and co-ordinate their policies,
regarding energy and mineral resources:
Cb1 harmonise their energy and mineral resources policies
especially as regards the produCtion and distribution of
energy, research, production and processing of mineral
resources:
CcY exchange information on the results of research being
carried out:
(dl plan joint programmes for training technicians and
personnel: and
Cer formulate a common energy and mineral policy especially
in the fields of production, distribution of energy,
research, production and processing of mineral resources.
CHAPTER 7
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL MATTERS
ARTICLE 49
Co-operation in Social and Cultural Matters 
Subject to any directions that may be given by the Council of
Ministers, the Social and Cultural Affairs Commission shall examine ways
of increasing exchange of social and cultural activities among the Member
States and of developing them, provide a forum for consultation generally
on social and cultural matters affecting the Member States and make
recommendations to the Council of Ministers.
CHAPTER XI 
FUND FOR CO-OPERATION, COMPENSATION AND DEVELOPMENT
ARTICLE 50 
Establishment 
There is hereby
 established a Fund to be known as the Fund for
Co-operation, Compensation and Development hereinafter referred to as "the
Fund".
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ARTICLE 51 
Resources of the Pund	 •
1. The Fund shall derive its resources from:
(a) contributions of member States:
(6) income from Community enterprises:
(c) receipts from bilateral and multilateralsources as well as
other foreign sources: and
(d) subsidies and contributions of all kinds and from all sources.
2. The contributions of Member States referred to in sub —paragraph (a)
of the preceding paragraph shall be determined by the Council of Ministers
and shall be of such minimum and maximum amounts as the Council of Ministers
may determine.
3. The method of determining the contribution to be paid by Member States,
the regulations governing the payment and the currencies in which they shall
be effected, the operation, organisation, management, status of the funds and
matters related and incidental thereto shall be the subject of a protocol
to be annexed to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 52 
Uses of the Fund 
The Fund shall be used to:
(a) finance projects in Member States.
(b) provide compensation to Member States which have suffered losses as a
result of the location of Community enterprises,
Cc) provide compensation and other forms of assistance to Member States
which have suffered losses arising out of the amplication of the
provisions of this Treaty on the liberalisation of Trade within the
Community.
M guarantee foreign investments made in Member States in res pect of
enterprises established in pursuance of the provisions of this Treaty
onirtIrd laartrionisa tion of industrial policiesT
(e) provide appropriate means to facilitate the sustained mobilisation
of internal and external financial resources for the Member States
and the Community, and
(f) promote development projects in the less developed Member States of the
Community.
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CHAPTER XII
FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE 53 
Budget of-the'Community 
1. There shall be established a budget of the Community.
2. All expenditures of the Community, other than those in respect of the
Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development, established under
Chapter XI of this Treaty, shall be a pproved in respect of each financial
year by the Council of Ministers and shall be chargeable to the budget.
3. Resources of the budget shall be derived from annual contributions by
Member States and such other sources as may be determined by the Council
of Ministers.
4. The budget shall be in balance as to revenues and expenditures.
5. A draft budget for each financial year shall be prepared by the
Executive Secretary and approved by the Council of Ministers.
6. There shall be special budgets to meet extraordinary expenditures of
the Community.
ARTICLE 54
Contributions by-Member:States 
1. A protocol to be annexed to this Treat y shall state the mode by which
the contribution of Member States shall be determined and the currencies in
which the contribution is to be paid.
2. The Member States undertake to pay regularly their annual contributions
to the budget of the Community.
3. Where a Member State is in arrears at the end of the financial year
in the payment of its contributions for reasons other than those caused
by public or natural calamity of exceptional circumstances that gravely affect
its economy, such Member States.may, by a resolution of the Authority, be
suspended from taking part in the activities of the institutions of the
Community.
ARTICLE 55
Financial Regulations 
The Council of Ministers shall make financial regulations for the
application of the provisions of this Chapter.
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CHAPTER X/II
SETTLEMENT OF D/SruiES
ARTICLE 56
Procedure for the'Sett/ement'of'Disputes
Any, dispute that may arise among the Member States regarding the
interpretation or application of this Treaty shall be amicably settled by
direct agreement.. In the event of failure to settle such disputes, the
matter may be referred to the Tribunal of the Community by a party to such
disputes and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final.
CHAPTER XTV 
GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 57
Headquarters of the Community 
The Headquarters of the Community shall be determined by the Authority.
ARTICLE 58 
Official Languages 
The official languages of the Community shall be such African
languages declared official by the Authority and English and French.
ARTICLE 59
Relation with other Regional Associations and Third Countries
1. Member States may be members of other regional or sub-regional
associations, either with other Member States or non-Member States, provided
that their membership of such associations does not derogate from the
provisions of this Treaty.
2. The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before
the definitive entry into force of this Treaty between one or more Member
States on the one hand, and one Member State and a third country on the other
hand, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty.
3. To the extent that such. agreements are not compatible with this Treaty,
the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to
eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States shallMbere
necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate,
adopt a common attitude.
4. In applying the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article,
Member States shall take into account the fact that the advantages accorded
under this Treaty by each Member State form an integral part of the
establishment of the Community and are thereby inseparably linked with the
creation of common institutions, the conferring of powers upon them and the
granting of the same advantages by all the other Member States.
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ARTICLE 60
Status; Privileges'and'Immunities 
1. The Community, as an international organisation, shall enjoy legal
personality.
2. The Community shall have in the territory of each Member State:*
Cal the legal capacity required for the performance of its
functions under this Treaty: and
Cb1 power to acquire, hold or dispose of movable or immovable
property.
3, In the exercise of its legal personality under this Article, the
Community shall be represented by the Executive Secretary.
4, The privileges and immunities to be granted to the officials of the
Community at its Headquarters and in the Member States shall be the same
as are accorded to diplomatic persons at the Headquarters of the Community
and in the Member States. Similarly, the privileges and immunities granted
to the Secretariat at the Headquarters of the Community shall be the same
as granted to diplomatic missions at the Headquarters of the Community and
in the Member States. Other privileges and immunities to be recognised
and granted by the Member States in connection with the Community shall be
determined by the Council of Ministers.
ARTICLE 61
Setting un of the Institutions 
1. The Authority shall at its first meeting after the entry into force
of this Treaty:
(a) appoint the Executive Secretary.
m determine the Headquarters of the Community: and
Cc) give such directions to the Council of Ministers and other.
institutions of the Community as are necessary for the
expeditious and effective implementation of this Treaty.
2. Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Council of
Ministers shall, within two months of the entry into force of this Treaty,
hold its first meeting to:
Car appoint persons to offices in the Executive Secretariat in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty,
CE1 give directions to other subordinate institutions,
Ccr give directions to the Executive Secretary as to the
implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, and
(dl perform such other duties as may be necessary for the
expeditious and effective implementation of this Treaty.
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ARTICLE 62
Entry,
 into Force, Ratification and Accession 
1. This Treaty and the protocols which shall be annexed and which shall
form an integral part of the Treaty shall res pectively enter into force
provisionally upon the Signature by Heads of State and Government and
definitively upon ratification by at least seven signatory States in
accordance with the constitutional procedures applicable for each
signatory State.
2. Any West African state nay accede to this Treaty on such terms and
conditions as the Authority may determine. Instruments of accession shall
be deposited with the Federal Military Government of Nigeria which shall
notify all other Member States. This Treaty shall enter into force in
relation to an acceding state on such date as its Instrument of Accession
is deposited.
ARTICLE 63 
Amendments and Revisions
1. Any Member State may submit proposals for the amendment or revision
of this Treaty.
2. Any such proposals shall be submitted to the Executive Secretary who
shall communicate them to other Member States not later than thirty days
after the receipt of such proposals. Amendments or revisions shall be
considered by the Authority after Member States have been given one month's
notice thereof.
ARTICLE 64
Withdrawal
1. Any Member State wishing to withdraw from the Community shall give
to the Executive Secretary one year's written notice. At the end of this
period of one year, if such notice is not withdrawn, such a State shall
cease to be a member of the Comniunity.
2. During the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph,
such a Member State shall nevertheless observe the provisions of this Treaty,
and shall remain liable for the discharge of its obligations under this Treaty.
H.E. LT.-COL. MATHIEU =EMU
President of the Republic of
Dahomey
H.E. SIR DAWDA JAWARA
President of the Republic of
Gambia
H.E. MR. FELIX HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY
President of the Republic of
Ivory Coast
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ARTICLE 65
Depository Government 
The present Treaty and all Instruments of ratification and
accessions shall be deposited with the Federal Military Government of
Nigeria which_ shall transmit certified true copies of this Treaty to
all Member States and notify them of the dates of deposits of the
Instruments of ratification and accession, and shall register this
Treaty with the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nation's
Organisation and such other Organisations as the Council of Ministers shall
determine.
IN FArra WHEREOF, WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN WEST AFRICA,
HAVE SIGNED THIS TREATY.
DONE AT Lagos this 28th day of May, 1975, in single original in the
English and Frencrt languages, both texts being equally authentic.
H.E. MR.LUIZ CABRAL
President of the RePublic of
Guinea-Bissau
H.E. LT.-COL.R.J.A.FELLI
Commissioner for Economic Planning
for and on behalf of the Head of State
and Chairman of the National Redemption
Council of the Republic of Ghana.
H.E% DR. LANSANA BEAVOGUI
Prime Minister
for and on behalf of the Head of State
and Commander-in-Chief of the People's
Revolutionary Armed Forces, President
of the Republic of Guinea.
H.E. LT. -COL.SEYNI KOUNTCHE
Head of State and President of the
Supreme-Military Council of the
Republic of Niger
H.E, GENERAL YAKDBU GOWN
Head of the Federal Military Government,
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
H.E. DR. WILLIAM R. TOLBERT,JR	 H.E. MR. ABDOU DIOUF
President of the Republic of	 Prime Minister
Liberia	 for and on behalf of the President of
the Republic of Senegal.
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H.E. MAJOR BABA DIARRA
	
H.E. DR. STARA STEVENS
President of the Republic of
Sierra Leone
Vice Chairman
for and on behalf of the
Chairman of the Military
Committee of National
Liberation, President of
the Republic of Mali.
H.E,MOKTAR OULD DADDAE	 H.E. GENERAL GNASSINGEE EYADEMA
	
President of the Islamic 	 President of the Togolese
	
Republic of Mauritania	 Republic
H.E. GENERAL A SANGOULE LAMIZANA
President of the Republic
of Upper Volta.
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ANNEX 2
IMPROVEMENT OF BASIC TEXTS OF THE ECOWAS TREATY DOCUMENTS (1977/78)
1. Extension of the Provisions of Article 13 of the Treaty - to make
the Consolidation of Tariff Barriers be a pplicable to non-tariff
barriers.
2. Modification of Article 27 of the Treaty - to provide for a Protocol
on Freedom of Movement, Right of Residence and Establishment and the
redefinition of the Concept of "Community Citizen".
3. Modification of Article 1 of the Protocol on Rules of Origin - the
notion of "Value Added".
4. Modification of Article 11.1 (c) of the Protocol on Rules of Origin -
replacement of "FOB Price" by the concept of 'ex-factory cost price
before tax".
5. Additional Protocol to Article 11.2 of the Protocol on Rules of Origin
fixing the desirable levels of capital participation in enterprises
producing Community originating goods.
6. Modification of Article 111.4 of the Protocol on Rules of Origin -
determining the accounting system to be adopted in lieu of physical
segregation of materials.
8. Additional Protocol to Article VIII of the Protocol on Rules of Origin -
determining conditions for accepting mixtures as originating products.
9. Extension of the provisions of the Protocol on re-exportation to cover
originating goods re-exported within the Community.
Source:	 ECOWAS Document : ECW/DEVE/C/7781 (Lagos 81)
Development of the Community - The First Five years (1977-1981)
pp.20-22.
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ANNEX 3
'ECOWAS SUBJECTS, STUDIES, REPORTS AND PUBLICATIONS 
1. Critical Appraisal of Economic Conditions of the West African sub-region.
2. Study of Recorded Trade Flows within ECOWAS.
3. Unrecorded Trade Flows within ECOWAS.
4. Import and Export Regimes, Profiles, Potentials and Joint Promotion
Measures.
5. Cooperation and Trade in Food Crop Products in the ECOWAS sub-region,
Vols. t and II,
6. Cooperation and Trade in Livestock Products in the ECOWAS sub-region,
Vols. I and II.
7. Cooperation in Fish and Fish Products in the ECOWAS sub-region, Vols. I
and II.
8. Cooperation and Trade in Forestry and Forest Products in the ECOWAS
sub-region, Vols. I and II.
9. Preliminary Report on Trade and Liberalization Options and Issues for
ECOWAS.
10. Preliminary Study Approaches to Fiscal Cooperation and Harmonization in
ECOWAS.
11. Currency Convertibility in the ECOWAS.
Source:	 ECOWAS Document : ECW/DEVE/C/7781 (Lagos, 81):
Development of the Community - The First Five Years, (1977-91),
pp.23-24.
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ANNEX 4
STATE VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON, HEAD OF iffh, 
FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED 
FORCES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA TO THE REPUBLIC OF TO(O.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE 
At the invitation of is Excellency General Etienne Eyadema,
President of the Republic of Togo, His Excellency General Yakubu Gowon,
Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, paid a state visit to the Republic
of Togo from April 26 to May 1, 1972.
During the visit, General Gowon and members of his entourage visited
a number of places in Togo where they were warmly and enthusiastically received
by the people. The two Heads of State held a number of discussions on co-operation
between their two countries. They exchanged views on current world problems
particularly those concerning Africa.
On world affairs, the two Heads of State re-affirmed their support
for the Charter and principles of the United Nations Organisation. They pledged
to continue to work with all men of goodwill to promote world peace and
international understanding. On African affairs, they stressed the need to
improve and strengthen the machinery of the Organisation of African Unity and
pledged the continued support of their governments for the liberation of African
territories still under colonial and minority racist regimes.
The two Heads of State emphasised the need to promote cooperation among
African countries at all levels - bilateral, regional and multilateral - as a
positive means for achieving African unity. To this end, they agreed to
establish an economic community made up of their two countries as a nucleus of
a West African Economic Community. They directed that officials of their two
countries should meet in Lagos in June, 1972 to consider ways and means of
establishing the Togo/Nigeria Economic Community and submit recommendations to
the governments of the two countries for study.
On bilateral relations, the two Heads of State expressed their entire
satisfaction at the cordial and friendly ties between their two countries. They
directed that officials of the two countries should meet and explore ways and
means of improving trade between Nigeria and Togo within the framework of the
Trade Agreement signed in 1966. The two Heads of State signed a Treaty of
Friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance.
His Excellency General Gowon expressed his profound gratitude to
President Eyadema, the government and the entire people of the Republic of Togo
for their kindness and hospitality and invited His Excellency General Etienne
Eyadema to pay a state visit to Nigeria on a mutually convenient date. General
Eyadema has graciously
 accepted the invitation.
Done at Lome this 1st day of May, 1972.
(sgd) GOWON
General Yakubu Gowan
Head of the Federal Military
Government, Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(sgd) EYADEMA
General Etienne Eyadema
President of the Republic of Togo.
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ANNEX 4
COMMUNIQUE FINAL 
Son Excellence le general Yakubu GOWON, chef du gouvernement Federal,
commandant en chef des Forces Armees de la Republique du NIGERIA, s'est rendu
en visite officielle au Togo, du 26 Avril au ler Mai 1972, sur l'invitation du
general Etienne EYADEMA, President de la Republique Togolaise.
Au cours de cette visite, le general Gowon et sa suite se sont rendus
dans plusieurs villes du Togo ou la population leur a reserve un accueil
chaleureux et enthousiaste. Les deux Chefs d'Etat ont eu des entretiens
relatifs a la cooperation entre leurs deux pays. Ils ont procede a un echange
de vue sur les problemes mondiaux actuels et sur ceux relatifs a l'Afrique.
En ce qui concerne les problemes mondiaux, les deux Chefs d'Etat ont
reaffirme leur attachement a la Charte et aux principes de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies. us s'engagent a continuer d'oeuvrer avec tous les homme de
bonne volonte pour promouvoir la paix dans le monde et la comprehension entre
les Nations.
Quant aux problemes africains, us ont souligne la necessite d'ameliorer
et de renforcer les rouages de l'Organisation de l'Unite Africaine et se sont
engages a apporter le soutien de leurs gouvernements pour la liberation des
territoires africains encore sous domination coloniale et sous les regimes
minoritaires racistes.
Convaincus que l'unite africaine passe necessairement par des
ensembles economiques regionaux ou sousregionaux viables, et fermement decides
a traduire dans la realite leur commune volonte d'instaurer une cooperation
effective, ils ont decide de creer, au niveau des deux Etats, un ensemble economique
veritable embryon d'une communaute economique ouestafricaine ouverte a tous les
Etats freres.
A cette fin, une commission d'experts des deux pays, charges d'etudier les
structures de cet ensemble, se reunira au mois de Juin a Lagos pour soumettre
aux deux Chefs d'Etat un project d'acte constitutif de cet ensemble.
Dans le domaine des relations bilaterales, les chefs d'Etat ont
souligne leur entiere satisfaction quant aux liens d'amitie qui existent entre
leurs deux pays.
us ont decide que des representants des deux pays se rencontrent pour
etudier les voies et moyens propres a ameliorer les relations commerciales entre
le Nigeria et le Togo dans le cadre du traite de commerce signe en 1966.
Les deux Chefs d'Etat ont signe un traite d'amitie, de cooperation et
d'assistance mutuelle.
Son Excellence le General Gowon a exprime sa tres profonde gratitude
envers le general Etienne EYADEMA, le gouvernement et le peuple de la Republique
Togolaise pour leurs temoignages d'amitie, ainsi que pour leur hospitalite, et
a invite le general Etienne Eyadema a se rendre en visite officielle au Nigeria
a une date a determiner d'un commun accord. Le general Eyadema a aimablement
accepte cette invitation.
Fait a LOME, le ler Mai 1972
signe:	 signe:
General Yakubua GOWON
	 General E. EYADEMA
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ANNEX 5
PROTOCOL RELATING TOTHE DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF PRODUCTS ORIGINATING 
FROM MEMBER STATES OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES
Having regard to paragraph 2 of Article 15 of the Treaty of the
Economic Community of West African States concerning the definition of the
concept of products originating from Member States:
AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
Definitions
"Treaty" means the Treaty of the Economic Community of West
African States:
"Council" means the Council of Ministers established by Article 6 of
the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States:
"Commission" means the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and
Payments Commission established by Article 9 of the Treaty of the Economic
Community of West African States:
"Member State" or "Member States" means a Member State or Member
States of the Economic Community of West AFrican States:
"Producer" includes a grower or a manufacturer or any person who
supplies his goods otherwise than by sale to another person and to whose
order the last process in the course of the manufacture of the goods is
applied by that other person:
"Materials" include raw materials, semi-finished products, products,
parts and components used in the production of goods:
"Produced" and "a process of production" include the application of
any operation or process with the exception of any operation or processes
listed in Article IV of the Protocol:
"Value-added" means the difference between the ex-factory price of
the finished product including subsidies, if any, less local taxes and duties,
and the c.i.f. value of the material imported from third countries and used in
the production.
ARTICLE II
Rules of Origin of Community Goods 
The promotion of trade in goods originating in Member States as well
as the collective economic development of the Community requires indigenous
ownership and participation. Goods shall be accepted as originating in
Member States for purposes of trade liberalisation if:
(a) they have been wholly produced as defined in Article V of
this Protocol: or
46.
(b) they have been produced in a Member State other than by any of
the operations and processes listed in Article IV of this Protocol or
with the material from a foreign or undertermined origin used in the process
of production of goods whose C.I.F. value does not exceed 60% of the total
cost of the material employed in the production or with the material of
Community origin whose value must not in any case be less than 40%
of the total cost of the material used in the process of production or with
the raw material of Community origin representing in quantity at least 60%
of the whole raw material used in the production: or
(c) if the goods have been produced from material of a foreign
or undetermined origin and having received in the process of production a
value added of at least 35% of the F.O.B. price of the finished product: and
2. If the Enterprises producing these goods attain a desirable
level of indigenous ownership and participation. The Commission shall,
on the basis of appropriate statistics, make proposals to the Council of
Ministers to determine orientations and levels relating to ownership and
participation.
3. Any conditions of acceptance of goods originating in Member
States for Community trade may be reviewed periodically by the Council.
ARTICLE III
Evidence of Community Origin 
The claim that goods shall be accepted. as originating from a
Member State in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, shall be
supported by a certificate in the form prescribed in Annex A to this
Protocol and indicating therein the percentage and origin of the materials
used and/or the percentage of value-added as the case may be, in the process
of production and the fact of direct consignment. A certificate shall be
given by the competent authority designated for that purpose by the exporting
Member State where the goods have been produced and countersigned by the
Customs Department of that Member State.
2. The competent authority designed by an importing Member State
may, notwithstanding the presentation of a certificate issued in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, require, in case of doubt,
further verification of the declarations made in a certificate.
3. In determining the place of production of marine, river or lake
products and goods, a vessel of a Member State shall be regarded as part of
that State. In determining the place from which goods originated, marine,
river or lake products taken from the sea, river or lake, or goods produced
there from at sea or on a river or lake, shall be regarded as having their
origin in a Member State if they are taken by, or produced in, a vessel of
that State and have been brought directly to the territories of the Member States.
4. For the purposes of paragraph 3 of this Article, a vessel shall
be regarded as a vessel of a Member State only if:
(a) it is registered in a Member State.
47.
(b) it carries a complement (inclusive of the Master thereof)
of which not less than fifty per cent are nationals of Member States: and
(c) at least majority control and equity holdings in respect of
the vessel are in the hands of nationals of Member States and/or a Government
or Governments of Member States or institutions, agencies, enterprises or
corporations of such Government or Governments.
ARTICLE IV
Processes not conferring origin 
For the purpose of sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of
Article II of this Protocol, the following operations and processes shall be
considered as insufficient to support a claim that goods originate from a
Member State:
(a) packing, bottling, placing in flasks, bags, cases, boxes,
fixing on cards or boards and all other simple packing operations:
(b) mixing of products except as provided for in Article VII
of this Protocol:
(c) operations to ensure the preservation of merchandise in good
condition during transportation and storage such as ventilation, spreading out,
drying, freezing, placing in brine, sulphur dioxide or other aqueous solutions,
removal of damaged parts and similar operations:
(d) changes of packing and breaking up or assembly of consignments:
(e) simple assembly of parts of a product to constitute a
complete product:
(f) marking or labelling for distinguishing products or their
packages:
(g) simple operations consisting of removal of dust, sifting or
screening, sorting classifying, matching including the making up of sets of
goods, washing, painting and cuttingrup:
01) a combination of two or more operations specified in sub-
paragraphs (a) to. (g) of this Article.
(i) slaughter of animals.
ARTICLE V
Goods wholly produced in the Member States 
For the purpose of sub-paragraph 1 of Article II of this Protocol,
the following are among the products which shall be regarded as wholly
produced in the Member States:
(a) mineral products extracted from the ground or sub-soil
or sea bed of the Member States:
(b) vegetable products harvested within the Member States:
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(c) live animals born and or raised within the Member States:
(d) products obtained within the Member States from live
animals in (c) above:
(e) products obtained by hunting or fishing conducted within the
Member States:
(f) products obtained from the sea and from rivers and lakes within
the Member States by a vessel of a Member State:
(g) products manufactured in a factory of a Member State exclusively
from the products referred to in sub-paragraph (f) of this Article:
(h) used articles fit only for the recovery of materials, provided
that such articles have been collected from users within the Member States:
(i) scrap and waste resulting from manufacturing operations within
the Member States:
(j) goods produced within the Member States exclusively or mainly
from one or both of the following:
(i) products within sub-paragraphs (a) to (i):
(ii) materials containing no element imported from outside
the Member States or of undetermined origin.
ARTICLE VI 
Application of percentage and value-added criteria 
For the purposes of sub-paragraph (b) and (c) of Article II of this
Protocol:
(a) the value of any materials which can be identified as having
been imported from a third country shall be their c.i.f. value accepted by the
Customs Authorities on clearance for home use, or on temporary admission, at
the time of last importation into the Member State where they were used in a
process of production, less the amount of transport costs incurred in transit
through other Mpmber States.
(b) If the value of any materials imported from outside the Member
States cannot be determined in accordance with sub-paragraph (b) of this
Article, their value shall be the earliest ascertainable price paid for them in
the Member State where they were used in a process of production:
(c) if the origin of any materials cannot be determined, such
materials shall be deemed to have been imported from a foreign country and
their value shall be the earliest ascertainable price paid for them in the
Member State where they were used in a process of production:
(d) the ex-factory price of the goods shall be the price paid or
payable for them to the exporter in the Member State where the goods were
produced, that price being adjusted, where necessary, to an f.o.b. or
free at frontier basis in that State.
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ARTICLE VII
Segregation of materials-. 
1. For thoseproducts oi industries where it would be impracticable for
the producer to segregate physically materials of similar character but
different origin used in the production of goods, such segregation may
be replaced by an appropriate accounting system which ensures that no more
goods are deemed to originate in the Member States than would have been the
case if the producer had been able physically to segregate the materials.
2. Any such accounting system shall conform to such
conditions as may be agreed upon by the Council in order to ensure that
adequate control measures will be applied.
ARTICLE VIII
Treatment of mixtures
1. In the case of mixtures, not being groups, set or assemblies of goods
dealt with under Article VII of this Protocol, a Member State may refuse
to accept as originating in a Member State any product resulting from the mixing
together of goods which would qualify as originating in the Member State with
goods which would not so qualify, if the characteristics of the product as a
whole are not essentially different from the characteristics of the goods
which have been mixed.
2. In the case of particular products where it is, however, recognised by the
Council to be desirable to permit mixing of the kind described in paragraph 1
of this Article, such products shall be accepted as originating in the Member
States in respect of such part thereof as may be shown to correspond to the
quantity of goods originating in the Member States used in the mixing subject
to such conditions as may be agreed by the Council upon the recommendation of
the Commission.
ARTICLE IX
Treatment of packing 
1. Where for purposes of assessing customs duties a Member State treats
goods separately from their packing, it may also, in respect of its imports
consigned from another Member State, determine separately the origin of such
packing.
2. Where paragraph 1 of this Article is not applicable, packing shall be
considered as forming a whole with the goods, and no part of any packing
required for their transport or storage shall be considered as having been
imported from a foreign country, when determining the origin of the goods
as a whole.
3. For the purpose of paragraph 2 of this Article packing with which goods
are ordinarily sold by retail shall not be regarded as packing required for
' the transport or storage of goods.
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ARTICLE X
Unit of qualification 
1. Each product in a consignment shall be considered separately.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article:
(a) where the Nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation Council
specifies that a group, set or assembly of products is to be classified within
a single heading, such a group, set or assembly shall be treated as one product:
(b) tools, parts and accessories which are imported with a product,
and the price of which is included in that of the product or for which no
separate charge is made, shall be considered as forming a whole with the
product, provided that they constitute the standard equipment customarily included
on the sale of products of that kind:
(c) in cases not within sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article,
goods shall be treated as a single product if they are so treated for purposes
of assessing customs duties on like products by the important Member State.
3. An unassembled or disassembled product which is imported in more than one
consignment because it is not feasible for trans port or production reasons
to import it in a single consignment shall, be treated as one product.
ARTICLE XI
Movement of goods in transit 
Where a Member State exports its products to another Member State
through other Member States, such exportation shall be in accordance with
International Transit procedures.
ARTICLE XII
Regulations 
The Council shall make regulations concerning proof and the
verification of proof of goods originating from Member States in pursuance
of this Protocol.
ARTICLE XIII
Infringement and Sanctions 
1. Member States undertake to introduce legislation, making such provision as
may be necessary for penalties against persons who, in their state, furnish
or cause to be furnished a document which is untrue in a material particularly
in support of a claim in another Member State that goods should be accepted
as originating from the Member States.
2. Any Member State to which an untrue claim is made in respect of the origin
of goods shall immediately bring the issue to the attention of the exporting
Member State from which the untrue claim is made so that the appropriate
action can be taken.
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3. A Member State shall be under no obligation to institute or continue
court proceedings, if it has not been requested to do so by the importing
Member State to which the untrue claim was made.
4. Without prejudice to the powers conferred upon the Tribunal of the
Economic Community of West African States established by Article II of the
Treaty, continued infringement by a Member State of the provisions of this
Protocol may be referred by another Member State to the Council through the
Commission.
ARTICLE XIV
Deposit and Entry into Force 
1. This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally upon signature by
Heads of State and Government of Member States and definitively upon
ratification by at least seven signatory States in accordance with the
constitutional procedures applicable for each signatory state.
2. This Protocol and all the instruments of ratification shall be deposited
with the Depository Government of the Treaty which shall transmit certified
true copies of this Protocol to all Member States and notify them of the
dates of deposits of the instruments of ratification and shall register this
Protocol with the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and such
organisations as the Council shall determine.
3. This Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form an integral part
of the Treaty.
IN FAITH WHEREOF, WE THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN
WEST AFRICA, HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL.
DONE AT LOME this 5th day of November,1976, in single original
in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.
H.E. Lt. MATHIEU KEREKOU
	 H.E.Dr. LANSANA BEAVOGUI
President of the People's Republic
of Benin
H.E.Mr.A.M.CAMARA
Vice-President
for and on behalf of the President
of the Republic of Gambia
Prime Minister
for and on behalf of the Head of
State and Commander-in-Chief of
the People's Revolutionary Armed
Forces, President of the Republic
of Guinea
H.E. Mr. LUIZ CABRAL
President of the Republic of
Guinea-Bissau
Hon. Dr. K.A. GARDINER	 H.E. Mr. FELIX HOUPHOUET-
Commissioner for Economic Planning for 	 BOIGNY
and on behalf of the Head of State and 	 President of the Republic of
Chairman of the National Redemption
	 Ivory Coast
Council of the Republic of Ghana
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H.E.Dr.William R.TOLBERT,Jr.
President of the Republic of Liberia
H.E.Lt.GENERAL OLUSEGUN OBASANJO
Head of the Federal Military
Government, Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria
Hon. Mr. FOUNEKE KEITA
	 H.E. Mr.Leopold Sedar SENGHOR
Minister of Finance and Trade for
	 President of the Republic of
and on behalf of the Chairman of
	 Senegal
the Military Committee of National
Liberation, President of the Republic
of Mali
H.E.MOKTAR OULD DADDAH
President of the Islamic Republic
of Mauritania
H.E. Lt.-Col.SEYNI KOUNTCHE
Head of State and Chairman of the
Supreme Military Council of the
Republic of Niger
H.E. GENERAL A.SANGOULE LAMIZANA
President of the Republic of Upper
Volta
H.E. Dr. SIAKA STEVENS
President of the Republic of
Sierra Leone
H.E. GENERAL GNASSINGBE EYADEMA
President of the Togo Republic
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Paragraph 1 of Article III
ANNEX A
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
MOVEMENT CERTIFICATE
Ref No 	
1. NAME OF EXPORTER AND OFFICE
	 2. CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN
ADDRESS (Not P.O.Box or PMB)
3. NAME OF CONSIGNEE AND	 5. Country, grour-cf countries in which
OFFICE ADDRESS	 the products are considered as
originating
4. PARTICULARS OF TRANSPORT
6
Custons
tariff no.
7
Marks &
8
Number and kind
of packages and
9
Origin criterion
(See Overleaf)
10	 .11
Weigh
Gross	 Net
F.O.B.
Value
•
.
12. DECLARATION BY EXPORTER
	 13.
I, the undersigned, hereby declare
that the above details and statement
are correct, that all the goods are
produced in
CERTIFICATE
It is hereby certified that the
above mentioned goods are of
	 origin
Authorised Signature of Certifying
Body.
Signature of Declarant	 Place and Date of issue
(Place & Date)
OFFICIAL STAMP
14. REQUEST FOR VERIFICATION, to
Verification of the authenticity and accuracy of this certificate
is requested
(Place and date)
Stamp
Signature)
15. RESULT OF VERIFICATION
Verification carried out shows that this certificate (1)
was issued by the Customs Office indicated and that the
Information contained therein is accurate.
does not meet the requirements as to authenticity and accuracy
(see notes attached).
(Place and date)
Stamp
(Signature).
(1) Insert x in the appropriate box
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NOTES
Rules for the Issuing of Certificate of Origin.
(i) The forms may be completed by any process, provided that the entries
are indelible and legible;
(ii) Neither erasures nor super-impositions should be allowed on the
certificates. Any alterations should be made by striking out the
erroneous material and making any addition required. Such alterations
should be approved by the person who made them and certified by the
appropriate authority or body;
(iii) Any unused spaces should be crossed out to prevent any subsequent
addition.
(iv) If warranted by export trade requirements, one or more copies may be
drawn up in addition to the original.
2. Origin Criteria
(i) That all the goods (mentioned overleaf) have been wholly produced
or manufactured in 	
(ii) They have been produced in the Member State but not manufactured
as a result of any of the processes listed in Article IV of the
Protocol on Definition of Originating Products and the percentage
of the materials imported from a foreign country or of undetermined
origin which have been used at any stage of the production of the
goods does not exceed 60 per cent or the percentage of the inputs
of Community origin shall not be less than 40%; or
(iii) They have been produced in the Member State (but are not manufactured
as a result of any of the processes listed in Article Iv of the
Protocol on Definition of originating products) from materials
imported from a third country or of undetermined origin and the
value-added in the process of production accounts for at least
thirty-five per cent of the f.o.b. price of the finished product.
(iv) They have been produced by enterprises referred to in paragraph 1 of
the Protocol;
(v) They have been consigned directly from one member-State to another.
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PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE RE-EXPORTATION WITHIN
THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
OF GOODS rMPORMU FROM TaIRD COUNTRIES.
57.
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES
Aware of the necessity to facilitate the imnlementation of
Article 22 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States
on the re-exportation within the Community of goods imported from third
countries:
AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
Definitions
In this Protocol:
"Treaty" means the Treaty of the Economic Community of
West African States;
"Community" means the Economic Community of West African
States;
"Council" means the Cauncil of Ministers established by
Article 6 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States;
"Commission" means the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and
Payments Commission established by Article 9 of the Treaty of the Economic
. Community of West African States;
"Barter Agreement" means any agreement or arrangement by which
goods are imported into a Member State of the Community, being goods for
which settlement may be affected, in whole or in part, by the direct
exchange of goods;
"Customs Duty" shall include import duties and taxes of
equivalent effect;
"Re-exportation" means the exportation from a Member State to
another Member State of goods originally imported from a third country.
ARTICLE II
Customs Duty Collected to be Refunded in the Collecting State
1. Where any goods, which are imported into a Member State of the Community
from a third country and in respect of which customs duty has been charged
and collected in that State (in this paragraph referred to as "the Collecting
State") are transferred to one of the other Member States of the Community
(in this paragraph referred to as "the Consuming State") the following
provisions shall apply:
(a) An administrative fee representing 0.5% of the c.i.f. value
of every consignment being re-exported is to be charged by the Collecting
State.
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(b) The Collecting State shall refund to the importer within
its territory, the full amount of duty paid on the goods while other costs
such as c.i.f.,port charges, etc., involved in the importation are to be
included in the invoiced price to be paid by
 the importer in the Consuming
State.
(c) The Consuming State shall charge and collect the duty
payable on such goods.
2. Where goods which are imported into a Member State of the Community from
a third country and in respect of which customs duty is charged and collected
in that State (in this paragraph referred to as "the Collecting State")
are wholly or in Part used in Collecting State in the manufacture of other
goods (in this Article referred to as "the manufactured goods"), and the
manufactured goods are subsequently transferred to another Member State
of the Community (in this Article referred to as "the Consuming State"), the
Collecting State shall refund to the importer within its territory the full
amount of the duty collected in respect of the goods imported and used in the
production of the manufactured goods subsequently transferred to the
Consuming State.
ARTICLE II/
Power of the Council of Ministers of the Community.
1, The Council of Ministers of the Community may make regulations generally
for the better carrying into effect of the provisions of this Protocol
and matters connected therewith.
2. Without prejudice to the measures referred to in Article 23 of the Treaty
and to this Protocol, the Council may, on the recommendation of the Commission
lay down other conditions under which re-exportation of goods from third
countries may be permitted under this Protocol. Such conditions shall
include the type, the minimum value and quantity of goods that may be
re-exported and the minimum amount of customs duty that may be refunded by a
Member State,
ARTICLE Iv
Infringements
1. Without prejudice to the powers conferred upon the Tribunal of the
Community established under Article II of the Treaty, continued infringement
by a Member State of the provisions of this Protocol may be referred by another
Member State to the Council through the Commission.
H.E.MOKTAR OULD DADDAH
President of the Islamic Republic
of Mauritania
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ARTICLE V
The Provisions of this Protocol and the Treaty
The provisions of this Protocol shall where s pecific provisions exist on the
same subject matter in the Treaty be so construed as to complement each other.
ARTICLE VI
Deposit and Entry into Force
1. This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally upon signature by
Heads of State and Government of Member States and definitively upon
ratification by at least seven Member States in accordance with the
constitutional procedure applicable for each signatory State.
2. This Protocol and all the instruments of ratification shall be deposited
with the Depository Government of the Treaty which shall transmit certified
true copies of this Protocol to all Member States and notify them of the
dates of deposits of the instruments of ratification and shall register
this Protocol with the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations
and such organisations as the Council shall determine.
3. This Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form an integral part of the
Treaty.
IN FAITH WHEREOF, WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN
WEST AFRICA, HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL
DONE AT Lome this 5th day of November, 1976 in single original in the English
and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.
H.E. Ltd.MATHIEU KEREKOU
	
H.E. Mr. A.M. CAMARA
President of People's Revd11c of
	
Vice-President
Benin	 for and on behalf of the President
of the Republic of Gambia
Hon. Dr.K.A.GARDINER
Commissioner for Economic Planning
for and on behalf of the Head of State
and Chairman of the National Redemption
Council of the Republic of Ghana
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H.E. Dr.LANSANA BEAVOGUI
Prime Minister
for and on behalf of the Head
of State and Commander-in-Chief
of the People's Revolutionary
Armed Forces, President of
the Republic of Guinea
H.E.Mr. LUIZ CABRAL
President of the Republic of
Guinea-Bissau
R.E.Lt.-Col. SFYNT KOUNTCHE
Head of State and Chairman of the
Supreme Military Council of the
Republic of Niger
H.E. Lt.General OLUSEGUN OBASANJO
Head of the Federal Military
Government, Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria
H.E. Mr.FELIX HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY
President of the Republic of the
Ivory Coast
H.E. Mr. LEOPOLD SEDAR SENGHOR
President of the Republic
of Senegal
H.E. Dr. WILLIAM R. TOLBERT Jr.
President of the Republic of
Liberia
H.E. Dr. SIAKA STEVENS
President of the Republic of
Sierra Leone
Hon. Mr. FOUNEKE KEITA
Minister of Finance and Trade
for and on behalf of the Chairman
of the Military Committee of
National Liberation, President of
the Republic of Mali.
H.E. General GNASSINGBE EYADEMA
President of the Togo Republic
H.E. General A. SANGOULE LAMIZANA
President of the Republic of
Upper Volta.
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PROTOCOL ON THE ASSESSMENT OF LOSS OF REVENUE
BY MEMBER STATES
62.
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES
Recalling the provision of paragra ph 2 of Article 25 of the
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States to the effect that
the precise method of assessing loss of revenue from import duties shall
be set out in a Protocol in the said Treaty:
AGREE AS FOLLONS:
ARTICLE l'
Definitions:
In this Protocol:
"Treaty" means the Treaty of the Economic Community of West
African States.
"Community" means the Economic Community of West African
States established by Article 1 of the Treaty.
"Member State" or "Member States", means a Member State or
Member States of the Community;
"Council" means the Council of Ministers established by
Article 6 of the Treaty;
"Commission" means the Trade, Customs, immigration, Monetary
and Payments Commission established by sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 1
of Article 9 of the Treaty;
"Import duties" shall have the same meaning ascribed to it
in paragraph 1 of Article 13 of the Treaty;
ARTICLE II
1. Assessment of Loss of Revenue
(a) The loss of revenue in respect of one year shall be equal to
the differences between the total duties that would result from the
application to commodities, duties and taxes applicable to such commodities
before the coming into force of the Treaty if they originated from a third
country enjoying most favoured Nations treatment and the amount actually
collected as a result of the application of the Treaty.
Cb) The exporting Member State shall effect to the Fund the
payment of compensations in respect of losses occasioned by her exports.
Those payments in respect of loss of revenue shall constitute permanent
resources of the Fund that are not liable to be transferred, except only
as exclusive payments in respect of losses incurred.
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Cc) The Council of Ministers in the light of the experience
acquired from the operation and functioning of the Fund and of the Community
may from time to time modify the method of assessment of loss of
revenue referred to in (a) and (b) of this paragraph.
2. Methods of Payment
Cal The competent departments of the Secretariat and the
Management of the Fund of the Community shall make recommendations to the
Council of Ministers on the compensation to be paid in respect of loss of
revenue by taking into account the available resources in accordance with the
objectives of the Fund and the budgetary requirements of the Member States
that have suffered such losses.	 •
Cb/ The assessment of losses shall be notified and the payment
of compensation shall be effected at the same time to all beneficiary Member
States.
ARTICLE III
Power of the Council
1. The Council may request that the statistics and information submitted to
it by a Member State for the purpose of the assessment of loss of revenue from
import duties shall be verified by the Executive Secretary of the Community.
The Executive Secretary of the Community may also request a Member State to
furnish further details of the statistics and information submitted by it in
relation to loss of revenue.
2. The provisions of this Protocol shall in no way derogate from the powers
vested in the Council by paragraph 1 of Article 25 of the Treaty as to the
determination of compensation to be paid to a Member State.
ARTICLE IV
Deposit and Entry into Force
1. This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally upon signature by -
Heads of State and Government of Member States and definitively upon ratification
by at least seven Member States in accordance with the constitutional procedure
'applicable for each signatory State.
2. This Protocol and all the instruments of ratification shall be deposited
with the Depository Government of the Treaty which shall transmit certified
true copies of this Protocol to all Member States and notify them of the
dates of deposits of the instruments of ratification and shall register this
Protocol with the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and such
organisations as the Council shall determine.
3. This Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form an integral part of the
Treaty.
IN FAITH WHEREOF, WE THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN WEST AFRICA,
HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL
DONE AT LOME this 5th day of November,1976 in single original in the English
and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.
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H.E. Lt.MAImIEU KEREKOU
President of People's Republic
of Benin
H.E. Dr. LANSANA BEAVOGUI
Prime Minister
for and on behalf of the Head
of State and Commander-in-Chief
of the People's Revolutionary
Armed Forces, President of the
Republic of Guinea
H.E. Mr.A.M.CAMARA	 H.E. Mr.LUIZ CABRAL
Vice-President
	
President of the Republic of Guinea
for and on behalf of the President
	
Bissau
of the Republic of Gambia
Hon. Dr. K.A. GARDINER
Commission for Economic Planning
for and on behalf of the Head of
State and Chairman of the National
Redemption Council of the Republic
of Ghana
H.E. Mr. FELIX HOUPHOUtT-BOIGNY
President of the Republic of
Ivory Coast
H.E. Dr. WILLIAM R. TOLBERT, Jr
President of the Republic of Liberi
H.E.Lt.General OLUSEGUN OBASANJO
Head of the Federal Military
Government, Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria
Hon. Mr. FOUNEKE KEITA
	
H.E. Mr.LeopOld SEDAR SENGHOR
Minister of Finance and Trade
	
President of the Republic of
for and on behalf of the 	 Senegal
Chairman of the Military Committee
of National Liberation, President
of the Republic of Mali
H.E.MOKTAR OULD DADDAH
President of the Islamic Republic
of Mauritania
H.E. Dr. SIAKA STEVENS
President of the Republic of
Sierra Leone
H.E. Lt.-Col S7YNT KOUNTCHE	 H.E. General GNASSINGBE EYADEMA
Head of State and Chairman of	 President of the Republic of
the Supreme Military Council of 	 Togo
the Republic of Niger
H.E. General A.SANGOULE LAMIZA/
President of the Republic of Upper
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PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE FUND
FOR COOPERATION, COMPENSATION
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
66.
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES
Recalling Article 50 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of
West African States whereby the Fund for Coo peration, Compensation and
Development was established, and Recalling further paragraph 3 of Article 51
of the said Treaty which requires that the method of determining the
contributions to be paid by Member States, and administrative and other
matters relating to the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development
should be set out in a Protocol to be annexed to the said Treaty:
AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
Definitions:
In this Protocol:
"Treaty" means the Treaty of the Economic Community of West
African States;
"Community" means the Economic Community of West African States
established by Article 1 of the Treaty;
"Member State" or "Member States" means a member state or member
states of the Community;
"Authority" means the Authority of Heads of State and Government
of the Community established by Article 5 of the Treaty;
"Council" means the Council of Ministers of the Community
established by Article 6 of the Treaty;
"Executive Secretary" means the Executive Secretary of the
Community appointed under Article 8 of the Treaty;
"Fund" means the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development
established by Article 50 of the Treaty;
"Board of Directors" means the Board of Directors of the Fund;
"Chairman" means the Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the Fund.
"Managing Director" means the Managing Director of the Fund;
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ARTICLE 2
Purposes of the Fund:
The Fund shall be used to:
Cal provide compensation and other forms of assistance to
Member States which have suffered losses as a result of the application
of the provisions of this Treaty;
Cb/ provide compensation to Member States which have suffered
losses as a result of the location of Community enterprises;
Col provide grants for financing national or Community research
and development activities;
031 grant loans for feasibility studies and development
projects in Member States;
Col guarantee foreign investments made in member-states in
respect of enterprises established in pursuance of the provisions of the
Treaty on the harmonization of industrial policies;
Cf/ provide means to facilitate the sustained mobilization
of internal and external financial resources for the Member States and
the Community; and
(g1 promote development projects in the less developed Member
States of the Community.
ARTICLE 3
Ordinary Capital Resources of the Fund
In the context of this Protocol, the term "ordinary capital
resources" of the Fund shall include:
Cal the capital of the Fund, including both paid and unpaid
contributions determined under Article 5 and authorised in pursuance of
the provisions of Article 7 of this Protocol;
Cbl income from enterprises either wholly or partly owned
by the Community;
Cc) receipts from bilateral and multilateral sources as well
as other foreign sources;
Cd1 subsidies and contributions of all kinds and from all
sources;
Cel income derived from loans made from the above mentioned
resources or from guarantees given by the Fund;
Cf/ borrowing by the Fund; and
(g) any other resources or income received by the Fund which
do not form part of its Special Facilities referred to in Article 4 of this
Protocol.
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ARTICLE 4
Special Facilities:
	
1.	 The Fund shall accept for administration the resources of any
special facilities.
	
2.	 The term "Special Facilities" as used in this Protocol shall refer
to the resources of any Special Facilities and shall include:
(a) funds contributed by Member States as may be determined
by the Council for the provision of compensation and other forms of
assistance to Member States;
(b) funds accepted by the Fund in any Special Facility;
(c) funds repaid in respect of loans or guarantees financed
from any Special Facility which, under the regulations of the Fund covering
that Special Facility, are received by such Special Facility;
(d) income derived from operations of the Fund in which any of the
above-mentioned resources or funds are used or committed if, under the
regulations of the Fund covering the Special Facilities concerned, that
income accrued to such Special Facilities; and
(e) funds from such sources as the Fund may consider appropriate
for the promotion of the purposes of the Fund including compensation to
Member States.
3.	 Special Facilities, accepted by the Fund under paragraph 1 of
this Article shall be used in such manner and on such terms and conditions as
are not inconsistent with other objectives of the Fund and the agreement under
which such resources are accepted by the Fund for administration and where
so specified, to provide compensation and other forms of assistance to
Member States.
4. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 25
of the Treaty, the Board of Directors shall make such regulations as may be
necessary for the administration and use of Special Facilities.
ARTICLE 5
Contributions by Member States
1.	 The contribution of each Member State excluding the contribution
relating to compensation of loss of revenue referred to in Article 4
paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a) of this Protocol in respect of the other
resources referred to in Articles 3 and 4 of this protocol shall be assessed
on the basis of a co-efficient which takes into account the Gross Domestic
Product and the Per Capita Income of all Member States. For this purpose,
the co-efficient shall be calculated as one-half of the ratio of the Gross
Domestic Product of each Member State to the total Gross Domestic product
äf all Member States plus one-half of the ratio of the Per Capita Income
of each Member State to the total Per Capita Income of all the Member States.
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2.	 The statistics and other data on the Gross Domestic Product and
population of the Member States published by the United Nations shall be
used in calculating the co-efficient referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article.
ARTICLE 6
Payment of Contributions:
1. Each Member State shall in such instalments as may be determined
by the Council pay into the Fund the amount assessed to be paid by it under
the provisions of Article 5 of this Protocol.
2. Unless otherwise decided by the Council, 100 per cent of the
amount assessed to be paid by Member States under this Article shall be paid
in specified convertible currency.
3. The unit of account in which the budget of the Fund shall be
prepared shall be the Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary
Fund.
4. For the nurposes of this Article "Convertible Currency" shall be
currency which is declared as such by the International Monetary Fund and
such other currencies as the Council may from time to time designate.
5. The exchange value of the currencies of Member States for the
purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article shall be the official declared rate
to the International Monetary Fund on the date of payment.' Where the
currency of a Member State is floating the day's average of the selling and
buying rates of the Central Bank of the Member State shall be u'sed.
6. The Fund shall determine the place for any payment of contribution,
provided that until the first meeting of the Board of Directors, payment
shall be made to the Central Bank of the member State where the Executive
Secretariat of the Community is situated, as Trustee to the Fund.
7. The liability of a Member State to the Fund shall be limited
to the unpaid contributions due from them under the provisions of this
Protocol.
ARTICLE 7
Additional Resources:
The Board of Directors shall periodically review the adequacy of
the resources of the Fund and may, if it deems it desirable, propose for the
approval of the Council an increase in the contributions to be paid Member
States and the currencies and the way in which such payment should be made.
The Board of Directors may also propose for the approval of the Council other
methods of increasing the resources of the Fund.
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ARTICLE 8
Operations General:
The resources of the Fund shall be used exclusively to implement
the purposes of the Fund as set forth in Article 2 of this Protocol.
ARTICLE 9
Other and Special Operations:
1. The operations of the Fund shall consist of ordinary operations
and special operations. Ordinary operations shall be those financed from
the Special Facilities referred to in Article 4 of this Protocol.
2. The ordinary capital resources and the Special Facilities of the
Fund shall at all times and in all respects be held, used, committed,
invested or otherwise disposed of entirely separately from each other.
3. The ordinary capital resources of the Fund shall not be charged
with, or used to discharge, losses or liabilities arising out of special
operations for which Special Facilities were originally used or committed.
4. Expenses relating directly to ordinary operations shall be charged
to ordinary capital resources of the Fund and those relating to special
operations shall be charged to the Special Facilities. Any other expenses
shall be charged as the Board of Directors shall determine.
ARTICLE 10
Methods of Operation:
1.	 Subject to the conditions set forth in this Protocol, and for the
Purposes of the Fund, the Fund may provide guarantees in respect of foreign
investments, provide finances for and facilitate the financing of projects
of Member States of the Community or promote development in the less developed
Member States in any of the following ways to any agency, entity or enterprise
which is subject to majority participation and control by nationals, including
Governments or Government or inter-governmentally-owned enterprises or
corporations of Member States.
(a) by making or participating in direct subventions and loans
with its unimpaired paid-up capital and, except in the case of its Special
Reserve as defined in Article 17 of this Protocol, with its reserves or
undistributed surplus or with the unimpaired Special Facilities other than
those designated for use in granting compensation to Member States in
accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article;
Cb) by making or participating in direct loans with funds raised
by the Fund in capital markets or borrowed or otherwise acquired by the Fund
for inclusion in its ordinary resources;
(c) by the investment of funds referred to in sub-paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this Article in equity capital of an institution or enterprise; or
(d) by guaranteeing in whole. or in part, loans or foreign
investments made in Member States in respect of enterprises established in
pursuance of the provisions of this Treaty on the harmonization of industrial
policies.
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2.	 The Special Facilities designated for that purpose, shall be used
to provide compensation and other forms of assistance to Member States
which have suffered losses as described in paragraphs m and (c) of Article 52
of the Treaty, in such manner and to such extent as the Council may decide.
ARTICLE 11
Limitations on Operations:
1. The total amount outstanding of loans, equity investments and
guarantees made by the Fund in its ordinary operations shall not at any time
exceed such percentage of the total amount of its unimpaired subscribed
capital, reserves and surplus included in its ordinary capital resources,
excluding the Special Reserve and any other reserve not available for
ordinary operation as the Board of Directors may regard as prudent.
2. The total amount outstanding in res pect of the special operations
of the Fund relating to any Special Facility shall not at any time exceed
the total amount of the unimpaired s pecial resources appertaining to that
Special Facility.
3. In the case of funds invested in equity capital out of the
ordinary capital resources of the Fund, the total amount invested shall not
exceed such percentage of the aggregate amount of the unimpaired paid-up
capital of the Fund together with the reserves and surplus included in its
ordinary capital resources, excluding the Special Reserve as the Board of
Directors may determine.
4. The amclunt of any equity investment in any entity or enterprise
shall not exceed such percentage of the equity capital of that entity or
enterprise as the Board of Directors shall in each specific case determine
to be appropriate. The Fund shall not seek to obtain by such investment
a controlling interest in the entity or enterprise concerned, except where
necessary to safeguard the investment of the Fund.
5. In the case of guarantees given by the Fund in the course of its
ordinary operations the total amount guaranteed shall not exceed 10 per cent
of the aggregate amount of the unimpaired paid-up capital together with the
reserves and surplus included in its ordinary capital resources excluding
the Special Reserve.
ARTICLE 12
Provision of Currencies for Direct Loans:
In making direct loans or participating in them, the Fund may
provide finance in the following ways:
(a) by furnishing the borrower with currencies other than the
currency of the Member State in whose territory the project is located,
which are needed by the borrower to meet the foreign exchange costs of the
project; and/or
(b) by providing, when local currency required for the purposes of
the loan cannot be raised by the borrower on reasonable terms, local currency
but not exceeding a reasonable portion of the total local expenditure to be
incurred by the borrower.
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ARTICLE 13
Operating Principles:
Apart from the compensation or other form of assistance to a
Member State as may be determined by the Council, or where it may be
inappropriate to do so, the other operations of the Fund shall be
conducted in accordance with the following principles:
(a) the Fund shall be auided by sound banking principles in
its operations and shall not make loans or undertake any responsibility
for the discharge or re—financing of earlier commitments by borrowers.
CO) in selecting prOjects, the Fund shall always be guided by
the need to pursue the objectives set forth in Article 2 of this Protocol;
(c) subject to Article 2 of this Protocol, the Fund shall
ensure that it shall so conduct its operations as not to impede the balanced
economic development of all Member States;
(d) the operations of the Fund shall provide principally for
the financing directly of specific projects within the Member States
but may include loans to or guarantees of loans made to the national
development agencies of the Member States so long as such loans or
guarantees are in respect of and used for specific projects which are
agreed to by the Fund;
(e) the Fund shall seek to maintain a reasonable diversification
of its investments;
• (f) the Fund shall seek to resolve its funds by selling its
investments in equity capital to other investors wherever it can appropriately
do so on satisfactory terms;
(g) the Fund shall not finance any undertaking in the territory
of a Member State if that Member State objects to such financing;
before a loan is granted or guaranteed or an investment made,
the applicant shall have submitted an adequate proposal to the Fund, and
the Managina Director shall have presented to the Board of Directors a
written report regarding the proposal together with his recommendation;
(i) in considering an application for a loan or guarantee,
the Fund shall pay due regard to the ability of the borrower to obtain
finance or facilities elsewhere on terms and conditions that the Fund
considers reasonable for the recipient, taking into account all pertinent
factors;
(j) in making or guaranteeing a loan, the Fund shall pay due
regard to the prospects that the borrower and its guarantor, if any, will
be able to meet their obligations under the loan contract;
(k) in making or guaranteeing a loan, the rate of interest, other
charges and the schedule for repayment of principal shall be such as are,
in the opinion of the Fund, appropriate for the loan concerned;
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(1) in guaranteeing a loan made by other investors, the Fund
shall charge a suitable fee or commission for its risk;
(m) in the case of a direct loan made by the Fund, the borrower
shall be permitted by the Fund to draw the loan funds only to meet
payments in connection with the project as they fall due;
(II) the Fund shall take all necessary measures to ensure that
the proceeds of any loan made, guaranteed or participated in by the Fund
are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted and with due
attention to considerations of economy and efficiency;
(o) the Fund shall ensure that every loan contract entered into
by it shall enable the Fund to exercise all necessary powers of entry,
inspection and supervision of operations in connection with the project
and shall further enable the Fund to require the borrower to provide
information and to allow inspection of its books and records during such
time as any part of the loan remains outstandino.
ARTICLE 14
Prohibition of Political Activities:
1.	 The Fund, its Managing Director and officers and staff shall
not interfere in the political affairs of any Member States, nor shall
they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of a
Member State. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their
decisions and such considerations shall be weighed impartially to achieve
and carry out the purposes and functions of the Fund.
2.	 The Fund shall not accept loans, Special Facilities or assistance
that may in any way prejudice, limit, deflect or otherwise alter its
purposes or functions.
ARTICLE 15
Terms and Conditions for Direct Loans and Gaurantees:
1.	 In the case of direct loans made or participated in or loans
guaranteed by the Fund, the contract shall establish in conformity with the
operating principles set out above and subject to the other provisions of
this Protocol the terms and conditions for the loan or the guarantee
concerned, including payment of principal, interest, commitment fee and
other charges, maturities, dates of payment in respect of the loan, or the
fees and other charges in respect of the guarantee res pectively and
foreclosure.
2.	 The contact shall provide that all payments to the Fund under the
contract shall be made in the currency loaned, unless, in the case of a
loan made or guarantees as part of special o perations, the regulations of
the Fund provide otherwise.
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3. Guarantees by the Fund shall also provide that the Fund may
terminate its liability with res pect to interest if, upon default by the
borrower, or any other guarantor, the Fund offers to purchase, at par
and interest accrued to a date designated in the offer, the loans or other
obligations guaranteed.
4. Whenever it considers it appropriate, the Fund may require as
a condition of granting or partici pating in a loan that the Member State
in whose territory a project is to be carried out, or a public agency
or institution of that Member State acce ptable to the Fund, guarantees the
repayment of the principal and the payment of interest and other charges
on the loan in accordance with the terms thereof.
5. The loan or guarantee contract shall specifically state the
currency in which all payments to the Fund thereunder shall be made.
ARTICLE 16
Commission and Fees:
1. In addition to interest, the Fund shall charge a commission on
direct loans made or participated in as part of its ordinary operations
at a rate to be determined by the Board of Directors and computed on the
amount outstanding on each loan or participation.
2. In guaranteeing a loan as part of its ordinary operations. , the
Fund shall charge a guarantee fee at a rate determined by the Board of
Directors payable periodically on the amount of the loan outstanding.
1.	 Other charges, including commitment fee, of the Fund in its
ordinary operations and any commission, fees or other charges in relation
to its special operations shall be determined by the Board of Directors.
ARTICLE 17
Special Reserve:
The amount of commissions and guarantee fees, and such amount of
the interest as the Board of Directors may determine, received by the Fund
under the provisions of Article 16 of this Protocol shall be set aside as
a Special Reserve which shall be ke pt for meeting liabilities of the Fund
in accordance with Article 18 of this Protocol and the administrative
expenses of the Fund. This Special Reserve shall be held in such liquid
form as the Board of Directors may decide.
ARTICLE 18
Defaults on Loans and Methods of Meeting Liabilities of the Fund:
1.	 In cases of default on loans made, participated in or guaranteed
by the Fund in its ordinary operations, the Fund shall take such action
as it considers appropriate to conserve its investment including modification
of the terms of the loan, other than any term as to the currency of repayment.
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2. Payments in discharge of the Fund's liabilities on borrowing
or guarantees chargeable to the ordinary capital resources shall be
charged firstly against the S pecial Reserve and then, to the extent
necessary and at the discretion of the Fund, against other reserves,
surplus and capital available to the Fund.
3. Whenever necessary to meet contractual payments of interest,
other charges or amortization on borrowings of the Fund in its ordinary
operations, or to meet its liabilities with respect to similar payments
in relation to loans guaranteed by it, chargeable to its ordinary Resources,
the Fund may in accordance with Article 7 of this Protocol, propose an
increment in the resources of the Fund.
ARTICLE 19
Miscellaneous Powers:
In addition to the powers specified elsewhere in this Protocol,
the Fund shall be empowered:
(a) to borrow funds in the territories of the Member States, or
elsewhere, and in this connection to furnish such collateral or other
security therefore as the Fund shall determine:
Provided that:
(i) before setting its obligations or otherwise borrowing in the
territory of a country, the Fund shall obtain the approval of the Government
of that country to the sale, and
(ii) before deciding to sell its obligations or otherwise
borrowing in a particular country, the Fund shall consider the amount of
previous borrowing, if any, in that country with a view to diversifying
its borrowing to the maximum extent possible:
('b) to buy and sell securities which the Fund has issued or
guaranteed their sale;
(c) to guarantee securities in which it has invested in order
to facilitate their sale;
(d) to invest funds not immediately needed in its operations in
such financial assets as it may determine and to invest funds held for
pensions or similar pur poses in marketable securities;
(e) to provide technical advice and assistance which may serve
its purposes and come within its functions and where appropriate, for
example, in the case of special feasibility studies, the Fund shall charge
for such services;
(f) to study and promote the development and investment
opportunities within the Member States.
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ARTICLE 20
Power to make regulations:
The Board of Directors may make such regulations including
financial regulations as it considers necessary or appropriate to further
the purposes and functions of the Fund, provided that such regulations
shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this l'rotocol.
ARTICLE 21
Notice to be placed on securities
Every security issued or guaranteed by the Fund shall bear on
its face a conspicuous statement to the effect that it is not an obligation
of any Government, unless it is in fact the obligation of a particular
Government, in which case it shall be so stated.
ARTICLE 22
Determination of convertibility:
Whenever it shall become necessary under this Protocol to
determine whether any currency is convertible, the Fund shall submit
recommendations to the Council which shall hold consultation with the
International Monetary Fund.
ARTICLE 23
Use of currencies:
1.	 The Member States may not maintain or impose any restriction on the
holding or use by the Fund or by any recipient from the Fund for payments
in any country of the following:
(a) Currencies received by the Fund in payment of
contributions to its capital;
(b) Currencies purchased with the currencies referred to in sub-
paragraph (a) of this paragraph;
(c) Currencies obtained by the Fund by borrowing for inclusion
in its ordinary capital resources; and
(d) Currencies received by the Fund in payment of principal,
interest, dividends or other charges in respect of loans
or investments made out of any of the funds referred to in
sub-paragraph (a), (b) and (c) of this paragraph or in
payment of fees in respect of guarantees made by the Fund.
2.	 The Member States may not maintain or impose any restriction on
the holding or use by the Fund or by any recipient from the Fund, for payments
in any country, or currency received by the Fund which does not come within
the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article unless such currency forms
part of the Special Facilities of the Fund and its use is subject to
special regulations.
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3. The Member States may not maintain or impose any restriction
on the holding or use by the Fund for making amortization payments or
for repurchasing in whole or in part the Fund's own obligations, of
currencies received by the Fund in repayment of direct loans made out of
its ordinary capital resources.
4. Each Member State shall ensure, in respect of projects within
its territories, that the currencies necessary to enable payments to be
made to the Fund in accordance with the provisions of the contracts referred
to in Article 15 of this Protocol shall be made available in exchange for
currency of the Member State concerned.
ARTICLE 24
Organisation of the Fund:
The Fund shall have a Board of Directors, a Managing Director
and other officers and staff as the Board of Directors may consider necessary.
ARTICLE 25
Board of Directors
1. All the powers of the Fund shall, subject to the provisions of this
Protocol be invested in the Board of Directors.
2. The Board of Directors shall consist of Ministers who are members
of the Council appointed one each for that purpose by each Member State.
3. The Board of Directors shall elect in rotation according to an
order to be determined by the Board of Directors, one of its members to be
its Chairman who shall hold office for a term of one year.
4. When a Chairman ceases to be a member of the Board of Directors
before the end of his term as Chairman the person appointed in his place
shall become Chairman for the remainder of that term.
5. The appointment of a member of the Board of Directors may be
revoked by the Member State which appointed him.
6. Each Member State shall appoint an alternate to its representative
on the Board of Directors who shall be a person possessing high competence
and wide experience in economic, financial and banking affairs.
7. The Authority may give directions of a general nature to the Board
of Directors regarding the discharge of functions prescribed under this
Protocol.
ARTICLE 26
Procedure of the Board of Directors:
1.	 The Board of Directors shall normally meet at the headquarters of
the Fund but may meet at other places as the Board of Directors may decide.
The Board of Directors shall meet at least every three months or more
frequently if the business of the Fund so requires.
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2. Meetings of the Board of Directors shall be convened by the
Managing Director on the directions of the Chairman or at the request of
two-thirds of the members of the Board of Directors.
3. Two-thirds of the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum for
any meeting of the Board of Directors.
4. Subject to the provisions of this Protocol, the Board of Directors
may determine its own procedure.
ARTICLE 27
Voting
1. Each Member State on the Board of Directors shall have one vote.
2. All matters before the Board of Directors shall be decided by a
simple majority.
ARTICLE 28
Managing Director of the Fund
1. There shall be a Managing Director of the Fund who shall be
appointed by the Council and who, while he remains Managing Director, may
not hold office as a Director or an alternate to a Director but may attend
and participate at meetings of the Board of Director without the right to vote.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 8 of the
Treaty, the Managing Director shall be responsible for the day to day
administration of the Fund.
3. The Executive Secretary shall attend meetings of the Board of
Directors without the right to vote.
4. Subject to paragraph 5 of this Article, the Managing Director
shall hold office for a term of four years and may be re-appointed for
another term of four years only.
5. The Managing Director shall vacate his office if the Council After
consultation with the Board of Directors so decides.
6. If the office of Managing Director becomes vacant for any reason,
a successor shall be appointed by the Council for a new term of four years.
7. The Managing Director shall be the legal representative of the
Fund.
8. The Managing Director shall be the Chief Executive of the Fund and
shall conduct the current business of the Fund under the direction of the
Board of Directors. He shall be responsible for the organisation, appointment
and dismissal of the officers and staff in accordance with regulations made
by the Board of Directors.
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9. In appointing officers and staff the Managing Director shall,
subject to the paramount importance of securing the highest standard of
efficiency and technical competence, pay due regards to the recruitment
of citizens of the Member States.
10. There shall be a Deputy Managing Director appointed and dismissed in
the same manner as the Managing Director and he shall assist the Managing
Director in the performance of his duties.
ARTICLE 29
Loyalties of Managing Director and officers and
staff
The Managing Director and other officers and staff of the Fund,
in the discharge of their duties owe their duty and loyalty to the Fund.
Each Member State shall respect the international character of this duty
and loyalty and shall refrain from all attempts to influence the Managing
Director or any of the officers and staff in the discharge of their duties.
ARTICLE 30
Headquarters of the Fund
The headquarters of the Fund shall be determined by the Authority.
The Fund may establish offices or agencies elsewhere.
ARTICLE 31
Channel of communications, depositories:
1. Each Member State shall designate an appropriate official, entity
or person with whom the Fund may communicate in connection with any matter
arising under this Protocol.
2. Each Member State shall designate its Central Bank, or such other
agency as may be agreed upon with the Fund, as a depository with which the
Fund may keep its holdings of currency and other assets.
ARTICLE 32
Working languages
The working languages of the Fund shall be such African languages
so designated by the Authority and English and French.
ARTICLE 33
Accounts and Reports
1.	 The Board of Directors shall ensure that proper accounts and proper
records are kept in relation to the operations of the Fund and such accounts
shall be audited in respect of each financial year by auditors of high repute
appointed by the Council.
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2. The Fund shall prepare and transmit to the Council and to the
Member States through the Executive Secretary. and shall also publish an
annual report containing an audited statement of its accounts.
3. The Fund shall prepare and transmit to Member States quarterly
a summary statement of its financial position and a profit and loss statement
showing the results of its operations.
4. All financial statements of the Fund shall show ordinary operations
and the operations of each Special Facility separately.
5. The Fund may also publish such other reports as it considers
desirable in carrying out its purposes and functions and such reports
shall be transmitted to the Member States.
ARTICLE 34
Withdrawal
A Member State may not withdraw from the Fund except by withdrawing
from the Community.
ARTICLE 35
Termination of Operations
1.	 The Authority may on the recommendation of the Council upon the
proposal of the Board of Directors decide to terminate any of the operations
of the Fund other than those in respect of the provision of compensation and
other assistance to the Member States as prescribed in sub-paragraph 2 of
Article 10 of this Protocol, and the Fund shall after such termination,
forthwith, cease all activities in respect of any such operation except those
incidental to the orderly realisation, conversation and preservation of its
assets and the settlement of its obligations.
ARTICLE 36
Liabilities of Members and Payment
of Claims
1. In the event of termination of the operations of the Fund, under
the provisions of Article 35 of this Protocol, the liability of all Member
States for their unpaid contributions to the capital of the Fund shall
continue until all claims of creditors, including all contingent claims,
shall have been discharged.
2. All creditors holding direct claims shall first be paid out of
the assets of the Fund and then out of payments to the Fund of contributions
not yet paid. Before making any payments to
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ARTICLE 37
Status, Immunities and Privileges
1,	 The Fund is an international financial institution.
2.	 To enable the Fund effectively to fulfil its purposes and
carry out the functions with which it is entrusted, the status, immunities,
exemptions and privileges set forth in Article 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, and
44 of this Protocol shall be accorded to the Fund in the territories of
each of the Member States.
•	 ARTICLE 38
Legal Status
The Fund shall possess full juridical personality and, in particular, full
capacity:
(a) to contract;
(b) to acquire, hold or dispose of, immovable and movable property; and
(c) to institute legal proceedings.
ARTICLE 39
Judicial Proccedings
. 1.	 No action shall be brought against the Fund by Member States
or persons acting for or deriving claims from Member States. Member States
shall have recourse to such special procedures for the settlement of
controversies between the Fund and its Members States as may be prescribed
in this Protocol, in the regulations of the Fund or in contracts entered
into with the Fund.
2. Action may be brought against the Fund in the territories of the Member
States only in a court of competent jurisdiction in a Member State in which
the Fund has an office, has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting
service or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities.
ARTICLE 40
Immunity of Assets
The archives of the Fund and all documents belonging to it,
or held by it, shall be inviolable wherever located.
ARTICLE 41
Freedom of Assets from Restrictions
To the extent necessary to carry out the purposes and functions
of the Fund and subject to the provisions of this Protocol, all property
and other assets of the Fund shall be free from restrictions, regulations,
controls and moratoria of any nature.
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ARTICLE 42
Personal Immunities and Privileges
The immunities and privileges will be those provided for
under paragraph 4 of Article 60 of the Treaty.
ARTICLE 43
Exemption from Taxation
1.	 The Fund shall benefit from customs privileges usually
granted to international organisations.
2.	 The Fund shall be exempted from income tax and all other taxes.
ARTICLE 44
Implementation
Each Member State shall promptly take such action as is
necessary - to make effective within that Member State the privileges and
immunities set forth in Articles 40, 41, 42, 43 and the other provisions of
this Protocol and shall inform the Fund of the action which is has taken
on the matter.
ARTICLE 45
Waiver of Immunities
1.	 The Fund at its discretion may waive any of the privileges,
immunities and exemptions conferred under this Protocol in any case or
instance, in such manner and upon such conditions as it may determine
to be appropriate in the best interest of the Fund.
2.	 The Fund shall take every measure to ensure that the privileges,
immunities, exemptions and facilities conferred by this Protocol are not
abused and for this purpose shall establish such regulations as it may
consider necessary and expedient.
ARTICLE 46
Interpretation and Application
Any question of interpretation and application of the provisions
of this Protocol arising between any Member State and the Fund or between two
or more Member States which cannot be settled in accordance with the provisions
of Article 48 of this Protocol shall be submitted to the Tribunal of the
Community for decision.
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ARTICLE 47
Arbitration
Any disputes that may arise between any Member State and the
Fund or between two or more Member States regarding the interpretion
of this Protocol shall be amicably settled by direct agreement. In the
event of failure to settle such disputes, the matter may be referred to the
Tribunal of the Community by a party to such disputes and the decision of the
Tribunal shall be final.
ARTICLE 48
Commencement of Operations
1.	 As soon as this Protocol has been ratified by the requisite
number of Member States in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1
of Article 49 of this Protocol the Directors shall be appointed in accordance
with the provisions of Article 25 of this Protocol and the Managing Director
of the Fund shall call the first meeting of the Board of Directors.
3.	 The Fund shall notify all Member States of the date of the
commencement of its operations.
ARTICLE 49
Deposit and Entry into Force
1.	 This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally upon
signature by Heads of State and Government of Member States and definitively
upon ratification by at least seven Member States in accordance with the
constitutional procedure applicable for each signatory State.
2.	 The Protocol and all the instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the Depository Government of the Treaty which shall transmit
certified true copies of this Protocol to all Member States and notify them
of the dates of deposits of the instruments of ratification and shall
register this Protocol with the Organisation of African Unity, the
Unted Nations and such Organisations as the Council shall determine.
3.	 This Protoo61 shall be annexed to and shall form an integral
part of the Treaty.
IN FAITH WHEREOF, WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT
IN WEST AFRICA, HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL.
DONE AT LOME this 5th day of November, 1976 in single original in the
English and French languages, both being equally authentic.
H.E.Lt.Mathieu KEREKOU
	 H.E.Mr.A.M.CAMARA
President of People's Republic
	 Vice—President
of Benin	 for and on behalf of the President
of the Republic of Gambia
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Hon. Dr. K.A. GARDINER
Commissioner for Economic
Planning for and on behalf of
the Head of State and Chairman of
the National Redemption Council
of the Republic of Ghana.
H.E. Moktar Ould DADDAH
President of the /slamiO Republic
of Mauritania.
S.
H.E. Dr. Lansana BEAVOGUI
Prime Minister
for and on behalf of the Head of
State and Commander-in-Chief of
the People's Revolutionary Armed
Forces, President of the Republic
of Guinea
H.E. Lt-Col.Seyni KOUNTCHE
Head of State and Chairman of the
Supreme Military Council of the
Republic of Niger
H.E. Mr. Luiz CABRAL
President of the Republic of
Guinea-Bissau
Mr.Felix HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY
President of the Republic of the
Ivory Coast
H.E. Dr.William R. TOLBERT,Jr.
President of the Republic of
Liberia
H.E.Lt.General Olusegun OBASANJO
Commander of the Federal Military
Government, Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria.
H.E. Mr.Leopold Sedar SENGHOR
President of the Republic of Senegal
H.E. Dr. Siaka STEVENS
President of the Republic of
Sierra Leone
Hon .Mr. FOUNEKE KEITA
Minister of Finance and Trade
for and on behalf of the Chairman
of the Military Committee of
National Liberation, President
of the Republic of Mali
H.E. General Gnassingbe EYADEMA
President of the Togo Republic
H.E. General A.Sangoule LAMIZANA
President of the Republic of Upper
Volta
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PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE CONTRIBUTIONS
BY MEMBER STATES TO THE BUDGET OF THE
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
86
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES
Recalling the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 54 of the
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States which require that
the mode by which the contributions of Member States shall be determined
and the currencies in which Member States shall pay their contributions
to the Budget of the Economic Community of West African States shall be
Presciibed in a Protocol to the said Treaty:
AGREE AS FOLLOWS
ARTICLE 1
Definitions
In this Protocol:
"Treaty" means the Treaty of the Economic Community of .
West African States.
"Community" means the Economic Community of West African States
established by Article 1 of the Treaty.
"Commission" means the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary
and payments Commission of the Community established by sub-paragraph(s)
of paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Treaty.
ARTICLE II
The Budget of the Community
1. The revenue required to meet the budget of the Community for
each financial year shall be met by the Member States of the Community
in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article.
2. The contribution of each Member State in respect of the revenue
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be assessed on the basis
of a co-efficient which takes into account the Gross Domestic Product and
the Per Capita Income of all Member States. For this purpose, the co-efficient
shall be calculated as one-half of the ratio of the Gross Domestic Product of
each Member State to the total Gross Domestic Product of all Member States
plus one-half of the ratio of the Per Capita Income of each Member State to
the total Per Capita Income of all the Member States.
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3. The statistics and other data on the Gross Domestic Product and the
Per Capita Income of the Member States published by the United Nations shall
be used in calculating the contribution of each Member State in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. The co-efficient for assessing the contribution of the Member
States as determined in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be reviewed every
three years by the Council of the recommendation of the Commission.
ARTICLE III
Payment of Contributions
Contributions due from Member States of the Community under
the provisions of Article II of this Protocol shall be paid into the budget
of the Community within three months from the beginning of the financial
year to which they relate.
ARTICLE IV
Extraordinary Expenditure
1. Unless otherwise determined by the Council, the contributions
of Member States of the Community to meet any extra-ordinary expenditure of
the Community shall be on the basis of the same co-efficient as prescribed
in Article II of this Protocol.
2. Contributions due from Member States of the Community under
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be paid by such Member States within two
months after they have been notified by the Executive Secretary of the
Community that such contributions are due from them.
ARTICLE V
Currencies for the Payment of Contributions
1. Unless otherwise decided by the Council, 100 per cent of any
contribution due from a Member State of the Community under this Protocol
shall be paid in convertible currency.
2. The unit of account in which the budget of the Community shall
be prepared shall be the Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary
Fund.
3. For the purposes of this Article "convertible currency" shall
be currency which is declared as such by the International Monetary Fund
and such other currencies as the Council may from time to time designate.
4. The exchange value of the currencies of the Member States of
the Community shall, for the purposes of the payment of contributions by
them under the provisions of this Protocol, be the official declared rate to
the International Monetary Fund on the date of payment. Where the currency
of 'aMember State is floating the day's average of the selling and buying
rates of the Central Bank of the Member State shall be used.
H.E.Moktar OulaDADDAH
President of the Islamic Republi
of Mauritania
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ARTICLE VI
Deposit and Entry into Force
1.	 This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally upon
signature by Heads of State and Government of Member States and definitively upon
ratification by at least seven Member States in accordance with the constitutional
procedure applicable for each signatory State.
2.	 This Protocol and all the instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the Depository Government of the Treaty which shall transmit
certified true copies of this Protocol to all Member States and notify them
of the dates of deposits of the instruments of ratification and shall register
this Protocol with the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and
such organisations as the Council shall determine.
3.	 This Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form an integral part
of the Treaty.
IN FAITH WHEREOF, WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN
WEST AFRICA, HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL
DONE AT LOME this 5th day of November, 1976, in single original in the English
and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.
H.E. Lt.Mathieu KEREKOU 	 H.E.Mr.A.M. CAMARA
President of People's Republic
	 Vice-President
of Benin	 for and on behalf of the President
of the Republic of Gambia
Hon.Dr.K.A.GARDINER
Commissioner for Economic Planning
for and on behalf of the Head of State
and Chairman of the National Redemption
Council of the Republic of Ghana
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ARTICLE VI
Deposit and Entry into Force
1.	 This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally upon
signature by Heads of State and Government of Member States and definitively
upon ratification by at least seven Member States in accordance with the -
constitutional procedure applicable for each signatory state.
2.	 This Protocol and all the instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the Depository Government of the Treaty which shall transmit
certified true copies of this Protocol to all Member States and notify them
of the dates of deposits of the instruments of ratification and shall
register this Protocol with the Organisation of African Unity, the United
Nations and such organisations as the Council shall determine.
3.	 This Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form an integral
part of the Treaty.
IN FAITH. WHEREOF, WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT
IN WEST AFRICA, HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL
DONE AT LOME this 5th day of November, 1976, in single original in the
English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.
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GENERAL CONVENTION ON PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
91.
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
Whereas paragraph 2 of Article 60 of the Treaty establishing the
ECOWAS, hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty", provides that the Community
shall have in the territory of each Member State the legal capacity required
for the performance of its functions;
Whereas paragraph 4 of Article 60 of the Treaty provides that the
privileges and immunities to be granted to the officials of the Community
and In Member States shall be the same as are accorded to diplomatic persons
at the Headquarters of the Community and in the Member States. Similarly, the
privileges and immunities granted to the Secretariat at the Headquarters of
the Community shall be the same as granted to the diplomatic missions at the
Headquarters of the Community and in the Member Sttes; and
Whereas Article 42 of the Protocol relating to the Fund for
Cooperation, Compensation and Development, hereinafter referred to as the "Fund"
provides that the immunities and privileges to be granted to the officials of
the FUND shall be those provided for under paragraph 4 of Article 60 of the
Treaty.
Consequently, the High Contracting Parties have adopted the following
Convention.
ARTICLE 1
Definitions:
In this Convention, the following expressions shall have the meanings
assigned to them hereunder:
(a) The "Treaty" means the Treaty of the Economic Community of
West African States;
(b) The "Community" means the Economic Community of West
African States and it includes the Fund for Cooperation,
Compensation and Development and all other institutions
as defined in Article 4 of the Treaty;
(c) "Fund" means the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and
Development as established under Article 50 of the Treaty;
(d) "Community Officials" means an Official entitled to the
privileges and immunities stated in this Convention;
(e) "Member State" or "Member States" means a Member State
or Member States of the Community;
(f) "Council" means the Council of Ministers established by
Article 6 of the Treaty.
92.
ARTICLE 2
Juridical Personality
The Community shall possess juridiscal personality. It shall
have the capacity:
(a) to contract;
(b) to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property;
(c) to institute legal proceedings.
ARTICLE 3
Property, Funds & Assets
1.	 The Community, its premises, buildings, assets and other
property wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity for
every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case it
has expressly waived its immunity. It is, however, understood that no
waiver of immunity shall extent to any measure of execution. Provided
that actions may be brought against the Fund as provided in paragraph 2 of
Article 39 of the Protocol relating to the Fund.
2.	 Subject to the provisions of Article 41 of the Protocol relating
to the Fund, the premises and buildings of the Community shall be inviolable.
The property and assets of the Community, wherever located and by whomsoever held,
shall be immune from search, requisition,cofifiscation, expropriation and from
any other form of interference whether by executive, administrative, judicial
or legislative action.
3.	 The archives of the Community and in general all documents belonging
to it or held by it shall be inviolable wherever located.
4.	 Without being restricted by financial controls, regulations or
moratoria of any kind;
(a) the Community may hold funds, gold or currency of any
kind and operate account in any currency;
(b) the Community shall be free to transfer its funds, gold
or currency from one country to the other, or within any
country and to convert any currency held by it into any other
currency.
5.	 It is provided however, that in exercising its rights under
paragraph 4 above, the Community shall pay due regard to any representations
made by the Government of any Member State in so far as it is considered that
effect can be given to such representations without detriment to the interests
of the Community.
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ARTICLE 4
Tax Exemption
1.	 The Community, its income, assets and properties shall be
exempt:
(a) from all direct taxes, except that the ECOWAS will not
claim exemption from taxes or dues which are no more
than charges for public utility services;
(b) from all import and export duties, prohibitions and
restrictions on imports and exports in respect of
articles imported or exported by the Community for its
official purposes. It is provided, however, that articles
imported under such exemptions shall not be sold or otherwise
disposed of in the country into which they were imported
except under conditions agreed upon by the appropriate
authorities of the Government of that country.
(c) from customs duties, prohibitions and restrictions of
import and exports in respect of its publications.
2.	 The Community shall be exempt from excise duties and from taxes which
are payable on the purchase of moveable and immoveable property which form
part of the price to be paid. Member States shall make appropriate
administrative arrangements for the remission or refund of the amount of duty
or tax if such duty or tax has been charged.
ARTICLE 5
Facilities in Respect of Communications.
1. The Community shall enjoy in the territory of each Member for its
official correspondence treatment not less favourable than that accorded by
the Government of that Member to any other international organisation as well
as any Government, including its diplomatic mission in the matters of priorities,
rates and taxes on mails, cables, telegrams, radiograms, telephotos, telephone
and other communications, as well as press rates for information to the press
and radio. All official correspondence and other official communications of
the Community shall not be subject to censorship.
2. The Community shall have the right to use codes and to despatch
and receive its official correspondence either by courier or in sealed bags
which shall have the same immunities and privileges as diplomatic couriers and
bags.
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ARTICLE 6
Representatives of Member States
1.	 Representatives of Member States to the institutions as well
as to the Technical and Specialised Commissions of the Community and to
conferences convened by the Community , shall, while exercising their
functions, and during their travel to and from the place of meeting,
enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
(a) Immunity from personal arrest or detention and from
any official interrogation as well as from inspection
or seizure of their personal baggage;
(b) Immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of
words spoken, written or acts done by them in the exercise
of their functions;
Cc) Inviolability for all their papers and documents and the
right to use codes and to receive papers or correspondence
by courier or in sealed bags;
(d) Exemption in respect of themselves and their spouses from
immigration restrictions, aliens' registration and from
national obligations in the state they are visiting or
through which they are passing in the exercise of their
functions;
(e) The same facilities in respect of currency or exchange
restrictions as are accorded to representatives of foreign
governments ort temporary official missions;
(f) The same immunities end facilities in respect of their
personal and official baggage as are accorded to diplomatic
enkroys.
(g) Such other privileges, immunities and facilities not
inconsistent with the foregoing as diplomatic envoys enjoy,
except that they shall have no right to claim exemption
from customs duties on goods, imported (otherwise than as
tart of their personal baggage) or from excise duties or
sales taxes.
2.	 In order to secure, for the representation of Member States to the
institutions as well as to the Technical and Specialised Commjissions of the
Community and to conferences convened by the Community, complete freedom
of speech and independence in the discharge of their duties, the immunity
from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done
by them in discharging their duties shall continue to be accorded, notwithstanding
that the persons concerned are no longer the representatives of Member States.
3.	 Where the incidence of any form of taxation depends upon
residence periods during which the representatives of Member States to
the institutions as well as to the Technical and Specialised Commissions of the
Community and to conferences convened by the Community, are present in a state
for the discharge of their duties, shall not be considered as periods of
residence.
4. Privileges and immunities are recorded to the Representatives
of Member States not for personal benefit of the individuals themselves but
in order to safeguard the independent exercise Of their functions in connection
with the Community. Consequently, a Member State not only has the right but
is under a duty to waive the immunity of its representative-in any case where
in the opinion of the Member State, the immunity of its representative in any
case where in the opinion of the Member State, and it can be waived without
prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity is accorded.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article are not
applicable as between a representative and the authorities of the state of
which he is a national or of which he is or has been the representative.
6. In this Article, the expression "representative" shall be deemed
to include all delegates, advisers, technical experts and secretaries of
delegations.
ARTICLE 7
Officials of the Community.
1. The Executive Secretary shall specify the categories of officials
to which the provisions of this Article and Article 8 shall apply. He shall
submit these categories to the Council for approval. Thereafter, these
categories shall be communicated to the Government of all Member States.
The names of the officials included in these categories shall from time to
time be made known to the Governments of Member States.
2. Community Officials have the same privileges and immunities as
diplomatic persons at the headquarters of the Community and at the headquarters
of the Fund as well as in all Member States. Consequently, Member States
undertake to give the same recognition and facilities to the Executive
Secretary of the Executive Secretariat and the Managing Director of the Fund
as are given to Heads of Diplomatic Missions.
3. In keeping with paragraph 2 of this Article, Community officials
particularly have the following privileges and immunities:
(a) the person of the Community official is inviolable. He
shall not be liable to arrest and detention, and Member
States shall treat him with due respect and shall take
all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his personal
freedom or dignity.
(b) the private residence of the Community official enjoys the
same inviolability and protection as the premises of the
headquarters of the Community. His papers, correspondence,
and except as provided in paragraphs 3(k) of this Article
his property shall likewise enjoy inviolability.
(c) the Community official shall enjoy immunity from criminal
jurisdiction in all the Member States. He shall also enjoy
immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction in all
the Member States, except in the case of:
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(i) a real action relating to private immovable property situated
in the territory of a Member State, unless he holds it on behalf of the
Community for the purposes of the Executive Secretariat_of the Fund or
any other institution of the Community.
(ii) an action relating to succession in which the official is
involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person
and not on behalf of the Community or any of its institutions.
(iii) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the official in the Member State outside his official functions.
(d) No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a Community
official expept in the cases coming under sub-paragraphs 3(c) (i), (ii) and (iii)
of Article 7, and provided that the measures concerned can be taken without
infringing the inviolability of his person or of his residence.
(e) The Community official shall not be obliged to give evidence
as a witness in any legal proceedings.
(f) He shall be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments
paid to him by the Community.
(g) He shall be immune from national service obligations.
(h) He shall be immune together with his spouse and relatives residing
with and dependent on him from immigration restrictions and alien registration.
(i) The immunity of a Commmnity official may be waived by the
Executive Secretary on behalf of the Community.
(j) The initiation of proceedings by a Community official shall
preclude him from invoking immunity from jurisdiction in respect of any counter-
claim directly connected with the principal claim.
(k) Waiver of Immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or
administrative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of immunity
in respect of the execution of the judgement, for which a separate waiver
shall be necessary.
4.	 Community Officials are members of Staff of the Community entitled
to privileges and immunities. They shall be the professional international
civil servants as defined in the Staff Rules and Regulations of the Community,
and such other persons as the Executive Secretary may designate from time to time.
ARTICLE 8
Experts on Mission for the Community
1.	 Experts (other than officials coming within the scope of
Article 7 performing missions for the Community) shall be accorded such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of
their functions during the period of their missions, including the time spent
on journeys in connectinn with their misssions. In particular, they shall be
accorded:
97.
(a) immunity from personal arrest or detention as well as any
official interrogation and from inspection or seizure of
their personal bag4ege except where he is caught in the
actual commission of an offence and the member state concezned
shall immediately inform the Executive Secretary.
(h) in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by
them in the course of the performance of their mission,
immunity from legal process shall continue to be accorded
notwithstanding that the persons concerned are no longer
employed on missions for the Community.
(c) inviolability for all official correspondence.
(d) the same facilities in respect of exchange restrictions
as are accorded to representatives of foreign governments
on temporary official missions. .
2.	 Privileges and immunities are granted to experts in the interests
of the Community and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves.
The Executive Secretary shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity
of any expert in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede
the course of justice and it can be waived without prejudice to the interests
of the Community.
ARTICLE 9
Community Laissez-Passer
1. The Community may issue Community Laissez-Passer to its officials.
The Laissez-Passer shall be recognised and accepted as valid travel document
by the authorities of Member States.
2. The Community may conclude agreements for this Laissez-passer to be
recognised as valid travel documents within the territories of the Member States
of the OAU and within the territories of other countries.
ARTICLE 10
Settlement of Disputes
All disputes that may arise between the Community on the one
hand and a Member State on the other hand, regarding the interpretation
or application of this Convention shall be refdrred to the Tribunal of the
Community as established by Article 11(I) of the Treaty and the decision
of the Tribunal shall be final.
Intendant Militaire Mousse.
TONDI
Minister of Finance for and
on behalf of the Supreme
Military Council of the
Republic of Niger
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ARTICLE 11
1.	 This Convention shall enter into force provisionally
upon the signature of Heads of State and Governemnt and definitively
upon ratification by at least seven (7) signatory states in accordance
with the constitutional procedures applicable for each signatory State.
2.	 This present Convention shall be subject to ratification
and the instrument of ratification shall be deposited with the Executive
Secretary.
3.	 Any member State may accede to this Convention and the
Instrument of accession shall be deposited with the Executive Secretary.
IN FAITH, WHEREOF, WE THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN THE
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, HAVE SIGNED THIS CONVENTION.
DONE at Lagos this 22nd of April 1978 in single original in the English and
French languages both texts being equally authentic.
H.E. Colonal Mathieu KEREKOU
President of the Republic of Benin
H.E.Alhaji Sir Dauda K.
JAWARA
President of the Republic of
Gambia
H.E. Mr.Aristides PEREIRA
President of the REpublic of
Cape Verde
H.E.Major General George Yaw
BPALU
for and on behalf of the
Head of State and Chairman
of the Supreme Military
Council of the Republic of
Ghana
Mr. Ismael TOURE
Minister of the Economy and Finance
for and on behalf of the Head of State
and Commander-in-Chief of the People's
Revolutionary Armed Forces of the
Republic of Guinea
President Ahmed Sekou TOURE
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PROTOCOL OF NON-AGGRESSION
100.
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES
CONSIDERING that the Economic Community of West African
States, ,(hereinafter referring to as the "Community"), set up by virtue
of the Treaty of May 28, 1975, cannot attain its objectives save in an
atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among the Member States
of the Community.
RECALLING Article 2(4) of the United Nations Chatter which
provides that all Member States shall refrain, in their international relations,
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
independence of any State, or any other manner incnncistent with the purposes
of the United Nations.
RECALLING Article 3(3) of the Charter of the Organisation of
African Unity which provides for the respect of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each State and its inalienable right to independent existence;
RECALLING the Resolution of the Summit Meeting of Heads of
State and Government of the Community held in Lome on 5 November, 1976,
regarding the signing of an Annexed Protocol on non-recourse to force by
Member States of the Community:
AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
Member States shall, in their rletions with one another, refrain
from the threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other
means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organisation
of African Unity against the territorial integrity of political independence
of other Member States.
ARTICLE 2
Each Member State shA l 1 rofrain from committing, encouraging
or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or sggression against the
territorial integrity or political independence of the other Member States..
ARTICLE 3
Each Member State shall undertake to prevent Foreigners resident
on its territory from committing the acts referred to in Article 2 above
against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other Member States.
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ARTICLE 4
Each Member State shall undertake to prevent non-resident Foreigners
from using its territory as a base for committing the acts referred to in Article
2 above against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member-States
ARTICLE 5
1. Member States pledge to resort to all peaceful means in the
settlement of disputes arising among themselves.
2. Any dispute which cannot be settled peacefully among Member
States shall be referred to a Committee of the Authority. In the event of
failure of settlement by the aforementioned Committee the dispute shall
finally go to the Authority.
3. The composition and the mandate of the Committee referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall be decided upon by the Authority.
ARTICLE 6
(1) This Protocol shall come into effect provisionally
on signature by the Heads of State and Government,
and definitely on ratification by at least seven
signature States, in conformity with the constitutional
regulations of each Member State.
(2) This Protocol, as well as all the instruments of
Ratification, shall be deposited with the Executive
Secretariat who shall transmit certified true copies
of this Protocol to all Member States informing them
of the dates on which the Instruments of Ratification
have been deposited. The Protocol shall be registered
with the Organisations approved by the Authority.
(3) Any Member State may accede to this Protocol and the
instrument of accession shall be deposited with the
Executive Secretariat.
(4) This Protocol shall be annexed to and form an
integral part of the Treaty.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT
IN THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WHAT AFRICAN STATES HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL
DONE at Lagos this 22nd of April 1978 in single original in the English
and French languages both texts being equally authentic.
102.
PROTOCOL RELATING TO FREE MOVEMENT OF
PERSONS,RESIDENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT
103.
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES
RECALLING that sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 2 of Article 2
of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States calls on
Member States to ensure by stages the abolition of the obstacles to
free movement of persons, services and capital.
RECALLING also that paragraph 1 of Article 27 of the Treaty
of the Economic Community of West African States confers the status
of Community citizenship on the citizens of Member States, and also enjoins
Member States to abolish all obstacles to freedom of movement and residence
within the Community.
RECALLING further that paragraph 2 of Article 27 of the Treaty of
the Economic Community of West African States further calls on Member States
to exempt Community citizens from holding visitor's visa and residence permits
and allow them to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities
within their territories.
CONVINCED of the need to spell out in this Protocol the various
stages to be undergone to accomplish complete freedom of movement as
envisaged by sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 2 of Article 2 and Article 27
of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States:
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
PART II
Definition
ARTICLE 1
In this Protocol:
"Treaty" means the Treaty of the Economic Community of West
African States.
"Council of Ministers" means the Council of Ministers established
by Article 6 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States.
"Executive Secretary" means the Executive Secretary of the
Economic Community of West African States.
"Commission" means the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary
and Payments Commission established by Article 9 of the Treaty of the Economic
Community of West African States.
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"Community" means the Economic Community of West African
States.
"Member State" or Member States" means a Member State or Member
States of the Economic Community of West African States.
"A citizen of the Community" means a citizen of any Member State,
"A valid travel document" means a passport or any other valid
travel document establishing the identify of the holder with his photograph,
issued by or on behalf of the Member State of which he is a citizen and on
which endorsement by Immigration and emigration authorities may be made.
A valid travel document shall also include a laissez-passer issued
by the Community to its officials establishing the identify of the holder.
PART II
General Principles on Movement of Persons, Residence and
Establishment
ARTICLE 2
1. The Community citizens have the right to enter, reside and
establish in the territory of Member States.
2. The right of entry, residence and establishment referred to
in paragraph 1 above shall be progressively established in the course of
a maximum transitional period of fifteen (15) years from the definitive
entry into force of this Protocol by abolishing all other obstacles
to free movement of persons and to the right of residence and establishment.
3. The right of entry, residence and establishment which shall be
established in the course of a transitional period shall be accomplished in
three phases, namely:
Phase I	 - Right of Entry and Abolition of Visas
Phase II	 - Right of Residence
Phase III	 - Right of Establishment
4. Upon the expiration of a maximum period of five (5) years from
the definitive entry into force of this Protocol the Commission, based upon
the experience gained from the implementation of the first phase as set out
in Article 3 below, shall make proposals to the Council of Ministers for
further liberalization towards the subsequent phases of freedom of residence
and establishment of persons within the Community and these phases shall be
dealt with in subsequent Annexes to this Protocol.
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PART III
Implementation of the First Phase : Abolition of Visas
and Entry Permit
ARTICLE 3
1. Any citizen of the Community who wishes to enter the territory
of any other Member States shall be required to possess valid travel document
and international health certificate.
2. A citizen of the Community visiting any Member State for a period
not exceeding ninety (90) days shall enter the territory of the Member State
through the official entry point free of visa requirements. Such citizen shall,
however, be required to obtain permission for an extension of stay from the
appropriate authority if after such entry that citizen has cause to stay for
more than ninety (90) days.
ARTICLE 4
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 above, Member States
shall reserve the right to refuse admission into their territory any Community
Citizen who comes within the category of inadmissable immigrants under its laws.
PART IV
Movement of Vehicles for the Transportation of
Persons
ARTICLE 5
In order to facilitate the movement of persons transported
in private or commercial vehicles the following provisions shall apply:-
1. Private Vehicles.
A private vehicle registered in the territory of a Member
State may enter the territory of another Member State and
remain there for a period of ninety (90) days upon presentation
of the documents listed hereunder to the competent authority of
that Member State:-
(i) Valid driving licence.
(ii) Matriculation Certificate (Ownership Card) or Log Book.
(iii) Insurance Policy recognised by Member States.
(iv) International Customs carnet recognised within the
Community.
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2. Commercial Vehicles.
A commercial vehicle registered in the territory of a
Member State and carrying passengers may enter the
territory of another Member State and remain there for
a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days upon presentation
of the documents listed hereunder to the competent authority
df that Member State:-
(i) Valid driving licence.
(ii) Matriculation Certificate (Ownership Card) or Log Book.
(iii) Insurance Policy recognised by Member States.
(iv) International customs carnet recognised within the
Community.
During the period of fifteen (15) days the commercial motor
vehicle shall however not engage in any commercial activities within the
territory of the Member State entered.
PART V
MiScellaneous Provisions
ARTICLE 6
Each Member State shall deposit at the Executive Secretariat .
specimen of travel documents defined in Article 1 in the present Protocol
with a view to communicating them to all Member States.
ARTICLE 7
Any dispute that may arise among Member States regarding the
interpretation or application of this Protocol shall be amicably settled
by direct agreement. In the event of failure to settle such disputes,
the matter may be referred to the Tribunal of the Community by a party
to such disputes and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final.
ARTICLE 8
Any dispute that may arise among Member States regarding the
interpretation or application of this Protocol shall be amicably settled
by direct agreement ,in the event of failure to settle such disputes, the
matter may be referred to the Tribunal of the Community by a party to
such disputes and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final.
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ARTICLE 8
1.	 Any Member State may submit proposals for the amendment or
revisionzof this Protocol.
2.	 Any such proposals shall be submitted to the Executive
Secretary who shall communicate them to other Member States not later
than thirty days after the receipt of such proposal. Amendments or
revisions shall be considered by the Council of Ministers after Member
States have been given one month's notice thereof.
a
ARTICLE 9
Member States undertake to cooperate among themselves by
exchanging information on such matters that are likely to affect the
effective implementation of this Protocol. Such information will also
be sent to the Executive Secretary for necessary action in accordance
with the provisions of the Treaty.
ARTICLE 10
The provisions of this Protocol shall not operate to the
prejudice of citizens of the Community who are already in residence and
establishment in a Member State provided they comply with the laws in
general and in particular the immigration laws of that Member State.
ARTICLE 11
1.	 A decision to expel any citizen of the Community from the
territory of a Member State shall be notified to the citizen concerned
as well as the government of which he is a citizen and the Executive
Secretary of ECOWAS.
2.	 The expenses incurred in the expulsion of a citizen shall
be borne by the Member State which expels him.
3.	 In case of expulsion the security of the citizen concerned
as well as that of his family shall be guaranteed and his property protected
and returned to him without prejudice to his obligations to third party.
4.	 In case of repatriation of a citizen of the Community from the
territory of a Member State, the Member State shall notify the government of
the state of origin of the citizen and the Executive Secretary.
5. The cost of repatriation of a citizen of the Community from
the territory of a Member State shall be borne by the citizen himself or
in the event that he is unable to do so by the country of which he is a
citizen.
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ARTICLE 12
The provisions of the present Protocol shall not affect more
favourable provisions contained in agreements that have already been
concluded between two or among several Member States.
PART VI
Final Provisions : Deposit and Entry into Force
ARTICLE 13
1.	 This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally upon
signature by Heads of State and Government of Member States and definitely
upon ratification by at least seven signatory States in accordance with
the constitutional procedures applicable for each signatory state.
2.	 This Protocol and all the instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the Executive Secretariat which shall transmit certified
true copies of this Protocol to all Member States and notify them of the
dates of deposits of the instruments of ratification and shall register
this Protocol with the Organisations : as the CoUncil'shall determine.
3.	 This Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form an integral
part of the Treaty.
IN FAITH WHEREOF, WE THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF
• THE COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL.
DONE at Dakar this 29th Day of May 1979 in single original in the
English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.
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SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL OF RECTIFICATION OF THE
FRENCH TEXT OF THE PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF PRODUCTS ORIGINATING
FROM MEMBER STATES OF ECOWAS
110.
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES
CONSIDERING that certain rectification should be made to the
French text of the Protocol relating to the definition of the concept
of products originating from Member States and ECOWAS signed at Lome
on the 5th day of November 1976.
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
Definition
The last paragraph of Article 1 of the French text of the
Protocol relating to the definition of the concept of products originating
from Member States-of ECOWAS and especially defining "Value-added"
is rectified below to agree with the English text.
"Value-added" means the difference between ex-factory price of
the finished product including subsidies if any, less local taxes and duties,
and the c.i.f, value of the material imported from third countries and used
in the production.
ARTICLE 11
Deposit and Entry into Force
1. This Supplementary Protocol and rectification shall enter
into force upon signature by Heads of State and Government of Member
States and definitively upon ratification by at least seven signatory
states in accordance with the constitutional procedures applicable for
each signatory state.
2. This Supplementary Protocol and all instruments of ratification
shall be deposited with the Executive Secretariat which shall transmit
certified true copies of this Supplementary Protocol to all Member States
and shall register this Supplementary Protocol with the Organisation of
African Unity, the United Nations and such organisations as the Council
determine.
3. This Supplementary Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form an
. integral part of the Treaty.
IN FAITH THEREOF, WE THE HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENT OF THE
THE COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES HAVE SIGNED THIS SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL.
DONE at Dakar this 29th day of May, 1979, in single original in the English
and French languages both texts being equally authentic.
SUPPLEMENTARY PRMOCOL AMENDING PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF
PRODUCTS ORIGINATING FROM MEMBER STATES
112.
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES
CONSIDERING the Protocol relating to the definition of
products originating from Member States and especially Article II of
the Protocol.
CONVINCED that the concept of ex-factory price before tax derives
from the manufacturing process and is therefore a more appropriate factor
to be used as the basis for the determination of the contributions of the
resources from the Community to the value of a finished product than the
concept of FOB price.
DESIRING to conclude a supplementary Protocol amending the Protocol
relating to the definition of products originating from Member States.
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
Rules of Origin of Community Goods.
Article 11(i) (c) of the Protocol is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"If the goods have been produced from material of a foreign
or undetermined origin and having received in the process
of production a value added of at least 35% of the ex-factory
price before tax on the finished product; and"
(ii)	 Article II (3) of the Protocol is amended to read as follows:
"Any conditions of acceptance of goods originating in Member
States for Community trade may be reviewed periodically by the
Council who shall determine the elements that constitute the
ex-factory price before tax of a finished product and those
that constitute value added."
ARTICLE II
Deposit and Entry into Force
1.	 This Supplementary Protocol shall enter into force provisionally
upon signature by Heads of State and Government of Member States and definitively
upon ratification by at least seven signatory States in accordance with the
constitutional procedures applicable for each signatory State.
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2. This Supplementary Protocol and all instruments of ratification
shall be deposited with the Executive Secretariat which shall transmit
true copies of this supplementary Protocol to all Member States and notify
them of the dates of deposits of the instruments of ratification and shall
register this supplementary Protocol with the Organisation of
African Unity, the United Nations and such organisations as the Council
shall determine.
3. This Supplementary Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form
an integral part of the Treaty.
IN FAITH WHEREOF WE THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES HAVE SIGNED THIS SUPPLEMENTARY
PROTOCOL.
DONE at Dakar this 29th day of May, 1979, in single original in the
English and French languages both texts being equally authentic.
Signed
H.E.Colonel Mathieu KEREKOU
President of People's Republic of
Benin
_Signed
H.E.Mr.Aristides PEREIRA
President of the Republic of
Cape Verde
Signed
H.E. Mr. Felix HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY
President of the Republic of
the Ivory Coast.
Signed
H.E.Alhaji Sir Dauda K.JAWARA
President of the Republic of
Gambia
Signed
H.E. General Frederick William
Kwasi AKUFFO
The Head of State and Chairman
of the Supreme Military Council
of the Republic of Ghana
Signed
H.E. Dr. Lansana BEAVOGUI
Prime Minister
For and on behalf of the Head of
State and Commander-in-Chief of
the People's Revolutionary Armed
Forces. President of the People's
Revolutionary Republic of Guinea
Signed
H.E. Mr. Moulaye MOHAMED
Minister of Finance and Commerce
for and on behalf of the Chairman
of the Military Committee of
National Redemption of the
Islamic Republic of Mauritania
Signed
H.E.Lt.Col.Seyni LOUNTCHE
Head of State and Chairman of the
Supreme Military Council of the
Republic of Niger
Mr.Luiz CABRAL
President of the Republic
of Guinea-Bissau
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Signed	 Signed
H.E.General Olusegun OBASANJO
Head of the Federal Military Government
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Nigeria.
Signed	 Signed
HE. General A.Sangoule LAMIZANA
President of the Republic of
Upper Volta
H.E. Mr.Leopold Sedar SENGHOR
President of the Republic of Senegal
Signed
	
Signed
H.E. Dr.William R.TOLBERT,Jr.
	
H.E. Dr.Siaka STEVENS
President of the Republic of
	
President of the Republic of Sierra
Liberia	 Leone
Signed
H.E. General Moussa TRAORE
Chairman of the Military Committee
of National Liberation
President of the Republic of Mali
H.E. General Gnassingbe EYADEMA
President of the Republic of Togo.
